

TITANIC



THE LIFEBOAT LAUNCHING SEQUENCE
A NEW STUDY

BY
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*With revisions to our & George Behe's original (2001 and onward) Re-Examination,
and commentary on other lifeboat timelines.*

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Preceding spread: The scene as Collapsible D reaches the water, just minutes before *Titanic* takes her final plunge. (HFX Studios.)

Above: This image shows the scene as Boat No. 8 pulls away from *Titanic*'s side, while Boat No. 6 hangs alongside C Deck, waiting for Major Peuchen to climb in. Boat No. 4 hangs beside A Deck on the left. Below, the portholes along E Deck are submerging. (HFX Studios.)

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INTRODUCTION

In 1912, the British Inquiry into the *Titanic* disaster came up with a complete analysis of when each lifeboat left the ship during the sinking. Over the decades that followed, their findings were largely accepted as gospel, though occasionally a historian, author or enthusiast would suggest that certain details in the court's findings were inaccurate. It was not until 2001 that an entirely fresh analysis of the evidence was placed before the public, based on far more data than the inquiries had available to them in 1912. It was named '*Titanic: The Lifeboat Launching Sequence Re-Examined*', written by Bill Wormstedt, Tad Fitch and George Behe. This was originally published in the *Titanic* Historical Society's *The Titanic Commutator* No. 155 in 2001, and was put online shortly afterwards at <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/lifeboats.htm>.

In our 2001 analysis of the lifeboat launch sequence, our team took a holistic approach to the subject. We compiled as much evidence as we could possibly find, comparing eyewitness statements from across the spectrum, simultaneously factoring in multiple angles of study; among these were observed angles of list and trim throughout the sinking, the timing of the firing of the rockets, and a whole host of other data. In short, we attempted to take as many disparate lines of evidence as we could find, compare the data with other lines of analysis, and see what the results indicated. We did not set the article up as the final word on the matter; indeed, we have made minor additions to it over time as more evidence has come to light, including new information from Sam Halpern and J. Kent Layton, refining certain details where the new data has suggested the need for such alterations.

Between 2001 and 2023, this lifeboat launch timeline has been examined, and nearly universally adopted, by numerous historians and authors. It was included in the book *Report into the Loss of the SS Titanic: A Centennial Reappraisal*. Indeed, that timeline proved nearly impossible for others to 'break'. Even our own research into producing the manuscript for *On a Sea of Glass*, and the later 2021 real-time sinking animation into the sinking with HFX Studios based on that book, showed that the launch timeline really held up quite well even when viewed in 3D, as a series of simultaneous events playing out on different sides of the ship viewable from any angle at any point in the sequence.

In early 2023, Samuel Halpern, a colleague with whom we have worked for many years, released a public challenge to our article's findings. On the one hand, our findings agree in these key areas:

1. The launch time of the first boat to leave *Titanic*, No. 7, at 12:40 a.m.
2. The launch time of the first rocket fired from *Titanic*, 12:47 a.m.
3. The launch times of Boats Nos. 5, 3, and 1.

4. The launch time of Boat No. 16
5. The launch time of Boats Nos. 2 & 10.
6. The launch time of the last rocket fired from *Titanic*, 1:52 a.m.
7. The launch times of Collapsibles C and D, and of the times that Collapsibles A & B floated off the deck

However, Halpern’s article also disagreed with our previous findings in these key areas:

1. The launch times and launch sequence for Boats Nos. 6 and 8.
2. The launch times for Boats Nos. 9, 11, 13, and 15
3. The launch times and launch sequence for Boats Nos. 12 and 14.
4. The launch sequence relationship between Boat No. 9 on the starboard side and Boat No. 14 on the port side, a vital area of consideration.
5. The launch time of Boat No. 4.

In narrowing the focus of his research from a broad-spectrum analysis to align multiple points of evidence, to one where he focused on a narrower range of analysis – subjective reports of observed list and trim – and then plugging a selection of these observations into a regression curve analysis – Halpern arrived at these key differences. We believed, and advised Halpern prior to the release of his article, that this narrow-spectrum approach was a serious mistake, and that his conclusions in these key areas of difference were incorrect. We wanted to spare a long-term colleague the discomfort of a public debate and the need for us to issue a rebuttal, as well as avoid creating a needless rift within the *Titanic* community.

Halpern’s work followed in the wake of a third launch sequence by Ioannis Georgiou (published in a series of articles between 2012-2016), another colleague of ours of many years; this sequence disagreed both with the British Inquiry’s, ours and with Halpern’s. In fact, many aspects of these three opposing lifeboat timelines are completely incompatible with the others. (*See table on page 8.*)

To our surprise, once Halpern released his article with the differing launch timeline, an opposition group formed, one which was rabidly opposed to our work; while we are perfectly comfortable with other researchers disagreeing with our findings, these individuals made snide, unprofessional comments in online *Titanic* forums about the general quality of our research. At every attempt that we make in public forums and social media pages to steer readers back toward our work, which we believe remains more accurate, these individuals have loudly made light of our findings and, since we disagreed with their conclusions, made comments, such as saying: “If they would have shared any

Comparison of Three Separately Developed Lifeboat Lowering Timelines						
Time	British Inquiry Sequence (1912)		Halpern Sequence (2023)		Georgiou Sequence (2016)	
	Port	Starboard	Port	Starboard	Port	Starboard
12:40am				Boat #7		Boat #7
12:45am		Boat #7		Boat #5		Boat #5
12:47am	Rockets first fired					
12:50am						
12:55am	Boat #6	Boat #5	Boat #6	Boat #3	Boat #6	Boat #3
1:00am		Boat #3				Boat #1
1:05am			Boat #8	Boat #1		Boat #9
1:10am	Boat #8	Boat #1				Boat #11
1:15am				Boat #9		Boat #13
1:20am	Boat #10	Boat #9	Boat #16		Boat #8	
1:25am	Boat #12	Boat #11	Boat #12	Boat #11		Boat #15
1:30am	Boat #14		Boat #14	Boat #13	Boat #16	
1:33am				Boat #15		
1:35am	Boat #16	Boat #13 and #15			Boat #12	
1:40am		Coll. C			Boat #14	
1:45am	Boat #2		Boat #2		Boat #10	
1:50am			Boat #10		Boat #2	
1:52am	Last rocket fired					
1:55am	Boat #4		Boat #4		Boat #4	
2:00am				Coll. C		Coll. C
2:05am	Coll. D		Coll. D		Coll. D	
2:10am						
2:15am						
2:17am			Coll. A & B washed off.			Coll. A
2:18am					Coll. B	
2:20am	Coll. B	Coll. A				

of this with me beforehand, I would have saved them the embarrassment of publishing the type of garbage that they have accused others of doing,” and even that our work “is not what serious researchers do.”

The situation grew worse in early 2024 after *Titanic: Honor & Glory* adopted the Halpern sequence in their revised real-time sinking animation for the anniversary. A particular ‘hotbed’ of nastiness formed on the official Facebook group page for Encyclopedia Titanica, where one of their own moderators joined in making derogatory comments about our lifeboat launch sequence and championed the Halpern/THG livestream timeline as the first ‘thoughtful’ approach to the subject yet performed.

Since we have been aware that the Halpern sequence – supported by Georgiou, despite their own sequences not agreeing with each other – adopted by THG for their 2024 livestream are demonstrably incorrect, we have continued to point those with an interest in the subject to our own work. In response to some of our public statements, Halpern has claimed that we were setting ourselves up as Walter Lord’s ‘final arbiter’ of events on the night of the disaster, as if our claims were motivated by ego. Quite the contrary, we have been simply working to get reliable information into the hands of the public and have always been willing to amend or revisit our own conclusions in light of new evidence.

After considering the Halpern evidence, and doing further research of our own while preparing the revised fourth edition text of *On a Sea of Glass*, we are more convinced than ever that the Halpern lifeboat sequence is mistaken on a number of key details, as is the prior analysis proffered by Ioannis Georgiou. The time has now come for us to dispassionately and professionally present the evidence that shows why our original analysis on these matters remains the most solidly-grounded one.

However, far from claiming to be the ‘final arbiter’ of matters on the disaster, we are also going to show a few areas where recently-discovered evidence has led us to revise our own findings to improve the quality of our work. *Titanic* is always showing us something new. The more we study, the more we all learn.

Up front, we will list a number of our key finds. Further down in the article, we will point to evidence to support each of these finds.

1. Boat No. 8 launched before Boat No. 6;
2. Boat No. 9 was without a doubt launched after Boat No. 14;
3. The aft port boats launched in the order: 16, 14, 12, 10;
4. Boat Nos. 9 and 11 launched closer together than we concluded in our previous work. This takes on added significance, when considering a significant amount of new evidence supporting that No. 11 began lowering at 1:35 a.m.;

5. Boats Nos. 13 and 15 launched a few minutes earlier than our previous conclusion that they lowered at 1:40 and 1:41 a.m., respectively, and closer to when Boat No. 11 lowered away, at 1:35 a.m.;
6. The launch of Boat No. 2 should likely be set forward slightly, to about 1:41-1:42, from our earlier assigned time of 1:45;
7. The Halpern timeline created irresolvable personnel-movement contradictions; these contradictions disprove his arguments by placing the same individual in very different spots at the same times;
8. The Halpern timeline claimed that inquiry testimony is more reliable than eyewitness accounts given in personal letters or carried in newspapers. However, Halpern also ignored (or claimed that a number of accounts given in the inquiries that went against his theory were mistaken) because they were inconvenient to the premise; simultaneously, and quite disingenuously, he happily gave credence to reports carried in newspapers when the evidence agrees with his revisions. On the other hand, we balance both inquiry testimony and *reliable* newspaper or written accounts by survivors, taking as much evidence as possible into account.
9. The basis for the Halpern timeline (list/trim of the ship during sinking) is too narrow a basis for serious analysis of the subject, because such angles of list and trim were observations of a non-technical nature, often by eyewitnesses unfamiliar with basic nautical terminology and technical details; as such, these reports were subject to either interpretation or the same types of errors and contradictions as all eyewitness recollections are;
10. Only a broad-spectrum analysis of events, using as many data points from as many eyewitnesses as can be obtained, can create reliable findings on timing and sequence, as these tend to 'cancel out' errors in single individuals' recollections.

SECTION 1:

Did Boat No. 8 or No. 6 depart first?

The variance: Our launch sequence has No. 8 departing first at 1:00 a.m., and No. 6 departing second at 1:10 a.m. Halpern placed No. 6 departing first at 12:55 a.m., and No. 8 departing second at 1:05 a.m.

Of *Titanic's* 20 lifeboats, there are few which are as difficult to determine the launch sequence of than Boat Nos. 8 and 6. There is a significant amount of conflicting evidence related to these boats, and a careful analysis is required in order to glean the truth. In our original lifeboat article, we broke with tradition, concluding the evidence supported Boat No. 8 having begun lowering first at 1:00 a.m. and that Boat No. 6 began lowering at 1:10 a.m. This was a departure from the British Inquiry, which concluded that Boat No. 6 was the first boat to leave the forward-port side, followed by No. 8. Their conclusion was mainly based on the testimony of Lookout Frederick Fleet, who said that No. 8 was loaded after No. 6. When asked, "Did you see any lowered before No. 6?" responded: "No, sir."¹ Yet our decision to break with the findings of the British Inquiry in our original paper was not undertaken lightly.

Indeed, the confusion about which of these two boats was lowered first was perhaps first noted by First Class passenger Colonel Archibald Gracie, who researched the sinking for his book. He concluded: "Lightoller's testimony shows it [No. 6] could not have been the first ... Notwithstanding Seaman Fleet's testimony ... I think she [No. 8] must have preceded No. 6."² This conclusion is noteworthy because Lightoller and Gracie had conversed at length aboard *Carpathia*, and later appeared to be in lockstep on most issues related to the sinking. Gracie was also here breaking with the findings of the British Inquiry.

Part of the confusion surrounding Nos. 6 and 8 may stem from the fact that Boat No. 4 was lowered down *without passengers* to the Promenade Deck by Second Officer Lightoller with the intention of loading it from there. After having it tied-off to the coaling wire that ran under A Deck, in case a list developed, efforts to load Boat No. 4 were abandoned until later, when the enclosed Promenade windows could be opened. All of this happened before Boat Nos. 8 and 6 were loaded and lowered,³

¹ Am. 363

² Gracie, Archibald, *The Truth About the Titanic*, Chapter 6, 1913.

³ Br. 13831-13834.

and could have given some survivors the impression that a boat had lowered away prior to Nos. 6 and 8, since it was no longer in sight along the edge of the Boat Deck. However, work on Boat No. 4 does not explain accounts of individuals helping with, or seeing the crew load passengers into and lower away a lifeboat prior to, loading and lowering Boat No. 6. Nor does it explain people who reported seeing boats actually *in the water* prior to when No. 6 lowered away.

Second Officer Lightoller gave some conflicting evidence about No. 8 and No. 6 in the inquiries. At the American Inquiry, Lightoller described Boat No. 6 as the “fourth boat.” In his testimony, he was specifically referencing filling and lowering other boats prior to this “fourth boat”.⁴ In his testimony there, he referred to each boat not by number, but as the “first boat,” “second boat,” etc., leaving much room for confusion. Lightoller may have been referring to No. 6 as the “fourth boat” from the front of the ship, behind the Bridge, on that side, as it was located behind No. 2, Collapsible D, and No. 4. Whatever his terminology, Lightoller was clearly referring to No. 6 when he was asked about the “fourth boat,” since he mentioned sending First Class passenger Major Arthur Peuchen down the falls to help man the boat – this unquestionably happened at Boat No. 6. While No. 6 was clearly not the fourth boat lowered on the forward port side, this also indicates that Lightoller felt it wasn’t the first lowered, either, since he described three other boats being filled and departing before this boat.⁵

Of note, Lightoller also testified that he preferred to send two sailors in each boat, but that he could not at No. 6 because he “was getting short of men.” He also stated that “I could only find one seaman,” since “it is absolutely necessary to have a seaman on each fall” on deck and he could find no others nearby, other than the two men standing by the davits.⁶ It seems highly unlikely that there would already have been an extreme shortage of sailors at No. 6 if it really was the first boat in this area to lower, as opposed to other boats departing prior, as Lightoller testified.⁷

To confuse matters, in his British Inquiry testimony, Lightoller – after describing how he first lowered No. 4 to A Deck – was asked what the next boat was. He replied that it was No. 6. Then, after being asked, “And the next one?” he responded: “As far as I remember, No. 8.”⁸ Although his answers were correct responses to the leading questions he was being asked, they were also a clear contradiction of his earlier testimony that Boat No. 6 was the ‘fourth boat’, since in this stretch of testimony, No. 6 could have been described as the ‘second’ boat.

⁴ Am. 78-80.

⁵ Am. 78-80.

⁶ Am. 80.

⁷ Thank you to Arun Vajpey for bringing this detail to the authors’ attention.

⁸ Br. 13831-13842

Lightoller's testimony referring to "first boat", "second boat", etc., using those vague terms, opens the door to an issue facing anyone trying to dissect the terminology. The question is: what did any particular individual mean by "first boat" – "first" in relation to what? Did they mean the launch sequence, i.e., it was the 'first boat [to lower], second boat [to lower]', etc.? Or were they referring to the "first boat" counting from the bow of the ship behind the Bridge, "second boat" behind the Bridge, and so forth? Or might it be that someone was referring to the "first boat" that was just outside the door where they came on deck – a description of a perception that literally depended on their route to the deck? Is it even possible that definitions of the recollections from different people referring to "first boat", "second boat", and so forth, could actually be a mix between these various definitions, depending on who was telling the story? If so, the possibilities for confusion are endless, and we must pay strict attention to context from each eyewitness before drawing conclusions.

A prime example of this has to do with Major Arthur Peuchen's recollections. Peuchen gave extensive testimony at the American Inquiry, and also detailed accounts which ran in newspapers before his testimony was offered. Let's start with his testimony under oath. Proceeding up to the Grand Staircase, he emerged on the Boat Deck, and described the situation there:

Maj. PEUCHEN. ... I saw the boats were all ready for action; that is, the covers had been taken off of them, and the ropes cleared, ready to lower. This was on the port side. I was standing near by the second officer [Lightoller], and the captain [Smith] was standing there as well, at that time. The captain said - I do not know whether it was the captain or the second officer said - "We will have to get these masts out of these boats, and also the sail." He said, "You might give us a hand," and I jumped in the boat, and we got a knife and cut the lashings of the mast, which is a very heavy mast, and also the sail, and moved it out of the boat, saying it would not be required. Then there was a cry, as soon as that part was done, that they were ready to put the women in; so the women came forward one by one. A great many women came with their husbands.

Senator SMITH. Just a second, before you come to that. What number boat did you get into?

Maj. PEUCHEN. I got into - I think it was - the first large boat forward on the port side, and I imagine, from the way they number those boats, the emergency boat is 2, and the first large one is 4, and the next one is 6. I am not sure about that.

Senator SMITH. Beginning to count from the forward end?

Maj. PEUCHEN. From the forward end; from the bow.

Senator SMITH. On the port side?

Maj. PEUCHEN. On the port side. This was the largest lifeboat - the first large

lifeboat toward the bow on the port side. They would only allow women in that boat, and the men had to stand back.

Senator SMITH. Was there any order to that effect given?

Maj. PEUCHEN. That was the order. The second officer stood there and he carried out that to the limit. He allowed no men except the sailors, who were manning the boat, but there were no passengers that I saw got into that boat.

Senator SMITH. How many sailors?

Maj. PEUCHEN. I am not sure, but I imagine there were about four. As far as my memory serves me, there were about four. I was busy helping and assisting to get the ladies in. After a reasonable complement of ladies had got aboard, she was lowered, but I did not see one single passenger get in that first boat.

Senator FLETCHER. You mean male passenger.

Maj. PEUCHEN. Yes; male passenger.

Senator SMITH. Did you see any attempt to get in?

Maj. PEUCHEN. No; I never saw such order. It was perfect order. The discipline was splendid. The officers were carrying out their duty and I think the passengers behaved splendidly. I did not see a cowardly act by any man.

Senator SMITH. Was the boat safely lowered?

Maj. PEUCHEN. The boat was loaded, but I think they could have taken more in this boat. They took, however, all the ladies that offered to get in at that point.

Senator SMITH. Was the boat safely lowered?

Maj. PEUCHEN. Oh, very; the boat was safely lowered.

Senator SMITH. Who was in it that you know of?

Maj. PEUCHEN. I should say about - I do not know - I imagine about 26 or 27. There was room for more.

Then, as soon as that boat was lowered, we turned our attention to the next.⁹

Here, Peuchen is describing activity around a single lifeboat. He emerged on deck, was asked by the officers to help, got into the boat and helped clear the mast and sail from it, got back onto the deck, helped load women in, and saw the boat lowered safely away before he and those with them turned their attention “to the next [boat]”. The question now becomes: what boat did Peuchen assist at, and that he was referring to here? The boat in question must meet several criteria:

⁹ Am. 334.

1. Captain Smith and Second Officer Lightoller had to have been present.
2. Once Peuchen had helped to clear the boat, the boat was actually loaded with women.
3. The Second Officer had allowed no men into the boat, but had put about four crewmen in.
4. The boat was subsequently safely lowered with about 26-27 individuals.

Clearly, Peuchen could not have been referring to Boat No. 4, which was the second boat behind the Bridge, and the forward-most “large boat”. That boat had been lowered to A Deck devoid of passengers prior to Peuchen arriving in the area, and would not be loaded until far later in the evacuation, after the windows to the Promenade Deck had been opened.¹⁰ Only after that fiasco, and the temporary abandonment of work on No. 4, had attention been focused on Boats Nos. 6 and 8. Clearly, Emergency Boat No. 2 is not a viable candidate, either, as that boat would not be launched until much later in the evacuation, and it was always swung out over the side of the ship ready for launch at short notice. It also was not a “large” boat. Nor could Peuchen have been referring to boats in other areas of the deck, since he clarified that his observations were on the port side only, and the aft section of boats would not launch until later on. By the process of elimination, we are left with two choices: Boat No. 6 and Boat No. 8.

Could Peuchen have been referring to No. 6, the next boat aft of No. 4? No, because he saw this boat lowered away, and only *then* did these men turn their attention “to the next [boat]”. This “next” boat, as we shall soon see, was the lifeboat he eventually ended up in: No. 6.

We have now eliminated all boats but Boat No. 8 as a possible candidate for the boat that Peuchen helped at when he arrived on deck. Does No. 8 meet the criteria outlined above? Yes.

1. Both Captain Smith and Second Officer Lightoller were reported at Boat No. 8.
2. Women were loaded into Boat No. 8 before it was lowered away from the deck, unlike No. 4.
3. There were four crewmen – two Able Bodied Seamen [ABs], a cook, and a steward – who have been identified as leaving in No. 8.¹¹
4. Boat No. 8 is known to have lowered away with 27 aboard, exactly what Peuchen estimated.¹²

¹⁰ This is a revised finding since the release of *On a Sea of Glass: The Life & Loss of the RMS Titanic*, Editions 1-3. In that text, we misinterpreted Peuchen’s movements, and this correction will be included in future revisions of the book.

¹¹ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Lifeboat_Project_Survivors.html

¹² <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/occupancy.pdf>

Interestingly, some might object at this point that Peuchen said that this boat was “the first large boat forward on the port side”. Counting from the bow, the forwardmost large lifeboat would be Boat No. 4. However, we have already eliminated No. 4 as a candidate, because it was not loaded with women from the Boat Deck, and was not loaded at all until much later. Remember, however, that we already pointed out the possibilities for confusion with terms like “first boat”, “second boat”, etc. Since No. 4 is not a candidate, is there any chance that we might be able to find out what Peuchen meant here? Yes, because although he was obviously confused about boat numbers, he also said that the lifeboat in question “was the largest lifeboat - the first large lifeboat *toward the bow* [authors’ emphasis] on the port side.” Only an unreasonably strict interpretation of his earlier statement, not accounting for his second statement’s slightly different wording, would force this in the direction of the impossible: Boat No. 4.

Why is the wording of Peuchen’s second statement so important? Because Peuchen arrived on the port side of the Boat Deck from the Entrance, at the top of the forward First Class Grand Staircase. Exiting the door from the Entrance on the port side, which faced aft, Peuchen would have had to turn to his right to get to the forward lifeboats, all of which were forward of the Entrance. Boat No. 8 was quite literally *the first large lifeboat toward the bow* from that location. Quite literally, it would have been the first large lifeboat that he encountered as he walked forward from the Entrance. This interpreta-

Below: This image shows the scene as Major Peuchen emerged from the First Class Entrance on the port side and turned toward the bow. Boat No. 8 is the first, or closest, lifeboat to where he is standing. (HFX Studios)





Above: This image shows the forward port lifeboats as they sat along the edge of the ship at about the time that Major Peuchen arrived on the scene. No. 8 is closest to the viewer, No. 6 forward of that, No. 4 lowered to A Deck toward the bow, and Emergency Boat No. 2 all the way forward, just behind the port Bridge wing. (HFX Studios)

tion allows for harmonization between Peuchen's testimony and known events, while allowing for perspective and a bit of confusion regarding numbering.

If our conclusion is so far correct, then we can test the theory by answering the next question: what boat did Peuchen go to next? Let's resume our consideration of his testimony.

Maj. PEUCHEN. ... Then, as soon as that boat [No. 8] was lowered, we turned our attention to the next.

I might say that I was rather surprised that the sailors were not at their stations, as I have seen fire drill very often on steamers where they all stand at attention, so many men at the bow and stern of these lifeboats. They seemed to be short of sailors around the lifeboats that were being lowered at this particular point. I do not know what was taking place in other parts of the steamer.¹³

Interestingly, Peuchen's description here of a shortage of sailors after the first boat left seems to match Lightoller's recollection about being short of men while working on No. 6. Peuchen went on to de-

¹³ Am. 334-335.

scribe an incident where a “very powerful” officer had driven a large group of “about 100 stokers” who were crowding around the boats “right off the deck”. This was apparently a reference to Chief Officer Wilde, who was taller than all of the other officers. Based on the wording of Peuchen’s testimony, this event had apparently happened when he had first arrived on the Boat Deck, before loading Boat No. 8. In other words, Peuchen’s testimony was not chronological, and in referencing this event, he had jumped backward to before No. 8 had been loaded. Then Peuchen continued his narrative:

... I had finished with the lowering of the first boat from the port side [No. 8]. We then proceeded to boat No.2 or No.4 or No.6; I do not know which it is called [the “next” boat he had previously referred to].¹⁴

It was at this point that Senator Smith interrupted Peuchen to ask a clarifying question. Unfortunately, the interruption and the exchange that followed has caused endless confusion, even for ourselves. It was not until recently that we were able to unravel the meaning of exchange, and why it did not mean what we have long thought it meant. The following quotation of testimony will include bracketed boat numbers to make clear what was being referred to:

Senator SMITH. You had stepped into the boat [Boat No. 8] to assist in lowering it?

Maj. PEUCHEN. Yes; and then got out of it [No. 8] again.

Senator SMITH. And you stepped out of it [No. 8]?

Maj. PEUCHEN. I only got into the boat [No. 8] to assist in taking out the mast and the sail.

Senator SMITH. I understand. Then you got out [of No. 8] again?

Maj. PEUCHEN. Then I got out [of No. 8] again, and I assisted the ladies into the boat [No 8]. We then went to the next boat [No. 6] and we did the same thing - got the mast and the sail out of that. There was a quartermaster in the boat [Hichens], and one sailor [Lookout Frederick Fleet], and we commenced to put the ladies in that boat. After that boat had got a full complement of ladies, there were no more ladies to get in, or if there were any other ladies to get in they did not wish to do so, because we were calling out for them - that is, speaking of the port side - but some would not leave their husbands.

Senator SMITH. Do you know who they were?

Maj. PEUCHEN. I only saw one or two stand by who would not get in. Whether they afterwards left them I can not say, but I saw one or two women refuse to get in on that account.

¹⁴ Am. 335.

Senator SMITH. Did you see any woman get in and then get out because her husband was not with her?

Maj. PEUCHEN. No, I do not think I did. I saw one lady where they had to sort of pull her away from her husband, he insisting upon her going to the boat and she did not want to go.

The boat [No. 6] was then lowered down, and when it got -

Senator SMITH. (interposing) Pardon me a moment. How many were put into this second boat?

Maj. PEUCHEN. I did not know at the time of the lowering, but as I happened to be a passenger [of this boat, No. 6] later on, they were counted and there were exactly 20 women, 1 quartermaster, 1 sailor, and 1 stowaway that made his appearance after we had been out about an hour.

Senator SMITH. Twenty-three all together?

Maj. PEUCHEN. Twenty-three all together; before I was a passenger.¹⁵

For decades, we had mistakenly believed that Peuchen was referring to a third boat that he helped to prepare for lowering. However, having removed Boat No. 4 from the equation earlier, and then carefully re-reading his testimony in a fresh light, we were not only able to ascertain the identity of his “first boat”, No. 8, but were then able to show where a question about his actions in No. 8, after he had already started speaking about the “next” boat, No. 6, had created the potential for misunderstands of his testimony.

In thinking that Peuchen had worked at *three* boats, not two, we had long believed that he arrived on the Boat Deck and had first assisted in preparing Boat No. 4 for lowering to A Deck, before skipping back to Boat No. 8, and then assisting at and leaving in No. 6. Because of *our* longstanding misunderstanding of his testimony, Halpern and Georgiou have long assailed Peuchen as an unreliable witness, one who was very confused about what boats he was working at, in what order, and where they were located. Yet the misunderstanding was without a doubt ours, not confusion on Peuchen’s part. Clearly, Peuchen *testified* to having worked at only two boats: No. 8, which he helped prepare, load, and saw lowered away, and then No. 6, which he subsequently left in.

At this point, however, some might ask about Peuchen’s newspaper accounts, which seem to complicate what we have just sorted out. One takeaway from each of his newspaper interviews, however, is this: his story that *never wavered* that his own lifeboat, No. 6, was not the first boat lowered from that area of the deck. In his interview with the New York correspondent of the *Express*, he stated:

¹⁵ Am. 335-336.

I got into one boat [No. 8] because the crew were not there, and I took out a small sail and mast to make more room. Then I scrambled back to the deck and helped put women into boats [plural].

The third boat [No. 6] had been lowered sixty feet down the *Titanic's* side, when I noticed that there were twenty-two women in it and only two sailors.

He then described getting permission to climb down into this “third boat”, and stated: “The second officer of the *Titanic* gave me a written document in which he says ‘I commanded you to go into boat Number Six, to take a sailor’s position. You have not only proved yourself a good seaman, but a brave man.’”¹⁶

In a separate newspaper account, Peuchen repeated the story of his rescue, *again* stating that he helped load and lower a lifeboat prior to his own boat, No. 6, wherein he said that No. 6 was the “third boat.”¹⁷ In yet another account, Peuchen vividly described seeing the first boat lowered away prior to departing in No. 6, which he *again* called the “third boat”:

On deck the port side lifeboats were being swung out, but scratch crews were working them and there was much confusion. The sailors did not seem to know how to manage the boats. I got into one boat [No. 8] because there was no crew there and I took out the small sail and mast to make more room. Then I scrambled back to deck and assisted women into the boat [No. 8]. The first boat launched on the port side [No. 8] was not filled to capacity because there weren’t enough women about as it was being lowered. Orders were issued that no men should get in. It was pitiful to see wives leaving husbands and being lowered in a boat which could easily have held the husbands too.

The same thing happened with the second boat.

The third boat [No. 6] had been lowered sixty feet down the side when I noticed that there were twenty-two women in it and only two sailors.¹⁸

Peuchen then describes getting permission to enter this “third boat” boat, and going down the falls to board it.

It is noteworthy to see that in these three newspaper interviews, Peuchen said time and again that his lifeboat, No. 6, was *not the first one lowered away from the deck, filled with women and children*. How-

¹⁶ *The Canadian Gazette*, April 25, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

¹⁷ *The Toronto World*, April 20, 1912.

¹⁸ *The Sun*, April 20, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

ever, some might notice that he did refer to No. 6 as the “third boat” in each of these interviews. What are we to make of this, and how does it diverge from his testimony?

For starters, we already discussed the fact that the terms “first boat”, “second boat”, and so forth, can be tricky to sort out. In his *testimony*, Peuchen clearly referred to No. 8 as the first big boat on that quarter of the deck because it was the first boat he encountered as he moved forward from the Entrance on the port side, not because it was the first large boat aft of the Bridge. His testimony also indicates that No. 8 was the “first boat” in that it was the first boat to be filled with women and lowered away from that quarter of the deck. But in these accounts, was Peuchen referring to No. 6 as the “third boat” aft of the Bridge (i.e., 2, 4, 6, 8)? Or was he describing it as the “third boat to leave” that section of the deck? The former definition would suffice for two of the accounts, but in the third account he specifically mentions a ‘second boat’ leaving before his own boat left. Considering what we were able to learn from a fresh analysis of his testimony, there are a couple of options for interpretation:

1. In this third newspaper interview, Peuchen is quoted as saying that he worked at the “first boat”, which we have already defined as No. 8, and that he climbed *into* the “third boat”; we know that he left in No. 6. In that newspaper account, however, he did not specifically say that he had personally assisted at the “second boat”. He merely said that the same sequence of events had happened to the “second boat” as at the “first boat”, which we know was No. 8. Is it possible that he saw Boat No. 4 lowered from the edge of the deck, some feet away from where he was working at Nos. 8 and 6?
2. In this third interview, Peuchen was not quoted as saying that he had helped to load the boat that he eventually got away in, No. 6, which was termed the “third boat” in that interview. Even the standalone paragraph and lack of detail about the “second boat”, and the way it runs into the “third boat” story, seems out of place. Is it possible that the reporter misquoted or misunderstood Peuchen’s story – the story given in such a clear but disjointed manner at the inquiry – of loading and seeing No. 6 away from the deck before he was eventually told to get into that boat and help man it?

What is the answer? We simply can not say. However, we should not have to: Halpern claims to give more credence to inquiry testimony than newspaper interviews, so we should not be forced to conclude from these newspaper interviews that Peuchen was a bad witness on the witness stand. Nor does it necessarily follow that anyone can then make the leap to dismiss Peuchen’s consistent claims

that at least one lifeboat was loaded with women and children and lowered away before he helped to load and lower away Boat No. 6, which he eventually boarded. Simply because his testimony is inconvenient to the Halpern/Georgiou argument that No. 6 lowered first does not mean that Peuchen, and other eyewitnesses who support our conclusion, were wrong.

Ironically, in comments on the Encyclopedia Titanica message board, Halpern forgoes his opposition to press accounts, citing a single newspaper account which quotes Peuchen slightly differently than the above-listed inquiry testimony and interviews, presumably in an attempt to insert doubt about Peuchen's consistency as a witness. Halpern stated that "Randy Bryan Bingham [*sic*, Bigham] sent me a quoted account given by Major Peuchen to a reporter from the *Daily Express* that was printed in the April 20, 1912 *NY Herald European Edition*. Peuchen says that he got into the first boat that was lowered on the port side. He also admits it was his only chance to get away. For what it's worth." The Major stated the following in this particular account, which Halpern posted an image of:

The sailors did not seem to know how to manage the boats. I got into one boat because the crew were not there, and I took out a small sail and mast to make more room; then I scrambled back to the deck and helped put women into the boat. The first boat lowered on the port side was not filled to its capacity because there was not enough women about as it was being lowered, and orders were issued that no men should be allowed to get in.

It was pitiful to see wives leaving their husbands and being lowered into boats that could easily have contained more people. The same thing happened with the second boat. The first boat had been lowered sixty feet down the *Titanic's* side when I noticed that there were twenty-two women in it and only two sailors. I cried out:

'Oh, they cannot manage alone!'

Peuchen then described getting permission from Captain Smith to climb down into the boat. In short, Peuchen's reliability is inconvenient to Halpern's theory on which boat left first, No. 6 or No. 8; so while Halpern openly states that he considers newspaper interviews unreliable, especially compared to testimony given at the court, he simultaneously uses this article to sow doubt about the reliability of Peuchen's testimony and other accounts. It is hypocritical to suggest that a singular press account could somehow sow doubt on the entire body of evidence from Peuchen, detailed previously, including inquiry testimony.

Ironically, proof that this selective forwarding of evidence is misguided comes in the form of Peuchen's interview which appeared in *The Sun* on April 20, 1912. We included this account earlier in this section, but as a reminder to readers, it gives nearly identical quotes to the account cited by

Halpern on Encyclopedia Titanica's message board. The account from the *NY Herald European Edition*, referred to by Bigham and Halpern, leaves out important details which prove Peuchen was not stating he left in the first boat; this includes an alteration of the statement from Peuchen, from: "The third boat had been lowered sixty feet down the side when I noticed that there were twenty-two women in it and only two sailors,"¹⁹ to: "The first boat had been lowered sixty feet down..." completely altering the meaning.

As an aside, this sort of confusion about boat numbering, boat order, and launch order is seen time and time again in survivor accounts; this includes some of the survivor accounts cited in this article, such as the testimony of Hugh Woolner, who stated that Boat No. 6 was the "sternmost boat on the port side" at the time that Mrs. Candee boarded No. 6.²⁰ Indeed, we must wonder: was Woolner mistaken about No. 6 being the "sternmost boat" on that side, somehow missing No. 8 hanging just aft of it? Or does his statement actually imply that Boat No. 8 had already lowered away from the Boat Deck at the time? Neither scenario implies that Woolner was a liar, and if No. 8 had lowered away first, nor was he necessarily mistaken in referring to No. 6 as the "sternmost boat" in that area. Much of the confusion boils down to perspective: what a person saw, what direction they were coming from or going in, at what *point* in the process a person came on the scene and noticed something. As we have also seen, even in sworn testimony, confusion can arise when a story is told in a disjointed manner.

Although there is certainly room for further discussion about possible interpretations of Peuchen's newspaper interviews, the quality of the interviews, etc., there is one inescapable fact: a careful consideration of Peuchen's *testimony* shows that he helped at two lifeboats – the first of which we have identified as No. 8, and the second of which was No. 6 – before he left in Boat No. 6. To say anything beyond that is unsupported by the historical record.

Before we leave the subject of Peuchen's testimony, there is more that has been said about the veracity of his memory that should be addressed. There is also more that we can, in fact learn, from his statements when comparing them with the statements of others in the area at the time that Nos. 8 and 6 were being loaded and lowered.

Halpern makes much of the fact that Peuchen recalled that the "second officer stood there [at Boat No. 8] and he carried out that to the limit."²¹ He claims that since Lightoller was in charge of loading Boat No. 6 and Chief Officer Wilde was in charge of loading No. 8, that Peuchen's mention of Lightoller being present at No. 8 proves Peuchen did not see No. 8 lower away first. This argument does not stand up to scrutiny, however.

¹⁹ *The Sun*, April 20, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

²⁰ Am. 884.

²¹ Am. 34.

“ I went on deck. Lifeboats were being swung out on the port side, but only scratch crews were working them and there was much confusion. The sailors did not seem to know how to manage the boats. I got into one boat because the crew were not there, and I took out a small sail and mast to make more room.

“ Then I scrambled back to the deck and helped put women into the boats. The first boat lowered on the port side was not filled to its capacity because there were not enough women about as it was being lowered, and orders were issued that no men should be allowed to get in. It was pitiful to see wives leaving their husbands and being lowered in a boat which could have easily contained more people.

NECESSARY AID.

“ The same thing happened with the second boat. The third boat had been lowered sixty feet down the Titanic's side when I noticed that there were twenty-two women in it and only two sailors. I cried out, ‘ Oh, they can't manage alone.’

Above: This contains the pertinent portion of Peuchen's account, as given in *The Sun* on April 20, 1912. Although the quote here varies slightly in punctuation, paragraph breaks, and subheading placement, from that in the *New York Herald European Edition* shown on the next page, they largely match, and were clearly from the same interview. (Authors' Collection.)

trunk. I went on deck. Lifeboats were being swung out on the port side, but only scratch crews were working them, and there was much confusion.

Confusion at Boats.

“The sailors did not seem to know how to manage the boats. I got into one boat because the crew was not there, and I took out a small sail and mast to make more room; then I scrambled back to the deck and helped put women into the boat. The first boat lowered on the port side was not filled to its capacity because there were not enough women about as it was being lowered, and orders were issued that no men should be allowed to get in.

“It was pitiful to see wives leaving their husbands and being lowered into boats that could easily have contained more people. The same thing happened with the second boat. The first boat had been lowered sixty feet down the Titanic’s side when I noticed that there were twenty-two women in it and only two sailors. I cried out: ‘Oh, they cannot manage alone!’

Above: This contains the pertinent portion of Peuchen’s account, as given less accurately in the *New York Herald European Edition* on April 20, 1912. Notice that the highlighted segment has been changed completely from *The Sun’s* version. This reproduction of his quote also uses “crew were not there” instead of “crew was not there”, and “can’t manage” instead of “cannot manage”. While these two variations are acceptable grammatically, the change from “third boat” to “first boat” is a drastic editorial error. (Authors’ Collection.)

In fact, although Wilde, along with Captain Smith, was overseeing the loading of No. 8, Lightoller was also involved in the process of loading that boat at least at some point. For his own part, Lightoller – although clearly confused about which boat was which – testified: “If it was No. 8 that the Chief Officer came to” that he left the *lowering* of that boat to Wilde. However, Lightoller did not deny being involved in the *loading* process at No. 8. In fact, it seems almost certain that he was involved in the loading process there, then moved along to No. 6 after his superior arrived.²²

Where had Wilde been? Peuchen himself likely gave the answer when he described the very strong officer, which we have already identified as likely being Wilde, having to drive a large group of stokers away from the scene around these boats. Peuchen specifically recalled that officer driving them right off the deck. While Wilde had been engaged in that effort, Lightoller had likely stuck around No. 8 to help the loading process until his superior returned. Once Wilde had finished that work, Lightoller apparently moved on to No. 6.

Indeed, Lightoller’s presence at No. 8 is verified by more than one other witness. First Class passenger Caroline Bonnell described seeing Captain Smith giving directions through a megaphone as they waited to board No. 8, and noted that “subordinate officers [plural] were rushing to and fro.”²³ Of the possibilities, these officers could only have been Wilde *and* Lightoller, since Murdoch, Pitman, Boxhall, Lowe and Moody were occupied elsewhere at the time. Indeed, her description of ‘rushing to and fro’ could play into what Wilde was involved in, moving stokers away from the area; if Lightoller moved aft to assist at No. 8 in Wilde’s absence, and subsequently left to go forward to work on No. 6 before the loading of No. 8 had been completed, once Wilde had returned, this certainly would fit the description of *officers* rushing *to and fro*.

Furthermore, First Class passenger Margaret Swift, who was also saved in No. 8, specifically mentioned Lightoller being present at the loading of that boat, stating: “The second officer, who had been so kind to us at the time we left the *Titanic*, was one of those who went down with the vessel, but he, too, came to the surface.”²⁴

Additionally, Able Bodied Seaman Thomas Jones mentioned both Wilde and “the first officer,” who he said was “running around there,” at Boat No. 8. Jones did not know the officer’s name, stating, “I had never been with these people before.”²⁵ However, since Murdoch was engaged on the starboard side at that time, it seems all but certain that Jones was referring to Lightoller, who was photographed

²² Br. 13929-13931. Ironically, fellow historian, researcher, and author George Behe came to this same conclusion about Lightoller’s movements, based on this same stretch of testimony, and completely independently of our own work. (*Titanic: The Long Night*, by George Behe, currently unpublished.)

²³ *Youngstown Vindicator*, April 19, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

²⁴ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, April 19, 1912.

²⁵ Am. 571.

in Queenstown still wearing the uniform insignia of a First Officer, due to the last-minute rank shuffle at Southampton. Indeed, multiple eyewitnesses who did not know Murdoch and Lightoller by name succumbed to ‘rank confusion’ during the evacuation because of the insignia that the two men still wore. Incredibly, Margaret Swift got his rank correct when Seaman Jones did not.

What all of this shows is that there is no reason to suspect any dishonesty in Peuchen’s accounts, simply because he doesn’t agree with Halpern’s conclusion that Boat No. 6 was the first lifeboat lowered away on the forward-port side. Interestingly, in agreement with Peuchen’s testimony, Quartermaster Robert Hichens, who left in Boat No. 6, testified:

1185. Could you tell us how many boats had got away before you?

- I think there were two on the port side, but how many on the starboard side I could not tell you.

1186. On the port side you think there were two before you?

- Yes, Sir.²⁶



Hichens, who was sitting at the tiller in command of Boat No. 6, must have seen Boat No. 8 lowered away just behind him, and must also have noted the absence of Boat No. 4 on the Boat Deck ahead of their boat, since it had already been lowered to A Deck. Here Hichens contradicted Look-out Fleet’s testimony about which lifeboat

²⁶ Br. 1185-1186.

Left: This image shows Second Officer Lightoller (center) and First Officer Murdoch (right) at the E Deck gangway door at Queenstown, Ireland on April 11, 1912. Several crewmen stand behind them on the left side of the image. Notice that Lightoller’s uniform retains the two bands indicating the rank of a First Officer. (Authors’ Collection.)

went first; however it's possible that Hichens' perch at the tiller may have afforded him a better view of No. 8's lowering behind them than Fleet, who testified that he was up forward in the boat, and who was photographed in the bow of the boat as Boat No. 6 approached *Carpathia*.²⁷

Amongst passengers, beyond Peuchen, eyewitness accounts are mixed about whether Boat No. 8 or No. 6 departed first. However, even here the evidence for No. 8 going first is persuasive. For example, First Class passenger **Mary Eloise Smith**, stated in her affidavit for the American Inquiry that she refused to get into the first boat lowered on the port side, but was forced by her husband into the second:

When the first boat was lowered from the left-hand side I refused to get in, and they did not urge me particularly; in the second boat they kept calling for one more lady to fill it, and my husband insisted that I get in it.²⁸

Smith was rescued in Boat No. 6. Skeptics might suggest that her "first boat" was No. 4 being lowered to A Deck, but the fact is that no passengers were placed in it before it lowered from the Boat Deck to A Deck; thus, there would have been no opportunity for her to "refuse to get in" it. She was clearly describing a boat lowered from the port ("left") side, filled with passengers, prior to No. 6 lowering away. In this, her account harmonizes beautifully with Peuchen's. In fact, Peuchen's description of the woman who refused to be parted from her husband, but who subsequently left in Boat No. 6, matches Mary Eloise Smith's story precisely; it seems that he was directly witnessing their experiences without the benefit of knowing their identities.²⁹

Interestingly, in an earlier account, Eloise described her departure as follows, reinforcing the conclusion that Boat No. 6 was not the first boat lowered away from this quadrant of the Boat Deck:

He [Lucian P. Smith] hurried me to the side of the first boat that was already loading and about to be lowered. He urged me to get into it and he pulled away a man who was already clambering in and held him back with one hand while he lifted me with the other over the gunwale.

I struggled ... because I saw that Lucies [*sic*] meant to remain behind himself. I was still clinging to my husband and the officer who was helping him to separate us when the command came for the boat to go, I flung myself back upon my husband and moments later the lifeboat was lowered.

²⁷ Am. 326.

²⁸ Deposition of Mary Eloise Smith in the American Inquiry, May 20, 1912.

²⁹ Am. 335.

My husband dragged me a little way toward where the second boat was filled with women. He put both hands upon my shoulder and said: "Sweetheart, I want you to go in the boat. I can't go with you, but you must go. There's [a] small chance that the ship will go down anyway. I'll be safe enough, little girl, and if I find I'm not, why I'll come on one of those other life boats [sic] in plenty of time. But you've got to go for your father's sake - he'd want to know that you didn't take any risks."

But I still wouldn't go, and kept my arms about his neck. Then the ship listed - and there came a great slant in the deck toward starboard and toward the bow. The man who was in charge of sending off the second lifeboat ran from the side of it to where we were standing and tried to separate us.³⁰

Eloise was forced to leave in Boat No. 6. This account clearly reinforces the conclusion we were able to draw from her affidavit: that she saw a boat loaded and lowered prior to No. 6, and had nearly been forced into it. She clearly was not mistaking that boat, No. 8, with No. 4, which was already lowered empty of passengers to A Deck. How can we be sure? Because she had been on A Deck with a group of people waiting to board the boats from that deck and knew they could not be loaded into a boat there, due to the Promenade windows being closed; subsequently, the crew ordered the passengers to return to the Boat Deck. Apparently the couple first approached No. 8, where she refused to be parted from Lucian, and she subsequently left in No. 6.³¹ Of note, Mrs. Smith also observed a starboard list while she was at Boat No. 8, before being taken to No. 6. More conclusions on this vital point will be drawn regarding this later on in this article.

First Class passengers Isidor and Rosalie Ida Straus were alongside Boat No. 8 as it loaded. Mrs. Straus helped her maid, **Ellen Bird**, board the boat, before climbing in herself. She then had second thoughts, stepping back onto the Boat Deck. Bird later described these events to Sylvester Byrnes, the general manager of R.H. Macy & Co.:

Mr. Straus stepped aside when *the first boat was being filled* [authors' emphasis], explaining that he could not go until all the women and children had been given

³⁰ *Public Ledger*, April 24, 1912. Reproduced in *Gilded Tragedy, West Virginia's Titanic Widow*, by Brandon Whited, 2019. A nearly identical version of this account was published several days previously, in the *Uniontown Morning Herald* on April 20, 1912. In that printing, it is specified: "The following graphic account...was telegraphed to Pittsburgh last night by *The Herald's* New York correspondent and transmitted later to us by long-distance telephone. It is absolutely authentic." Thank you to Brandon Whited for pointing this out.

³¹ Amer. 1149.

places. ‘Where you are, Papa, I shall be,’ spoke up Mrs. Straus, rejecting all entreaties to enter the boat.³²

Bird was very specific that the Strauses refused to be parted as “the first boat was being filled”; she was later rescued in that “first boat ... being filled”, Boat No. 8. Her statements thus make it clear what definition of the term “first boat” she was using: the first boat to load and lower from that section of the deck. **Bedroom Steward Alfred Crawford**, who also left in Boat No. 8, described witnessing this same tragic scene in his inquiry testimony, confirming that these events occurred at Boat No. 8:

Mrs. Isidore [*sic*, Isidor] Straus and her husband were there, and she made an attempt to get into the boat first. She had placed her maid in the boat previous to that. She handed her maid a rug, and she stepped back and clung to her husband and said “We have been together all these years. Where you go I go.”³³

Crawford’s observation that Mrs. Straus had put her maid in a lifeboat, which was No. 8, and which Bird termed “the first boat ... being filled”, before refusing to be separated from her husband, helps to build the case that No. 8 was being loaded before No. 6. This ties in closely with the evidence from Eloise Smith and Major Peuchen.

Further evidence in agreement with this comes from First Class passenger **Helen Candee**, who was rescued in Boat No. 6. She gave the following account:

In a corner against a wall stood the beautiful old couple [Isidor and Ida Straus], calm spectators. “Come, let us help you into the life-boat,” they said to the woman. “I stay with my husband,” she answered simply, her head on his arm. And in death these two were not divided.

The order came to my group, “Put the lady in that life-boat [No. 6].” The boat was designated by a pointing finger. We advanced.

“No men allowed near the boats!” The two men, stung at the implied cowardice, jumped away from me. The little boat was empty.³⁴

³² Mowbray, Jay Henry, *The Sinking of the Titanic*, Ch. 17, 1912.

³³ Am. 827.

³⁴ Handwritten account from Candee, held in the Paris Museum of Letters and Manuscripts, courtesy of George Behe.

Not only was Candee familiar with the Strauses, but she also specified that No. 6 didn't even have any passengers in it at the point when Ida Straus refused to board No. 8, which as already discussed, was then being loaded. Importantly, if No. 6 had left ten minutes before No. 8, as Halpern postulates, it would have been almost impossible for Candee to see the Strauses part at No. 8.

As mentioned previously, **Quartermaster Hichens** testified that two boats had lowered away prior to his boat, No. 6. Ironically, in a rare, later account, he provided further proof of this, when he described seeing the Strauses refuse to part:

There were about nine millionaires on board whose combined bank balances must have amounted to about £120,000,000. But money did not count that night. Money could not buy life. Millionaires stood shoulder to shoulder with ordinary men, gazing at the sullen water that appeared ever nearer as the ship's list grew more pronounced.

One of them was Mr. Isidor Straus, who with his wife became known to everybody on board as "Darby and Joan." It was their proud boast that during all their married life they had never been separated, even for a day. They were standing on deck, held affectionately in each other's arms. They were not afraid. They were only waiting with calm resignation to see what would happen. An officer asked Mrs. Straus to get into a boat, but she refused.³⁵

If Hichens – who left in Boat No. 6 – personally witnessed this scene, which played-out at Boat No. 8, this is further proof that Boat No. 6 departed after No. 8. Why? Because according to Halpern, No. 6 lowered away a full 10 minutes before No. 8, and in that scenario Hichens would not have been in a position to see this scene after he had left. Hichens' account of the Strauses is consistent with that of Candee and the other witnesses.

Another First Class passenger, **Martha Stone**, gave a particularly compelling account. She described what happened prior to her departure in Boat No. 6:

I made my way up to the boat deck, thinking that I would reassure myself and my maid. Up there I found men of the crew beginning preparations to launch the lifeboats, and I knew then the accident was serious. I went back to my cabin and threw on my heaviest clothes, because the weather was bitterly cold.

Back to the boat deck then, and *we found that one boat had been launched. I looked down to the water and I could see empty spaces in that first boat* [authors' emphasis]. There

³⁵ *The Kerryman*, May 11, 1935. Courtesy of George Behe.



were men standing around the boat deck, but there was no panic, no confusion - everything was proceeding so quietly that it was hard to appreciate the seriousness of the situation. [*Scene illustrated opposite in our animation, courtesy HFX Studios.*]

I was guided to a place in the second boat, and a moment later they began to lower it. There were twenty-two women in that boat, and one man - a steward, who was in command. The boat's capacity was marked as '50,' [*sic: they could hold 65*] but it needed no designation to make clear the fact that valuable space was being wasted in that boat, while men were standing on the deck above whose lives might have been saved. It was nothing but a death lottery, in which lives were sacrificed without reason.³⁶

Stone then went on to criticize the performance of the crew in lowering the boats, stating: "First one end and then the other would be tilted up until the little boat would be swinging almost vertical." She also witnessed Peuchen climbing down the falls into her boat, No. 6.³⁷ Stone gave another account in which she again stated: "I was in the second boat that put off."³⁸

Stone's accounts are inarguable evidence that No. 8 left before No. 6. She recounted not only seeing another lifeboat down *in the water* before No. 6 lowered away (not just *lowering* away, or *missing* from the Boat Deck like Boat No. 4 was), but she also took note of there being some empty seats in it. This is a clear reference to Boat No. 8 – which left with just 27 of its 65 seats occupied – being *in the water* (not lowering away, but actually in the water) *before* No. 6 lowered away. Also important is the fact that she recalled that she was "in the second boat that put off"; when coupled with her clear reference to another lifeboat, clearly No. 8, leaving first, a harmonious picture emerges.³⁹ The picture she paints meshes beautifully with the testimony of Peuchen, Eloise Smith, and others, indicating that No. 8 was in the water before No. 6 lowered away.

First Class passenger **Rose Amelie Icard**, who was Martha Stone's maid, was also rescued in Boat No. 6. She concurred with her employer about it being the second boat:

Amelie Icard, Mrs. Stone's maid, told of how she begged the steward who managed the launching of *the second boat* [authors' emphasis] to allow some of the men standing on the deck to get into the boat, but without success.⁴⁰

³⁶ *New York Tribune*, April 20, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ *The Enquirer* (Cincinnati), April 20, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

³⁹ <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/occupancy.pdf>

⁴⁰ *New York Tribune*, April 20, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

In Halpern's lifeboat articles, he concludes that Boat No. 6 was lowered at 12:55 a.m. and that Boat No. 8 began lowering at 1:05 a.m. As such, he only mentions Stone's account of seeing a boat in the water in passing, and mixed in with a list of other accounts which counter his conclusion, yet with little notice paid to the implications of these. The simple fact is: it is highly unlikely that Stone could have been mistaken about seeing a boat afloat in the water with empty spaces, which clearly implies there were people aboard.

Ioannis Georgiou, in an effort to downplay Stone's account – since it is one of the areas where his own conclusions in his lifeboat articles happen to agree with Halpern – stated the following on Encyclopedia Titanica's message board on 03/21/23: "Sounds to be Boat No. 4 which was the first 'lowered' but only to A deck." This is a ludicrous argument at best, since Stone clearly described looking over the side of the ship, seeing a boat *in the water* and that there were empty seats in it. She did not describe a boat hanging near A Deck with no occupants. The Georgiou claim distorts what Martha Stone actually said.

Another survivor, Third Class passenger **Fahim Al-Za inni** (on the White Star Line list as Lenni Fabini, commonly known as Phillip Zenni) gave compelling evidence that indicates Boat No. 8 departed prior to Boat No. 6. Al-Za inni was perhaps the first Steerage passenger to board a lifeboat, having gotten up to the Boat Deck relatively early in the sinking. In a sober account that does not paint his own actions in a very flattering light, he described his escape:

When I reached the upper deck I found it pretty well crowded. The first life-boat just was getting ready to lower away. I walked up to this and tried to get in, but the officer on duty said 'Stand back, women and children go first.' I did so. But as there seemed to be no great desire on part of many of the favored ones to get into the boat I tried again. This time the officer said, 'Try that again and I'll blow out your brains.' The sight of a revolver made me think that he meant business and so I took his advice. During this time the first boat was lowered and put away. It was not full by at least ten or a dozen.

The second boat was at once gotten ready. I was still standing close to the rail, watching developments. The *Titanic* was sinking so rapidly that I could feel it settling under me. I feared that we were going to the bottom and I determined to get away if possible. As the second life-boat was being filled, the officer turned for a moment to attend to a woman and child. At that moment I took a desperate chance and leaped across the few intervening feet into the boat. No one saw me, at least there was raised no objection and I was soon safe under one of the seats.⁴¹

⁴¹ *Youngstown Vindicator*, April 27, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

Al-Za inni gave another account, repeating the same story, but more briefly. He reiterated that he got into the first boat that was lowered away, but was forced out of it, before sneaking into the second boat to lower away.⁴² Why are his accounts important? Because Al-Za inni was rescued in Boat No. 6, which he referred to as the ‘second boat’ to lower away.⁴³ Multiple eyewitnesses mentioned an “Italian” stowaway coming up from under the seats of No. 6 once that boat was afloat.⁴⁴ Al-Za inni also gave an account specifically mentioning a lady in his boat who had her dog with her; this was Elizabeth Rothschild, who was rescued in No. 6; he even remembered seeing a man in the boat later refuse to help her take the dog up the ladder to *Carpathia*.⁴⁵

First Class passenger Mary “Zette” Douglas, rescued in Boat No. 6, apparently witnessed Al-Za inni being thrown out of Boat No. 8 at gunpoint, corroborating his statements that he attempted to leave in another boat, prior to sneaking into No. 6:

Another passenger jumped into a boat, near the one she was in, and landed on the legs of an old lady. A steward or petty officer, who was in that boat, put a revolver to the man’s temple, and was going to shoot him when the daughter of the lady he had injured begged for his life.⁴⁶

Douglas’s reference to an “old lady” and her “daughter” in No. 8 may have been identifying First Class passenger Elizabeth Bonnell, who was 61, and her niece Caroline Bonnell, who was 30, although this is not certain. If so, neither seems to have complained about Al-Za inni landing on Elizabeth.⁴⁷

Al-Za Inni’s accounts are hard to dismiss. His accounts of being thrown out of a boat, which subsequently lowered away before he snuck into No. 6 are very specific. That boat he described being lowered away before No. 6 could only have been Boat No. 8.

Some survivors gave contradictory statements in different accounts, or at least they were quoted this way by reporters. One example is First Class passenger May Futrelle, who gave conflicting accounts of the sinking. Those who believe Boat No. 6 lowered prior to No. 8 might selectively point out that Futrelle stated the following, in one of her 1932 accounts:

⁴² *The Dayton Evening Herald*, June 13, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁴³ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Al-Za%20nni_Fahim.html

⁴⁴ Am. 336-337; Am. 365. Major Peuchen, for example, mentioned “1 stowaway that made his appearance after we (Boat No. 6) had been out about an hour,” and “this stowaway, an Italian...” Frederick Fleet testified “We had a stowaway.”

⁴⁵ *Dayton Evening Herald*, June 13, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁴⁶ *The Evening Journal* (Ottawa), April 22, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁴⁷ Another possibility would be that Douglas mistook First Class passengers Ella White, 55, and Marie Young, 36, both of whom were in No. 8, as mother and daughter. However, this seems less likely.

The orders came to go up upon [*sic*] deck. I was in the first group of women up.

The captain and Mr Wild [*sic*, Wilde], the chief officer, launched the first boat, No. 6...We were ordered into the boat. I hung back and slid out of the group, having some idea that I could help my husband's chances of getting into a boat if I stayed with him.

Many people have asked why Capt Smith let that first boat get away with only 24 women in it, when it could have taken 65. It has been said that he intended to put more people into the boats after they had been lowered to the water's edge. But I heard him say, as the boat was lowered, "Row to that steamer, discharge your passengers and come back."⁴⁸

Despite this specific account being more cognizant than some of her other accounts, and many details of her survival in it being verifiable through other lines of evidence, there are concerns with her statements about Boat No. 6 leaving first.

In a 1912 account, Futrelle does not name this boat as No. 6, instead recounting the following:

The officers quickly launched boats on the port side. This, however, was not done with official sanction. All boats on the starboard side were sent away by order of the captain. I stood right beside Capt. Smith and the first officer as he ordered the first boat away - I mean the first boat officially sanctioned.

Futrelle goes on to again describe Smith giving the order to row for the light.⁴⁹ The wording suggests that the boat she saw lowered was not the first on the port side, but the first that she believed was "officially sanctioned" to leave, although it is not clear why she believed that these boats left without permission.

Interestingly, in another 1932 account, Futrelle, who maintained that she remained on the port side during the entirety of the sinking, until boarding Boat No. 9, also claimed to have seen multiple boats lowered away, unsanctioned:

I got on deck and saw there was a crowd of people. There was no panic, no confusion, although the boat had begun to tilt downward. Stokers came running up from the hold. We knew that the damage was serious...All of the women and men were ordered to A deck, which is below the boat deck. At that time some of the boats had

⁴⁸ *Daily Boston Globe*, April 17, 1932. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁴⁹ *Boston Herald*, April 17, 1932. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

already pushed off. I do not know who were in them, but they had gone without being full; they had been sneaked away – they were the sneak-boats.⁵⁰

Futrelle's individual accounts tend to vary in details, and must be cross-referenced with her other accounts, and indeed, the accounts of other survivors, to find areas where she was consistent and her claims are supported by other evidence. For example, it can be established within certainty, both from Futrelle's latter-day accounts, as well as the evidence of others, that she was rescued in Boat No. 9.⁵¹ However, in one of her 1912 accounts, she states that she was saved in a starboard side boat, which she names as "No. 14."⁵² Clearly, she was mistaken about the boat numbers, before later learning that she was actually saved in No. 9.

Could this confusion over the boat numbers have led her to misidentify another boat as No. 6, which she described as "the first boat"? There is some evidence that she may have. In her 1932 account, she states that Captain Smith and Chief Officer Wilde were involved in the loading of the boat she identified as No. 6, and that Smith ordered those in the boat to row for the lights on the horizon. As will be seen later, Smith gave this order to the crew in Boat No. 8, not No. 6. Indeed, the testimony suggests that Second Officer Lightoller gave this order to those in No. 6, before it started to lower, not the captain. (See the section "The Order to Row for the Light" for details regarding this.) Additionally, while Smith was at least briefly involved in the loading of No. 6, he was more involved at No. 8, helping man a davit during the lowering. There is no evidence to support that Wilde was involved in the loading of No. 6. Both of these details make it possible that Futrelle may have simply misidentified Boat No. 8 as No. 6, although the contradictory nature of her recollections regarding this, make it difficult to say with certainty. Any way you slice it, however, Futrelle's mention of Boat No. 6 can not be taken as proof that No. 6 was lowered away before No. 8.

Another prime example of contradictory statements given by survivors, are the accounts of Edith Chibnall. Chibnall, who was rescued in No. 6, was quoted as saying that she and her daughter Elsie Bowerman were rescued in the first boat launched.⁵³ Yet in a more detailed account, Chibnall was quoted differently, stating that they "were in one of the first three boats to leave the vessel."⁵⁴ What are we to make of this apparent contradiction?

In situations where a survivor's own statements contradict each other, it is useful to have another eyewitness corroborate the actions or observations of that individual. In an interesting coincidence,

⁵⁰ *The Miami Metropolis*, May 4, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁵¹ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Futrelle_Lily.html

⁵² *Seattle Daily Times*, April 22 & 23, 1912. Courtesy of George Behe.

⁵³ *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, April 19, 1912.

⁵⁴ *New York Herald*, April 19, 1912.

First Class passenger Carrie Chaffee's account provides exactly this sort of insight regarding Chibnall and Bowerman, even though Chaffee herself was rescued in a later boat, possibly Boat No. 11 or No. 4.⁵⁵ Chaffee, who was interviewed by reporters at her son's house, described seeing the first port lifeboat lowered away:

In a cabin across the hall were an English woman and her daughter [Chibnall and Bowerman]. I heard the daughter leave and go up on deck. Presently she returned. We learned from her that the passengers were to get up on deck...

... On the deck there was no excitement whatever. In the first lifeboat that left the ship there were only twenty persons, although it was intended to carry at least thirty-five. It remained at the edge of the deck for ten minutes, with people in it, before it was lowered.

Although there was no excitement among the passengers, there was absolutely no order of action among the crew. I don't know who was in charge. Not a single man knew his place. There had been no boat drill from the time we left England. In the first boat the oars were manned by dining room stewards, who knew nothing about rowing, which the women had to do.⁵⁶

Of note, Chaffee did not state that she saw Chibnall and Bowerman in this "first boat" to leave, which was apparently No. 8. Since she had just seen Chibnall and Bowerman, this omission suggests that she had seen Boat No. 8, not No. 6, lower away first, because Chibnall and Bowerman were rescued in No. 6. Beyond that supposition, the detail about this "first boat" being manned by "dining room stewards" strongly suggests that the first boat Chaffee saw lower away was No. 8. There is no evidence that there were any stewards in Boat No. 6, but there were one or more in Boat No. 8; First Class passenger Ruth Taussig stated there were four stewards aboard, while Gladys Cherry said there were two stewards. Bedroom Steward Alfred Crawford was one of the stewards in No. 8. He also noted the presence of a cook in his boat.⁵⁷

In some cases, even individuals who were in the same party and left in the same boat did not agree on the order of the boats. For example, First Class passenger **Albina Bassani**, the maid to Emma Bucknell, was rescued in Boat No. 8. She stated the following:

⁵⁵ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Chaffee_Carrie.html

⁵⁶ *Evening Tribune*, April 23, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁵⁷ <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/occupancy.pdf>

Mrs. Bucknell and I were among the first of the survivors to leave the *Titanic*. After I had seen her safely put into the lifeboat, I went into it too. We were the fifth and sixth passengers to get aboard; four other women had preceded us.

When our lifeboat, which [*sic*] was the first to leave the ship, was rowed away there were 30 women and four sailors aboard.⁵⁸

By contrast, Bucknell, who was also rescued in No. 8, stated that she “was put in the second lifeboat from the bow,” (Boat No. 8 was actually the farthest aft of the forward port boats) and that “*Titanic* was settling rapidly by that time, although we were the second lifeboat to cast off.”⁵⁹ In another interview, Bucknell described No. 8 as “the second to leave the ship...”⁶⁰ Despite these statements, Bucknell gave another interview in which she gave details supporting that Boat No. 8 was the first boat lowered level with the deck and loaded with women:

Instead of having the lifeboats ready to be lowered and filled in two minutes as required by the law, it took at least ten minutes to untie the small cords that were around the lowering ropes, the men not even having knives with which to cut away the small lashings. While waiting for the boats to be freed I walked down to the end of A deck saloon and took a glass of water, and returned and stood still several minutes before the boat was lowered to the level of the A deck [*sic*, Boat Deck], from which all the women were handed into the lifeboat.⁶¹

Ironically, First Class passenger Margaret Brown, who was rescued in Boat No. 6, seems to have confirmed Bassani’s version of events. Brown stated the following:

We found the lifeboats there were being lowered from the falls and were at that time flush with the deck. Madame DeVallier [*sic*, Berthe Antonine Mayné] of Paris, appeared from below in a night dress and evening slippers with no stockings, over which she wore a woolen motor coat. She clutched at my arm and in a terrified voice said she was going below for her money and jewels.

After much persuasion I prevailed upon her not to go down but to get into the boat [No. 6]. As she hesitated and became very excited, I told her it was all only a precau-

⁵⁸ *The Evening Herald*, May 17, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁵⁹ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 20, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁶⁰ *Atlanta Journal*, April 20, 1912.

⁶¹ *Atlanta Constitution*, May 5, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

tion and she would be able to return to the then-sinking steamer later. After she got on, I turned and found the lady of my party [Emma Bucknell] in a lowering boat [clearly No. 8].

Brown began walking away, to head to the other side of the ship, when she was grabbed and dropped “into the lowering life-boat” – the same boat she had just helped Berthe Antonine Mayné into, Boat No. 6.⁶² Since Mrs. Brown saw Emma Bucknell in a lowering boat prior to being forced into No. 6, this indicates that Bassani’s statement about Boat No. 8 lowering away first is correct.

Another instance where the terms “first boat”, “second boat”, etc., cause confusion surrounds First Class passenger Caroline Bonnell. Though rescued in No. 8, she stated that “our party went into the second boat launched on the port side.” This statement was apparently agreed upon by Bonnell’s cousin, Mary Wick, who was also saved in No. 8.⁶³ However, in a lengthier account, which Caroline Bonnell began writing aboard the *Carpathia* and then completed upon the arrival in New York, she stated the following:

The boat we were in was the second to be let down over the side, but the first to strike the water.⁶⁴

Did Bonnell mean that No. 6 started lowering prior to No. 8, but that somehow, perhaps when the crew stopped lowering No. 6 for Peuchen to climb down the falls, that No. 8 ended up striking the water first? Might she have been watching the process of the crew swinging the boats out and lowering them to the edge of the deck, meaning that No. 6 was the first lowered down ready for lowering, but that No. 8 was the first to be launched *and* reach the water? Or, could she have seen No. 4 lowered down to A Deck, making it appear as if No. 8 was the second lowered, but the first to reach the water? Any of these conclusions is plausible, and could be argued for, yet this much is clear: in this account, she was clear that No. 8 was launched first. Nor is the open-to-interpretation definition from her accounts strong enough to force a change between what we have already established regarding Nos. 8 and 6.

Another example is Hugh Woolner, who testified:

Mr. WOOLNER. I then took Mrs. Candee up onto the boat deck, and there we saw preparations for lowering the boats going on. My great desire was to get her into the

⁶² *Newport Herald*, May 28 & 29, 1912. We are grateful to Craig Stringer for pointing out this detail.

⁶³ *Youngstown Vindicator*, April 19, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁶⁴ *Decatur Review*, April 19, 1912. Reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic: Memories of the Maiden Voyage*, Behe, George (Lulu, 2011).

first boat, which I did, and we brought up a rug, which we threw in with her, and we waited to see that boat filled. It was not filled but a great many people got into it, and finally it was quietly and orderly lowered away.

Senator SMITH. What boat was that?

Mr. WOOLNER. That was the sternmost boat on the port side.⁶⁵

Mrs. Candee was rescued in Boat No. 6. However, Boat No. 6 was not the sternmost boat amongst the forward port lifeboats; instead, it was the second-from-aft in this group. According to numerous other eyewitnesses, neither was it the “first boat” to be lowered from that section of the deck. Woolner reiterated in a press account that “Bjornstrom [*sic*, Björnström-Steffansson] and I took Mrs. Candee up to the upper A deck [*sic*, Boat Deck] where the boats were hung and we put her safely with a rug into the first boat.”⁶⁶ What are we to make of this? It is possible that Woolner got Candee up to the Boat Deck after Boat No. 8 had already lowered away. If so, then at the time of their arrival in that area, No. 6 would indeed have appeared to be the aft-most of the forward port boats.

Yet **Helen Candee**’s accounts add a measure of clarity on this intriguing possibility . After witnessing Captain Smith order passengers down to A Deck to board Boat No. 4, which had been lowered there, only to countermand that order once Woolner reminded him that the Promenade windows were still closed, Candee described the following:

The Captain, speaking to my two men, indicating me said, ‘Take this lady and put her in that boat.’ Each man took an arm. We were half way to the lonely boat when the Captain’s voice again called, ‘Hey, you two, come away from that boat! No men are allowed near the life-boats.’ At the implication, the two men dropped me as if I had been a leper. I was left to walk alone to the boat which hung beside the deck, touching it for a very little space.⁶⁷

Candee’s description of Boat No. 6 as “the lonely boat” makes sense if it was sitting alone along the side of the Boat Deck, with neighboring Boat No. 8 already having lowered away and Boat No. 4 al-

⁶⁵ Am. 884.

⁶⁶ Letter written by Woolner aboard *Carpathia* and published in the *New York Sun*, April 19,1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁶⁷ Helen Candee’s private account of the sinking, titled *Down to the Sea in Ships*, April 15, 1912. Thank you to Mike Poirier for bringing this detail to the present authors’ attention. This account is available at the following URL: <https://charlespellegrino.com/helen-churchill-candee/>

ready sitting below at A Deck. Her recollection might thus add weight to our theory that Woolner was referring to her boat, No. 6, as “the first boat” that they came across when they arrived at the area – not the “first boat” to be lowered away from that portion of the deck. And if No. 8 had already left, then his recollection of it being the “sternmost” boat in that area of the deck would, indeed, have been correct; however, if Halpern is to be believed that No. 6 left before No. 8, Woolner’s recollection of No. 6 being the “sternmost” boat makes no sense.

Additionally, Colonel Archibald Gracie paraphrased an account from Candee, one of his table companions with whom he had become well-acquainted with during the voyage, when he wrote:

Her impression is that there were other boats in the water which had been lowered before hers.⁶⁸

Both of these details tend to contradict Woolner’s statement about having placed Candee in the “first boat” – if he meant that No. 6 was the first of the two boats to depart.

Additional survivor accounts also indicate that Boat No. 8 departed first. First Class passenger **Marjorie Newell** and her sister Madeleine were rescued in Boat No. 6. Marjorie stated that their boat “was the second boat away.”⁶⁹ In another account, Newell stated the following:

When we arrived on the top, there were really very few passengers about; I believe we were among the first. I believe we were in the second boat to be lowered. The ship was listing rather badly and we were at a great height. The boat we were on had only one boatman.⁷⁰

In another interview, Marjorie was directly asked: “You were in one of the first lifeboats that left?” She responded: “I was in the second little boat.”⁷¹ We are not left to interpret what she meant by “sec-

⁶⁸ Gracie, Archibald, *The Truth About the Titanic*, Chapter 6, 1913.

⁶⁹ *Pomona Progress-Bulletin*, April 8, 1962. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁷⁰ *Yankee Magazine*, June 1981. Courtesy of Mike Poirier. Besides the details in Marjorie’s own accounts indicating that they were in Boat No. 6, a picture of Madeleine Newell appeared in the April 20, 1912 edition of *The Boston American*, showing what she was wearing upon her arrival in New York. She had on a light-colored hat, with black plumage on top. In the famous photograph of Boat No. 6 approaching *Carpathia*, an individual in front of Quartermaster Hichens can be seen wearing this same hat, providing further evidence of their presence in that boat. Two additional photos of Newell in No. 6, her hat clearly visible, have subsequently been found.

⁷¹ Marjorie Newell Robb interview conducted by George Behe and Don Lynch at the 1987 Titanic Historical Society Convention. The interview is reproduced in George Behe’s book, *The Titanic Disaster: Final Memories*, currently unpublished.

ond” in this instance. Why? In yet another account, Marjorie stated, “I was being placed in a lifeboat by my father. It was the *second lifeboat to go into the water* [authors’ emphasis].”⁷²

First Class passenger **Julia Cavendish** was also rescued in No. 6. She stated: “There were many lifeboats then preparing to dip down, and I ran with my husband for one of them.”⁷³ In another account, she specified that “I was in the second boat.” She also described Major Peuchen descending down the falls into the boat.⁷⁴ In a more detailed retelling of her survival, Cavendish reiterated that No. 6 was not the first lifeboat lowered on the forward port side:

I shall never forget Tyrell’s [her husband’s] absolute unselfishness, and how his every thought was for me and my comfort, and never once did he mention himself. When he put me in the lifeboat I never for a moment thought I would not see him again - we were both so calm and matter of fact - I looked on the whole as rather an exciting experience. I must have been sitting in the lifeboat quite ten minutes before they started to lower it. I noticed boats on either side of me being half filled and lowered.⁷⁵

This very detailed account shows that Mrs. Cavendish had reached the deck quite early in the loading process, waiting for “quite ten minutes” in the boat before it began lowering away; indeed, she seems to have entered No. 6 early enough to see lifeboats “on either side” of hers being both “half filled” and “lowered”. This would mean she saw No. 4 lowered to A Deck empty, as well as the loading and lowering of No. 8.

In comments made by Halpern on the Encyclopedia Titanica message board on October 26, 2022, arguing that Boat No. 6 lowered away first, he stated the following: “Forget about newspaper accounts. There is a first-hand written account by First Class passenger Marie Young that she wrote while on board *Carpathia*.” In the account in question, Young describes arriving on A Deck in time to “hear the order given for all women to go to the boat deck.” Subsequently, she described the following:

One boat had already been lowered from the port side when we were lifted into Boat No. 8.⁷⁶

⁷² Unidentified magazine article, circa 1991. Marjorie was interviewed for an article by Joe Fuoco that appeared in an unidentified magazine clipping that was in Walter Lord’s files. It was from some point around 1991, given that she was 102 at the time.

⁷³ *Los Angeles Times*, April 20, 1912. Courtesy of George Behe.

⁷⁴ *The Kingston Daily Freeman*, April 29, 1912. Courtesy of Don Lynch.

⁷⁵ *R.M.S. Titanic Lifeboat No. 6: The Story of Julia Cavendish*, Cavendish, William (Unicorn, 2024).

⁷⁶ Letter from Marie Young, published in the *Washington Post*, April 21, 1912. Reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic*:

Again, one could argue whether a boat had actually been lowered prior to Boat No. 8, as Halpern contends, or whether Young simply noticed Boat No. 4 missing along the Boat Deck (it had been lowered to A Deck by this time) and mistakenly concluded that a boat had departed already; indeed, it would have been easy for her to observe an open spot on the deck where No. 4 *had* been before it was lowered to A Deck, but for her to be unaware that the boat had yet to be filled with passengers and lowered to the water. Ironically, at the same time that he is citing Marie Young's press account as proof of his theory, Halpern derides the use of newspaper accounts over primary source documents such as sworn testimony. He apparently did not realize that the letter written by her was published in a newspaper, too. However, and especially in light of Mrs. Cavendish's account outlined just earlier, it would seem that the lowering of Boat No. 4 to A Deck could easily have been the source of the confusion.

Another example is the testimony of Able Bodied Seaman Thomas Jones, who was rescued in Boat No. 8. Some have suggested that the following statement at the American Inquiry, is suggestive of Boat No. 6 preceding No. 8:

Senator NEWLANDS. And about how many boats were left on the port side when you got on your [No. 8] boat?

Mr. JONES. Two more after my boat, on my side.⁷⁷

However, with Boat No. 4 lowered to A Deck, Jones would have seen two boats remaining and lowered to the Boat Deck (Nos. 6 and 2), exactly as described. His statement is *not* proof that No. 6 lowered first. In fact, as will subsequently be discussed, Jones' statements on the steam venting, as well as the Strauses refusing to part, actually are evidence that No. 8 departed first.

Another account cited by Halpern to support his sequence comes from the American Inquiry testimony of First Class passenger Ella White:

Senator SMITH. Do you recollect what boat you entered?

Mrs. WHITE. Boat 8, the second boat off.

Senator SMITH. On which side of the ship?

Mrs. WHITE. I could not tell you. It was the side going this way - the left side, as we were going.

Memories of the Maiden Voyage, Behe, George (Lulu, 2011).

⁷⁷ Am. 572.

Senator SMITH. That would be the port side?

Mrs. WHITE. Yes. I got in the second boat that was lowered.⁷⁸

As is the case with several of the accounts that Halpern cites, White's statements are hardly definitive. She could easily have assumed that Boat No. 8 was the second boat lowered since, at that time, Boat No. 4 had already been lowered to A Deck and would not have been seen unless she leaned over the side of the ship; indeed, if these many eyewitnesses are correct that No. 8 left before No. 6, then anyone in No. 8 would then have had to look *around Boat No. 6* to see that No. 4 had not left completely, but was simply hanging empty alongside A Deck below at the time.

In spite of his repeated arguments that sworn testimony is reliable, whereas newspaper or personal accounts are not, Halpern also cites the press account of First Class passenger Margaret Swift as evidence that No. 8 was not the first port boat lowered away. Swift left in No. 8, and described her escape and the escape of her fellow First Class passenger, Dr. Alice Leader, as follows:

My companion and myself held back until the first lifeboat had been let down into the water. At that time absolute quiet prevailed. Indeed, at no time did I observe any traces of panic among the passengers. The men kindly helped the women into the lifeboats, many of them laughing and chatting, and few of them dreaming that there was any immediate danger. When the second boat was being filled Captain Smith insisted that we get into it, and as the sailors pulled away from the ship I heard him say, 'Row for that light'...⁷⁹

Halpern assumes that Swift was referring to No. 6 as "the first lifeboat" which was "let down into the water" before their own boat, No. 8, left. However, by relying on only this one specific account by Swift, Halpern is missing a large, and very important, part of her story. In another account, Swift stated that after being awakened for a second time following the collision, she and Dr. Alice Leader were advised to go up on deck. In her description of what they did next, it seems that they first went up to the *starboard* side of the Boat Deck, prior to crossing to the port side:

I thought it would be just as safe to remain on board, but *on second thought we went over to the port side* [authors' emphasis] - our room was starboard, about amidships, and

⁷⁸ Am. 1006.

⁷⁹ *New York Herald*, April 19, 1912.



Above: Boat No. 4 was the first boat to be lowered from the Boat Deck, but it was then empty of people, and it was lowered only to the level of A Deck. The intention was to have passengers board from that level, but the entire plan went amok when it was realized that the windows were closed, and it would take time to open them. This perspective is taken from the roof over the First Class Entrance, and shows the optical illusion that may have been created to some on the Boat Deck, who may have concluded that Boat No. 4 had been lowered away with people in it because the boat was not visible from the deck any longer. (HFX Studios.)

there were some women there getting ready to leave the ship. I decided that it would be well to go into one of the boats, too, and the officers advised us to do so.⁸⁰

In this same account, she again states that she was in the second boat to leave the vessel. However, if she was initially on the starboard side before crossing to port, a vital question comes up: could she have seen one of the forward starboard lifeboats lower away, rather than a lifeboat prior to No. 8 on the port side? The answer is a decided “yes”.

While it could be argued that the wording in this account is too ambiguous to conclude that Swift was initially on the forward starboard side of the Boat Deck, prior to crossing to port, another account Swift gave removes all doubt on the point. After describing how she had initially gone on deck after the collision, and then returned to her cabin, Swift described the following:

I heard a stir on deck for the next hour, but I did not think there was any danger. The noises worked on my nerves so I went on deck. There was a greater crowd than before, but they did not seem to be very excited. They were being put in to lifeboats, but there was no hurry and no panic. No one seemed to be anxious to go. I could have gone in the first but Dr. Alice Leader, with whom I was traveling, suggested that it would be better to remain on the *Titanic* than to take our chances on the sea, and in an open boat. A great many people who could have been saved lost their lives because they believed it was absolutely impossible for the *Titanic* to sink.

By the time the *fourth boat* [authors’ emphasis] was being lowered I had convinced my friend to enter it, and we were lowered away together.⁸¹

Clearly, Boat No. 8 was not the fourth boat lowered on the port side. However, her description only makes sense, and then makes *perfect* sense, if Swift and Leader had initially come out onto the starboard Boat Deck and saw one or more boats lowered there before they headed over to the port side.

First Class passenger Marion Kenyon, who was traveling with Dr. Leader and Margaret Swift, provides evidence which supports this concept. She stated that “...the first few boats had been lowered without their full capacity...”, prior to when they boarded and departed in No. 8.⁸²

Dr. Alice Leader, who was also rescued in Boat No. 8, provides some additional evidence on this matter. Given her pioneering work in psychiatric medicine, she may have had a higher-than-average

⁸⁰ *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, April 19, 1912. Swift and Leader occupied Cabin D-17 on the starboard side.

⁸¹ *The Brooklyn Times*, April 19, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁸² *Oak Park Oak Leaves*, April 27, 1912.

degree of observational skill than average eyewitnesses. In his article, Halpern cites the following statement she made as corroboration of Swift's account about No. 8 not being the first port boat lowered:

We watched one [*sic*, boat] go down with passengers and noticed that there were no men in it – that is, none except seamen.⁸³

A detail that goes unmentioned by Halpern is that Dr. Leader, in this same account, doesn't describe their lifeboat, No. 8, as the *second* boat, but, instead referred to one "of the passengers in the *fourth* [authors' emphasis] lifeboat to be lowered."⁸⁴ This is identical to what Swift stated in her account. Unfortunately, some have claimed that Dr. Leader said that her boat, No. 8, was the "second" lifeboat to lower; however, that is absolutely *not* what she said when reading and comparing her known accounts. She instead repeatedly said that her boat was the "fourth" to leave.

Remarkably, First Class passenger Gladys Cherry, also rescued in No. 8, described the following, in a letter to her mother, written aboard *Carpathia* on April 17, 1912:

... then the boats began to be filled with women, we were about *the fourth to be lowered* [authors' emphasis] 75 feet from the top deck...⁸⁵

Again, there is no question that Boat No. 8 was certainly not the fourth boat lowered from the forward-port quarter of the deck. However, this detail being mentioned by Leader, Swift and Cherry only makes sense when the forward-starboard lifeboats (Nos. 7, 5, and 3, or Nos. 7, 5, and 4 to A Deck, depending on timing) are factored in.

Of note, Leader gave two more detailed accounts of her escape and does not mention another lifeboat, filled with passengers departing before hers on the port side, in either of those accounts. As accurate and detail-conscious as Leader appeared to be in all of her other descriptions, this stands out.

Importantly, Leader provided some further details in her other accounts, details which actually suggest that Boat No. 8 was the first forward port boat lowered. On April 18, 1912, she was a guest of the Women's Quaker City Motor Club, at the Majestic Hotel. It was described that the "club acted as a women's court of inquiry with Dr. Leader on the witness stand. It resulted in placing emphasis on points not clearly brought out before." During this talk, Leader stated the following, which was consistent with the one comment in her *New York Herald* account:

⁸³ *New York Herald*, April 19, 1912.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*

⁸⁵ Letter from Gladys Cherry to her mother, dated April 17, 1912. Reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic: Memories of the Maiden Voyage*, Behe, George (Lulu, 2011).

I was in Boat No. 8, which I think was the *fourth boat lowered* [authors' emphasis].⁸⁶

Dr. Leader's repeated claim, which again agrees with that of Swift and Cherry, that Boat No. 8 was the "fourth boat lowered" can not be ignored. It dramatically alters how Halpern used her one account to support his theory, when in reality that one account should be considered and weighed as part of a puzzle that also contains her other statements. Certainly, that one account, on its own, does not support the notion that No. 6 left first, as Halpern claims it does, when considered against the other statements she gave stating that No. 8 was the "fourth boat". However, her statements do make sense, supporting our original lifeboat conclusions and timeline. How so?

Together, their accounts indicate that these women saw one of two possible scenarios: 1) that they saw Boats Nos. 7, 5, and 3 lower on the *starboard* side, before they crossed over and boarded Boat No. 8 on the *port* side: quite literally, it was the "fourth boat" they saw leaving the ship; or 2) they saw Boats Nos. 7 and 5 lowered from the starboard side, crossed to port, saw the empty spot where No. 4 had been and assumed it had been lowered away, and then boarded and left in No. 8, which they assumed was the "fourth boat". Since Halpern agrees with us on the timing of Boats Nos. 7, 5, and 3 leaving the deck, this has an interesting side effect: if No. 3 did lower at 12:55 a.m., a fact which he and we agree upon, and No. 8 left before No. 6 – which we are seeing clear support for from numerous eyewitnesses – then these two factors, taken together, would also push the launch times of Nos. 8 and 6 *both* to after 12:55 a.m., when Boat No. 3 started down on the starboard side.⁸⁷ On the other hand, in Halpern's current lifeboat timeline, No. 8 would be the fifth or sixth boat (if you include No. 4 as a presumptive for having been "lowered") lowered, since he has No. 8 and No. 1 departing at approximately the same time. This conclusion does not harmonize with what these women reported.

As a sort of addendum to this conclusion, the Countess of Rothes also mentioned a tidbit that may support the notion that she and her cousin Gladys Cherry originally came out on the starboard side of the deck, prior to going to the port side and No. 8. Rothes stated that Cherry and she went up to A Deck, where they found Mr. and Mrs. Astor:

She was waiting under the starboard ports of the library, and her husband got a chair for her. She was quite calm.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 25, 1912. The authors are grateful to Brandon Whited for sharing this article and for pointing out the details in it.

⁸⁷ Thank you to Brandon Whited for pointing out these details about No. 8.

⁸⁸ *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

The fact that the two ladies were on the starboard side of A Deck would make it more likely that when they first went up to the Boat Deck, they stuck to the starboard side; this might set the stage for them to have seen the first three starboard lifeboats depart, prior to crossing over to the port side and arriving at No. 8, which Cherry described as the fourth to be lowered.

Dr. Leader also provided some additional details that are suggestive of her lifeboat, No. 8, leaving first. In a detailed interview with a reporter in her home, she stated: “It was 12:30 Monday morning when our life boat started into the water,” and added:

From 12:30 until 2 o’clock Monday morning we heard the orchestra of the ship playing in the saloon and saw the lights gleaming. Gradually the sound of music died away, as we got farther and farther from the sinking ship, and at least it could not be heard. Then the lights disappeared.⁸⁹

Considering that Leader says her boat began lowering at 12:30 a.m. and that *Titanic’s* end was at 2:00 a.m., it is clear that her watch and/or estimates were off by twenty minutes or so. Adjusting for this discrepancy places her estimated time for No. 8 beginning to lower to around 12:50 a.m., reaching the water around 12:55 or 12:56 a.m. This is very near the 1:00 a.m. time for No. 8 beginning to lower, from our original lifeboat article.

Of note, Margaret Swift, who had a watch suspended around her neck like a pendant, said the following:

The *Titanic* struck the iceberg exactly at 11:45 on Sunday night and it was between 1 and 1:30 o’clock when we left the ship.

Swift’s estimate that No. 8 left between 1:00-1:30 a.m., places the lowering time in the general range of 1:00, consistent with Leader. Swift cited the time of the collision as 11:45 p.m. and the sinking as 2:20 a.m. The fact that her collision and sinking times are close to accurate forces us to give serious weight to her estimate of the launch time of No. 8. In fact, when Swift was asked if she knew the exact time the ship foundered, she responded as follows: “I do not know that it was exact, for you see I had not changed my watch to midday on Sunday, but it was not more than a minute out of the way. I always carry a watch with me.”⁹⁰

⁸⁹ *Lewiston Evening Journal*, April 19, 1912. The authors are grateful to Brandon Whited for sharing this article and for pointing out the details in it.

⁹⁰ *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, April 19, 1912.

First Class passenger Emma Bucknell, rescued in No. 8, was quoted as saying that “the ten-mile trip in the lifeboat ... which began before 1 o’clock in the morning.”⁹¹ In the American Inquiry, Senator Smith asked Bedroom Steward Alfred Crawford whether he was rowing “[from] 1 o’clock until about daylight,” and he agreed.⁹² In the British Inquiry, Crawford was asked when No. 8 was lowered and he replied: “After 1 o’clock, I should say.”⁹³ In the American Inquiry, Crawford did give some additional details related to the departure of No. 8:

Senator SMITH. After you got away from the side of the *Titanic*, how long was it before that vessel sank?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It was sometime after we got away; probably an hour or an hour and a half.⁹⁴

Crawford’s time range places the lowering of No. 8 sometime between 12:50-1:20 a.m. All of this is consistent with the conclusion that No. 8 began lowering around 1:00 a.m., as per our original lifeboat article, published in 2001.

At this point, some might suggest that these are only estimates, that they conflict with each other, and could be used to support either Halpern’s launch time for No. 8 (1:05 a.m.) or our own (1:00 a.m.). That is true, as far as it goes. However, by comparison, what did occupants of Boat No. 6 say about the time they left the ship, or how long they were in the water before the ship sank? And how do their statements compare to those who were in Boat No. 8?

Frustratingly, we have found remarkably few statements from occupants of No. 6 on exactly what time they left. Lookout Frederick Fleet testified to the following, in the British Inquiry:

17428. (Mr. Scanlan - To the witness.) Now I want to ask you this question. Before you left the “*Titanic*” did you observe the lights of any ship in your neighbourhood?

- Well, there was a light on the port bow.

17429. Did you see this light on the port bow before you left the crow’s-nest?

- No, it must have been about 1 o’clock.

Did you observe it before you left the “*Titanic*”?

17430. (The Commissioner.) He says he saw it at 1 o’clock. (To the witness.) When did you leave the “*Titanic*” - at what time?

⁹¹ *Atlanta Constitution*, May 5, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁹² Am. 114.

⁹³ Br. 17892.

⁹⁴ Am. 829.

- I think I got into the water in the boat about 1 o'clock.
- 17431. And it was about that time that you saw this light?
- Or just a little before it - about that time.⁹⁵

Based on his wording of it being “about that time”, Fleet’s estimate of “1 o'clock” for No. 6 reaching the water appears to be just that: an estimate, rather than something read off of a watch.

However, as in his comments about whether other boats preceded No. 6, Fleet is in the minority in his opinion. We have found that several of those in No. 6 gave nearly identical estimates of how long they had to wait before *Titanic* foundered once they were in the water. Helen Candee recalled that they “drifted idly for an hour” before the bow went under and *Titanic* sank.⁹⁶ Mary Eloise Smith said that they “rowed away from *Titanic* for an hour” before the ship sank.⁹⁷ Fahim Ruhanna Al-Zainni said that it “was possibly an hour after we left the *Titanic* that the great liner sank.”⁹⁸

Here three separate eyewitnesses indicate that it was about an hour after they left the ship that *Titanic* sank. Our own conclusion is that No. 6 left the Boat Deck at about 1:10 a.m. Factoring in the minimum normal lowering time of 5-6 minutes, plus an additional 4 minutes or so, to account for the lowering halting at C Deck until Peuchen climbed down the falls, this means that No. 6 would have reached the water at about 1:20 a.m. – almost precisely an hour before *Titanic* sank, and in close harmony with the three timing statements outlined above. However, Halpern’s timeline places No. 6 leaving the Boat Deck 15 minutes before we do, meaning that his timing does not harmonize with what these occupants of Boat No. 6 recalled.

Another interesting detail was mentioned by two occupants of Boat No. 6: how high the water had reached when their boat was leaving *Titanic*. Mrs. Candee mentioned that when their boat left, the sea “was just covering the second row of lighted portholes”.⁹⁹ In Gracie’s book, Margaret Brown was quoted as saying that at the time No. 6 left, “E and C Decks were completely submerged.”¹⁰⁰ This recollection would not match the situation at about 1:05 a.m., when No. 6 would have reached the water according to Halpern’s timeline, as the E Deck portholes were still above water.

Comparing the statements from those who were actually in Boat Nos. 8 and 6, we can see that there are discrepancies. However, we can also learn quite a bit. For example, it seems that most of those aboard indicate that No. 8 left at about the time we had originally concluded, 1:00 a.m. Yet it

⁹⁵ Br. 17428-17431.

⁹⁶ Handwritten account from Candee, held in the Paris Museum of Letters and Manuscripts, courtesy of George Behe.

⁹⁷ *Public Ledger*, April 24, 1912.

⁹⁸ *Youngstown Vindicator*, April 27, 1912.

⁹⁹ Handwritten account from Candee, held in the Paris Museum of Letters and Manuscripts, courtesy of George Behe.

¹⁰⁰ Gracie, Archibald, *The Truth About the Titanic*, Chapter 4, 1913.

also seems clear that those in No. 6 indicated – both from the ship’s orientation in the water when they departed, and from how long it was from the time they reached the water to the time *Titanic* sank, namely an hour – that they left later than No. 8 had. These statements also harmonize with our own conclusion that No. 6 started lower at 1:10 a.m., and reached the water at about 1:20 a.m., roughly one hour before *Titanic* sank.

In light of this, it seems extremely unlikely that No. 6 left prior to 1:00 a.m. as Halpern suggests. We can establish that several starboard boats departed prior to any boats on the port side lowering away. Multiple witnesses, including Bedroom Steward Alfred Crawford, stated that “the starboard boats were lowered before ours [the forward-port boats] were.” Crawford had helped load and lower No. 5 on the starboard side – actually seeing it all the way to the water¹⁰¹ – before reporting to his assigned lifeboat station at No. 8, on the forward port side. He then helped Captain Smith and Chief Officer Wilde load No. 8, before being placed in charge of it.¹⁰²

There are other individuals who were connected with either Nos. 8 or 6, whose chain of movements indicate that 6 left after 8. One of these is Quartermaster Hichens. Hichens testified that he left the ship’s helm, being relieved by Quartermaster Walter Perkis at 12:23 a.m. At that point, he was asked to remove the cover from Collapsible D, which sat just inboard of Boat No. 2.¹⁰³ Hichens testified: “I had the cover off [of Collapsible D] and got the boat’s grips off,” before Second Officer Lightoller ordered him aft to Boat No. 6.¹⁰⁴ Based on Lightoller’s own testimony, it took “15 minutes to 20 minutes to uncover” a lifeboat,¹⁰⁵ meaning that Hichens was at Collapsible D until around 12:38 a.m. to 12:43 a.m., before heading to No. 6. This estimate makes sense, since Hichens testified that no rockets were launched while he was working on Collapsible D; instead, he specifically said that the first rocket was sent up while he was working at Boat No. 6.¹⁰⁶ It has been established that the first rocket was fired off at 12:47 a.m., a time which both we and Halpern agree upon.

Hichens testified that no passengers had been loaded into No. 6 when he arrived there, and that he was “working there not more than a quarter of an hour or 20 minutes, I suppose, before I was sent away in the boat.” If he arrived at No. 6 *after* leaving Collapsible D between 12:38 a.m. and 12:43 a.m., and then loaded No. 6 for around 15-20 minutes, that means that he was working at Boat No. 6 until

¹⁰¹ Br. 17911. Based on how long it took to lower a lifeboat, this would put Crawford on the scene at No. 5 until about 12:53. Importantly, Crawford did not say that any swinging out or lowering down to the level of the deck was needed for No. 8 by the time he arrived there, only that he helped to load it.

¹⁰² Am. 113; 117.

¹⁰³ Am. 451; Br. 1017; Br. 1053-1054.

¹⁰⁴ Br. 1086-1090.

¹⁰⁵ Br. 13855.

¹⁰⁶ Br. 1200-1204.

around 12:53 a.m. to 1:03 a.m. before being ordered to board it. This alone suggests that No. 6 departed after No. 8. We estimate that No. 8 began lowering at 1:00 a.m.

Additionally, Quartermaster Hichens stated that the lifeboat Master-At-Arms Joseph Bailey departed in “left about the same time as we [in No. 6] did.”¹⁰⁷ Bailey was in No. 16. Hichens is thus suggesting that No. 6 and No. 16 left somewhat close together. Our original lifeboat timeline concluded that No. 6 began lowering around 1:10 a.m.; however, as discussed previously, it halted after reaching the level of C Deck,¹⁰⁸ so that Major Peuchen could climb down the falls to help man the boat, delaying it from reaching the water by more than the average estimated 5-6 minute lowering time.¹⁰⁹ We conclude that No. 16 began lowering away at 1:20 a.m., putting the launch start times about 10 minutes apart. Considering this already-close timing, and then factoring in the delay in getting Boat No. 6 into the water, the time that Nos. 6 and 16 actually reached the water was, according to our timeline, very close together – just as Hichens testified. Yet Halpern concludes that No. 6 left at 12:55 a.m., or 25 minutes before No. 16; this timing is, at odds with 1) Hichens testifying that Nos. 6 and 16 left “about the same time,” as well as with 2) Hichens’ actions after being relieved at the ship’s wheel at 12:23 a.m.

Section summary:

So far in this section, we have considered statements from numerous survivors on the launch order of Boats Nos. 8 and 6. We saw that although there is conflicting testimony on the matter (at times from the *same* eyewitness), a careful analysis shows that multiple eyewitnesses recalled a lifeboat was loaded with women and lowered away from the forward-port side Boat Deck *before* No. 6 was lowered. That boat, by definition, could only be No. 8. Furthermore, some eyewitnesses who left in No. 8 had apparently just come over from the starboard side, having seen three lifeboats (apparently 7, 5, and 3) leave that area before coming over to No. 8, and thus correctly referring to No. 8 as the “fourth

¹⁰⁷ Am. 453. Hichens believed that the boat Bailey was in and which No. 6 tied up to once afloat, was No. 8. In fact, it was No. 16.

¹⁰⁸ Am. 336.

¹⁰⁹ In our previous work, Sam Halpern and we calculated that it would take 5-6 minutes at a minimum to lower a lifeboat 60 feet using the 6-to-1 pulley arrangement on the falls, which is what we are utilizing in this article as a baseline estimate. However, it is worth noting that in the Nat Geo special, *Titanic: 25 Years Later*, James Cameron ran an experiment with a nearly full-scale replica of a *Titanic* lifeboat and set of davits, to see how long it would take to prepare, swing out and lower the boat down to the edge of the deck, load it and lower it. He timed it as taking approximately 2 minutes to lower a lifeboat 10 feet, which would amount to 12 minutes to lower it 60 feet. This is with an inexperienced crew. Of course, on *Titanic*, there were a mix of crewmembers who were experienced and inexperienced using the Welin davits, so this time would have surely varied from boat to boat. In any event, it may have taken longer than 5-6 minutes to lower a lifeboat to the water in some cases. Cameron’s experiment can be viewed in the above-mentioned special, at the following link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jXHFEy-ibc>



This image shows the scene as Boat No. 8 pulls away from *Titanic's* side, while Boat No. 6 hangs alongside C Deck, waiting for Major Peuchen to climb in. Boat No. 4 hangs beside A Deck on the left. Below, the portholes along E Deck are submerging. (HFX Studios.)

boat” to leave the ship. Although by cherry-picking statements, a case could be made that No. 6 left first, the majority (by far) of what we have here considered indicates No. 8 left first.

Other Factors Relative to the Launch Order of Nos. 8 and 6:

Now that we have examined the eyewitness statements regarding the launch order of Boat No. 8 and No. 6, it is important to examine additional evidence which provides clues as to the launch order of these two boats.

1) The Venting of Steam -

Another line of evidence that provides clarity on whether Boat No. 8 or No. 6 departed first is the venting of steam. Since *Titanic* was sailing “Full Ahead” at the time of the collision, her boilers were generating a significant amount of steam pressure. After ordering *Titanic* “Slow Ahead” for several minutes following the collision, Captain Smith ordered the engines to “Stop” at around 11:46 a.m. (a time which both Halpern and we agree upon¹¹⁰). At that point, steam was no longer being fed into the engines, causing steam pressure to build in the feeds and steam lines. The ship had emergency releases high on the funnels; these were designed to vent steam when pressure in the lines reached critical levels, to prevent a rupture.

The steam venting began very shortly after *Titanic*’s engines halted, and continued for a significant period of time. The noise was tremendous, interfering with communication on the Boat Deck, discouraging passengers from coming out on deck early in the evacuation, and making it difficult for the wireless operators to hear responses once they began sending distress calls. Second Officer Lightoller later described this noise as follows:

The ship had been running under a big head of steam, therefore the instant the engines were stopped the steam started roaring off at all eight exhausts, kicking up a row that would have dwarfed the row of a thousand railway engines thundering through a culvert.¹¹¹

First Class passenger Isaac Frauenthal also described the incredible noise level created by the steam venting. He described how First Officer Murdoch, while supervising the preparation of Boat No. 7, had difficulty making himself heard:

¹¹⁰ See *On a Sea of Glass: The Life & Loss of RMS Titanic*, Fitch, Layton and Wormstedt (Amberley, 2015), endnotes for Chapter 4, as well as Halpern’s current chronology sheet at: <http://titanicology.com/Titanica/Chronology01-07-2024.pdf>

¹¹¹ Lightoller, Charles, *Titanic and Other Ships*, Chapter 32, 1935.

Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, was standing near a gangway on the starboard side, shouting orders through a megaphone, but I couldn't hear much of anything save the incessant blasting of the siren [i.e. steam venting].¹¹²

Does how long the steam continued venting provide any clues to which of the forward port boats left first? The answer is yes. Able Bodied Seaman Thomas Jones, as we will soon see, testified not only that he saw the Strauses refuse to part *before he departed in No. 8*, but he also added a critical detail:

Senator NEWLANDS. When your boat left, were there many women and children left on the ship?

Mr. JONES. I did not see any children, and very few women. There was an old lady there and an old gentleman, and she would not come in the boat.

Senator NEWLANDS. Had she got in the boat?

Mr. JONES. No; she would not come near the boat.

Senator NEWLANDS. What did she say?

Mr. JONES. She never said anything. If she said anything we could not hear it because the steam was blowing so and making such a noise.

Senator NEWLANDS. There was a great deal of noise?

Mr. JONES. Oh, yes.¹¹³

Jones was here very clear: although he *saw* the incident with the Strauses at Boat No. 8, the steam was still venting so loudly during the loading of that lifeboat that it made it difficult to hear anything being said.

When compared with Jones' statement about the steam venting during the loading of No. 8, Second Officer Lightoller described the following, in relation to Boat No. 6:

However, having got Captain Smith's sanction, I indicated to the Bosun's Mate, and we lowered down the first boat level with the boat deck, and, just at this time, thank heaven, the frightful din of escaping steam suddenly stopped, and there was a death-like silence a thousand times more exaggerated, fore and aft the ship. It was almost startling to hear one's own voice again after the appalling din of the last half hour or so.

¹¹² *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, April 20, 1912. Courtesy of George Behe.

¹¹³ Am. 571.

I got just on forty people into No 4 boat, and gave the order to “lower away,” and for the boat to “go up to the gangway door” with the idea of filling each boat as it became afloat, to its full capacity. At the same time I told the Bosun’s Mate to take six hands and open the port lower-deck gangway door.¹¹⁴

By a process of elimination, we can be sure that Lightoller was mistaken in identifying this “first boat” as Boat No. 4. First, he said he “got just on forty people” into this boat; yet No. 4 was not loaded with people when it was lowered away to A Deck. Additionally, 4, 2, and D did not leave until much later in the sinking. Furthermore, from Jones’ testimony, considered just above, we know that steam was still venting while Boat No. 8 was loading, whereas Lightoller is here clearly recalling that the steam stopped venting while he was working on a lifeboat which he personally loaded with people and lowered away. After considering these details, it is clear that in this account, Lightoller was referring to Boat No. 6, not another lifeboat.

Halpern downplays Lightoller’s statements that the steam halted during the loading of this boat, which we have now seen likely refers to Boat No. 6. He points out that Quartermaster Hichens’ testimony suggests that No. 6 was already lowered level with the Boat Deck when he was ordered to it after getting Collapsible D uncovered and the grips removed, an event that we have already seen likely took place between 12:38-12:43 a.m – much earlier than when Lightoller suggests No. 6 was lowered level with the deck in this 1935 account. In citing this contradiction, Halpern is correct. However, Halpern uses this contradiction as a reason to throw out the entire account, even though Lightoller was clearly associating the cessation of the steam venting with work at No. 6; however, this account also includes Lightoller’s recollection that he ordered Boatswain Alfred Nichols and six seamen below deck to open the gangways doors while working at this boat.

Ignoring this latter recollection by Lightoller also ignores another fact: this was not the first time that Lightoller drew a connection between his orders to the boatswain about opening the gangway doors and the events surrounding the loading of Boat No. 6. In his 1912 inquiry testimony, Lightoller also tied the timing of the order related to the gangway doors to sometime during the loading of Boat No. 6, consistent with what he said about it in his 1935 account:

13900. Now let us pursue the two things you have mentioned. You say you gave those orders to the boatswain to go down with some men and open the gangway doors? - Yes.

And:

¹¹⁴ Lightoller, Charles, *Titanic and Other Ships*, Chapter 32, 1935.

13905. Did the boatswain go off after receiving the orders? - As far as I know, he went down.

The Commissioner: Have we heard anything up to this time of these gangway doors?

The Solicitor-General: I am not aware of having heard it, my Lord. There has been a suggestion made by a witness, I think, that it was so, but I do not think there has been any evidence about it. There was a suggestion, I know.

The Commissioner: To open those doors?

13906. (The Solicitor-General.) Yes. (To the Witness.) Can you help us when it was that you gave this order to the boatswain? I mean, can you give it us by reference to boats. Was it before you had lowered No. 4 to the A deck or after? - I think it was after and whilst I was working at No. 6 boat.¹¹⁵

Thus, both in 1912 and later in 1935, Lightoller was equating the order to open the gangway doors with activity surrounding Boat No. 6; the only issue is that he gave the wrong boat number in 1935. Yet he clearly gave the correct number in his testimony in 1912. Importantly, this order to the boatswain as No. 6 was loading also ties work at No. 6 to a point when the steam stopped venting; yet we already know for a fact that steam was still venting when No. 8 was being loaded and lowered. How is this the case? Lightoller, in his testimony, described the steam venting thusly, in a description of it from a point earlier in the sinking:

13797. You were just telling us what you found when you came up on deck after you had heard of what had happened, and I think you just told us that the steam was roaring off - blowing out of the boilers, I suppose? - Yes.

13798. Was it making a great noise? - Yes.

13799. So great as to be difficult to hear what was said? - Very difficult.¹¹⁶

Lightoller also described the steam causing considerable difficulty in communicating with Captain Smith and Chief Officer Wilde early on during the sinking. For example, he testified that when he asked Wilde whether they should swing out the lifeboats, he had difficulty understanding Wilde's precise answer: "I am under the impression that Mr. Wilde said 'No,' or 'Wait,' something to that effect, and meeting the Commander, I asked him, and he said, 'Yes, swing out.'" Lightoller also remembered that he had to cup his hands around Smith's ear to ask him whether they should begin

¹¹⁵ Br. 13900-13906.

¹¹⁶ Br. 13797-13799.

getting the women and children into the boats. Both recollections clearly indicate that steam was still venting as work was getting under way at Nos. 6 and 8.¹¹⁷

However, in his testimony and his 1935 account, Lightoller did not refer to having any difficulty in communicating verbal orders to Boatswain Nichols to go below and open the gangway doors. By contrast, recall how the noise of the steam venting was so tremendous, that Isaac Frauenthal couldn't understand First Officer Murdoch, even when he was shouting to those preparing Boat No. 7, through a megaphone. We know Lightoller's gangway order was given while he was working on Boat No. 6. This suggests that the steam had in fact halted by the time Lightoller was loading Boat No. 6. If it was still making a terrible racket at No. 8 when the Strauses refused to part, but was not making a racket when Lightoller ordered the Boatswain and his men below, this is a strong indication of a sequence: No. 8 loading first, No. 6 loading second.

It is worth noting that while Able Bodied Seaman Jones described steam still blowing off during the loading of No. 8, there are indications that it halted by the time No. 8 was actually lowering away. Jones testified that after getting aboard No. 8, Smith gave the order to lower away. Jones testified that he then "told me to row for the light, and land the passengers and return to the ship."¹¹⁸ Multiple other occupants of No. 8 heard Smith give the order to row for the light, including First Class passengers Emma Bucknell, Gladys Cherry, The Countess of Rothes, Dr. Alice Leader, Margaret Swift and Marie Young, amongst others.

While the timing of Smith's command to row for the light is ambiguous in Jones' testimony, Emma Bucknell stated that Smith gave the order "to the man in charge" after handing "a big basket of bread" to her once she was already in the lifeboat.¹¹⁹ The Countess of Rothes said that Smith stood "shoulder to shoulder with me," and that this order was the "last words" he gave to Jones prior to lowering away.¹²⁰ However, Marie Young stated that after they "rested on the ocean" that "Captain Smith called to us to pull for a green light seen in the distance to unload passengers and return to the boat at once."¹²¹ Leader also claimed that this order came after No. 8 was afloat, stating "we dropped down, down and down until the keel of our tiny craft struck the sea and the captain shouted to pull over to a red light in the distance" and come back.¹²² Margaret Swift stated: "The captain ... threw in another

¹¹⁷ Br. 13820-13824; Lightoller, Charles, *Titanic and Other Ships*, Chapter 32, 1935. We are grateful to Arun Vajpey for pointing out these details about the timing of Lightoller's gangway orders, as related to the steam venting.

¹¹⁸ Am. 570.

¹¹⁹ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 20, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

¹²⁰ *New York Herald*, April 21, 1912.

¹²¹ *Washington Post*, April 21, 1912. Courtesy of George Behe.

¹²² *New York Herald*, April 19, 1912.

loaf [of bread] as we pulled away... As we went the captain told us to pull for a light..."¹²³

Given the contradictory evidence, it seems possible that Captain Smith may have given the order to row for the light more than once: first while No. 8 was still level with the Boat Deck, and then again shouting it down to the boat well after it reached the water. Regardless of the precise timing of this order, and whether it was given once or more times, one thing is clear: it is very unlikely that so many individuals in No. 8 could have clearly heard Smith give this command if the steam was still loudly venting at the time he uttered the words. None of them describe any difficulty in hearing what was said. Yet earlier, Lightoller could not even carry on an ordinary face-to-face conversation with Wilde or Smith because of the racket of the steam, and Frauenthal couldn't even hear First Officer Murdoch shouting through a megaphone for the same reason. Clearly the steam had stopped blowing off at some point as No. 8 reached readiness for lowering, or at the very latest once it had reached the water.

All of this begs the question: when, precisely, did the steam stop blowing off? While the time the steam *started* venting can be pinned down to very shortly after Captain Smith ordered *Titanic's* engines to "Stop" for the final time at 11:46 p.m., the time when it halted is less obvious. However, the evidence is there. Third Officer Pitman testified that "She was blowing off steam for three-quarters of an hour, I think..."¹²⁴ Forty-five minutes from 11:46 a.m. places Pitman's guess regarding when the steam halted to around 12:31 a.m. However, this is clearly an underestimate.¹²⁵ This can be established based on the timing of a wireless message sent from *Titanic* to *Carpathia* at 12:55 a.m., *Titanic* time. Harold Cottam, *Carpathia's* Wireless Operator, contacted *Titanic* just then, to tell them that *Olympic* had been calling them. According to Cottam, the response was that they were not aware of the messages. Cottam added: "He [Phillips] told me he could not read him because [of] the rush of air and the escape of steam."¹²⁶

This wireless transmission is clear evidence that steam was still venting as late as 12:55 a.m., which is precisely the time that we conclude that No. 8 was being loaded, as per the previously-discussed

¹²³ *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, April 19, 1912.

¹²⁴ Am. 315.

¹²⁵ It is clear that Pitman's time estimates were not particularly good ones. For one example, please see footnote PT-14 in our original lifeboat article: <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/lifeboats.htm>.

¹²⁶ Am. 105-106. While Cottam did not specify the precise time of this message from *Titanic* in his testimony, it can be gleaned based on the timing related to other messages. 1) It was several minutes after *Olympic* had difficulty hearing *Titanic* "due to atmospheric," being unable to tell if *Titanic* itself had struck an iceberg, as per their PV. 2) It was also just minutes after Cottam's message to *Titanic*, asking them to confirm the two distress coordinates, followed by *Frankfurt* communicating with *Titanic*. 3) It was also following the *Olympic* trying to call *Titanic* that was referenced by Cottam and was recorded in *Ypiranga's* PV. When factoring in these other messages and converting to correct shipboard time for *Titanic* of 2 hours and 2 minutes ahead of New York time, one arrives at 12:55 a.m. Sam Halpern arrived at this conclusion in his disaster chronology as well: <http://titanicology.com/Titanica/Chronology01-07-2024.pdf>

evidence above (remember, we place No. 8's launch time at 1:00 a.m., while Halpern places it at 1:05 a.m.). The timing alone is important, but not definitive on the question of which boat left first. However more importantly a clear picture is emerging of the status of work on Boats Nos. 8 and 6 when the stem stopped venting at some point *after 12:55 a.m.*: No. 8 was then filled with people, and *was about to lower away or had already reached the water* when the steam stopped, since many people overheard Captain Smith's orders; meanwhile, *work was just beginning on loading* Boat No. 6, when the steam stopped venting, in harmony with what Lightoller recalled. Yet Halpern's timeline contradicts this picture, placing Boat No. 6 *lowering away* from the deck – not starting to load, but actually lowering away – at 12:55 a.m.

This evidence about when the steam stopped venting at some point after 12:55 a.m., and the relative progress in getting Nos. 8 & 6 away when it stopped, also supports a launch time after 1:00 a.m. for Boat No. 8, and that it was the first of the two boats to depart.

2) The Order to Row for the Light -

As summarized above, Captain Smith gave the crewmen and occupants in Boat No. 8 direct orders to row for the light of the ship on the horizon, drop off the passengers and return to *Titanic*. Interestingly, Lookout Frederick Fleet testified that Second Officer Lightoller ordered those manning Boat No. 6 to pull for the light, too. Specifically, Fleet said "as soon as we got in the water he made us pull for the light." He added: "When we got the order from Mr. Lightoller to pull for the light, we were pulling for it; but when we found we could get no nearer and got a safe distance from the ship we stopped."¹²⁷

The wording of Fleet's testimony is confusing and could be wrongly interpreted as indicating that those in No. 6 received the order to row for the ship on the horizon *after* reaching the water. However, Quartermaster Hichens was very specific in his testimony at both inquiries about the timing of this order:

Mr. HITCHENS [*sic*, Hichens]. He [Lightoller] told us to go away and make for the light. We had them orders before we went down below [into the water]. We had no orders when we got to the water at all; we couldn't hear then.¹²⁸

And:

¹²⁷ Am. 363; Am. 366.

¹²⁸ Am. 456.

1159. Then, when the boat was lowered, did you have any order as to what you were to do?

- Yes, Sir.

1160. Who gave it to you?

- Mr. Lightoller, the Second Officer.

1161. What was the order?

- To pull for that light - to steer for that light.

1162. What light?

- There was a light about two points on the port bow, about five miles away, I should judge.

1163. You are speaking now of the time that the order was given to lower the boat?

- I am speaking now of the time when the boat was going to be lowered away.¹²⁹

In private comments to the present authors on October 11, 2023, Arun Vajpey noted that the order to row for the light on the horizon “was a fairly major decision and I do not think that Lightoller would have given Fleet in Lifeboat #6 that order unless he had already heard Captain Smith issue the same instructions to the crew of Lifeboat #8.”

While this is circumstantial evidence, we agree that it is unlikely that Lightoller would have given this order in a vacuum. We agree that the Second Officer ordering those in No. 6 to row towards the light on the horizon is suggestive that Captain Smith had issued that order previously, at No. 8; this is yet another piece of evidence that suggests that Boat No. 8 preceded Boat No. 6.

3) The Allison Family -

Many who have read about the *Titanic* disaster are familiar with the dramatic story of the Allison family. The party – consisting of Hudson Allison, his wife Bess, their children Helen Loraine and Hudson Trevor Allison,¹³⁰ as well as maid Sarah Daniels, nursemaid Alice Cleaver, cook Amelia “Mildred” Brown and chauffeur George Swane – boarded at Southampton, bound for Montreal.

The Allison family is most famous due to the fact that Loraine Allison, at just two-years-old, was the only child from First Class (and Second Class, for that matter) who was lost in the disaster. Her parents somehow became separated from Trevor during the sinking, refused to leave without him and didn’t realize that Alice Cleaver had gotten their son safely off the ship in Boat No. 11. Hudson

¹²⁹ Br. 1159-1163.

¹³⁰ We are here referring to the children by their full legal names for the sake of accuracy. However, young Helen Loraine went by the name “Loraine”, and Hudson Trevor was referred to as “Trevor.” We will henceforth refer to them by those names.

and Bess remained aboard with Loraine searching for Trevor until it was too late to be saved. All three perished. Chauffeur George Swane also did not survive.

Unexpectedly, the hazy details about how and why the Allison party was separated does shed some light on the launch order of Boat Nos. 8 and 6. In his book *The Truth About the Titanic*, Colonel Archibald Gracie made the following comment about the Allisons:

Mrs. Allison and Miss Allison could have been saved had they not chosen to remain on the ship. They refused to enter the lifeboat unless Mr. Allison was allowed to go with them. This statement was made in my presence by Mrs. H. A. Cassebeer, of New York, who related it to Mrs. Allison's brother, Mr. G. F. Johnston, and myself. Those of us who survived among the first cabin passengers will remember this beautiful Mrs. Allison, and will be glad to know of the heroic mould [British spelling] in which she was cast, as exemplified by her fate, which was similar to that of another, Mrs. Straus, who has been memorialized the world over.¹³¹

Unfortunately, Gracie does not provide any further details about which lifeboat Mrs. Allison refused to board. It is unclear whether Eleanor Cassebeer, a fellow First Class passenger, actually witnessed Bess Allison refuse to part with her husband, or if this was something that was relayed to her by someone else. Either way, she must have felt it was a credible-enough story to relate it to Bess Allison's brother. Cassebeer was rescued in No. 5, the second lifeboat to depart *Titanic*, and Halpern agrees with us that it began lowering around 12:45 a.m.

Fortunately, there is an eyewitness account that provides more details about this alleged incident. After arriving in New York, Sarah Daniels, who was the personal maid of Bess Allison, made a long-distance phone call to her aunt, a Mrs. Adam Gross of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. During the call, she related her experiences to her aunt. Mrs. Gross then related the story to a reporter, who apparently extrapolated or misconstrued multiple details in the process, including calling Daniels the "sister" of Mrs. Allison, claiming that Daniels saved Trevor (misnamed "Wilbur" in the article), etc. However, the story itself appears to have some truth to it, since it generally matches what Colonel Gracie was told about Mrs. Allison refusing to leave without her husband. Sarah Daniels was quoted as follows:

When the boat struck few realised there was any danger. Herbert [*sic*, Hudson] and Bessie laughed and went to dress. When we stood together at the rail, as the boats were being sent away, I was standing with Wilbur [*sic*] and Lorraine, was with Her-

¹³¹ Gracie, Archibald, *The Truth About the Titanic*, Chapter 2, 1913.

bert [*sic*] and Bessie. Then came the order. 'Women only' and an officer tried to put Bessie in the boats.

'Not without my husband' she cried.

'You must' cried the officer, but Bessie threw her arms around Herbert's [*sic*] neck and refused and refused to leave him. Then after the officer stopped trying to force her into the boat, she ran to me, pushed me into the boat, and threw little Wilbur [*sic*] after me.

The boat was full and she grasped Lorraine in one arm, her husband with the other, and stood waving her hand, and it seemed to me, smiling as she saw us rowing away.

The last I saw of her, just as the boat started to plunge to the bottom, was Bessie turning to her husband for a farewell kiss. As the water washed to their knees, Lorraine was holding to her mother's skirts.¹³²

Sarah Daniels was rescued in Boat No. 8.¹³³ This indicates that if the story is true, Daniels saw Mr. and Mrs. Allison alongside No. 8, where Bess refused to board the boat without her husband. With so many inaccurate details in the article, such as the claim of her seeing water up to the knees of the family (something Daniels could not possibly have seen after leaving in a boat that early in the sinking), it does raise questions about how accurate the alleged quotes attributed to Daniels were. However, it does seem unlikely that a reporter would have fabricated the claim of her seeing the Allisons at her lifeboat, since the family's story was not famous or well-known to the general public as early as April 19, the day after the survivors reached New York aboard *Carpathia*.¹³⁴ Thus, the claim that Sarah Daniels saw Mr. and Mrs. Allison and Loraine at her lifeboat, No. 8, is not a detail that one would expect a reporter to randomly make-up out of whole cloth.

Fortunately, besides Daniels' story generally matching what Colonel Gracie was told, there is another witness who apparently saw the Allisons around this time, and who provides corroboration of at least the large details of the story. The witness in question is Major Arthur Peuchen.

Peuchen certainly knew the Allison family well, since they were some of his dining companions during the maiden voyage. While Peuchen didn't mention anything about seeing the Allison family on deck during his inquiry testimony or in many of his press accounts, he apparently did relate details

¹³² *Chicago Daily Tribune*, April 20, 1912.

¹³³ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Daniels_Sarah.html

¹³⁴ The dispatch from Milwaukee was dated April 19, 1912, with the story being published in the newspaper on April 20. This indicates that the phone call between Daniels and her aunt most likely happened on April 19, since the press would have been unlikely to sit on that story for two days before running it, with the thirst for news in the press at a fever pitch.

regarding this to Hudson Allison's brothers, after the arrival in New York. Obviously, Hudson Allison's family would have had great interest in learning any news about their late brother; at the same time, Peuchen having seen the family would not have been of particular interest to the inquiry or to the American press at the time. Yet what Peuchen related to the Allison family was picked up on in the Canadian press, which did have a special interest in the stories of Canadian passengers such as Peuchen and the Allisons:

Major Arthur Peuchen, of Toronto, was able to tell the Allison brothers about their brother and his description of his last meeting with the Montreal capitalist and his wife indicated that Mrs. Allison died a heroine's death, steadily refusing to save herself without her husband.

The major said that after the first alarm and when everybody was in a quandary as to what was best to be done, some officers saying that the *Titanic* could not sink, that alarm was mere foolishness, and others getting the boats ready, he saw Mr. Allison and asked him what he thought about it. Mr. Allison said that he thought some of the passengers were getting unduly excited. Mrs. Allison came up while this conversation was going on and said that she had been advised to go to the boats. This she said she would not do.

Half an hour later, when the *Titanic* was leaning steadily over to one side, he saw the Allisons. They had their little girl [Lorraine] with them.

Mrs. Allison was distracted about her baby. Mr. Allison said that he had urged his wife to go but she had refused.

A member of the crew then called to the girl and she ran to the side of the ship, which was several feet under water by this time. Both mother and father went after the child and that was the last the major saw of them.¹³⁵

Based on the account, it seems likely that it was meant to say that Lorraine was beckoned to the starboard side of the ship by a crewmember and her parents followed, rather than the edge of the Boat Deck on the port side. Otherwise Peuchen would not have lost sight of the family.

As with Sarah Daniels' account, Peuchen makes mention of the Allisons being on the deck as water reached it, something he couldn't possibly have seen from his position in Boat No. 6. This would seem to indicate that both Sarah Daniels and Major Peuchen had been told by someone else that the Allisons were seen on deck as water reached it; that this detail was then relayed by the reporters as if

¹³⁵ *The Citizen* (Ottawa), April 20, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

they, themselves, had witnessed it, rather than just passing on what they had been told. If so, it is unfortunate, since the name of the potential witness has been lost to time as a result.

Lending further credence to this theory is a press account which suggests that while Mildred Brown and Sarah Daniels were lowering away in a lifeboat, they saw “Mr. and Mrs. Allison being placed in another lifeboat, but this, which was one of the last to leave the stricken steamship, foundered.”¹³⁶ This is impossible, since the only lifeboats that swamped were the upturned Collapsible B and flooded Collapsible A. Daniels and Brown were not even in the same lifeboat, being rescued in No. 8 and No. 11, respectively. Both left the ship too early for either to have personally seen this. Yet another mention of water reaching the family further suggests that the Allison family was seen on the Boat Deck late by *someone*, with the details becoming garbled in the press.

Indeed, researcher Brandon Whited told us: “I feel like this event was heard by Peuchen while aboard *Carpathia*. Unfortunately, who knows who the actual witness was? But if someone did, indeed, see Bess possibly get aboard Boat A, it would have been a story of great interest to the surviving Canadians.”¹³⁷

A slightly different version of Major Peuchen’s account appeared in another newspaper; some of the details it contains vary from the account already quoted, which is much more detailed. Yet it suggests that Peuchen actually did make statements about seeing the Allison family, rather than it being the random invention of a lone Canadian reporter. As with the previous account, it was noted that Hudson’s uncle J. Wesley Allison and his brother George Allison, along with a “Mr. G. F. C. Johnston,” waited for Alice Cleaver and baby Trevor Allison in New York. Peuchen was quoted as stating:

Mrs. Allison could have gotten away in perfect safety, but somebody told her that Mr. Allison was in a boat being lowered on the opposite side of the deck, and with her little daughter she rushed away from the boat in which infant and nurse had been placed. Apparently she had reached the other side to find Mr. Allison was not there. Meanwhile, our boat put off. Then I saw a collapsible boat being launched. Whether it was leaky or whether it shipped water I do not know, but I saw the water-logged boat, and it vanished from our sight in the foam.¹³⁸

Boat No. 6, which Peuchen left in, was not near any of the collapsible boats during the night. However, this is another reference to one of the swamped collapsibles, making it likely that

¹³⁶ *New York Herald*, April 20, 1912.

¹³⁷ Private correspondence.

¹³⁸ *The Toronto Daily Star*, April 19, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

Peuchen did relate some details about one of those boats, albeit being quoted incorrectly in the press.

Despite some details being incorrect or muddled, the accounts from both Sarah Daniels and Peuchen are largely consistent with each other. Together, they indicate that Hudson and Bess Allison, along with Loraine, were seen on the forward port side of the Boat Deck as those boats were being loaded, before Mrs. Allison refused to board a boat without her husband. Additionally, both of these accounts are consistent with what Eleanor Cassebeer related to both Colonel Gracie and Bess Allison's brother. Likewise, Peuchen apparently shared what he witnessed with Hudson Allison's family, leading one to believe that it is a credible story and not just something made up in the press, at a time when the Allison family's story was not nearly as well-known as it is amongst students of the disaster today.

This story becomes important to the lifeboat timeline when one considers that Sarah Daniels claimed that Hudson, Bess and Loraine Allison were at her lifeboat, No. 8, before Mrs. Allison refused to part with her husband. She saw them waving as No. 8 rowed away, indicating that they remained on the scene at least for that long. The fact that Peuchen witnessed this scene and the Allisons subsequently departing that area of the deck, all prior to when he climbed down the falls down into No. 6, is yet another indication that Boat No. 8 lowered away first. On its own, it would be a thin basis to suppose that No. 8 left first. However, as part of a large body of evidence to that effect, it becomes useful to consider. While there are some garbled details in both Daniels' and Peuchen's accounts, the fact that they partially corroborate each other means that they cannot simply be dismissed.

4) The Starboard List -

Given all of the evidence that we have examined which supports the notion that Boat No. 8 left before Boat No. 6, one may at this point wonder why Halpern is so convinced that No. 6 departed first. The answer is simple: while dismissing his testimony regarding other boats lowering prior to No. 6, Halpern places significant weight on Quartermaster Hichens' testimony indicating that a starboard list was present during the lowering of No. 6. Recall that Halpern's laser-like focus in building his timeline is a consideration of reports of list and trim.

Stepping back and looking at the larger picture, eyewitness evidence strongly supports the conclusion that after taking on a starboard list due to flooding on the side of the iceberg damage, *Titanic* later evened-out, and then assumed an increasing port list later in the sinking as water reached Scotland Road and other areas of the ship, giving it more ready access to the port side of the vessel.

On the subject of which way *Titanic* was listing when Boat No. 6 lowered, Hichens made a statement:

1375. I was just asking you for your opinion. When you were being lowered had you any difficulty in getting the boat away from the ship's side?

- Yes, we had to put our hands out several times.

1376. To push it away?

- Yes.

1377. That is, through the length of the drop from the upper deck?

- Yes, and the list as well.¹³⁹

While there are other explanations of why No. 6 may have bumped against the port side of *Titanic* as it lowered – such as occupants moving around inside the boat when it halted at C Deck for Peuchen to climb down the falls, the boat tipping forward or aft due to the falls playing out unevenly, causing it to swing, etc. – the present authors do agree that the starboard list still being present as No. 6 lowered away is the most likely explanation.

Interestingly, the starboard list must not have interfered significantly with the lowering of No. 6, since, at present, we have only been able to locate one additional survivor – out of the approximately 23 who were aboard the lifeboat¹⁴⁰ – who even mentions it. First Cashier Ruth Bowker, rescued in No. 6, seemingly described the list, or at least the issue with the boat bumping against the hull, as follows:

The boat was launched with difficulty, threatening to upset through swinging against the side of the ship.¹⁴¹

As Halpern reasons, since there is no known description of Boat No. 8 dragging against the ship's hull as it lowered, that means that the starboard list had reduced or was gone by the time it lowered away, thus proving that Boat No. 6 must have preceded it.

Ironically, Second Officer Lightoller testified that there was actually a *port* list during the loading of No. 6:

13852. How long did that state of things continue? When was it you did first notice either a list or that she was down by the head?

- Very shortly, afterwards I noticed she was down by the head, when I was by No. 6 boat. When I left No. 4 and went to No. 6 she was distinctly down by the head, and I

¹³⁹ Br. 1375-1377.

¹⁴⁰ <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/occupancy.pdf>

¹⁴¹ *Cheshire Observer*, May 18, 1912.

think it was while working at that boat [No. 6] it was noticed that she had a pretty heavy list to port.¹⁴²

Later in his testimony, Lightoller reiterated his belief that *Titanic* had a list to port “about when I was at boat No. 6.”¹⁴³ In fact, Lightoller was asked if he ever noticed a list to starboard and he said: “Not that I am aware of, and I think I should have noticed it in lowering the boat [No. 6].” The Second Officer claimed that Chief Officer Wilde gave the order, “All passengers over to the starboard side” while he was “dealing with Boat No. 6,” to help give the ship “a righting movement.”¹⁴⁴

Two other witnesses also described an early port list. In the British Inquiry, Quartermaster George Rowe described the ship listing to port, when he headed from the aft Docking Bridge to the forward Bridge.¹⁴⁵ This was sometime after 12:47 a.m., when the first distress rocket was fired by Fourth Officer Boxhall. It was at this point that Rowe noticed a lifeboat in the water and called the Bridge. If accurate, this would mean the ship listed to port *prior* to Boats Nos. 8 and 6 lowering, not starboard. Oddly, Rowe’s British Inquiry testimony here contradicted his earlier American Inquiry testimony, where he noted that *Titanic* “did not list, so far as I know, until the time when my boat [Collapsible C] was lowered.”¹⁴⁶ Bathroom Steward Alfred Crawford’s testimony backed up Rowe’s British Inquiry testimony, however; he responded ‘yes’ when asked, in reference to the lowering of Boat No. 8, ‘There was a list to port, was there not?’¹⁴⁷

We feel that Lightoller, Rowe and Crawford were likely incorrect about there being a port list that early in the sinking; the majority of the evidence indicates that the starboard list reversed to a port side list a bit later in the disaster. However, the completely contradictory evidence on whether a list was or was not present at No. 6, or indeed, which side the ship seemed to be listing to at the time if there *was* a list, does illustrate the dangers of Halpern relying on such a small number of eyewitness statements on the direction or degree of list to draw a firm conclusion on the sequence in which Nos. 8 and 6 lowered. It is unreasonable to rely on such a narrow swath of eyewitness evidence of a port list as No. 6 lowered, when there is at least as much evidence contradicting the point, and then to use that as a foundation on which to base a conclusion that No. 6 left before No. 8; it is patently ludicrous to then claim that this conclusion that No. 6 must have left first, already on very shaky ground, is more accurate than the entire body of evidence supporting the conclusion that No. 8 left before No.

¹⁴² Br. 13852.

¹⁴³ Br. 13861.

¹⁴⁴ Br. 13867-13868.

¹⁴⁵ Br. 17675-17677.

¹⁴⁶ Am. 523.

¹⁴⁷ Br. 17928-17946.

6, and to then conclude that this overwhelming body of evidence pointing to No. 8 departing first *must* be mistaken.

Halpern does not consider other possibilities, such as survivors simply not mentioning a starboard list at No. 8, even if there was one. This is not implausible, considering that just two out of 23 survivors in No. 6 seemed to notice a list during the lowering of that boat. In fact, while no survivors in No. 8 seem to have specifically mentioned a starboard list as it lowered away, a number of survivors did describe the presence of a starboard list just prior to when it began lowering.

Ironically, one of the survivors who gave a description of the presence of a list prior to No. 8 leaving was Quartermaster Hichens. In the previously-described account where Hichens stated that he witnessed Isidor and Ida Straus refuse to part, which happened at Boat No. 8, he mentioned the following in the sentence just prior to his description of that tragic scene:

Millionaires stood shoulder to shoulder with ordinary men, gazing at the sullen water that appeared even nearer as the ship's list grew more pronounced.¹⁴⁸

Although he did not say which side the ship was listing to in this quote, neither Halpern nor we suggest that *Titanic* was carrying a port side list this early; that only came later on. If a starboard list was present as the Strauses refused to part at No. 8 and this was before Hichens left the ship in No. 6, then it stands to reason that a starboard list was present while No. 8 was lowering away.

First Class passenger Margaret Swift provided a more detailed description of the list, describing what happened as she waited to board No. 8:

I might have gone in the first [lifeboat to leave the ship], but I did not believe that there was any real danger, and I hesitated to get down in an open boat at 1 o'clock in the morning when our own ship seemed to be perfectly safe. One of the passengers - he went down with the *Titanic*, poor fellow, called my attention to a *list to starboard* [authors' emphasis] but I did not notice it. Somebody said that a ship always listed a bit when she struck anything. The boats were supplied with lights and we could see them dropping into the water from the [unintelligible] bulk of the vessel's hull.

As I said, we did not stay alongside, but pulled away hard as we could for the light that had been pointed out to us.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ *The Kerryman*, May 11, 1935. Courtesy of George Behe.

¹⁴⁹ *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, April 19, 1912.

Fellow First Class passenger Eloise Smith also described the presence of a starboard list right after stepping out of the first boat [No. 8], moments before it lowered away, to rejoin her husband on the Boat Deck while Boat No. 6 was loading:

My husband dragged me a little way toward where the second boat [No. 6] was filled with women.

As her husband Lucian pleaded with her to board No. 6 and she clung to him, she described the following:

Then the ship listed - and there came a great slant in the deck *toward starboard* [authors' emphasis] and toward the bow.¹⁵⁰

While it can be established that the starboard list was present starting in the moments following the collision with the iceberg, perhaps the bow continuing to tip downward made it more noticeable to Mrs. Smith at that very point in time. This was just after she saw a boat, which could only have been No. 8, lowering away. This is strong evidence that a starboard list was indeed present as No. 8 departed.

Fellow First Class passenger Caroline Bonnell also described a starboard list being present when she first reached the Boat Deck, after having initially been told by a crewman to go up to A Deck. While up top, Bonnell observed: "There was no confusion here even yet, although we noticed that the boat was beginning to list toward starboard." After remaining on the Boat Deck for an hour, Bonnell boarded No. 8, which then lowered away. As the boat began rowing away from *Titanic*, "then we noticed in a few minutes that the *Titanic* began to list more heavily."¹⁵¹ Her previous description indicates that she was using the term list correctly.

First Class passenger Marjorie Newell also described a list during the loading of the early port side boats. Since she stated repeatedly that her boat, No. 6, was the second boat on that side to lower away, her descriptions of a list place it right during the loading of No. 8. In one account she said:

People were already considering getting into lifeboats. It seemed more dangerous to do that than to stay on the ship, because we knew it was unsinkable. Then the ship began to list.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ *Public Ledger*, April 24, 1912. Reproduced in *Gilded Tragedy, West Virginia's Titanic Widow*, by Brandon Whited, 2019.

¹⁵¹ *Decatur Review*, April 19, 1912. Reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic: Memories of the Maiden Voyage*, Behe, George (Lulu, 2011).

¹⁵² *Pomona Progress-Bulletin*, April 8, 1962. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

In another account, she gave a further description of the state of the ship when she reached the Boat Deck, stating: “I remember distinctly the great *Titanic* tilting to one side. That was a giveaway as to what was to happen.”¹⁵³ Although she did not state which side the ship was listing to, a majority of other eyewitnesses refer to a starboard list being present at the time.

All of these accounts show that Halpern’s reliance on the description of a starboard list by Hichens as Boat No. 6 lowered away is not reason enough to throw out all of the eyewitness evidence indicating that Boat No. 8 departed prior to No. 6, in favor of his preferred scenario. All of the evidence must be examined as a whole, whether looking at angles of list and trim or any other subject. Our analysis of eyewitness statements leads us to believe that there was a starboard list present at the loading and lowering of *both* Boats Nos. 8 and 6. Thus, a starboard list during the launching of No. 6 can not be used as evidence that No. 6 left first.

Boatswain Nichols and the Boats Nos. 1 and 6 Launch Sequence:

When one studies the movements and sightings of Boatswain Alfred Nichols, another significant problem with Halpern’s lifeboat sequence emerges. In his testimony in the British Inquiry, Lookout George Symons was asked about the circumstances in which Boat No. 1 was lowered away with so few occupants aboard. Symons stated the following:

11780. Can you explain to my Lord how it is that this order was given for your boat [No. 1] to go away with only five passengers?

- I cannot say, Sir.

11781. Was there any person directing operations on the boat deck besides Mr. Murdoch?

- Mr. Murdoch and the boatswain.

11782. Who is the boatswain?

- Nichols.¹⁵⁴

Earlier in his testimony, Symons had mentioned that Nichols was also involved in the loading of Boats Nos. 3 and 5.¹⁵⁵ The fact that Symons remembered Nichols being involved in the launch of Boat No. 1 becomes a significant issue for Halpern when one examines the accounts of Second Officer Lightoller. Lightoller indicated – both in his 1912 inquiry testimony and his 1935 book – that while

¹⁵³ *Cape Cod Times*, April 15, 2012. Courtesy of Mike Poirier. This is a quote from an audio recording Marjorie made in 1986, which is held by the Westport Historical Society.

¹⁵⁴ Br. 11780-11782.

¹⁵⁵ Br. 11435.

he was working on Boat No. 6, he had ordered Boatswain Nichols and six sailors below deck to open the gangway doors.¹⁵⁶ However, Halpern has Boats Nos. 3 and 1, both of which Nichols was involved with, lowering at 12:55 a.m. and 1:05 a.m., respectively. Halpern also has No. 6 lowering at 12:55 a.m., *at the same time as No. 3*. Clearly Nichols could not have been in two places at once, and on opposite sides of the ship at that.

Whatever else may be true about the launch sequence, this evidence proves that Boat No. 6 lowered *after* Boat No. 1. Halpern's version, already looking implausible, is rendered impossible on this point alone. Indeed, this evidence strongly aligns with our conclusion that No. 1 began lowering at 1:05 a.m. and that No. 6 lowered away shortly thereafter at 1:10 a.m. This sequence and timing would have given Nichols plenty of time to cross over to port, and to No. 6, before being ordered below by Lightoller to open the gangway doors. This conclusion also strongly suggests that No. 8 departed before No. 6, since No. 8 clearly did not leave after 1:10 a.m.

Additional evidence supporting this comes from the fact that Boat No. 8 departed with two Able Bodied Seamen aboard. There was a shortage of sailors at both boats, Nos. 8 and 6, but Steward Alfred Crawford stated that Captain Smith and a steward lowered the forward falls of Boat No. 8.¹⁵⁷ This may have made it possible to send two sailors with that boat. On the other hand, there was significant difficulty securing any seamen for Boat No. 6. When it began to lower, the boat was manned only by Quartermaster Hichens and Lookout Fleet, with no Able Bodied Seamen aboard. As a result, the boat had to stop at C Deck so Major Peuchen could climb down the falls and help man the boat. Since there were already few Able Bodied Seamen available at No. 8, when it lowered away, and Second Officer Lightoller subsequently sent Boatswain Nichols and six sailors to open the gangway doors while No. 6 was being loaded, a clear picture begins to emerge of how the shortage of trained sailors began to get worse as No. 6 loaded and lowered away. Yet if Boat No. 8 had really departed after No. 6, as Halpern suggests, then we could not expect the shortage of sailors to be worse at No. 6 than it was at No. 8. The fact that No. 6 was so undermanned when it left clearly indicates that Boat No. 6 departed after No. 8.

Conclusions Regarding Boats Nos. 8 and 6:

In relying on Hichens' one statement of a starboard list during the lowering of Boat No. 6, Halpern mistakenly concluded that No. 6 launched first, and that this list had eased by the time No. 8 was lowered. As we have seen, however, the majority of the evidence indicates that Boat No. 8 left before

¹⁵⁶ Am. 432; Br. 13900-13906; Lightoller, Charles, *Titanic and Other Ships*, Chapter 32, 1935.

¹⁵⁷ Am. 113.

No. 6. We have also seen that the very premise for Halpern’s conclusion that No. 6 left before No. 8 – the starboard list – is meaningless since a number of people in the area as Boats Nos. 8 and 6 loaded and lowered mentioned a starboard list. Halpern either did not find or did not use the other evidence indicating a list at both of these boats. In point of fact, only later on would *Titanic*’s list completely flatten out, and only after that would she begin to list over to port – a subject that we will address later on.

Quite simply, we have far more evidence available to us today that supports No. 8 leaving *Titanic* before No. 6 than we did when we first wrote and released the lifeboat launch article in 2001. The case for this conclusion is stronger, not weaker, than it was 25 and more years ago. The known movements of Boatswain Nichols, who was present at Boat No. 1 and then crossed to the port side, and who was subsequently ordered by Lightoller to go below and open the gangway doors as No. 6 was starting to load, is particularly compelling.

Indeed, instead of stubbornly sticking to old conclusions just to say “we were right all along”, our consideration of newly-discovered evidence has allowed us to clarify our conclusions on this point. How so? The picture of how much time separated Nos. 8 and 6 has become even clearer. At one time, we considered whether the two boats left the deck at nearly the same time,¹⁵⁸ but that No. 8 reached the water first when No. 6 paused so that Peuchen could board; however, the evidence that has come to light since then has forced us to actually put more time between the launching of the two boats as we have learned more.

We are forced to follow the preponderance of evidence, and conclude that Boat No. 8 left before Boat No. 6, and that No. 6 had to have lowered after Boat No. 1 on the starboard side, just as we concluded in 2001.

¹⁵⁸ *Titanic Real Time Sinking - Historian Edition*, published May 9, 2021, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PboGLRAEwFU&t=59s>.

SECTION 2:

The Timing of the Aft Boats' Departure

Another area where Halpern's conclusions diverges widely from our own has to do with the general timing of the launch of the aft boats. In a major variance from our previous findings – especially regarding the aft-starboard boats, Nos. 9, 11, 13, 15 – Halpern advances the launch time for No. 9 forward by as much as 15 minutes over our original conclusions. Although Halpern stayed with our launch time for No. 16 (1:20 a.m.), the relationship he postulates between Boats Nos. 9 (aft starboard) and 14 (aft port) changed dramatically as he advanced No. 9's launch time forward. Halpern also switches the departure order of Nos. 12 and 14 from our findings. So what does the evidence indicate, and are there any areas where we again can refine our previous findings? We will look at the matter from several directions.

The Lowering of Boat No. 1:

In addition to helping us anchor the relative launch times of Boats Nos. 1 and 6, through Boatswain Nichols, the launch time of Boat No. 1 can also help us determine how early the aft port and starboard boats could have been launched. Because the subsequent movements of several crewmembers who assisted in lowering No. 1 are specifically known – including those of Fifth Officer Lowe, Boatswain Nichols and Able Bodied Seamen Evans and Buley – the timing of the lowering of No. 1 is a key factor.

In our original article, we concluded that No. 1 started lowering at 1:05 a.m. This conclusion was based on a range of evidence related to the launch times of forward-starboard boats, Nos. 7, 5, 3 and 1, taken in relation to each other. Our previous 1:05 a.m. departure time for No. 1 remains our current conclusion. Ironically, and importantly, in his lifeboat article Halpern still agrees with our launch times for Boats Nos. 7, 5, 3, and 1. As with all the lifeboat launch times in our original article, these represent the time when the lifeboats *began* lowering, *not* when they reached the water.

Since the publication of our original article, we found further evidence which supports the conclusion that No. 1 started down at around 1:05 a.m. For example, First Class passenger Abraham Salomon gave an account indicating that prior to boarding No. 1, he was on deck and went back down below to his cabin on E Deck in order to retrieve a proper pair of glasses, rather than the “nose pinchers” he was wearing, since they would be more difficult to dislodge if he had to “get in and out of boats.” Salomon stated: “[When] I opened my stateroom door the water was rushing in...” He hurried

back on deck, recalling: “I didn’t look at my watch when we got into the dinghy [No. 1] and put off, but I had looked not long before and it must have been about 1 o’clock.”¹⁵⁹ Allowing for a few minutes’ variability on his time piece and for time for him to get into the boat, his observation from his time-piece supports a 1:05 a.m. time for the start of No. 1 lowering.

During the lowering process, No. 1 got stuck below B Deck. Lookout George Symons stated: “When we were lowered down, just below B deck, we got hung up by a wire guy.”¹⁶⁰ Able Bodied Seaman Evans also testified regarding this:

Mr. EVANS. ... As soon as we lowered the starboard action boat [No. 1] to the next deck the gripes of the boat caught and we had to cut them with an axe.

Senator SMITH. What happened to that?

Mr. EVANS. We had to cut it away.

Senator SMITH. Did it get caught in the gear?

Mr. EVANS. Yes, the gripes we use in the lowering of the boat; it caught up underneath, or else it had not been untied. I could not look at it, because it was holding it in.

Senator SMITH. It was chopped away with an axe?

Mr. EVANS. Chopped away with an axe, sir.¹⁶¹

First Class passenger Charles Stengel described this same incident:

We had difficulty in lowering the boat, and it was by the merest chance that we were not all dumped out into the sea, as its painter stuck so we had to cut it with a knife in order to loosen the boat and permit ourselves to be lowered to the water.¹⁶²

In another account, he said:

My boat met with difficulty right at the start. Its painter was stuck fast and it was only after considerable time had been spent that she was finally loosened and lowered... Someone came down on the next deck and chopped it away...¹⁶³

¹⁵⁹ *The American Stationer*, April 19, 1913. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

¹⁶⁰ Br. 11454.

¹⁶¹ Am. 683.

¹⁶² *Newark Evening Star*, April 19, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

¹⁶³ *Newark Star*, April 19, 1912.

First Class passenger Laura Francatelli, who was Lady Duff Gordon's secretary, also described the trouble at No. 1, giving a dramatic description, similar to Stengel's, stating that "it got caught up at one side and nearly hurled us all into the water."¹⁶⁴ In another account, she said that as No. 1 "began to lower away," that "the boat became hooked up on something." An officer said: "[']Look out below, ['] and threw down a length of steel which jarred the lifeboat loose."¹⁶⁵ All of this would have taken, as Stengel said, "considerable time." The result was that No. 1 only reached the water approximately 10 minutes after lowering began, or around 1:15 a.m. This accounts for the approximate 5-6 minutes from 1:05 that it would take the lifeboat to lower to the water, plus an additional 4-5 minutes for them to free up the boat after it was hung up.¹⁶⁶

A significant fact pertains to which officers were at No. 1 at the time. We can establish – from, amongst other sources, the testimony of Symons – that First Officer Murdoch was in charge and ordered No. 1 to begin lowering away. In fact, as Symons sat in the boat as it began descending, Murdoch told him to "take charge of that boat."¹⁶⁷ In his testimony, Able Bodied Seaman Albert Horswill also indicated that Murdoch personally gave the order to lower away. When asked how he knew it was Murdoch, Horswill stated: "We have been together long enough, we ought to know each other."¹⁶⁸ Horswill had served with Murdoch on *Oceanic* several years before the disaster. Francatelli's account suggests that Murdoch remained there at least until the point where No. 1 was freed and resumed lowering to the water, and that he was the officer who threw down the "length of steel" to help free the boat.¹⁶⁹

However, there is some evidence that Murdoch may have moved on shortly thereafter: Fifth Officer Lowe, by his own testimony, assisted at No. 1 and remained there until it actually reached the water, recounting how he "hollered down" once the boat was in the water, asking who was in charge. If Murdoch was then still in the area, Lowe could easily have asked him who was in charge of the lifeboat; instead, the recollection creates the feeling of an officer in charge of the scene making sure that everything has been taken care of before the boat gets too far away.

¹⁶⁴ Affidavit, sold by Aldridge Auction House, Oct. 16, 2011. Courtesy of George Behe.

¹⁶⁵ Private letter written by Laura Francatelli, April 18, 1912.

¹⁶⁶ As noted earlier, 5-6 minutes is the quickest estimate for how quickly a lifeboat could be lowered 60 feet using the 6-to-1 pulley arrangement on the falls. It is entirely possible that it could have taken longer, making our 1:15 a.m. time estimate a conservative one, based on James Cameron's experiment with a full-sized replica of a *Titanic* lifeboat and davits, and without taking into consideration that water had reached E Deck by that point in the sinking, and the boat would have had to lower somewhat less than 60 feet.

¹⁶⁷ Br. 11454 & 11459.

¹⁶⁸ Br. 12400.

¹⁶⁹ Francatelli doesn't mention Murdoch by name, but states that he died, and suggests that he committed suicide. Clearly, this is a reference to Murdoch and not Lowe.

Lowe stated that he “next went across the deck”; he ended up on the completely opposite corner of the deck, approaching Nos. 16 and 14 on the aft port side.¹⁷⁰ Murdoch did not survive to testify, but his subsequent movements can be deduced from witnesses who saw him following his departure from the scene at Boat No. 1.

The errand to retrieve the revolvers:

In our original lifeboat findings, we concluded that Boat No. 6 lowered away around 1:10 a.m. As we stated earlier, Quartermaster Hichens stated that Master-At-Arms Bailey, who was in Boat No. 16, “left about the same time as we [No. 6] did.”¹⁷¹ Halpern agrees with our conclusion that Boat No. 16 began lowering at 1:20 a.m., yet ignored Hichens’ testimony on the timing relationship between the two boats, concluding that Boat No. 6 lowered away 25 minutes before No. 16, at 12:55 a.m. The timing of Boat No. 6’s lowering is very important, however. How so?

In his book, Second Officer Lightoller stated that at “about” the time that Arthur Peuchen was sent down the falls into Boat No. 6, Chief Officer Wilde approached him, asking if he knew where the revolvers were. Due to Second Officer Blair having been transferred off the ship just prior to the maiden voyage, Henry Wilde being brought aboard as Chief Officer, Murdoch being temporarily demoted from Chief to First Officer and Lightoller from First Officer to Second, Lightoller knew that the guns were stored in the First Officer’s cabin, which had originally been his quarters, while Murdoch did not:

It was about this time that the Chief Officer came over from the starboard side and asked, did I know where the firearms were?

As I pointed out before, it was the First Officer’s responsibility to receive firearms, navigation instruments, and so forth. I have also said firearms on merchant ships are looked on as ornamental more than useful, and as First Officer I had simply hove the lot into a locker, in my original cabin, a locker that was of little use owing to its inaccessibility.

Then, later on, had come the “general post,” whereby Murdoch who was now First Officer, knew nothing about the firearms, and couldn’t find them when they were wanted—I say wanted, rather than needed, because I still don’t believe they were actually needed.

I told the Chief Officer, “Yes, I know where they are. Come along and I’ll get them

¹⁷⁰ Am. 405-406.

¹⁷¹ Am. 453.

for you,” and into the First Officer’s cabin we went—the Chief, Murdoch, the Captain and myself—where I hauled them out, still in all their pristine newness and grease.

I was going out when the Chief shoved one of the revolvers into my hands, with a handful of ammunition, and said, “Here you are, you may need it.” On the impulse, I just slipped it into my pocket, along with the cartridges, and returned to the boats. The whole incident had not taken more than three minutes, though it seemed barely worth that precious time.¹⁷²

Lightoller was the sole survivor of this group of officers. The question is whether he remembered the timing of this event correctly, particularly since he generalized it as having happened “*about* this time.” Due to the Second Officer’s suggested timing, it has often been speculated that the errand to retrieve the revolvers happened after the lowering of Boats Nos. 1 and 6. Needless to say, there is a limited window for when this trip could have happened, since we know that these officers had revolvers by the time the aft lifeboats began loading.

Yet there are also problems with Lightoller’s recollections. For starters, in his 1935 book, the narrative jumped around a good deal, and Lightoller made inarguable errors in the order of what happened; for example, he clearly mistook Boat No. 4 as the first boat he loaded with women and children when his work on that particular boat clearly happened much later on. More importantly, we know that his 1935 book places this specific trip to find the revolvers at a *vastly* different time than what Lightoller recalled in 1912. In that earlier account, Lightoller actually indicated that the trip to find the revolvers had happened shortly before Collapsible B was brought down from the roof of the Officers’ Quarters.¹⁷³ Certainly both can’t be true. Clearly, although specific events that Lightoller recalled in his accounts are probably trustworthy, because of his many contradictions and memory issues, there is a lot of room to interpret his statements on the order of the events he described, and the chronological relationship between them.

Interestingly, there is evidence that First Officer Murdoch, not Wilde, may have been the officer who began searching for the revolvers. After First Class passengers Henry and Isaac Frauenthal jumped down into Boat No. 5 as it lowered away at 12:45 a.m., injuring Annie Stengel, First Class passenger Charles Stengel heard the officer in charge state: “I will stop that. I will go down and get my gun,” then leave the deck, returning shortly thereafter.¹⁷⁴ Fellow First Class passenger Washington Dodge Jr. also witnessed this, hearing the officer state “that he was going to go below decks and get

¹⁷² Lightoller, Charles, *Titanic and Other Ships*, Chapter 33, 1935.

¹⁷³ *The Christian Science Journal*, October 1912.

¹⁷⁴ Am. 975.

his gun, if the pushing didn't stop."¹⁷⁵ His father, Dr. Washington Dodge, corroborated this story, stating that the following happened, after he placed his wife and child into Boat No. 5:

Thirty-one persons got in [No. 5]. They were nearly all women, but a few men jumped in into [*sic*] this boat as she was being lowered, seeing again all that was left. This caused [First Officer] Murdoch to say that he must get his revolver, and he did go and get it from his room *before* [authors' emphasis] launching the next boat [No. 3].¹⁷⁶

There is no evidence that Third Officer Pitman was ever armed. Was this when the guns were retrieved?

As an important aside, this incident at No. 5, recalled by Dr. Dodge, his son, and Stengel, is not to be confused with an incident during the loading of No. 3 reported by First Class passenger Henry Harper: "Four or five stokers or some such men came along and jumped into the boat at the forward end. The sailor who seemed to be in charge of the boat laughed a little. 'Huh' he said, 'I suppose I ought to go and get my gun and stop this'." Even though Harper stated that the man "did not go and get any gun",¹⁷⁷ it is likely that he was mistaken, and that the "sailor who seemed to be in charge" at No. 3 was Fifth Officer Lowe, who had recently arrived on the forward starboard side, and who reportedly, after having initially assisted at the forward starboard boats, returned to his room quickly to retrieve his personal Browning automatic pistol, because "you never know when you will need it". Because his quarters were so close by, if he left the deck briefly, his absence may have been easily missed because it was so short.¹⁷⁸

Getting back to the incident surrounding Boat No. 5, Lightoller did point out that Chief Officer Wilde had come "over from the starboard side" when he approached the Second Officer about the guns. Perhaps he had just spoken with Murdoch? If so, Murdoch, who, due to the switch up in officer ranks, "knew nothing about the firearms," may have been unable to find them when he began his search.

Halpern, in comments on the Encyclopedia Titanica message boards on, September 14, 2022, highlighted what Lightoller said in his book about the timing of this incident, using it to support the

¹⁷⁵ From an article named "60 Years Ago The Titanic Went Down" (paper unknown) containing an interview with the young Washington Dodge. Account courtesy of Mike Poirier.

¹⁷⁶ *Pittsburgh Daily Dispatch*, April 27, 1912. Courtesy of George Behe.

¹⁷⁷ *Harper's Weekly*, April 27, 1912.

¹⁷⁸ Am. 388-391. Lowe then stated that after getting his revolver, he returned to the starboard side and helped lower No. 5. Interestingly, Lowe gave contradictory evidence on which boat was the first that he assisted at, stating more than once in the American Inquiry that it was No. 5, while stating in the British Inquiry (Br. 15799-15818) and his deposition for the British Inquiry, that he assisted in loading and lowering No. 7 first.

notion that Boat No. 6 lowered first: “Having Wilde come over from the starboard side after Lightoller launched #6 does fit in with #6 being launched before #8. My guess is that he first went to ask Murdoch if he knew where the arms were since Murdoch was the 1/O at that time. Murdoch didn’t know, and so Wilde would have gone over to the port side to ask Lightoller who used to be the 1/O before the officer shakeup.” However, there is evidence that the officers were armed prior to when Lightoller claimed in his 1935 book, rendering this point moot.

When looking at the evidence of Dr. Dodge, his son, and Stengel, placing the errand to retrieve the guns happening after the incidents surrounding the loading and lowering of No. 5 makes sense. It also matches up well with evidence that the officers had received their revolvers before either No. 8 or No. 6 were lowered away. For example, as mentioned earlier, Third Class passenger Fahim Al-Za inni managed to sneak aboard Boat No. 6, thus becoming one of the very first Steerage passengers to escape the ship. However, he described the following happening before that point, when he had first tried to board Boat No. 8:

The first lifeboat just getting ready to lower away. I walked up to this and tried to get in, but the officer on duty there said, “Stand back, women and children go first.” I did so. But as there seemed to be no great desire on the part of many of the favored ones to get into the boat I tried again. This time the officer said, “Try that again and I’ll blow out your brains.” The sight of a revolver made me think that he meant business and so I took his advice.¹⁷⁹

Al-Za inni subsequently snuck aboard Boat No. 6. We have already shown the strong body of evidence that No. 8 lowered away before No. 6. The fact that officers were already armed during the loading of No. 8 suggests that the trip to fetch the revolvers had taken place even before that point.

As mentioned previously, First Class passenger Mary “Zette” Douglas appears to have witnessed this incident at No. 8, prior to leaving in Boat No. 6. She stated that the officer “put a revolver to the man’s temple, and was going to shoot him..”¹⁸⁰ Fellow First Class passenger Edith Chibnall, also rescued in No. 6, stated that “it was necessary for Captain Smith to drive them [Steerage passengers] away from the lifeboats at the point of a revolver.”¹⁸¹ Quartermaster Hichens, also rescued in No. 6, testified to the following:

¹⁷⁹ *Youngstown Daily Vindicator*, April 27, 1912.

¹⁸⁰ *The Evening Journal*, April 22, 1912.

¹⁸¹ *New York Herald*, April 19, 1912.

1327. Can you tell me whether any steps were taken to prevent passengers approaching the boat?

- Steps were taken as regards the male passengers. They had to stand back and let the women and children get in the boats first. That was the order, Sir.

1328. What method was adopted to see to that?

- All the Officers had revolvers, as far as I am aware of, Sir.¹⁸²

In a detailed newspaper interview, which largely matched his inquiry testimony, Hichens elaborated further, stating “how the officers stood with revolvers drawn, to enforce, if the emergency should arise, that rule of the sea of women first..”¹⁸³

All of these accounts mentioning the officers brandishing revolvers at both Nos. 8 and 6 suggest that the errand to retrieve the firearms did happen as early as the lowering of Boat No. 5, since the officers involved in the loading of either No. 8 or No. 6 in some capacity (Smith, Wilde and Lightoller) were armed as a consequence of this excursion to Murdoch’s quarters.

The logical conclusion from this evidence is that sometime after Boat No. 5 began lowering away at 12:45 a.m., but prior to Boat No. 8 starting to lower away at 1:00 a.m. (Halpern concludes 1:05 a.m.), the senior officers retrieved the revolvers from Murdoch’s cabin. It seems likely that Dr. Dodge and Stengel saw Murdoch leave to go on this very errand and quickly return, during the lowering of Boat No. 5, placing it closer to 12:45 a.m. Dr. Dodge actually specified that Murdoch was armed before lowering the next boat, No. 3. This disproves the timing given by Lightoller in his book, when he said it happened “about” the time that Peuchen climbed down the falls into No. 6. However, it does accord with his suggestion that the whole affair “had not taken more than three minutes.”

This timing for the gun errand also makes sense, since Murdoch’s absence would help explain the 10-minute gap between the lowering of No. 5 at 12:45 a.m. and No. 3, which began lowering at 12:55 a.m. These are both times that Halpern and we agree on. Despite the briefness of the trip, the temporary abandonment of the forward port lifeboats by the senior officers during their preparation for loading was noticed by some aboard. First Class passenger Arthur Peuchen stated:

On deck on the port side lifeboats were being swung out, but scratch crews were working them and there was much confusion. The sailors did not seem to know how

¹⁸² Br. 1327-1328.

¹⁸³ Mowbray, Jay Henry, *The Sinking of the Titanic*, Ch. 18, 1912.

to manage the boats. I got into one boat [Boat No. 8] because there was no crew there and I took out the small sail and mast to make more room.¹⁸⁴

This confusion was one reason, amongst several, why the forward port boats began lowering away much later than the forward starboard ones. The delay was increased even further, when, during or just prior to the loading of Boat No. 6, Lightoller sent Boatswain Alfred Nichols and six other seamen below deck to open the gangway doors.¹⁸⁵ These men did not subsequently return to Lightoller, leading to a shortage of trained seamen available to assist the officers on the port side, going forward.¹⁸⁶

Furthermore, if Murdoch left the scene at Boat No. 5 to find the revolvers as the lowering process was starting, his absence may have set the stage for the famous event between Ismay and Fifth Officer Lowe, during the lowering of that lifeboat. At about the time that No. 5 had started down, Lowe had arrived, and under Murdoch's orders, Lowe oversaw the lowering process, personally working at one of the falls. Ismay excitedly called out "Lower away! Lower away! Lower away! Lower away!" while waving his arms. Not recognizing Ismay as his boss, Lowe erupted at him: "Do you want me to lower away quickly? You will have me drown the whole lot of them!" Ismay silently proceeded to Boat No. 3 to help there.¹⁸⁷

With Third Officer Pitman actually in No. 5, the Frauenthal brothers leaping into the boat as it started away, and Murdoch in response audibly saying that he was leaving to obtain his revolver, a rather cohesive picture emerges on how Murdoch's absence might have led to the situation where Ismay felt the need to intervene at Boat No. 3 in this rather agitated manner. Lowe was in charge of the lowering process, but was actually working the fall on the deck near Ismay's feet; the lowering process was not going well, with one end of the boat tipping down, threatening to spill the passengers out, and then the process repeating at the other end. Surely if Murdoch had simply proceeded directly to No. 3 a few feet away, he might have stepped back to help smooth the situation out? Instead, with him entirely out of the area for those minutes, Ismay may have felt an absence of authority and a need to intervene.

Proving that the revolvers were handed out sometime after 12:45 a.m., but before No. 8 lowered away at 1:00 a.m., as well as the evidence that Murdoch apparently did not remain on the scene until

¹⁸⁴ *The Sun*, April 20, 1912.

¹⁸⁵ Am. 85-86; Am. 432; Lightoller, Charles, *Titanic and Other Ships*, Chapter 33.

¹⁸⁶ Nichols was subsequently seen on A Deck during the loading of Boat No. 13 by Leading Fireman Barrett (*Manchester Guardian*, April 29, 1912) and later, at Boat No. 2 by Saloon Watchman Johnstone (Br. 3511). This proves that Nichols and the other seamen sent below by Second Officer Lightoller did not drown below deck, as has often been asserted.

¹⁸⁷ Amer. 389-390.

Boat No. 1 reached the water at 1:15 a.m., leads to another question: where did Murdoch go following his departure from the scene at No. 1, since it wasn't to get the guns? There is a gap in his established movements between helping free Boat No. 1 after it was hung up at B Deck and the lowering of the next starboard boat, No. 9, at 1:32 a.m. (We concluded Boat No. 9 launched at 1:30 a.m. in our original lifeboat article. The reasoning for this change will be discussed later in this article.) As will be seen in the next section, however, there are witnesses who very well may explain where he went during this time period.

Movements of the crew from forward to aft:

During his inquiry testimony, Fifth Officer Lowe was asked why he went from No. 1 on the forward-starboard side to No. 14 on the aft-port side. He said: "Because they seemed to be busy there."¹⁸⁸ While Lowe didn't elaborate further, his comment is a reference to the crowd of individuals which were swelling at the aft port boats and beginning to get unruly. He did not specify whether he went to that location, rather than simply heading to the aft starboard boats, by order or by his own decision.

Why crowds of men began to congregate at the aft-port boats specifically is somewhat puzzling, considering that the officers and crew had difficulty finding passengers even willing to get into the early forward port and starboard boats just minutes before. For example, when it started lowering at around 1:05 a.m., Boat No. 1 had just 12 of its 40 seats occupied; Boat No. 6, which according to our research began lowering around 1:10 a.m., reached the water with around 23 of its 65 seats occupied.¹⁸⁹ There were still multiple lifeboats being prepared for loading on both the aft port and starboard side, as well as remaining forward boats on both sides of the ship.

First Class passenger Laura Francatelli appears to have noticed this movement of passengers aft to the port side, during the loading of No. 1: "After all the lifeboats had gone, everybody seemed to rush to the other side of the boat, & leave ours [No. 1] vacant."¹⁹⁰ The question is, why were passengers heading elsewhere?

First Class passenger Dr. Washington Dodge speculated on these movements, suggesting the following:

At no time were there that many people on the starboard side that night. Why was that? The most reasonable explanation that I can give is that the captain was in charge of the launching of boats on port side. Now, in times of danger the captain always

¹⁸⁸ Br. 15830.

¹⁸⁹ <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/occupancy.pdf>

¹⁹⁰ Letter written by Francatelli to a "Mary Ann," dated April 28, 1912. Courtesy of Paul Lee and available in full on his website at the following URL: <https://www.paullee.com/titanic/lfrancatelli.php>

draws a crowd. The more notable men on board, who were known by sight to the other passengers, knew Captain Smith personally and remained near him. These men attracted others. In this way the crowd grew on the port side, while at no time was there anything like a crowd on the starboard side.¹⁹¹

Dodge admitted that he remained on the starboard side during the sinking, and therefore did not directly know anything about what transpired there. Dodge's speculation may have been one factor in the crowd congregating on the aft port side, but there was also a more specific, concrete reason for it.

As we mentioned in our original lifeboat article, Second Class passenger Lawrence Beesley provided evidence for why this happened. Beesley stated that sometime after the first distress rocket was fired (at 12:47 a.m.¹⁹²) and after the crew had swung out the aft starboard boats, a rumor began to circulate that men were to be taken off on the port side. He was unsure of where the rumor started, but said that it was "acted on at once by almost all the men" who went to watch the preparation for lowering the aft port boats. Beesley said that this left the aft starboard side "almost deserted". This, along with the simultaneous movement of some crewmembers from the starboard side to port, helps explain the delay in loading and lowering the boats on the starboard side, in comparison to when the aft port boats began lowering, a subject we will discuss in greater detail later.¹⁹³

The rumor led to crowds of men gathering on the aft port side, pushing and trying to rush the boats, eventually leading to Lowe having to threaten men with a revolver and fire shots as No. 14 lowered away. Ironically, this rumor also caused men to congregate at a location that made it far less likely for them to board a boat than if they had remained on the aft starboard side. On the port side, Lightoller and the other officers more rigidly followed the rule of women and children *only*, while on the starboard side, Murdoch enforced women and children *first*, then allowing men in if there was still room.

This migration likely explains why Lowe went directly to the aft-port boats; this likely explains why other crewmen – such as Nichols, Evans, and Buley – also went to the port side. Quite simply, at this time there was a clear need for crewmen to work at this 'hotspot' of activity. On the other hand, if the aft-starboard lifeboats were closer to being ready to load and lower away, as Halpern contends – advancing the launch time of the first to lower, No. 9, by 15 minutes over our previous conclusions – one would think after finishing at the forward-starboard boats (7, 5, 3, and 1), the natural place for these officers and crew to go would be to the aft-starboard boats. Instead, they crossed to the other

¹⁹¹ Dodge, Washington, *The Loss of the Titanic*. Reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic*, by George Behe (Lulu edition, 2011).

¹⁹² <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/lifeboats.htm>

¹⁹³ Beesley, Lawrence, *The Loss of the S.S. Titanic*, Chapter 3, 1912.

side of the ship, many of them specifically headed to the aft-port boats, where crowds were then gathering. Furthermore, if activity around the aft-port boats was advanced over work on the aft-starboard boats, this indicates that the aft-port boats were more likely to begin lowering first.

The loading of Boat No. 9 was overseen by Chief Purser Hugh McElroy, Boatswain's Mate Albert Haines, and stewards; they filled the boat with at least 40 individuals – a higher number of occupants than any of the boats previously launched from the forward end of the Boat Deck.¹⁹⁴ With crewmen struggling to find passengers to load the forward-starboard boats just minutes earlier (placing only 12 individuals in Boat No. 1), one is forced to wonder: if No. 9 did launch as early as 1:15 a.m., as Halpern suggests, what suddenly motivated so many passengers to step up to board No. 9 when they weren't willing to do so just prior to this? A launch time for No. 9 as early as 1:15 a.m. makes even less sense when one considers this.

The record shows that when Boat No. 9 was being loaded, there was a shortage of Deck Crew members in the area. Yet when several crewmen and Fifth Officer Lowe left the forward-starboard quarter of the deck after seeing Nos. 7, 5, 3 and 1 away, instead of going directly aft and helping at No. 9, they crossed to the opposite side of the ship. These men would have been very useful hands if Boat No. 9 had been loading and lowering as early as Halpern suggests, at 1:15. Yet they moved elsewhere instead. This indicates that the aft-starboard lifeboats were not as close to loading and launching as the boats on the aft-port side when work at the forward-starboard boats was finished. The Halpern timeline places Boat No. 9's launching at almost precisely the same time that Boat No. 1 reached the water: 1:15 a.m. Yet as we have already seen, Fifth Officer Lowe apparently remained with Boat No. 1 through the entire lowering process, and subsequently 'skipped' things at No. 9 on his way to Nos. 14 and 16, a conclusion that would make little sense.

Here we come upon a very interesting detail: When Saloon Steward William Ward was asked, "Who was superintending this loading," he responded that "Mr. Murdoch, the chief officer" was, and that "Purser McElroy was there, and Mr. Ismay." He mentioned no other officers. In his testimony, Ward made it clear that McElroy was at No. 9 while the canvas cover was being stripped off, during the loading of passengers, and at least up until the point when the Purser ordered Ward into the boat. Ward was uncertain as to whether Murdoch or McElroy gave the order for women and children to be loaded into No. 9, but his testimony made it sound as if McElroy was the crewmember taking the lead at work on this boat, saying that McElroy had even ordered him into it at the end.¹⁹⁵

In our original lifeboat article, we were unable to explain where Murdoch went between leaving the scene of Boat No. 1, before it had reached the water, and his subsequent sightings at Boat No. 9.


¹⁹⁴ <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/occupancy.pdf>

¹⁹⁵ Am. 597-599.

However, a close examination of eyewitness accounts suggests that rather than heading directly to Boat No. 9, Murdoch had instead, like so many others, first headed to the aft-port boats. In fact, if Murdoch was aware of the difficulties there, both with the unruly crowd swelling in size and the general difficulties in getting the port boats away, he may have directed the other crewmembers in question to head to that quadrant of boats, prior to heading there himself.

The testimony of Able Bodied Seaman Ernest Archer suggests just that. After being ordered on deck by the Boatswain, Archer worked on uncovering lifeboats, before proceeding to the forward starboard side, where he assisted in lowering three boats there. Archer stated that “an officer came along - I could not mention his name - and he sang out that they wanted some seamen on the other side, on the port side, to assist over there. I went over then and assisted in getting Nos. 12, 14, and 15

Below: This deck plan shows the aft port lifeboats, and how they were organized around the Second Class regions of the Boat Deck. (Plans by Bruce Beveridge.)



[sic, No. 16] out.”¹⁹⁶ Archer was yet another member of the Deck Crew who went from the forward starboard boats to the aft port boats, rather than aft along the starboard side.

Second Class passenger Charlotte Collyer placed Murdoch at the aft-port boats. Collyer and her family remained on the aft-port side quadrant of the Boat Deck during the sinking; she later gave a detailed account of the events around those boats, and particularly around Boat No. 14. Collyer specifically stated that they remained in the area of the Second Class Promenade, stating: “I never went near the first-cabin promenade deck, so I did not see any of the prominent people on board.” The Second Class Promenade was located on the Boat Deck, just aft of the Engineer’s Promenade.

Collyer mentioned Murdoch repeatedly in her account, stating both his rank *and* his name, which makes it less likely that she was mistaking him for someone else. “He was a masterful man, astoundingly brave and cool,” she recalled. “I had met him the day before, when he was inspecting the second cabin quarters.” She also mentioned the rumors that he committed suicide, which rumors swirled around Murdoch’s name after the disaster, a detail which further cements the notion that she was specifically identifying Murdoch. By the time Charlotte and her daughter were preparing to board Boat No. 14, however, she stated that Lowe was in charge: “First Officer Murdoch had moved to the other end of the deck. I was never close to him again.”¹⁹⁷

Is there any other evidence that Murdoch was seen near the aft port boats, prior to the loading of Boat No. 10 later in the night? The answer is yes. Interestingly, Steward George Crowe said that after going up to the Boat Deck, “when I got outside of the companionway, I saw them working on boat No. 1. After that I went to boat No. 14, the boat allotted to me - that is, in the case of fire or boat drill - and I stood by according to the proceedings of the drill. I assisted in handing the women and children into the boat...” This is another instance of a crewmember who went from the area of Boat No. 1 to the aft-port side. Reaching his post at No. 14, he was asked if he “could take an oar,” and said: “Yes.” During his testimony, he identified the individual who had asked him as the “senior officer. I am not sure whether it was the first officer or the chief officer, sir, but I believe the man’s name was Murdoch.”¹⁹⁸ This makes two survivors who specifically saw Murdoch at Boat No. 14, after No. 1 lowered away.

One unnamed steward was interviewed by a reporter, along with other *Titanic* crewmembers who crossed the Atlantic back to England aboard the *Laplant*. While not identified, the reporter described him as a “young chap, so bronzed and sturdy that I mistook him for an out-and-out seaman.” The unnamed steward gave a detailed account of the sinking and Fifth Officer Lowe’s efforts to organize

¹⁹⁶ Am. 644-645.

¹⁹⁷ *Washington Post Semi-Monthly Magazine*, May 26, 1912.

¹⁹⁸ Am. 615.

his flotilla and return to rescue swimmers in the water. While caution must be taken given the anonymous nature of the account, the account is a sober one, and appears to genuinely come from a crewman who was lowered in No. 14 and assisted with the rescue efforts. Specifically, this crewman said about First Officer Murdoch:

Going on deck the two of us stood by the bulkhead until Mr. Murdoch, who was directing the lowering of boats on the port side, called upon us to help. Mr. Lowe, who was off duty at the time, came and lent a hand. No one could have worked harder than he did.¹⁹⁹

The unnamed crewmember then described working at the aft port boats before departing in No. 14. It appears that this unnamed witness was Crowe himself, since the account matches Crowe's inquiry testimony, while offering some additional details which were not contained in his testimony. Crowe was aged 26 at the time of the sinking, so could be described as a "young chap." Evidence does suggest that Crowe, along with two other stewards, Frank Morris and Alfred Pugh, remained in Boat No. 14 when it rowed back to the site of the sinking to look for survivors.²⁰⁰ However, a comparison between the anonymous account and the testimony of Morris and the account of Pugh, reveals many differences that seem to rule them out as the unnamed witness. As such, the anonymous account, apparently from Crowe, does seem to confirm the extant evidence that it was indeed Murdoch at No. 14, and that Murdoch was working at that boat prior to Lowe arriving on the scene.

In our original lifeboat article, we had written Crowe's account off as mistaken identity. However, in addition to the two accounts above, Leading Fireman Thomas Threlfall also mentioned First Officer Murdoch in connection with Boat No. 14:

I was in Boat No. 14. We have forty-one women in it. Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, sent the boat away, and he said - they were the last words I heard him utter: "Pull away fifty or one hundred yards, and wait for orders. You must look out for wreckage."²⁰¹

In his lifeboat article, Halpern specifically mentions Threlfall's account, acknowledging that Murdoch was likely on the aft port side, a point where we both agree:

¹⁹⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, April 29, 1912.

²⁰⁰ *On a Sea of Glass: The Life & Loss of RMS Titanic*, Fitch, Layton and Wormstedt (Amberley, 2015), Chapter 6.

²⁰¹ *Daily Mirror*, April 29, 1912.

It should be mentioned that Leading Fireman Threlfall, in that *Daily Mirror* article, mentioned that it was First Officer William Murdoch who sent boat No. 14 away with Fifth Officer Lowe in command of the boat. This seems to fit with Murdoch coming over to the port side from the starboard side around 1:30am after ordering No. 13 and 15 to be lowered away.

Halpern's conclusion on timing is clearly erroneous, and doesn't take the other eyewitness statements about the First Officer's presence into account. First of all, Steward Crowe, who went right from No. 1 to the aft port boats, described Murdoch being there when he arrived. Collyer's account is more ambiguous on the timing, but makes it clear that by the time they were preparing to board No. 14, Murdoch "had moved to the other end of the deck." Threlfall does indicate that Murdoch was at No. 14 and ordered it lowered away. Comparing these accounts, it is clear that Murdoch was on location, at a minimum, prior to Lowe arriving and taking over the loading of No. 14, up until the boat was ordered lowered away.

Since Murdoch was already on the aft port side when Crowe arrived from the vicinity of Boat No. 1, and Crowe stated that this was before Lowe arrived, Halpern's assertion that Murdoch arrived at No. 14 after Boat Nos. 13 and 15 were lowered away is clearly incorrect. Halpern also created another issue in the natural flow of Murdoch's movements after departing the scene at Boat No. 1. How so? Halpern concludes that Boats Nos. 13 (starboard) and 14 (port) both began to lower away at 1:30 a.m. However, Lawrence Beesley's account suggests that Murdoch only departed for the port side *after* ordering the boats loading on A Deck, including No. 13, lowered away. Following this, there were two more calls for "Any more ladies," then, with none appearing, Beesley was permitted to jump down into No. 13 from the Boat Deck. Two more ladies were loaded aboard from the promenade, and then No. 13 started down, within a minute or two of Murdoch's order, and ahead of No. 15 by less than a minute.²⁰² So if Murdoch was at No. 13 until just before 1:30, how could he have also been at Boat No. 14 well before Crowe spotted him there, and Lowe arrived on the scene to finish the loading there?

So, what can be concluded from these accounts? Crowe and Threlfall's statements accord perfectly with Collyer's statements that Murdoch was at least briefly on the scene at No. 14. Now that we have found at least three survivors who placed Murdoch at the scene of Boat No. 14, it has become clear that our earlier dismissal of Crowe's identification of Murdoch at this boat was in error. These three eyewitnesses' recollections indicate that Murdoch went directly from Boat No. 1 to the aft-port boats, in order to ensure that the situation there was under control; it seems that he assisted

²⁰² Beesley, Lawrence, *The Loss of the S.S. Titanic*, Chapter 3, 1912.

in loading No. 14 until Fifth Officer Lowe arrived there, before returning to the aft-starboard side and Boat No. 9.

In fact, there is evidence suggesting that Murdoch did not take the lead throughout the entire process of loading and lowering No. 9. In his inquiry testimony, Saloon Steward Frederick Ray, was asked: “What officer stood at lifeboat No. 9, if any?” Ray responded, “There was an officer there, but I do not know which rank he took. He did not survive...” He then went on to clarify that he did not know any of the officers other than Murdoch, but that the officer in question was *not* him.²⁰³ Whether Ray had seen Sixth Officer Moody when he was present at No. 9, or had simply mistaken Purser McElroy for a deck officer, is a matter of speculation. Either way, Murdoch was not there at that point in the loading of No. 9.

Boatswain’s Mate Albert Haines arrived alongside No. 9, his assigned boat, not long before it was lowered away. He testified: “I got to my own boat just in time,” adding: “I came back just in time to take charge of my own boat.”²⁰⁴ Of interest, he stated that after getting to No. 9, “Mr. Murdoch *came along* [authors’ emphasis] with a crowd of passengers, and we filled the boat with ladies, and lowered the boat...”²⁰⁵ Bathroom Steward James Widgery, rescued in No. 9, confirms in his testimony that Purser McElroy played a significant role in the preparation and loading of Boat No. 9. However, he specified that before the boat lowered away, “the chief officer” was present and called out for more women – we are aware of many occasions when people mistakenly referred to Murdoch as the “chief officer” due to lingering confusion from the officer reshuffle in Southampton. When no more women responded to this call, the “chief officer”, apparently Murdoch, allowed some men to climb aboard.²⁰⁶ This sighting must have been after Haines’ sighting, and confirms that Murdoch returned to No. 9, prior to it lowering away.

Interestingly, Second Class passenger Sidney Collett seems to corroborate this story; Collett had led Kate Buss and Marion Wright to No. 9 and had helped them into the boat. He recalled that “the officer in charge, revolver in hand” had turned to Collett after the ladies boarded, and said to him: “What about you?” Collett then boarded No. 9 with the two women.²⁰⁷ Amongst Murdoch, Moody and McElroy, Murdoch was the only one of them present when the revolvers were retrieved from the first officer’s cabin.

Where was Murdoch coming from, then, when Haines saw him ‘come along’ the scene at No. 9, just before it lowered away, with a group of passengers, to fill the boat? The key may be the testimony

²⁰³ Am. 803.

²⁰⁴ Am. 660.

²⁰⁵ Am. 657.

²⁰⁶ Am. 602.

²⁰⁷ *The Post-Standard*, April 22, 1912. Thank you to Brandon Whited for sharing this account.

of Assistant Second Steward Joseph Wheat, who stated that when he arrived at No. 9, “Mr. Murdoch was there with quite a number of our men passing women and children over *from the port side* [authors’ emphasis] into No. 9 boat.”²⁰⁸ The body of evidence on this point clearly indicates that Murdoch, when he was briefly on the port side, used the opportunity to organize the transfer of some of the passengers from the crowded aft-port side over to the aft starboard side, in time to fill No. 9, before it lowered away. This will be examined further later on.

In our timeline, the flow of Murdoch’s movements harmonizes with the directions in which he was seen coming and going by other survivors:

- **1:10 a.m.:** Murdoch departs the scene at Boat No. 1 as it is freed from being hung-up, leaving Lowe to supervise the remainder of the lowering process. Murdoch then heads to the port-aft quarter;
- **1:12 a.m.:** Murdoch arrives at Boat No. 14, and is identified by three survivors there (Collyer, Crowe, and Threlfall);
- **1:15 a.m.:** Lowe arrives in the area of Boat No. 14 before Murdoch leaves the scene, leading the effort to pass women and children across to Boat No. 9.;
- **1:20 a.m.:** Murdoch organizes the effort to pass women and children from the aft port, to the aft starboard side, to fill No. 9. He may have gone back and forth between sides of the ship, or nearer to the middle of the ship, during these efforts, possibly ordering No. 14 lowered away during one of these stints (as per Threlfall). He personally brings across a group of women shortly before Boat No. 9 is lowered away at 1:32 a.m. (as per Wheat and Haines)
- **1:35 a.m.:** After supervising the loading of the aft starboard boats, Murdoch orders Boats Nos. 11, 13, and 15 to lower away, and then leaves the starboard Boat Deck for the port side (as per Beesley).
- **1:36 a.m.:** Murdoch is identified at Boat No. 10 (as per Buley and Evans).

McGough’s evidence that Boat No. 14 left prior to Boat No. 9:

As first uncovered by researcher George Behe in his 1991 booklet, *The Launching of the Lifeboats: A New Chronology*, and we agreed in our original study of the lifeboat launch sequence, Able Bodied Seaman Joseph Scarrott testified that fellow Able Bodied Seaman George McGough stood by the aft falls of Boat No. 14 as it lowered away.²⁰⁹ We also noted that Boatswain’s Mate Albert Haines testified that

²⁰⁸ Br. 13187-13188.

²⁰⁹ Br. 395.

McGough left *Titanic* in Boat No. 9.²¹⁰ In our original lifeboat article, we stated that if both Scarrott and Haines were correct, then no matter what else was true about the lifeboat sequence, their evidence meant that Boat No. 14 *must* have left prior to Boat No. 9; their evidence thus helped us to correlate events and timings that took place on opposite sides of the ship.

Yet in Halpern's lifeboat article, he concludes that Boat No. 9 left at 1:15 a.m., prior to Boat No. 14 lowering away at 1:30 a.m. Having made this conclusion, Halpern is forced to discount and/or explain away the evidence from Scarrott and Haines about the order of Nos. 14 and 9 in order to fit his conclusions. To this end, Halpern states that "there is no direct supporting evidence that McGough was actually handling the after-fall at No. 14 as it was being lowered." He also states that it "seems very possible that Scarrott may have seen McGough by the falls on No. 13 Boat while working to swing out boats on the starboard side along with Haines, Peters and several others and somehow got confused later on about McGough being at the falls of No. 14 when that boat was lowered with him, AB Scarrott, in it."²¹¹

While it is true that Scarrott is the only witness who mentioned McGough standing by the falls of No. 14, the suggestion that Scarrott had somehow misidentified McGough is very unlikely. Why? Scarrott and McGough were in the same starboard-watch deck crew under Fourth Officer Boxhall, and clearly knew each other. The claim that Scarrott had mistakenly remembered seeing McGough at the falls of Boat No. 13 on the starboard side for seeing him at Boat No. 14 is patently ludicrous. Why? Because Halpern here overlooks – or wants to downplay – the inconvenient context of *why* Scarrott mentioned seeing McGough at Boat No. 14.

Looking at the context of when Scarrott referred to seeing McGough, he was clearly referring to him working the after fall of his own lifeboat, No. 14. Scarrott specifically mentioned the frightening incident in which the aft fall of No. 14 got hung up, with the boat tipping down by the bow at a precarious angle, threatening to pitch everyone out into the water, before Fifth Officer Lowe freed the boat, causing it to drop some feet and slam into the water:

Our boat [No. 14] was at an angle of pretty well 45 degrees. I called Mr. Lowe's attention to it. He said, "Why don't they lower away aft?" I know the man that was lowering the after-fall, it was McGough.²¹²

Scarrott here is clearly referring to having seen McGough working at the after fall of Boat No. 14 on

²¹⁰ Am. 657. There is no doubt that McGough departed the ship in Boat No. 9, as documented here: https://wormsted.com/Lifeboat_Project/McGough_George.html

²¹¹ <https://www.EncyclopediaTitanica.org/lifeboats-launch-times-list-and-trim-1.html>

²¹² Br. 395.

the port side – the very boat that he was leaving the ship in – not No. 13 on the starboard side. This means that Scarrott saw McGough actively working the after fall up to the point when Boat No. 14 passed below eye level to the deck. To ignore this context is either uninformed or intellectually dishonest.

The aft falls getting twisted caused No. 14 to tip very precariously down by the bow, followed by it being released from the falls, causing the stern to violently slam down in the water. Fifth Officer Lowe guessed that the distance the stern fell was “about 5 feet,”²¹³ while Saloon Steward Crowe estimated “4 or 5 feet.”²¹⁴ Conversely, Able Bodied Seaman Scarrott testified that when the aft fall tangled and stopped playing out, the bow of No. 14 was actually in the water, while the stern remained suspended, “about ten feet” above the surface of the ocean. To Scarrott, he believed this caused the boat to hang at an angle of 45°.²¹⁵

In reality, if his distance estimates were correct, the geometry indicates that this would have been closer to 20° by Scarrott’s estimate, and around 10° by Lowe and Crowe’s distance estimates. Still, either angle would have been more than enough to make those aboard feel as if they were about to be pitched from the boat, into the icy waters. Once the falls were released, the lifeboat slammed down in the water, apparently damaging it, since several survivors, including Saloon Steward Crowe and Second Class passenger Charlotte Collyer, mentioned a significant amount of water accumulating in the bottom of the boat.²¹⁶ It is no wonder that Scarrott vividly recalled McGough being the one he had seen at that after falls.

Halpern goes even further in his lifeboat article, claiming that Boatswain’s Mate Albert Haines’ testimony suggests that McGough was already alongside him at Boat No. 9 when Murdoch “came along with that group of women to finish the loading of No. 9.” Halpern then claims that if McGough was at the aft falls of Boat No. 14, then he “could not have lowered boat No. 14 to the sea by 1:30am on the port side of the ship, and also be getting into boat No. 9 at the very same time that it was about to be lowered on the starboard side of the ship.”

On the face of it, this claim appears true. However, McGough’s presence at No. 9 is not the contradiction that Halpern believes it is. In our original lifeboat article, we assigned time estimates to the best of our ability, based on eyewitness descriptions and specifications. With a very few exceptions where the specific time could be pinpointed with more precision, our time estimates are only *to the nearest 5 minute mark*. For example, we concluded that Boat No. 14 began lowering around 1:25 a.m. The actual lowering time may have been a couple minutes later, but the extant evidence doesn’t allow

²¹³ Br. 15841.

²¹⁴ Am. 615.

²¹⁵ Br. 395.

²¹⁶ Am. 615; *The Semi-Monthly Magazine*, May 1912.

for that level of specificity. All that we can say with certainty is that since Leading Fireman Threlfall was released from Boiler Room No. 4 “At about 1.20,”²¹⁷ it is unlikely that Threlfall would have had enough time to get up on deck and into No. 14, if it left any earlier than 1:25 a.m. Similarly, our original time estimate of 1:30 a.m. (we now believe it was slightly later, at 1:32 a.m.) for Boat No. 9 starting to lower was just that, an estimate to the nearest 5-minute mark.

Why is this important? If McGough was at No. 14 around 1:25 a.m. (to the nearest five-minute mark), and the boat took five minutes or less to lower and for Lowe to free it (as noted previously, it took a lifeboat a minimum of 5-6 minutes to lower a lifeboat the full 60 feet height under normal conditions, using the 6-to-1 pulley arrangement on the falls, and the after fall of No. 14 became twisted before it reached wasn’t lowered the full distance to the water), that means that McGough would have been free to cross over to Boat No. 9 sometime just prior to 1:32 a.m. The actual time for No. 9 to begin lowering appears to have been closer to 1:32 a.m., which will be examined later, when discussing its relationship to Boat No. 11 lowering. This would have given McGough plenty of time to be alongside No. 9 and help load the last group of passengers aboard it, before the order to lower away was given and he climbed aboard. In other words, there is no contradiction in our original time estimates for McGough’s known movements.

Another possibility also emerges: the last time that Scarrott would have seen McGough at the aft fall of Boat No. 14 would have been as their boat passed below eye level to the Boat Deck at around 1:25 a.m. Much happened after that point during the lowering process, including: 1) the gunfire from Lowe at A Deck, and 2) the aft fall becoming twisted and leaving the lifeboat dangling with its stern in the air at a precipitous angle, ending the lowering process prematurely. At the time, Scarrott and Lowe conferred, and Scarrott was confused because a man he knew – McGough – had been manning that very fall when they had left the deck. In the end, they had to cut the line to raise the lever to release the blocks, thus freeing the boat from the ship.²¹⁸

The question now arises: did McGough stay with that after fall after Scarrott had gone below the level of the Boat Deck and could no longer see him there? Had McGough even left that after fall of No. 14 in someone else’s hands, passing it off to someone else before he proceeded to Boat No. 9? Or, was he ordered to his assigned boat, No. 9, once No. 14 could not be lowered any further, due to the fall getting twisted, instead helping guide passengers to the starboard side? Although only a theory, these are certainly possible scenarios and – when combined with the facts outlined above – opens up other possibilities for how McGough could have been correctly identified at both lifeboats in our timeline, without a need arising for a dubious assertion of mistaken identity.

²¹⁷ *Daily Telegraph*, April 29, 1912.

²¹⁸ Am. 615.

Quite literally, when Halpern claimed that there was “no direct supporting evidence that McGough was actually handling the after-fall at No. 14 as it was being lowered” in his online statements, he may have unintentionally provided the very key to unraveling how McGough could have been at both No. 14, and then No. 9, in rather close timing proximity: McGough may not have stayed with the fall during the *entire* lowering process of No. 14. We simply can’t say anything beyond the fact that Scarrott had seen him working that fall up to the point when he passed below eye level from the deck, and that he *believed* that McGough had continued working that fall throughout the lowering process. But neither is it fair to arbitrarily accuse Scarrott of mistaken identity simply because his identification of McGough at the after fall is inconvenient to Halpern’s adjustments to sequence and timing scenarios.

Furthermore, what Haines actually stated in his testimony about McGough’s presence at No. 9 is not exactly what Halpern represents it as. In the American Inquiry, Senator Smith asked Haines what he did after being ordered to “get the boats out” by Chief Officer Wilde. Haines stated that he “got all the boats swung out,” and that he next “went and stood by my own boat, sir, No. 9.” He was then asked: “What happened then?” He responded:

We had the boat crew there, and Mr. Murdoch came along with a crowd of passengers, and we filled the boat with ladies, and lowered the boat and he told me to lay off and keep clear of the ship.²¹⁹

Haines later clarified that “there were two sailors with me,” whom he identified as McGough (spelled “McGow” in the inquiry text) and Able Bodied Seaman William Peters.²²⁰ Yet, importantly, nowhere in his testimony does he specify *when* McGough had arrived at Boat No. 9. In fact, the most that can be said from a direct examination of his wording is that McGough had arrived in time for the last group of passengers to be loaded aboard No. 9 before it started lowering.

In point of fact, Haines himself appears to have arrived at No. 9 very late in the loading. After mentioning how Boatswain Alfred Nichols had missed leaving in his assigned boat, No. 7, Haines testified: “I got to my own boat *just in time* [authors’ emphasis],” and, “I came back *just in time* [authors’ emphasis] to take charge of my own boat.”²²¹ The lateness of Haines’ arrival at No. 9 is confirmed by the testimony of Quartermaster Walter Wynn in the British Inquiry. Wynn was ordered to take

²¹⁹ Am. 657.

²²⁰ Am. 657. It is worth mentioning that McGough’s name is often pronounced “mick-guff” these days, but the misspelling of Haines’ verbal testimony, transcribed by the person typing the testimony up as they heard it, could be a clue to how McGough’s name was pronounced in 1912 by people who knew him.

²²¹ Am. 660.

charge of Boat No. 9 by Sixth Officer Moody, but “when we started to lower away [authors’ emphasis] the boatswain’s mate got into the boat, and I handed over charge to him.”²²² Since Haines had arrived very late in the process of loading No. 9, his recollection of seeing McGough at that late point certainly could not have attested to McGough’s whereabouts several minutes earlier. Therefore – and especially when added to our earlier evidence of why McGough’s presence at Nos. 14 and 9 was not necessarily a contradiction – Halpern’s claims of a timing contradiction are for naught.

Unfortunately, while McGough himself was interviewed by reporters, and there were some quotes attributed to him in various newspapers, he never left a detailed, seemingly-reliable first-hand account of his actions that night. The press accounts shed some light on his actions, but there are also some claims attributed to him about things he could not possibly have seen for himself: these include seeing Captain Smith in the water rescuing a baby before handing it to Second Officer Lightoller aboard Collapsible B, and also hinting that something terrible happened to First Officer Murdoch, etc.²²³ Clearly, McGough’s press accounts were “enhanced” by reporters or newspaper editors to some degree – or McGough himself was making for a good story in the retelling. This latter concept seems even more possible, since McGough himself seems to have been a rather dubious character.²²⁴ Another possibility is that McGough was passing on details of things that he had heard from other survivors, and whether he was claiming to have seen those things himself, or the reporter attributed those events to his first-hand experience, it ended up in the finished article appearing that way.

However, comparing all of McGough’s press accounts, did any of these include any details that might support the notion that he was on the port side first, before leaving in Boat No. 9? The answer is yes. There are a few instances where McGough described things that happened at the port lifeboats. For example, in one press account, he stated: “At 12.10 the first boat was away on the port side. We did not know the ship was sinking.”²²⁵ While the 12.10 time for the first port boat to lower is clearly erroneous, there is at least a hint that McGough had been on the port side. McGough stated this more specifically in another interview: “The port boats lowered first and then those on the starboard side.”²²⁶ This statement was not true of the forward boats, but certainly applies in the context of the

²²² Br. 13326-13329.

²²³ *New York Evening World*, April 20, 1912.

²²⁴ In 1900, McGough was jailed for manslaughter after a fight with a fellow crewman ended with the other man’s death; in 1910, he was again jailed for sexual assault of a minor. Although some of the others in McGough’s boat, No. 9, remembered his behavior in the lifeboat positively, it is possible that McGough embellished his story when giving the details.

²²⁵ *Staffordshire Sentinel*, April 29, 1912.

²²⁶ *The Evening World*, April 20, 1912.

aft boats – the area we know McGough was seen at, near Boat No. 14, before he arrived alongside No. 9 on the starboard side and subsequently left in that boat.

McGough also stated that “Mr. Murdock [*sic*] had overlooked nothing that could help save the passengers when the final moment came. He ordered doors, chairs, chest of drawers - everything on board that would float to be thrown into the sea.”²²⁷ This account is interesting, considering that Second Class passenger Emily Rugg, prior to leaving in Boat No. 12, observed as the crew “were throwing deck-chairs and other floatable things overboard. She did not know why. It is probable these were to provide something to cling to for passengers who went overboard.”²²⁸ This is intriguing, particularly with the evidence that First Officer Murdoch was present at Boat No. 14, right next to No. 12, and that McGough claimed that Murdoch gave this order.

Halpern has criticized the authors of this paper, and of our original lifeboat timeline article, for quoting McGough’s press statements about lifeboats on the port side, pointing out some of the more questionable claims in his interviews. At the same time, both Halpern and Ioannis Georgiou have used those same accounts to emphasize that McGough does not mention Boat No. 14 in his press accounts. This creates a double standard: on one hand, they argue that the information we cite from McGough’s press accounts is unreliable because it favors our conclusions; but on the other hand, they selectively use those same accounts to downplay his involvement with Boat No. 14 when it suits their argument.

McGough himself mentioned in more than one account that First Officer Murdoch gave orders to “Swing out the boats,” and that “Mr. Murdoch, the chief officer, was in charge.”²²⁹ Since Murdoch had given him his initial orders, one wonders whether McGough may have initially turned out on the forward-starboard side, assisted with uncovering and swinging out the boats there, and then headed to the aft-port boats when it began getting chaotic there – just as Fifth Officer Lowe, Able Bodied Seaman Buley, Evans, Archer, and apparently even Murdoch himself did – ending up near Boats Nos. 16 and 14. Perhaps, Murdoch gave the order to those nearby to begin throwing floating objects overboard. It seems likely that McGough then followed Murdoch to Boat No. 9, where he departed the ship.

Additional evidence of the aft-port boats beginning to lower before the aft-starboard:

At this point, we have demonstrated that Halpern’s conclusions on where and when McGough was seen are dubious at best. Yet in his lifeboat article, Halpern claims that the McGough evidence is the

²²⁷ *The Evening World*, April 20, 1912.

²²⁸ *The Evening Journal*. April 20, 1912.

²²⁹ *Daily Telegraph*, April 29, 1912.

only reason to conclude that at least some of the aft-port boats were lowered before the aft-starboard ones. He says that the “timing that was then assigned to all of the aft starboard-side boats (Nos. 9, 11, 13 and 15) thus becomes fully dependent on this one linchpin of evidence in the developed launch sequence.” This statement could not be farther from the truth, as readers will subsequently see.

Still, we are left with an obvious question: why would there have been such a long gap between the launch times of Boats Nos. 1 and 9? The Halpern timeline, in advancing No. 9’s launch by 15 minutes, closes the gap to the launch time of No. 1 to a mere 10 minutes, and at first glance appears to have a more even flow of launch times; our timeline, on the other hand, leaves a 27-minute gap between the time that No. 1 left the deck and No. 9 did. Had the crew on the starboard side taken a nap? No, and, in fact, there is a clear flow of progress that supports our timeline over Halpern’s, and which also explains the delay in getting No. 9 lowered away. Several reasons emerge why No. 9 left later:

1) The loading process at Boat No. 9 took longer than average.

As we already saw, Boatswain’s Mate Haines stated that Murdoch brought a group of women with him to No. 9 shortly before it lowered away.²³⁰ We know from other witnesses, including Saloon Steward Allen Baggott – who apparently left in Boat No. 9²³¹ – that they had trouble finding passengers to fill No. 9. After describing how the boat was uncovered and swung out, Baggott recalled:

I was sent to bring up, with a few others, as many ladies as we could find. They were slow in coming.

We then began to lift them into the boats, several of them showing disinclination to help themselves, even protesting. They were bundled in by sheer force.

We got all the women in this boat [No. 9], who were then visible - between forty and fifty in number, I should estimate.²³²

Estimates from officers, including Second Officer Lightoller, were that it would take around 15-20 minutes to uncover a boat, and another 6-7 minutes to coil the falls down, swing the boat out and lower it level with the deck prior to loading.²³³ However, as Fifth Officer Lowe testified, “It was not the launching of the boats that took the time. We got the whole boat out and in the water in less than

²³⁰ Am. 657.

²³¹ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Baggott_Allen.html. Baggott was not only assigned to Boat No. 9, but also gave descriptions of the number aboard his lifeboat that closely matched No. 9.

²³² *Daily Mirror*, May 1, 1912.

²³³ Br. 13855.

ten minutes. It was getting the people together that took the time.”²³⁴ Assistant Steward Walter Nichols estimated that “it took us about twenty minutes to fill our lifeboat [No. 15] and get away.”²³⁵ His wording makes it sound as if his 20 minutes included the time it took to both load and lower the boat, which seems like a reasonable estimate.

It is worth mentioning that James Cameron conducted an experiment, using a nearly full-scale replica of a *Titanic* lifeboat and set of davits, as part of the National Geographic special, *Titanic: 25 Years Later*. Guided by longtime *Titanic* historians and researchers, they decided to test how long each step in the process would take. Using a timed trial, he estimated that it would take 8 minutes and 30 seconds to coil the falls down, swing out, and lower a lifeboat down level with the deck to prepare it for loading. Interestingly, this is only slightly longer than the 6-7 minutes Lightoller estimated in his testimony. Cameron also concluded that it would take a minimum of approximately 10 minutes to load a lifeboat, and perhaps longer when the passengers were reluctant to board the boats earlier in the sinking. These are just estimates, but worth keeping in mind when examining how long the “average” time to load a boat would have been, comparing it against eyewitness statements on the subject.²³⁶

In the case of No. 9, loading clearly took longer than average; this appears to be largely due to difficulty finding passengers in the area who were also willing to board – remember that many had massed on the aft-port side, instead. This issue alone would have contributed to a larger-than-average gap between the lowering of Boat No. 1 and Boat No. 9. We already saw how Assistant Second Steward Joseph Wheat testified that Murdoch – along with a number of stewards and other members of the Victualling Department – were actually passing women and children over from the port side of the ship, in order to fill No. 9 up.²³⁷ This effort may have been precisely why McGough proceeded from No. 14 to his assigned station at No. 9.

2) The timing relationship between A) Lowe/No. 1, B) Lowe/Moody at Nos. 14 & 16, and C) Moody/No. 9.

The timing between these three points clearly demonstrates that No. 9 left after Nos. 16 & 14. We have already seen that Fifth Officer Lowe **A)** stayed with Boat No. 1 until it finally reached the water close to 1:15 a.m. Lowe testified that when he proceeded from the forward-starboard side to the aft-port side, he ran into Sixth Officer Moody. Lowe asked him: “What are you doing?” Moody re-

²³⁴ Br. 15931.

²³⁵ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, April 19, 1912.

²³⁶ Cameron’s experiment and the whole special can be viewed at the following URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jXHFEy-ibc>

²³⁷ Br. 13187-13189.

sponded, “I am getting these boats [Nos. 16 and 14] away.” Moody finished No. 16, while Lowe went to work on No. 14. At some point, likely before they parted company – Lowe to work at No. 14, and Moody to work on No. 16 – Lowe remarked to Moody that he had seen five boats go away without an officer, and after Lowe asked who of them should go, Moody told him, “You go; I will get in another boat.”²³⁸ Sixth Officer Moody’s work loading Boat No. 16 is well established by those aboard No. 16, including Stewardess Violet Jessop.²³⁹

B) A natural question is: how advanced was work at Nos. 16 and 14 when Lowe arrived? AB Seaman Joseph Scarrott gives a key glimpse. Scarrott had been working on Boat No. 14 for a while already when Lowe arrived. He clearly recalled Wilde passing by and ordering him: “All right; take the women and children,” at which time they began loading No. 14. Wilde moved on to work at No. 12;²⁴⁰ meanwhile, Scarrott had issues with people trying to rush No. 14 as they loaded it. He remembered Fifth Officer Lowe arriving there rather late in the loading process:

There would be 20 women we got into the boat, I should say, when some men tried to rush the boats, foreigners they were, because they could not understand the order which I gave them, and I had to use a bit of persuasion. The only thing I could use was the boat’s tiller.

... I prevented five getting in. One man jumped in twice and I had to throw him out the third time.

... [When] Mr. Lowe came and took charge he asked me how many were in the boat; I told him as far as I could count there were 54 women and four children..²⁴¹

Scarrott’s evidence indicates that Lowe arrived at No. 14 when the loading process was well under way. Yet beyond Lowe’s own recollections of working to load Boat No. 14, there were other eyewitnesses who recalled him working in the area. Second Class passenger Clear Cameron, rescued in No. 14, stated that “when we got on the top deck there was no Captain and no First Officer to be seen, just two young Officers shouting and giving orders for Women and Children to get into the boats as quickly as they can...”²⁴² She subsequently boarded the boat. She later named one of the “young” officers as Lowe. It is likely that Moody, at just 24 years old, was the other officer nearby, a conclusion that concurs with Lowe’s testimony.

²³⁸ Am. 406; Br. 15832, 15837-15839.

²³⁹ *Titanic Survivor*, Jessop, Violet and Maxtone-Graham, John (Sheridan House, 1997).

²⁴⁰ Am. 635-636.

²⁴¹ Br. 383-387.

²⁴² Letter from Clear Cameron to her sister, dated April 21, 1912. Courtesy of George Behe.

It is true that at various other times during the loading of Nos. 16 and 14, Chief Officer Wilde,²⁴³ First Officer Murdoch and Second Officer Lightoller were present, but it seems that they had more or less passed through the area rather early on, and had moved on to No. 12 and other lifeboats. For example, Lowe recalled Lightoller passing through the vicinity of No. 14 after he arrived there, and that he moved on to another boat, which Lowe described as the “second boat forward” – a likely reference to Boat No. 12.²⁴⁴ However, the aggregate evidence clearly shows that between both of them, Moody, and later Lowe, oversaw the majority of work loading these two boats.²⁴⁵

Steward Alfred Pugh gave an account which, although he was confused about the aft lifeboat numbers years after the sinking, was clearly referring to Boats No. 16 and 14. Pugh added further details about the work at these boats:

On arriving at the boat deck I met the 6th Officer “Mr. [James] Moody.” Knowing each other he called to help him get the passengers in the Lifeboat 15.

We filled up No 18 boat [*sic*, No. 16], then did the same to No 16 Boat [*sic*, No. 14]. We met the 5th Officer there (Mr. Webb) [*sic*, Fifth Officer Lowe]. After filling the boat Mr. Moody remarked that he would go and see if he could be of help elsewhere telling me to stand by.²⁴⁶

Pugh was then ordered into No. 14, by Lowe, to help row. Pugh’s account suggests that Moody left the area after helping at Nos. 16 and 14. Where did he go?

This leads us to C), Sixth Officer Moody’s relationship with the launch order of Nos. 16, 14, and 9. We know that once the order to begin preparing the lifeboats for loading and lowering had been given, Sixth Officer Moody had focused much of his attention on the port side boats. Third Officer Pitman had found him aft on the port Boat Deck when he had first turned out of his quarters. He was apparently seen by Gracie (who called him a ‘tall thin chap’) in the vicinity of Boat No. 4 as early efforts around that boat were under way on A Deck. Moody also seems to have been the officer that Beesley saw beginning work at uncovering Boat No. 16 on the port side.

²⁴³ Br. 383; Br. 2936. Scarrott clearly implied that Wilde was only on the scene briefly before he moved on.

²⁴⁴ Amer. 406.

²⁴⁵ It appears that Lightoller and Wilde had moved along to Boat No. 12 at some point early in the process of loading Nos. 14 and 16. Both officers were identified at No. 12 (Clench, Amer 636; Poingdestre Br. 2909). Their absence at Nos. 14 and 16 left room for Lowe and Moody to be on scene at those two boats, largely take charge of loading them, and to then decide between them who would leave in which boat, and who would stay.

²⁴⁶ Letter from Alfred Pugh to Walter Lord, dated July 20, 1955. Available on paullee.com.

Note here that we are not claiming this as an absolute, but we are instead pointing out an apparent trend in the reports of Moody's movements. It is possible that Moody did not restrict himself to the port side. Early on, for example, at about the time that Boat No. 7 was being lowered away, Steward Ray went to Boat No. 9, his assigned lifeboat. He found the boat was nowhere near ready to load and lower. There he encountered an officer whom he did not know by name, but who did not survive. Ray only knew First Officer Murdoch by name, and confirmed that the officer in question was not Murdoch – whom we also know was forward at the time, anyways.²⁴⁷ This officer could have been Moody, but we can not say for sure; if it was Purser McElroy, who was also known to have been involved in efforts around No. 9, we feel that it's more likely that Steward Ray would have identified the officer in question; since the officer was not the captain, the only other candidate would be Wilde, but to our knowledge, no witnesses identified Wilde as being present at No. 9. However, this sighting was much earlier, back around the vicinity of 12:45 a.m., and before Ray went below to his quarters for the last time. Halpern places the launch of No. 9 some 30 minutes after this sighting, at 1:15 a.m., and we place No. 9's launch at about 1:32 a.m., 47 minutes later. It would be absurd to suggest that if this unnamed officer was actually Moody, that he stayed with No. 9 for 30-47 minutes – at either extreme of those estimates.

Either way, after Moody and Lowe loaded Boats Nos. 16 and 14, when Pugh heard Moody say that he was going to see “if he could be of help elsewhere”, Moody seems to have moved to the starboard side in short order. How can we conclude that? Quartermaster Walter Wynn encountered Sixth Officer Moody, whom he identified by name. Wynn testified:

13326. Did you go to a boat?

- Mr. Moody told me to *go to* [authors' emphasis] number nine boat and take charge of number nine.

13327. Whether that was your right boat or not, you do not know?

- It was all ready swinging out on the davits and he told me to take charge of No. 9, as I did not know my own boat.

13328. Did you take charge of No. 9?

- I got in and assisted the ladies in; and when we started to lower away the boatswain's mate got into the boat, and I handed charge over to him, and took an oar.²⁴⁸

Note that Moody ordered Wynn to *go to* No. 9 at a point when it was already “swinging out on the davits”, and that he also ordered him to “take charge” of the boat – this sort of order was usually given

²⁴⁷ Am. 803.

²⁴⁸ Br. 13323-13329.

shortly before a boat was launched. Although, frustratingly, Wynn didn't indicate exactly where Moody was when he had given him this order, the exchange indicates that Moody had become involved – or re-involved, if Ray had seen him there much earlier – with No. 9 at a rather late stage in its loading process.

Wynn encountering Moody is a vital link in this chain. Why? QM Wynn and Lookout Symons had been assisting at the forward-starboard lifeboats. Unfortunately, Wynn's testimony was very truncated; those examining him seemed inclined to avoid delving deeply into the minutiae of his movements early in the disaster. However, Symons clearly mentioned an errand that he and Wynn had worked on together as efforts at the forward-starboard boats were under way. Symons testified at both the British and American Inquiries, but frustratingly, his recollection of what order the forward-starboard boats left the ship varied between his two stretches of testimony. However, he testified:

11444. (The Attorney-General.) Yes. It is said the water came in on the starboard side, and so it requires some explanation. (To the witness.) Speaking of boats 3, 5, and 7, did you see seamen placed in these boats under the order of Mr. Murdoch?

- Yes, under the orders of Mr. Murdoch. They were given an order to get in, to get the plugs ready, to see everything was right in the boat, and told to stay there and take the women and children.

11445. Three lifeboats had been lowered away, 3, 5, and 7; were they lowered before you went to No. 1?

- No, after we got the three boats out I went and assisted Wynn in clearing away one of the guys on B deck.

11446. Of what?

- Of No. 1 boat. From there I went back to the boat deck and assisted generally in putting the passengers in Nos. 3 and 5.

11447. That was the first you had to do with No. 1?

- Yes.

11448. You had already cleared away one of the guys?

- Yes.

11449. And you went back again and helped to get out the boats 3 and 5?

- Yes.

11450. And then after that what did you do?

- After I went back on the boat deck we had orders to put the women and children in. I assisted generally, and they lowered down. I do not know whether 5 or 7 went first;

I could not say for certain. I was at No. 5; whether No. 7 went before it I could not say. When we got No. 5 away I went back to No. 3 and assisted there generally, and then I helped to lower the forward end of No. 3 along with the boatswain.²⁴⁹

After this work clearing away “one of the guys” on Boat No. 1 was accomplished, Symons returned to the Boat Deck, where he helped load Boats Nos. 5 and 3. Therefore, this work was accomplished at a point before Boats Nos. 5 and 3 began lowering away. Interestingly, Symons seems to have allowed for the possibility that Boat No. 7 had already begun lowering away when he returned to work at loading Boats Nos. 5 and 3. Boat No. 5 started down at about 12:45 a.m., placing his errand with Wynn before that point.

Wynn seems to have referred to this errand with Symons in his affirmative response to two leading questions. Let’s look at the pertinent portion of his testimony:

13320. I do not want to take you through the whole story, I presume it is quite unnecessary; after a time did you hear this, the Captain giving an order to you and another quartermaster, to go and get the two accident boats [emergency boats] ready?

- Yes.

13321. I want to omit the earlier part, you see. Did you obey that order?

- Yes.

13322. *After that* [authors’ emphasis] did you go and help to clear away at various lifeboats?

- Yes.

13323. After that did you meet the sixth Officer Mr. Moody, who told you to go to your own boat?

- Yes.

13324. Did you know your own boat?

- No.

13325. Did you ascertain what was your own boat then?

- No, not then.

13326. Did you go to a boat?

- Mr. Moody told me to go to number nine boat and take charge of number nine.

13327. Whether that was your right boat or not, you do not know?

- It was all ready swinging out on the davits and he told me to take charge of No. 9, as I did not know my own boat.

²⁴⁹ Br. 11444-11450.

It would be very easy to assume that Wynn had immediately peeled off from Symons after they had finished their work on Boat No. 1's "guys", apparently at about 12:40. Wynn also very quickly moved forward in his testimony to the moment when Moody told him to go to No. 9. At a surface glance, it would be easy to look at this and argue that Wynn's evidence indicates that No. 9 left early.

However, there are two details that suggest otherwise. First, Wynn answered in the affirmative to question 13322, saying that *after* he had gotten the emergency boats (referred to as 'accident boats' here) ready, he had helped 'to clear away at *various* lifeboats'; this answer allows for a broad range of movements and events to occur before he met up with Sixth Officer Moody and was told to go to Boat No. 9, which boat he eventually left in. Indeed, Wynn's testimony is so abbreviated and disjointed that anyone could make a case for timing of his movements any way that they liked.

However, there is another important detail in Wynn's testimony. Later on in the questioning, and after discussing a number of other subjects, Wynn also mentioned a personal errand that he had made to his own quarters at some point after he had first gone up on deck from his quarters after the collision:

13394. Did you immediately go on deck when you were wakened [by the collision]?

- I went up on the forewell deck and asked what was the matter. I saw a lot of men passengers there, and I saw the ice on the deck, and they pointed it out to me: "Look at that" they said. "We have just struck an iceberg." Then I went down below and woke my two mates up, and then I dressed and walked on the bridge to await orders from the Captain.

13395. Did you have time to get your kit bag?

- No, I took that up *when I went down to get my knife* [authors' emphasis].

13396. Did you place your kit bag in the boat?

- I had two sets of underwear in my bag which I had never unpacked. I threw it into the first boat I came to when I was told to get into the boat.

13397. That was the boat you left in [No. 9]?

- Yes.


Wynn had clearly gone back below to his quarters on E Deck, off Scotland Road, to fetch his knife and his kit bag at some point after he had been on deck working at the lifeboats; we know the errand was one of the last things he did before heading to Boat No. 9 because the 'first boat [he] came to' when he came back up from this personal errand was No. 9, the boat he left in. If Wynn had helped to clear other boats *after* he had prepared the emergency boats and worked with Symons, as he testified, then this errand to his quarters must have come *after* he had worked at those other boats.

Wynn’s quarters were located forward, abreast of the No. 1 funnel and across from the door that led into Boiler Room No. 6 from Scotland Road. When Leading Fireman Fred Barrett escaped from Boiler Room No. 5 at about 1:10 a.m., he recalled that there was water coming down the forward end of Scotland Road from forward. Shortly afterward, Steward Ray – who, like Wynn, ended up in Boat No. 9 – found water had reached as far aft on Scotland Road as the emergency door that led to the First Class Entrance on E Deck, about 90 feet aft of the door that led to Quartermaster Wynn’s quarters. These two reports show that Wynn must have visited his quarters *before* Ray found the water by the Emergency Door.

We will get into this in a little more depth later on, as we ‘follow the water’ along E Deck. Wynn was never asked, and never testified, about whether he saw water on Scotland Road as he went down to his quarters. Because of the truncated nature of his testimony and the out-of-order manner of his story being told, all we can really conclude with certainty is that Wynn had left his quarters to head topside before Ray left his quarters and found the water aft by the emergency door.

We can place this errand below as one of the last things that Wynn did before departing in No. 9 because No. 9 was “the first boat [he] came to” when he emerged back on deck. So it seems apparent

Below: This deck plan shows the locations of Quartermaster Wynn’s quarters (forward, marked in deep red), and how it was accessed from Scotland Road (light red), in relationship to the emergency door leading from Scotland Road into the First Class Entrance where Saloon Steward Ray encountered water. Clearly, Wynn went to his quarters before Ray left his to go topside. (Plans by Bruce Beveridge.)



that coming up from E Deck, Wynn ran across Moody, who told him to go to No. 9 and take charge of it.

In our lifeboat launch sequence, Moody would be leaving his work at Boat No. 16, which began lowering away at 1:20 and reaching the water at about 1:25, coming across Wynn, and telling him to take charge of No. 9, which was then apparently late in the stages of filling, and which we have concluded began lowering at 1:32 – a sequence that is very tidy. So what was Moody doing when Wynn ran across him? We have a clue – and this clue presents multiple other issues for the Halpern timeline.

In one of her accounts, First Class passenger May Futrelle discussed the movements she and her husband Jacques made following the collision. It appears that they never left the port side until May boarded Boat No. 9 later in the night. May described how she and her husband Jacques were on A Deck, conversing with fellow First Class passengers John Jacob Astor and William T. Stead, amongst a crowd of others. The recollection suggests that she was on the forward-port side at the time, where Astor was with his wife, near Boat No. 4, which did not lower away until much later – around 1:50 a.m. in our timeline.

Futrelle's husband eventually convinced her that she was not giving him a chance to save himself by remaining with him, so she reluctantly abandoned him. She then described her subsequent movements, and who she encountered along the way:

As I started up the companionway a little chap named Moody, the sixth officer, who was lost, said to me, "What are you doing below, Mrs. Futrelle? All of the women are gone." He started to pull me up the steps. I said, "Don't pull me." I thought if I was going to die I didn't want to be pulled. He took me to the starboard side. "There was a boat there a minute ago," he said. It was just being lowered.

It was No. 9, the last boat to leave. He put me in as they were launching it.²⁵⁰

Notice a few key details here: May was on the port side of A Deck, near the group surrounding Boat No. 4 forward. When she parted from her husband, she started up a companionway on the same side, headed up toward the Boat Deck. Here she encountered Sixth Officer Moody. He pulled her up the companionway and took her to the starboard side. Boat No. 9 was just being lowered, having apparently just slipped below the edge of the deck as they approached it.

From Futrelle's perspective, Boat No. 9 may have appeared like the "last boat," since it was the only aft starboard boat still on the Boat Deck at the time, with Nos. 11, 13 and 15 having been lowered down to A Deck to take on passengers there. This is similar to the account of Fireman Harry Oliver,

²⁵⁰ *Daily Boston Globe*, April 17, 1932.

who stated: “On reaching the boat-deck, he found that most of the boats had already been launched except number nine.” Like Futrelle, his account indicates a later launch time for No. 9, since he described how “Recognising that the *Titanic* was fast settling down, the crew pulled vigorously” to get away.²⁵¹

Futrelle said that Moody led her *from the port side to the starboard side* before she left in No. 9. The direction of Moody’s movements – port-to-starboard – is exactly the opposite of the direction of Moody would have needed to move if he had been engaged in work at No. 9 on the starboard side and saw her into the boat as it lowered away first, before he started to work on Nos. 16 and 14 on the port side.

Futrelle gave a later account, which, while having some elements embellished by age, reinforces many details from her earlier account. She again stated that she was forward, looking down at Steerage passengers on the forward Well Deck, before describing the following:

So then we noticed that the *Titanic* lunged [*sic*, listed] to the left, and he [Jacques Futrelle] said “I think the ship is gone.” Now he said, “I might possibly save myself, but I don’t think I could save you too,” and he gave me the idea I must leave him, so I did leave him.... [So] I went down into an entry, I started up the stairway ... and at the top of the stairs was Sixth Officer Moody, and he said “Mrs. Futrelle, what are you doing? All the boats are gone.” He began pulling me up the stairs, and I said, “Now please don’t pull me, because if I’m going to die I don’t want to be pulled,” but he took me to the big open doors and said “Stand here. I’ll see if there are any boats, but I think they’re all gone.” Then he went over to the starboard side (you know we were on the port side all along).... So I looked at my side, and there were a group of men with very black faces had come up, of course, from the engine room, and I could see their eyes; even to this day I can see their eyes, and they looked so anxiously at me, as if to say “She has a chance, but we have no chance.” Or perhaps they thought that none of us had a chance.

About that time, Officer Moody came back and said, “Yes, there’s one boat hanging in the davits, and come up, please.” So I came, and in the meantime they must have collected the crew to swing out the boat and lower it, so in my boat I was, I suppose, the first one to be put in.²⁵²

²⁵¹ *Western Daily Mercury*, April 29, 1912.

²⁵² Interview with May Futrelle by Winslow Bettinson, a radio program director at WJDA in Quincy, Massachusetts, in 1962. The interview was transcribed by George Behe and is reproduced in his book, *The Titanic Disaster: Final Memories*, currently unpublished..

In this second account, Futrelle confirms several key details: **1)** That the port side boats began lowering prior to the aft-starboard ones; **2)** that *Titanic* was at least starting to list to port prior to No. 9 lowering; **3)** that men from the Engine Room arrived on deck when she was waiting for Moody to take her to No. 9, indicating a launch time for the boat of later than 1:20 a.m., which – as we will discuss later – is when the men below deck were released from duty to go up on deck; and **4)** that her husband and she had remained on the port side through the sinking until they separated and she was taken to No. 9 on the starboard side by Moody. There is no question that Futrelle was rescued in Boat No. 9.²⁵³

No doubt Halpern would argue that Wynn had been ordered to No. 9 shortly before No. 9 lowered at his proposed time of 1:15 a.m., and that Moody then went to Boat No. 16, which he continues to agree with us lowered at 1:20 – just 5 minutes later, and 15 minutes before he theorizes No. 14 lowered away. However, such an argument would not hold up under scrutiny. Multiple eyewitnesses placed Moody on the scene during the loading of Boat Nos. 16 and 14 on the aft port side.

When Lowe arrived in the area, after seeing No. 1 to the water at about 1:15 a.m., he found Moody already hard at work in filling Nos. 16 and 14. Lowe arrived rather late in the process of loading No. 14, meaning that Moody had likely been engaged in working at those two boats for some minutes already. As Lowe testified, he asked Moody, “What are you doing?” Moody responded: “I am getting these boats [Nos. 16 and 14] away.” They then filled those two boats.²⁵⁴

Since Halpern agrees with our findings that No. 16 began lowering at 1:20 a.m., there is simply no room in the Halpern timeline for Moody to have been working at No. 9 late enough to order Wynn to take charge of the boat before hypothetically moving to Nos. 16 and 14 where Lowe found him, for Moody to then fill No. 16 and see it lowered away, in the five minutes that Halpern estimates.

Futrelle’s accounts pose further irregularities for the Halpern lowering scenario to explain, besides the fact that there wasn’t enough time for Moody to do these things in this order and still meet Halpern’s timeline. In his own article, Halpern states: “Because of their [the present authors] belief that No. 9 was launched after No. 14, the concept that Moody may have met her [Futrelle] while on his way to the port side after leaving No. 9 on the starboard side to help Wilde and Lightoller with the three aftermost boats there, never seemed to occur to them.” In fact, it has occurred to us... but the theory simply does not stand up to our scrutiny.

For example, Futrelle’s recollection that Moody remarked to her that “All of the women are gone” makes zero sense if all of the aft-port boats were still present when Boat No. 9 began lowering, as Halpern would have us believe, since Nos. 16, 14 and 12 all contained many women when they low-

²⁵³ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Futrelle_Lily.html

²⁵⁴ Am. 406.

ered. In fact, in Halpern’s version of events, all of the aft boats were still aboard *Titanic*, with large crowds congregating on the aft-port side, when No. 9 left. Furthermore, why would Moody – finding Futrelle on A Deck on the port side – have taken her to the starboard side, if there were four perfectly good lifeboats – 10, 12, 14, and 16 – directly astern of them on the same side, three of them ready to load or being loaded with women and children?

On the other hand, Futrelle’s account makes perfect sense if we now pull together several other threads we have already set in place. Pugh recalled, for example, that as work on No. 16 was wrapping up, Moody had remarked to him that he would “go and see if he could be of help elsewhere”, telling Pugh to stand by.²⁵⁵ In our timeline, work at No. 9 would then be under way – and we know that Murdoch and others were engaged in taking women from the crowded aft-port side area of the Boat Deck over to Boat No. 9 to help fill it before it lowered away. Moody could not have seen Boat No. 9 filling from where he was working on Boat No. 16. (*See image opposite top.*)


However, if he moved forward to the forward end of Boat No. 12, around where the davits between Nos. 10 and 12 were located, and looked to starboard past the skylight covering the dome over the Aft Grand Staircase, he could have seen No. 9 hanging in the davits. (*See image opposite bottom.*)

Moody could conceivably have *seen* Murdoch and the others taking passengers to No. 9; alternatively, he could have been *informed* that Murdoch was taking women to No. 9. Either way, he apparently became aware of the need and, according to Pugh, Moody was clearly looking for a way to help. Interestingly, Moody had left the efforts around Boat No. 4 on A Deck earlier on, and if he was aware of a need for passengers at No. 9, his thought might have been to see if there was anyone still waiting for No. 4 who was then interested in getting into No. 9. To get to that group on A Deck,

²⁵⁵ Letter from Alfred Pugh to Walter Lord, dated July 20, 1955. Available on paullee.com.

Opposite page, top: This image captures the scene as Boat No. 16 was lowered away from the aft Boat Deck on the port side. From this vantage point, Sixth Officer Moody could not have seen work going on at Boat No. 9. However, we know that he was leaving that area to help elsewhere, and where he was seen shortly thereafter. (HFX Studios.)

Opposite page, bottom: As Moody moved forward slightly, he would have been able to look across to the starboard side, where Boat No. 9 hung in the davits. Considering the fact that efforts were under way to bring passengers to No. 9 from the port side, it could be that Moody was asked to help in that process, possibly even by Murdoch, thus leading him to find May Futrelle and bring her to No. 9. (HFX Studios.)





Above: As Moody headed forward, he would have come to the top of the stairs that led down to the Boat Deck. It was on these stairs (the door to which is visible on the right side of the image, just behind the raised roof over the Lounge) that he met May Futrelle, pulling her up to the Boat Deck. (HFX Studios.)

forward, Moody would likely have gone forward – crossing from Second Class, into the Engineers’ Promenade, and then into First Class – making his way to the staircase on the port side of the deckhouse at the base of the No. 3 funnel, which led down to A Deck.

Looking at certain details of May Futrelle’s accounts, particularly the fact that as she climbed a set of stairs, she spotted Moody at the top of those stairs, and that he had pulled her up to the Boat Deck, it would seem that this staircase is an obvious candidate for where the two individuals met. From this location, if Moody was intent on getting May to No. 9, he would likely have taken her through the gate onto the Engineers’ Promenade, and then directly across to starboard behind the deckhouse, following the path of the aft expansion joint. Another option would be for him to take her up and over the roof of the Lounge, just forward of the deckhouse, before heading back astern.

More interestingly, in Futrelle’s later account, she remembered him leaving her for a moment near the top of those stairs, checking for another boat, and then returning and actually leading her to No.



Above: Once Moody had found Mrs. Futrelle, he could have led her to No. 9 by backtracking onto the Engineers' Promenade and crossing to the starboard side by the aft expansion joint. (HFX Studios.)

9. Moody's likely routes from the top of those stairs over to Boat No. 9 intersects with a location that is a likely tie-in to Quartermaster Wynn, whose movements during the sinking we considered earlier.

Coming up from his quarters on E Deck, Wynn met Moody, who told him to proceed to No. 9 and take charge of it. Although Wynn never said what route he took to get back up to the Boat Deck from his quarters, the most obvious candidate was the working staircase on the aft end of the No. 3 funnel uptake, which led up to the Boat Deck, at the top of which he would emerge through a door facing the starboard side.

Astonishingly, this door is located in almost precisely the same area where Moody and May Futrelle were traversing at the time – either together, or as he went to check and make sure No. 9 was still there before going back to fetch her and bring her there himself. If Moody had temporarily left her to be certain No. 9 was still there, had he encountered Wynn on the way there or back, and told



Above: As Moody led Mrs. Futrelle to the starboard side of the Boat Deck and turned aft, this is the sight that they would have been presented with. Moody led her to Boat No. 9, which is the boat closest to the camera in this view. We are forced to wonder if it was during this trip that he encountered Wynn as the Quartermaster came up from below, telling him “to go to” No. 9 and take charge of it. (HFX Studios.)

Wynn “to go to” No. 9 and take charge of it, while he returned to Mrs. Futrelle to lead her back to that boat? The locations, timing, and order of events certainly indicates that likelihood.

Even without the apparent tie-in to Wynn’s likely route back up from below, May Futrelle’s recollections are a “final nail” in the coffin of the Halpern timeline placing No. 9 leaving before No. 14. For example, 1) Moody’s comments to Futrelle about the women ‘having gone’ make sense in the context of our timeline, where No. 9 departs after Nos. 16, 14, and 12 – which were filled with women – and at a point where No. 10 was still sitting in its chocks, not yet ready to load. However, such a comment makes no sense whatever in the Halpern timeline. Under our order of events, Moody’s comments would not only have made sense, but 2) it would also have been logical for him to then take her across to the starboard side, barely arriving there before No. 9 departed at 1:32 a.m., as we conclude. 3) Futrelle having seen men from the Engine Room with sooty faces while waiting for Moody also indicates that Boat No. 9 is important. These were clearly men who had been on duty at the time

of the collision, as they likely would have showered already if they were off duty. They were thus not the off-duty men seen earlier at No. 8, and were part of the group just released from below. This indicates that No. 9 was launched later than 1:20, and in harmony with our conclusion that No. 9 left at about 1:32 a.m. – giving these men time to get to the Boat Deck after being released from their posts below at about 1:20 a.m.

There is another fascinating detail to take into account: we know from other evidence that Moody was subsequently involved in the loading of Boats Nos. 13 and 15 on the starboard side, astern of No. 9. These boats began lowering away at about 1:37 and 1:38 in our new timeline (we concluded 1:40 and 1:41 in our original lifeboat article. The reasons for this change will be discussed later), about 5-6 minutes after our departure time for No. 9. In our sequence, Moody – having finished at No. 16 – becomes involved in efforts to move people from the port side over to No. 9, orders Quartermaster Wynn to that boat, and brings May Futrelle to that same boat. Then he *remains* on the starboard side (instead of dashing back to port to work on No. 16 first, as the Halpern timeline requires), and simply moves aft to engage with those lifeboats after he sees No. 9 lower away.

Another surprising source of evidence, pertaining to White Star Chairman J. Bruce Ismay, also demonstrates that Boat No. 16 left prior to Boats Nos. 9 *and* 11 – and since Halpern agrees with us that No. 16 left before No. 14, this also means that Nos. 9 and 11 *must* have left before No. 14. In his inquiry testimony in the United States, Ismay stated that he saw “Certainly three” of the lifeboats lowered. He also gave a general statement that he “saw the first lifeboat lowered on the starboard side,” but added that he had no knowledge of what happened on the port side.²⁵⁶ In the British inquiry, Ismay was much more specific, again stating that he had no knowledge of what was happening on the port side, but stating: “I saw 3, 5, 7, and 9 lowered.”²⁵⁷ Ismay’s account of being at those four specific boats is supported by multiple other witnesses, both in the inquiries and elsewhere.

Now, when Ismay was directly asked: “Did you see No. 1 boat launched?” he responded, “I did not.” He later reiterated: “I know nothing about No. 1 boat; I never saw it at any time.”²⁵⁸ In addition to Ismay’s statement that he helped load No. 3, Fifth Officer Lowe and Bathroom Steward Samuel Rule confirmed his presence and assistance there.²⁵⁹ Halpern continues to agree with our assessment that No. 3 lowered away at 12:55 a.m., and No. 1 began lowering away at 1:05 a.m. It seems unlikely that Ismay would have completely missed seeing No. 1 loading right next to No. 3 unless he had left the scene after No. 3 was ordered to lower away. If he did leave the area, then where did Ismay go next?

²⁵⁶ Am. 7; Am 9.

²⁵⁷ Br. 18541.

²⁵⁸ Br. 18775-18780.

²⁵⁹ Am. 401; Br. 6444.

We have an important clue: a little-known letter written by Dr. W. A. James to Ismay on July 29, 1912. James was the husband of Stewardess Evelyn Marsden, and wanted to thank Ismay for persuading his wife to board a lifeboat. He wrote: “She was a stewardess, only a stewardess, but that made no difference to you. And so you saved her...” He added: “She never ceases to sing your praises, and so from two hearts there will daily come a prayer for ‘Bruce Ismay’ this, as you said ‘you are all women now.’”²⁶⁰ Marsden was clearly rescued in Boat No. 16,²⁶¹ indicating that Ismay was on the aft-port side at least briefly. It appears that after assisting at the forward-starboard boats, Ismay – as was the case with so many others – went to the aft-port side, where he encouraged Marsden to get into No. 16, before moving on.

Not only does this letter give an insight into how Ismay helped a stewardess into a lifeboat, but the fact that she had left in No. 16 is another example which shows that taking only inquiry testimony as “superior” to accounts in other forms, including written personal accounts, is foolhardy, and leads to missing important parts of the story. But the fact that Ismay was on the port side at No. 16 also leads to further interesting conclusions.

We know that Ismay was involved as No. 9 was loading from the testimony of Saloon Steward William Ward, who reported that Ismay was seen helping load Boat No. 9. Ward testified to this, seeing Ismay speaking with Purser McElroy, and hearing Ismay say something along the lines of, “Steady, boys” – apparently to the crew in the area. He also recalled that Ismay “was on deck when our boat [No. 9] left.”²⁶² This is confirmed by Saloon Steward Edenser Edward Wheelton, who testified: “Mr. Ismay, the last I saw of him was when we sent No. 9 away.”²⁶³ Ismay did not leave No. 9 before it lowered away.

He also stayed in the area after No. 9 started down. We know this from multiple eyewitnesses. Philip Mock and his sister Emma Schabert were standing there at the time, and Emma had just refused to leave her brother to get into No. 9. In an April 18, 1912 letter, Emma wrote:

The great Mr Ismay [had] tried to make me enter the last boat on the upper deck [No. 9]. When I refused and it had gone, he said: “You made a great mistake not to get into that boat.” I answered: “It does not matter. I prefer staying with my brother.”²⁶⁴

²⁶⁰ Letter from Dr. W.A. James to Bruce Ismay, July 29, 1912. Reproduced in *Understanding J. Bruce Ismay*, by Clifford Ismay (The History Press, 2022).

²⁶¹ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Marsden_Evelyn.html

²⁶² Am. 597; Am. 601.

²⁶³ Am. 445.

²⁶⁴ Letter from Emma Schabert, April 18, 1912. From Kyrill Schabert, shared with George Behe by Don Lynch, and contained in *The Triumvirate: Captain Edward J. Smith, Bruce Ismay, Thomas Andrews and the Sinking of Titanic*, by

Mock and Schabert subsequently left in Boat No. 11.²⁶⁵ Ismay apparently next spotted First Class passenger Edith Rosenbaum, and helped to save her. She recalled:

Women were being placed in the lifeboats as I stood perplexed on the boat deck. Just then I happened to turn around and I caught sight of a man standing in one of the doors. He was calling out and asking if all the women were being cared for. As he caught sight of me he motioned to me and I approached him. As I have said, this man was Mr. Ismay, who seized my arm and cried, 'Woman, what are you doing here? All women should be off the boat!' He thrust me down the passageway to A deck, where I found myself between two lines of men. I was picked up by two of them, carried to the side of the lifeboat, and thrust over into it head first.²⁶⁶

The lifeboat Rosenbaum was tossed into was No. 11. Rosenbaum remembering that “women were being placed in the lifeboats” as she stood on the starboard Boat Deck can only be a reference to Boat No. 9 – since Nos. 7, 5, 3, and 1 forward had already lowered away, and Nos. 11, 13, and 15 would only lower away after No. 9. The fact that she saw this boat, No. 9, being loaded just prior to Ismay forcing her down to A Deck, at which time she boarded and left in No. 11, also strongly suggests that Nos. 9 and 11 left close together, as will be discussed later. It also gives us a direct pattern for Ismay’s movement: he was with No. 9 during the loading, stayed there once it lowered away, chastised Emma Schabert for not getting into No. 9, and led Edith Rosenbaum from the vicinity of No. 9 on the Boat Deck down to get into No. 11 at A Deck just in time for it to leave.

Yet Halpern places the launch time for Boat No. 16 on the port side between the launches of Boats No. 9 and 11 on the starboard side – still, we know that Ismay was seen at all three boats, 16, 9, and 11. The fact that Ismay went directly from No. 9 to No. 11 indicates that Ismay remained on the aft-starboard side during the loading of these two boats; this shows, along with the wealth of other evidence examined in this paper, that Boat No. 16 *must have* lowered *prior* to Nos. 9 and 11, disproving Halpern’s sequence placing No. 9’s launch earlier. Why?

For the Halpern sequence to work, the following sequence is required: 1) according to his own statements and eyewitness testimony from other survivors, Ismay was clearly at No. 9 both *as it loaded* and he also *stayed there after it began lowering away* at Halpern’s 1:15 a.m. 2) He then spoke with Emma Schabert; he also met Edith Rosenbaum, and pushed her down to A Deck to get her into No. 11,

George Behe, 2024.

²⁶⁵ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Mock_Philipp.html

²⁶⁶ *New York Times*, April 23, 1912. Rosenbaum credited Ismay with saving her life in other accounts as well.

which Halpern believes launched at 1:25; from there, 3) Ismay would have needed to time travel backwards as he climbed back up to the Boat Deck and crossed over to the port side in time to help Evelyn Marsden into No. 16 for it to have launched at the time we both conclude that boat began to lower, at 1:20 a.m. Worse yet for the Halpern timeline, Ismay's testimony suggests that he did not even stay late enough to actually see No. 16 lower away – meaning that he got Marsden into No. 16 a bit prior to the order to lower it away, precisely when Halpern would have him seen on the starboard side during the loading of No. 9.

Another issue becomes evident: as we have already seen, Steward Rule recalled seeing Ismay in the area where Boat No. 3 had been when Boat No. 1 was launched at about 1:05 a.m.²⁶⁷ In Halpern's new timeline, he concludes that Boat No. 9 left at 1:15 a.m. Suddenly, when extra evidence is considered, the Halpern timeline and sequence between Nos. 9, 11, and 16 becomes hysterically implausible. The puzzle pieces simply don't work when jammed into the Halpern sequence. Furthermore, our sequence provides not only a logical flow of Ismay's movements, but also likely reasons for those movements. When he left the forward-starboard Boat Deck, Ismay clearly headed to the aft-port side, as so many of the crewmembers did. This also helps explain why the gap between his known movements between No. 3 and No. 9 on the starboard side in our original lifeboat timeline. For starters, although he does not seem to have approached No. 1 as it loaded and launched, he was seen in the vicinity of where No. 3 had launched up to the point when No. 1 began lowering away; secondly, his brief trip to the aft-port side to No. 16 fills the gap between that point and when he appeared at No. 9 during its loading.

Arriving at No. 16 as it was loading, Ismay saw Marsden and persuaded her to get in the boat. However, Ismay apparently did not stay until No. 16 began lowering away at 1:20 a.m. Instead, he then crossed back to the starboard side, as McGough, Murdoch and others had done, where he was seen helping at No. 9 until and after it lowered away at 1:32 a.m. Given how actively he was involved in the loading of the lifeboats on the starboard side, it is easy to envision Ismay having helped with the efforts to pass women and children across from the port side to fill No. 9, that Assistant Second Steward Wheat described in his testimony.²⁶⁸ Ismay would have then seen Rosenbaum still standing on deck, forcing her down to A Deck, where she was tossed into No. 11, prior to it lowering at 1:35 a.m.

Further evidence that at least some of the aft port boats left prior to the aft starboard ones comes in the form of the accounts of Second Class passengers Emilio Pallás y Castelló, Julian Padrón Marent, as well as the sisters Florentina and Asunción Duran y Moré. The two men saw Florentina and

²⁶⁷ Br. 9567-9606.

²⁶⁸ Br. 13187-13188.

Asunción safely into Boat No. 12, before subsequently jumping down into one of the aft-starboard boats loading from A Deck.²⁶⁹

The Duran sisters' presence in No. 12 is established by the disorder mentioned in their account, and the detail that they were aboard the boat which rescued men off of Collapsible B. Pallás y Castelló and Julian Padrón Manent described how, some time after helping the girls into the boat they had left in, No. 12, they saw a boat "in the lower deck" that was "abruptly filling." The two men stood over that boat, and jumped down into it from the deck above, the Boat Deck. The fact that the boat was loading from A Deck indicates that the boat they boarded was one of either No. 11, 13 or 15 on the starboard side. First Class passenger Philip Mock, rescued in No. 11, detailed how "two men jumped from the deck above."²⁷⁰ This recollection supports the conclusion that the two men made it into No. 11 specifically. Taken together, this also proves that No. 12 went before No. 11, just as we concluded in our 2001 lifeboat article (1:30 a.m. for No. 12 and 1:35 a.m. for No. 11, respectively). However, Halpern's current lifeboat conclusions have No. 12 and No. 11 both starting to lower away at 1:25 a.m., an impossibility for this sequence of passenger movements to work correctly.

According to Second Class passenger Kate Buss, a group of fellow Second Class passengers – a group which included Marion Wright, Sidney Collett, Robert Norman, Alfred Pain, Robertha Watt and her daughter – were initially on the aft-port side, before crossing to the aft-starboard side. It is also possible that Second Class passenger Ellen Toomey was a member of Watt's group, given the fact that she shared a cabin with Bertha Watt and her daughter, and given the movements around the deck that are described in her own accounts. Kate Buss recalled:

On deck I saw Mr. N. [Robert Norman] again, and Dr. P, was looking out for Miss W.... We didn't realize that a lot of passengers were off the vessel, and it seemed quite by chance that *we went round to the other side of the ship* [authors' emphasis] and heard them call, "Any more ladies on deck?" and "Ladies first."²⁷¹

Buss, along with several of her group, subsequently boarded Boat No. 9 and departed the ship. Clearly, they had started off on the port side, and were in an area of deck where they saw other Second Class passengers whom they knew. Another account from Buss further described the movements that she took once reaching the Boat Deck. She described seeing several boats depart the ship and then noticed passengers moving from the port side, where she was, to the starboard side. Fellow Second

²⁶⁹ *El País*, Madrid, May 23, 1912. Courtesy of Craig Stringer.

²⁷⁰ *The Evening Sentinel*, April 24, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

²⁷¹ *East Kent Gazette*, May 4, 1912. Reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic: Memories of the Maiden Voyage*, Behe, George (Lulu, 2011).

Class passenger Robert Norman asked her to stay where she was, and crossed over to the starboard side to see if there were any boats there. Returning, he took her to the other side of the ship, where she boarded boat No. 9.²⁷² If Buss had been on the aft-port Second Class Boat Deck, where she was seeing fellow Second Class passengers, and saw several lifeboats leave from the deck while she was there, all before going over to leave in Boat No. 9, this is another strong proof that Nos. 16, 14, and 12 left before No. 9 left from the starboard side, as we initially concluded. Buss's description of the group starting on the aft-port side and subsequently heading to the aft-starboard side to Boat No. 9 takes on added significance when the accounts of her companions who initially gathered on the aft-port side are examined, as we will now show.²⁷³

In her accounts, Robertha Watt gave a description supporting that at least some of the aft port boats lowered before the aft starboard. She stated that after coming on deck, "we met with some friends, who told us that the eight first-class boats had gone off. The port side of the ship was very crowded, so we went around to the starboard side..." She then boarded and left in Boat No. 9, "which was the tenth to leave."²⁷⁴

Watt's description of the crowds present on the port side is consistent with the conditions that Lowe, Lightoller and others faced when loading the aft-port boats. Remarkably, in our original 2001 lifeboat article, our timeline conclusions – made at a time when we were not even aware of Watt's account – show precisely eight lifeboats departing prior to No. 9 lowering away (Nos. 7, 5, 3, 8, 1, 6, 16 and 14), and No. 9 being the ninth or tenth to leave (we concluded No. 12 and No. 9 started lowering at the same time). In this article, we will see that there is evidence pushing No. 9's launch *slightly* later than No. 12's, making it precisely the tenth boat to leave, just as Watt stated. Is this a coincidence? Or a remarkably detailed observation? Either way, by comparison, the Halpern timeline places Boat No. 9 as the seventh boat to leave *Titanic* – quite a ways off from Watt's statement that No. 9 was the tenth boat, and our own conclusion that it was the tenth boat to leave.

Watt later wrote a letter in which she mentioned that her group stood with fellow Second Class passengers John Ashby, Alfred Pain, Marion Wright and the Collyer family, before being joined by "Mr. Hoffman" and his sons (the Navratil family).²⁷⁵ This is confirmation that Watt and her group

²⁷² *The Titanic Commutator*, Vol. 30, No. 176, 2006. Letter written by Kate Buss in 1932.

²⁷³ The Second Class passengers apparently remained in their designated deck spaces to a remarkable degree. Of the 118 Second Class survivors, only 13 are definitively known to have been rescued in a lifeboat other than one of the aft lifeboats. Approximately 89% of them remained in their assigned open spaces on the stern section of the Boat Deck. See https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Lifeboat_Project_Survivors.html. Thank you to Brandon Whited and Craig Stringer for sharing their thoughts regarding this.

²⁷⁴ *Maidenhead Advertiser*, April 29, 1912. Watt repeated these exact details about the number of lifeboats that departed prior to No. 9, in *The Spectrum*, April 1914. Courtesy of Craig Stringer.

²⁷⁵ Letter from Roberta Watt to Walter Lord, April 10, 1963. Courtesy of Paul Lee.

were initially on the port side, since, as discussed previously in this article, the Collyers remained on the port side before departing in Boat No. 14.²⁷⁶

Ellen Toomey, who shared a cabin with Robertha Watt and her mother Elizabeth and was pushed to go on deck by Watt, was also rescued in Boat No. 9. Her account gives further evidence that Boat No. 14 departed prior to No. 9; she expressed being puzzled at how two men got into her boat [No. 9], due to the rumor that “they shot down five men for attempting to get into the boats.” She then went on to state that “the shooting was done before we were lowered.”²⁷⁷

In another account, Toomey also stated that she heard shooting prior to departing the ship:

We were ordered to the side of the ship along with other women. The men stood aside. They were brave, those men on the *Titanic*. They were real heroes. The order was given to lower the lifeboats, and one boat on our side was loaded with women and lowered to the water.

An officer stood with drawn revolver. I did not see him shoot. He threatened to shoot a man because he did not do what the officer told him to do, but finally the man obeyed. But I heard several shots on other parts of the ship. Who did the shooting I do not know.

I was put into the second lifeboat on the starboard side and I think there were about thirty persons in our boat.²⁷⁸

If Toomey heard shooting prior to boarding No. 9, then looking at all available evidence on incidents of gunfire that occurred during the disaster, this would have to have been Lowe’s shots fired as No. 14 lowered away. There are only three documented incidents of gunfire during the sinking: Lowe firing shots at No. 14 as it lowered away, First Officer Murdoch firing shots during the loading of Collapsible C and Second Officer Lightoller possibly firing his weapon at Collapsible D.²⁷⁹ Given the timing, only the incident at Boat No. 14 fits, and means that Toomey left in No. 9 *after* the gunfire surrounding No. 14.

²⁷⁶ Thank you to Craig Stringer for sharing this observation.

²⁷⁷ *The Indianapolis Star*, April 23, 1912. Courtesy of Craig Stringer.

²⁷⁸ *Indianapolis Star*, April 24, 1912. Courtesy of Craig Stringer.

²⁷⁹ *On a Sea of Glass: The Life & Loss of RMS Titanic*, Fitch, Layton and Wormstedt (Amberley, 2015). See Appendix H: Incidents of Gunfire During the Sinking. There are eyewitness allegations of one of the ship’s officers shooting passengers and them himself. However, this was reported to have happened late in the sinking and it is not entirely clear whether it was related to one of the gunfire incidents at Collapsible C or D, or later, during the aborted launch of Collapsible A.

Second Class passengers Edward and Ethel Beane, also rescued in Boat No. 9, provide corroboration for both 1) gunshots being fired before they departed the ship, as well as 2) the aft-port boats departing prior to the starboard ones. The Beanes had gone to the port side of the deck before crossing to the starboard side and boarding No. 9. Just after the sinking, Edward recalled:

As I look back on it now the officers kept pretty good order and although I heard revolvers crack I did not see anyone shot. I think it was done to frighten steerage passengers. They were crowding the companionways, trying to get on deck. On the first side of the boat we landed when we got out on deck [the port side], every boat had gone and there were few people standing there. It looked pretty black for us then, but on the other side we found a boat just loading [No. 9] and I got my wife into it.²⁸⁰

In other accounts, the Beanes repeated the claim of hearing gunfire prior to leaving the ship, although in some later versions, this morphed into Edward actually seeing a man shot, rather than just hearing it. This may have been a case of hearing stories of a shooting, and having heard gunfire himself, and then later extrapolating conclusions about what happened in his latter-day account:

“The crew had their rifles [*sic*] to keep the men back until the women and children could get into the boats,” explained Mr. Beane. “A man never knows what he’ll do in an emergency or what tricks his nerves will play on him. I saw a man shot down for trying to break through... I saw Charles Williams, the prize fighter coming over for a tag match drop back when the rifle fire scorched his fingers for overeagerness. He was a big brute of a man, too.”²⁸¹

It seems that Beane was referring to Leslie Williams, a Third Class passenger who was a boxer and coming to the United States for a series of matches. Of note, Second Class passenger Charles Williams was rescued in Boat No. 14, having been taken into it by Fifth Officer Lowe so that he could help row.²⁸² However, he was a racquet player, not a boxer. It is possible that Beane simply mixed up the two individuals in the intervening years, since the shots he heard and/or saw were certainly those that Lowe fired at No. 14. Either way, across multiple accounts, Beane’s memory of gunfire – clearly

²⁸⁰ *The Syracuse Herald*, May 3, 1912, Courtesy of Mike Poirier. Beane always claimed to have jumped into the water after seeing his wife into No. 9, subsequently being pulled aboard that boat. It seems likely that he simply boarded the lifeboat from the deck.

²⁸¹ *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, April 15, 1931.

²⁸² Am. 406; Am. 621.

referring to the incidents surrounding Boat No. 14's launch from the port side – was before he and his wife left in No. 9 from the starboard side.

Another member of Kate Buss's group, Marion Wright, also gave evidence that supports the fact that the aft-port boats began departing prior to the aft-starboard ones. We can establish that she departed in Boat No. 9 from the starboard side, a conclusion which helps us unravel a terminology error in her account. In a letter to victim Alfred Pain's mother, she wrote:

About 12:30 p.m. [*sic*, a.m.], when I had been on deck already for some time, your son came up, properly dressed, and with his life belt on. I could see he was looking for someone, and after a while he found me, and said: "I have been trying to find you for some time." I asked him if he thought there was any great danger, and he assured me there could not be. We stood for some time on the starboard, watching them load boats. There were hundreds of women on that side, and your son suddenly said: "I think we had better go round the other side; there aren't so many people there." We did so, and scarcely had we got round when the call came "any more ladies, this way!" Your son said, "you had better run." I did so and he followed and put me on the lifeboat.²⁸³

Wright clearly meant port when she said starboard, since she described crossing over to the other side of the ship from where she had been, to the side where she boarded Boat No. 9, which was on the starboard side.²⁸⁴ Interestingly, despite the confusion in terminology, her account meshes well with the picture painted by others on the port side of the aft Boat Deck who described migrating over to the starboard side after the aft-port lifeboats (16, 14, and 12) had launched.

Third Class passenger Jennie Hansen, who was rescued in Boat No. 11, was interviewed in her home after arriving back home in Racine, Wisconsin. She described the following events transpiring before her escape:

I went back [to my cabin], but I heard the steerage passengers coming upstairs and I looked out again. I saw the cabin stewards with lifebelts on and people rushing around. I asked again what the trouble was and an officer yelled to me to get a life belt on and get out on deck. Then I told Peter and with Henry we jumped into our clothes and got belts on.

²⁸³ Letter from Marion Wright to Alfred Pain's mother, May 28, 1912. Thank you to Craig Stringer, for drawing our attention to this account.

²⁸⁴ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Wright_Marion.html

By this time I knew that something awful had happened and I heard shots fired, but whether they were to scare the panic-stricken steerage people or distress signals I could not tell. We got out on deck and as the stairs leading to the boat deck were crowded with passengers, we had to climb up on an iron ladder on the outside of the ship.²⁸⁵

Hansen's quote about hearing gunfire sometime prior to departing in No. 11 was reported, verbatim, in more than one newspaper; it was clearly not the invention of a reporter.²⁸⁶ The fact Hansen heard shots fired before she got to A Deck and boarded No. 11 suggests that they were the same shots fired by Fifth Officer Lowe as No. 14 lowered, as there is no record of earlier gunshots. Halpern's current timeline has No. 11 lowering at 1:25 a.m., prior to his 1:30 a.m. departure time for No. 14. Clearly this does not work with her recollections. However, this is entirely consistent with our original lifeboat timeline, which shows No. 14 lowering around ten minutes prior to No. 11.

Third Class passenger Margaret Mannion gave further evidence that some of the aft-port boats, particularly No. 14, left prior to some of the aft-starboard boats. She stated: "Panic set in, and as we tried to run down the corridors sailors were firing shots in the air."²⁸⁷ Again, this is a clear reference to the shots fired as No. 14 lowered away, and the earliest documented incident of gunfire during the sinking; she subsequently boarded Boat No. 13, looking up and catching a last glimpse of her fiancé, Martin Gallagher, praying the rosary. This account again suggests No. 14 was lowering away some time prior to Mannion boarding No. 13, which we know left after the launch of Boat No. 9. Halpern's lifeboat timeline has both Boat No. 14 and 13 lowering at the same time, 1:30 a.m., which again, is incompatible with the gunshot evidence.

Further evidence comes from Saloon Steward Benjamin Thomas. Thomas was rescued in No. 15, but appears to have seen or heard Fifth Officer Lowe fire shots at Boat No. 14 before he departed. He quoted Lowe, and even accurately noted that the gunfire happened as the boat was lowering, rather than as it was being loaded:

He [Thomas] endorsed the statement made by others that some of the officers made sure of order by firing their revolvers over the heads of people. Just after one of the boats was discharged, the officer in charge said: "If anyone disobeys me I will shoot."²⁸⁸

²⁸⁵ *Racine Journal News*, April 24, 1912.

²⁸⁶ *Kenosha Telegraph-Courier*, May 2, 1912.

²⁸⁷ *Ballinasloe Life*, issue No. 6, February/March 2012. Courtesy of George Behe.

²⁸⁸ *Western Daily Mercury*, April 30, 1912.

No. 15 was Thomas's assigned lifeboat, so it seems likely that he would have helped load the boat prior to being ordered into it. In Halpern's currently postulated launch timeline, No. 14 began lowering at 1:30 a.m. and No. 15 at 1:33 a.m. If Thomas heard Lowe's shots, and even an accompanying verbal warning, at No. 14 before he crossed to starboard in time to help load No. 15 before being ordered it, then Halpern's time of 1:33 a.m. for No. 15 cannot be correct. However, if No. 14 departed around 1:25 a.m. and No. 15 didn't lower until around 1:38 a.m., as we have concluded, this provides Thomas with plenty of time to be in both locations.

Third Class passenger Charles Dahl departed in Boat No. 15. His accounts also provide some evidence of the aft-port boats loading prior to the aft-starboard ones. Dahl gave multiple recollections of his experiences, which we shall place in order to make them easily understandable. In one of his accounts, Dahl stated:

I went up on the steerage deck aft. I saw the first class passengers putting on their lifebelts, so I put on mine and went up to the first class deck. When I got there I saw them getting ready to put out the lifeboats.²⁸⁹

Clearly, Dahl is referring to an early stage of the evacuation here, since he sees First Class passengers donning lifebelts and the crew preparing to put the lifeboats out. In a second account, Dahl specifies the following, and then describe the events that happened subsequently:

I then went up on deck with the first class passengers and they were all busy by that time putting on their life belts. The crew from below then came up and most everyone went to the starboard side of the ship. The starboard boats [clearly a reference to the forward boats on that side] were the first to be lowered. I waited on the port side for a boat half an hour, then went over to the starboard side. The women and children were looked after first. The men were ordered to stand back and were warned if they did not obey they would be laid out.²⁹⁰

Dahl almost certainly saw the forward-starboard boats loading and lowering, before proceeding to the port Boat Deck and waiting for 'half an hour' for a boat. He next described remaining on the starboard side "until the last boat [*sic*, No. 15, the aft-most boat on the starboard side, and the last of the aft-starboard boats to lower away] [was] well filled, going down the side of the ship." He then got permission from "the

²⁸⁹ *Manitoba Free Press*, April 29, 1912.

²⁹⁰ *The Ward County Independent*, May 2, 1912.

officer” to climb down the falls into No. 15.²⁹¹ Why did Dahl leave the port side for the starboard side at that point? The details from the next portion of the first account, quoted above, may give a clue:

I went to the port side and waited for half an hour or more, but no one was allowed into the boats. *Some of the passengers came from the starboard side and said that all the lifeboats had left that side* [authors’ emphasis]. There were hundreds of people waiting on the port side, and when I saw that, I thought there was no chance of being saved on that side of the boat. I ran over to the starboard side and to my surprise saw a boat half lowered [No. 15], nearly full of people.²⁹²

If Dahl had already seen the forward-starboard boats lower, then this piece of news that ‘all the lifeboats’ from the starboard side had left must have been a new development. However, when he arrived on the starboard side, he discovered that No. 15 was not yet gone. So what had motivated the report from those passengers? It is possible, indeed likely, that some of these had seen that Nos. 11, 13, and 15 had lowered from the Boat Deck to A Deck for loading purposes and, like many others, assumed that they had already departed.

With this in mind, Dahl’s account is suggestive of the general movement of passengers from the aft-port boats to the aft-starboard ones, Halpern attempts to downplay this in the account from *The Ward County Independent*. He states that “if one looks at the account that Dahl gave to T. P. Shaver on his way from Toronto and Winnipeg [the *Manitoba Free Press* article], we get a totally different and much clearer picture of what was happening.” Actually, as we can see by comparing the accounts above, *both* are suggestive of crowds on the aft-port side after the forward-starboard boats had lowered away, consistent with the conditions that occurred during the loading and lowering of the boats on the aft-port Boat Deck as per numerous witnesses, including Lowe, Buley, Poingdestre, etc., before Dahl eventually escaped in Boat No. 15.

Halpern points to the *Manitoba Free Press* account as evidence that the aft-starboard boats had left before the aft-port ones; however, Dahl did not state in this account where these passengers had come from who said that “all the boats had left [the starboard] side”. Furthermore, when he investigated for himself on the starboard side, Dahl discovered that the reports he had heard were not entirely correct, since he found No. 15 on the starboard side had not yet left; he even stating that “I remained on the starboard side until the last boat well filled, was going down the side of the ship,” possibly indicating that he was on the starboard side for *some time* until he left in No. 15.

²⁹¹ *ibid.*

²⁹² *Manitoba Free Press*, April 29, 1912.

Additionally, Halpern fails to factor in two other explanations for these reports: 1) that No. 9 had already been lowered from the Boat Deck, and Nos. 11, 13, and 15 were not seen by these passengers, as they had already been lowered to A Deck, but had not yet left the ship; or 2) that the passengers were referring to the forward-starboard boats, Nos. 7, 5, 3, and 1, which had, indeed, already left by that point. Either or both of these explanations could account for the reports Dahl heard. Either way, *both* of Dahl's accounts provide useful details, and should not be used to support an early launch time for No. 9 as Halpern indicates.

Furthermore, Dahl described the following in a third account, which was repeated in more than once:

The sight was terrible. Men were fighting with women to get in boats. I heard several shots fired around me. I was picked up by one of the boats.²⁹³

Interestingly, even though this claim appeared in more than one of Dahl's accounts, in his account which appeared in the press several weeks later, he gave contradictory information. In the *Manitoba Free Press* account quoted above, he did discuss men rushing the boats, but he denied hearing shots, although he mentioned being told by others that "two Italians were shot." He also mentioned hearing an officer on the port side exclaim: "If anyone does not obey orders - lay him out."²⁹⁴

It is possible that he was referring to an alleged later incident, rather than denying hearing gunshots in general. Both of these versions are from press accounts, making it unclear what Dahl actually said about hearing shots. Yet if Dahl did hear shots near him on the ship prior to departing in No. 15, those must have been Lowe's shots at No. 14 as it lowered; only after that moment would Dahl have crossed to starboard from the vicinity of No. 14 on the port side, according to his account. This actually provides further evidence that the aft-port boat boats began to lower away first.

Stewardess Katherine Gold's account of the sinking also indicates that the aft-port boats began lowering first:

Three-quarters of an hour after the collision Mrs. Gold went up on deck. On the port side, which was the side of the deck she came up on, all the boats had gone, and on the other side there were only one or two remaining.²⁹⁵

²⁹³ *Chicago Daily Journal*, April 19, 1912; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, April 20, 1912. Dahl boarded No. 15 from the deck by climbing down the falls, and did not enter the water.

²⁹⁴ *Manitoba Free Press*, April 29, 1912. Reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic*, by George Behe (Lulu edition, 2011).

²⁹⁵ *The Bathurst Times*, September 6, 1913. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

Like Edith Rosenbaum, after caving to some urging from Bruce Ismay, Stewardess Gold then boarded and left in Boat No. 11.²⁹⁶

The accounts discussed above also corroborate the story of Assistant Second Steward Joseph Wheat. Wheat testified:

13187. I think you can tell us now [what] happened when you got to the boat Deck?

- When I arrived at No. 9 boat Mr. Murdoch was there with quite a number of our men passing women and children over from the port side into No. 9 boat.

13188. When you say “with a number of our men” does that mean with a number of stewards?

- Yes; the victualling department.²⁹⁷

Wheat’s sighting of Murdoch at No. 9, “passing women and children over from the port side” must have been after Murdoch had been seen at Boat No. 14, after he had left the area of Boat No. 1. Halpern’s conclusion that Boat No. 9 lowered away at 1:15 a.m. is not supported by Murdoch’s movements; the very fact that they had to pass passengers across from the port side just to fill No. 9 also does not seem to match up with the conclusion that No. 9 left earlier in the sinking. However, if No. 9 left later, as we conclude, this matches Murdoch’s movements and the fact that a large crowd had gathered at the aft-port boats by that point, leaving the aft-starboard side abandoned.

Boatswain’s Mate Haines testified that as he stood by No. 9, “Mr. Murdoch came along with a crowd of passengers, and we filled the boat with ladies, and lowered the boat...”²⁹⁸ This sighting, late in the loading of No. 9, suggests that Murdoch may have been responsible for the efforts to pass women and children across from the crowded aft-port boats to the starboard side and that he brought a group of passengers from that location with him. It is entirely possible that Ismay was involved in this effort, returning from his brief sojourn to the port side, where he persuaded Evelyn Marsden to board No. 16. It also is another factor that supports the conclusion that the aft-port boats began lowering before the aft-starboard ones.

Perhaps, Murdoch, upon crossing from the forward-starboard boats to No. 14, found Sixth Officer Moody there and directed him to help gather women and children from the port side, where Nos. 16, 14, and 12 had lowered away, to No. 9, just as he, himself was doing? If so, this would certainly accord with Futrelle’s description.

²⁹⁶ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Coghlan_Gold.html

²⁹⁷ Br. 13187-13188.

²⁹⁸ Am. 657.

The Launch Time of Boat No. 9, and its relationship to the launch of other lifeboats.

As discussed previously, Halpern argues that Boat No. 9 began lowering away as early as 1:15 a.m. – prior not only to when Boat No. 14 began lowering, but also before Boat No. 16, the first of the aft-port boats to depart, started to lower away at 1:20 a.m. Now, recall that the assigned launch time for No. 16 is one that he and we continue to agree on. As readers can see from the evidence above, the conclusion that No. 9 began lowering way before Nos. 14 and 16 significantly clashes with what numerous surviving eyewitnesses actually described. Indeed, taking their evidence as an aggregate, the picture they paint regarding the timing of the aft-port boats in relation to the aft-starboard ones is remarkably consistent and very much opposed to the recent Halpern revisions. Someone inclined to pick apart the veracity of individual statements, to favor their own contrary conclusions, would have a difficult time tackling such an aggregate picture that survivors in the area reported. However, is there additional evidence which sheds light on when Boat No. 9 began lowering away? The answer is yes.

Point 1: The Steward Ward/Steward Ray/Boat No. 9 early work/Boat No. 7 “leaving”/E Deck flooding/Boat No. 6 departure/Ray and Rothschild conversation/Boat No. 9 loading relationship.

Although an incredibly complex step-by-step relationship of events, when we look at each of the steps involved, a remarkable picture begins to emerge. One factor that can be used in estimating the timing of No. 9’s launch is to consider when work on uncovering and preparing Boat No. 9 began in relation to when Boat No. 7 began lowering away – an event which both Halpern and we conclude began at 12:40 a.m.

Saloon Steward William Ward’s testimony gives us a minimum window for when Boat No. 9 could have been ready to lower, at the earliest. It is completely incompatible with Halpern’s timeline. Ward stated that after helping load Boat No. 7, which was his assigned boat, and being turned away from helping man it, he went aft to Boat No. 9. Since No. 7 began lowering at 12:40 a.m., Ward arriving at No. 9 around 12:45 a.m. would seem like a reasonable estimate, although it might have been slightly earlier; for the sake of argument, we will place Ward’s arrival at 12:45, since it is a round number, and easy to estimate from, but we will allow that he might have arrived there as early as 12:42-12:43. When he arrived there, No. 9 was still covered and he assisted in getting the canvas cover off of it.²⁹⁹

We know from Second Officer Lightoller’s testimony that it took 15-20 minutes to unlace and uncover a lifeboat.³⁰⁰ Working from a start time of about 12:45 a.m., and being generous by only adding

²⁹⁹ Am. 597.

³⁰⁰ Br. 13855.

15 minutes to that starting time places the time for finishing up uncovering No. 9 at around 1:00 a.m., although it could easily have been up to five minutes later.

Next the boat had to be swung out and lowered down to the edge of the deck. As per the previously-mentioned James Cameron experiment with a full-sized lifeboat replica and davits, it would take 8 minutes and 30 seconds to coil the falls down and swing out and lower a lifeboat down level with the deck to prepare it for loading.³⁰¹ If, in being generous to the Halpern timeline, we start at 1:00 a.m., then Boat No. 9 would have drawn level with the Boat Deck, ready *to begin* loading, at the *very earliest*, at 1:08 a.m., and might not have achieved this point until up to five minutes later, at 1:13 a.m.

What happened next? Ward added a critical detail in his testimony, indicating that No. 9 did not begin loading as soon as it had reached the edge of the Boat Deck, which we just estimated was at about 1:08-1:13 a.m. He specifically said that when the boat reached the level of the deck, “a sailor came along with a bag and threw it into the boat,” announcing that the Captain had sent him to take charge of the boat. Boatswain’s Mate Haines ordered the man out, and the man complied. Ward testified: “He [the man who had just been ordered out of the boat] stayed there *for three or four minutes*, and I think the purser - I am not sure on that point - said “Are you all ready?” Haynes [*sic*, Haines] answered “Yes” - it was either the purser or Mr. Murdoch - and with that he said: “Pass in the women and children that are here into that boat.”³⁰² If this recollection of several minutes passing between the time that the boat reached the edge of the deck and the moment when the order to begin loading it was given is correct, then this would have to be added to the time we estimated earlier, of 1:08-1:13 a.m. Again, let’s be generous and add just three minutes to the early side of what we estimated before, and say that loading No. 9 began at 1:11 a.m., although again, it should be recognized that it could easily have been five, or now more, minutes after that point.

Now, how long would it have taken to load the boat from that time? Fifth Officer Lowe testified: “It was not the launching of the boats that took the time. We got the whole boat out and in the water in less than ten minutes. It was getting the people together that took the time.”³⁰³ For James Cameron’s full-scale trial, his team concluded it would take an average minimum of 10 minutes, under ordinary circumstances, to load a lifeboat.³⁰⁴ This minimum harmonized well with our earlier original lifeboat launch article, where we estimated that it would take a minimum of 10-15 minutes to load 40-50 occupants into a lifeboat.³⁰⁵

³⁰¹ Cameron’s experiment and the whole special can be viewed at the following URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jXHFEy-ibc>

³⁰² Am. 597.

³⁰³ Br. 15931.

³⁰⁴ Cameron’s experiment and the whole special can be viewed at the following URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jXHFEy-ibc>

³⁰⁵ <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/lifeboats.htm>

Using the estimated 10-15 minute range, starting from our very generous 1:11 a.m., Boat No. 9 would likely have started lowering between 1:21 and 1:26 a.m. under normal circumstances. However, as mentioned earlier (see the section titled “The Loading Process at Boat No. 9 Took Longer Than Average”) the situation at No. 9 was not typical. The crew had to transfer passengers from the port side to fill the lifeboat, which took additional time. Instead, any slowdown in the loading process would then have to be added to the 1:21-1:26 a.m. (or later) range that we have just estimated – in rough terms. Given even the minimum estimates, it is clear that Boat No. 9 could not have been lowered as early as Halpern’s 1:15 a.m. However, and quite interestingly, once you start adding a few minutes to these rough estimates, the timeline certainly begins to support our conclusion that No. 9 did not begin to lower away until 1:32 a.m.

Similarly, Saloon Steward F. Dent Ray gives a marvelous sequence of events between Boat No. 7 and when Boat No. 9 was loading, and it isn’t pretty for the Halpern timeline. Ray testified that when he proceeded up to the Boat Deck, he found his assigned boat, No. 9, “just being swung out.” There were “8 or 10 men standing around it and one or two passengers and no women.” Looking over the rail, he “saw the first boat leaving the ship on the starboard side.”³⁰⁶ Thus, when Ray first arrived alongside No. 9, there was only a small number of passengers present and No. 9 was still being swung out, a step before it could even be lowered level with the deck preparatory to any work at putting passengers aboard it; but simultaneously, Ray went to the rail and, looking over, noticed that Boat No. 7 was just beginning to ‘leave’ the ship.

Now, Ray’s phrase that Boat No. 7 was “leaving” is admittedly a bit open-ended. Ray could have been referring to the boat ‘leaving’ the ship by being lowered away; however, he could just as easily have been referring to it ‘leaving the ship’ by starting to row away from the ship’s side after it had reached the water. Either way, he had to lean over the rail to look and observe this boat leaving the ship, but he did not seem to give any further indication on the state, and unfortunately the statement is left rather open to interpretation to anyone’s convenience. So let’s briefly look at some known factors that we can consider in a balanced look at the matter.

Given that it took a minimum of 5-6 minutes to lower a lifeboat 60 feet to the water safely with the 6-to-1 pulley arrangement they had on the falls, and that No. 7 began lowering away at 12:40 a.m., this places Ray getting to No. 9 in a window of approximately 12:40-12:47 a.m. At the later end of the

³⁰⁶ Am. 803-804. It must be noted that in his 1912 book *The Loss of the S.S. “Titanic,”* Second Class passenger Lawrence Beesley claimed to have seen the crew preparing and swinging out Boat Nos. 9, 11, 13 and 15, shortly after saying “the time about 12.20.” However, it is unlikely this was the case, given Ray’s testimony of seeing No. 9 just being swung out, at the same time that No. 7, which began lowering at 12:40 a.m., was “leaving the ship.” Beesley also demonstrated confusion regarding boat numbers, such as thinking No. 15 was No. 14, etc. We therefore have placed more credence in Ray’s detailed testimony.

spectrum, if Ray referred to seeing No. 7 begin rowing away from the ship, his observation may have coincided with the moment, at about 12:47 a.m., when Quartermaster Rowe saw No. 7 beginning to pull away from the ship's side – likely seeing it because it was illuminated in the flare of the first rocket.

On the other hand, Ray *did* not refer to the first rocket in his accounts, so he might have missed it, having left the deck already on his way below. Since Ray did not mention seeing a rocket, and the first rocket that went up seemed to get the attention of nearly everyone on deck at the time, let's assume that Ray had just left the deck when the rocket was fired. In either case, Ray seems to have seen No. 7 at some point between 12:40 and 12:47 a.m., when the first rocket was fired, and it seems safe to say that it was before 12:47 because he seems to have missed the rocket; so let us, just for the sake of having a waypoint, place Ray's sighting of No. 7 at 12:45 a.m., at about the point when the boat reached the water, and just before the first rocket went off. In doing so, remember that we must allow for a margin for error of a couple of minutes in either direction.

Ray later said: "Things seemed to be dragging rather, and it was very cold, so I decided I'd like to get an overcoat put on." Clearly, there seemed no rush for him to get back to his boat, No. 9, as things were in such an early state of work at the time. Ray proceeded back below deck, headed to his quarters in "No. 3 room" on E Deck, off Scotland Road. A straight read-through of Ray's testimony suggests his visit there was brief. However, when he gave an interview later on, Ray gave a more complete picture of what he did while he was below in his quarters, actually packing some things up that he thought he might need:

I got my overcoat, opened my suitcase, took some handkerchiefs out, which my wife always supplied me so that I had a good supply of, and, uh, one or two other things -- my toothbrush and shaving gear. I thought wherever I was the next morning I should require them, and I came out, nobody about, [the] deck was deserted, the alleyway was deserted.³⁰⁷

None of this indicates a rush. Leaving his room and moving forward on E Deck toward the open emergency door that led to the First Class Entrance and forward Grand Staircase, Ray saw that the forward end of Scotland Road was underwater; in fact, he testified that he was just able to get through the door. Note that his wording likely doesn't suggest that he was swimming or stepping *into* water – *a la* some of the more spectacular water sequences in the 1997 film – to get through the door; instead, it likely means that the water had reached a point just short of the open door.

³⁰⁷ 1958 interview. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLsYVmeWm1g>

Making his way through the door into the First Class Entrance, Ray went across to the other side of the ship, checking the cabins there for passengers, and finding none. He recalled:

I went across to the other side of the ship where the passengers' cabins were; saw nobody there. I looked to see where the water was and it was corresponding on that side of the ship to the port side [**authors' note:** this means that the ship's list had flattened out, and she was then on more or less an even keel]. I walked leisurely up to the main stairway, passed two or three people on the way, saw the two pursers in the purser's office and the clerks busy at the safe taking things out and putting them in bags, and just then Mr. Rothschild [First Class passenger Martin Rothschild] left his stateroom and I waited for him.

Below: This artwork depicts the moment that Steward Ray saw water on the starboard side of E Deck, in the vicinity of the First Class passenger cabins. (Courtesy Paul Quinn.)



After having “come through D deck and then C deck,” on his way up, Ray found Rothschild. Their encounter actually seemed to have been a conversation, rather than a passing encounter. In fact, Ray said that he “waited” for Rothschild. He also recalled a part of their conversation:

I spoke to him and asked him where his wife was. He said she had gone off in a boat [authors’ note: Mrs. Rothschild left in Boat No. 6]. I said, “This seems rather serious.” He said, “I do not think there is any occasion for it.” So we walked leisurely up the stairs until I got to A deck and went through the door.³⁰⁸

As examined previously (see Section 1: Did Boat No. 8 or No. 6 depart first?), the evidence supports the conclusion that No. 6 had begun lowering away at around 1:10 a.m., placing Ray’s sighting of Rothschild some minutes after that. How long after?

Even if we estimate time frames conservatively, and assume that Rothschild departed from the area of Boat No. 6 before it reached the water – which took longer than the minimum 5-6 minutes due to it stopping at C Deck for Major Peuchen to climb down the falls – then we must factor in the time it took Rothschild to return to his cabin, care for whatever he was doing there, and then to leave his cabin again in time for Ray to spot Rothschild as he was leaving his stateroom and coming through the area by the Purser’s Office. Adding time from when No. 6 lowered from the deck at 1:10, the time when Ray and Rothschild spoke was at the *earliest* 1:15 a.m., and most likely later. If Ray had left the Boat Deck at our approximate time of 12:45, we can begin to see that he had spent quite a bit of time in his quarters and looking around at things below, and had only now reached this point of his trip back up to the Boat Deck about a half-hour after he had seen Boat No. 7 ‘leaving’, give or take.

If this estimate seems an absurd amount of time for Ray to have stayed below, consider this: When Ray went to his quarters, he did not seem to have seen water coming up Scotland Road from forward. If he had, he might have been instilled with greater urgency while in his quarters, not wanting to become trapped by rising water – or at the very least keeping a wary eye on it while he gathered his things. Yet when he came back out of his quarters and came back onto Scotland Road, the advancing water had clearly caught him off guard. This will become an important consideration when we consider other observations of water levels on E Deck shortly.

What happened next? Ray testified that after finding Rothschild, “we walked leisurely up the stairs until I got to A deck,” at which point the steward parted ways with Rothschild, and proceeded

³⁰⁸ Amer. 804.

up to the Boat Deck and back to No. 9. When he returned, No. 9 was only then “just being filled with women and children.” Ray then helped finish the loading and saw it safely away.³⁰⁹

Clearly, there is simply no way that Ray could have accomplished everything that he did – heading below at our estimated time of 12:45, reaching his quarters, spending time there sorting out his things, then coming out and observing specific water levels on the port and starboard sides of E Deck, making a slow ascent to C Deck, meeting up with Rothschild (whose wife had just left in No. 6 at 1:10 a.m.), waiting for Rothschild at least briefly, having a brief conversation with him, and then heading back up on deck at a “leisurely” pace – and for Boat No. 9 to have lowered away as early as 1:15 a.m., as Halpern contends. Even this sequence of events assumes that Ray left nothing out of the recollections of his movements during the trip down and back up; for example, had he stopped to speak to anyone, to help a passenger on the way down? What route had he taken down, and how did it compare to his route back up? Any of these things could have extended his trip.

By way of comparison, Halpern gives Captain Smith 10 minutes to get from the Bridge down to E Deck and make his way back to the Bridge between 11:50 p.m. and 12:00 midnight, and as part of the post-collision investigation into the damage, Captain Smith was likely then rushing down and back up. If Ray, moving at a “leisurely” pace also made a trip from the Boat Deck down to E Deck, once the other events he described played out, it is easy to see how a 10-minute trip could extend to an unhurried half-hour that included all of these stops, conversations, and observations in different areas.

Even if one accepts Halpern’s demonstrably inaccurate launch time for Boat No. 6, namely 12:55 a.m., then Ray and Rothschild could not have bumped into each other on C Deck until at least 1:00 a.m. – and that estimate assumes that Rothschild left the scene immediately when his wife’s boat *started* down. As Brandon Whited said to us: “Why would Rothschild have simply walked off just when the boat containing his wife began to lower? He would have watched it safely to the water, in all probability.”³¹⁰ Even assuming Halpern’s incorrect launch time for No. 6 was correct, no less than 15 minutes were needed for Ray to head down and be back up to C Deck in time to meet Rothschild. When one adds in the time for the two men to talk, and walk up the Grand Staircase at a leisurely pace, this quickly begins to extend even under the Halpern timeline.

For example, Ray recalled specific details about what the pursers and pursers’ staff were doing when he came across the scene there on C Deck. He must have taken at least a short time to pause there and identify what he was seeing. He also testified that he “waited” for Mr. Rothschild, but didn’t define why or for how long. Furthermore, as Ray came up, he heard the sound of “a fiddle”; the band was not actually playing a song, he said, but instead what he heard was the sound of one of the bands-

³⁰⁹ Am. 803-804.

³¹⁰ Private correspondence.

men in the process of tuning up his violin. We know that the band played throughout the majority of the disaster from the Boat Deck level of the First Class Entrance, and so since we already know Ray was coming up the forward Grand Staircase when he met Rothschild, he clearly finished the journey back up via that route. None of this indicates a rapid trip down and back.

Upon reaching the deck, Ray proceeded aft to No. 9. Note that Ray clearly referred to the Boat Deck as A Deck, suffering a form of “deck letter confusion” that plagued many survivors in their later recollections. However, since we know that No. 9 was loaded from the Boat Deck, and Ray even said that he “went out there *onto the open deck* [authors’ emphasis] and along to No. 9 boat”,³¹¹ it seems clear that he was referring to the Boat Deck instead of the Promenade Deck. What was the status of work on No. 9 when Ray returned? He testified: “It was just being filled with women and children. I assisted.”³¹²

Although loading had obviously already started by the time he returned, he clearly had plenty of time to help before it lowered away. None of this works well with the Halpern timeline that concludes that No. 9 left as early as 1:15 a.m. However, if Ray returned to the Boat Deck and Boat No. 9 by around 1:25 a.m., whereupon he helped finish loading the boat, then a 1:32 a.m. launch time for Boat No. 9, is consistent with the evidence.

At this point, one could counter-argue: if Halpern’s launch time for Boat No. 6 was correct, at 12:55 a.m., then the sequence of seeing Boat No. 7 launching at about 12:45 a.m., going below, coming back up, meeting Rothschild after his wife’s departure in No. 6 at 12:55 a.m., and then getting Ray to No. 9 to help load still works with Halpern’s 1:15 a.m. departure for No. 9. Unfortunately it doesn’t. We have already seen that even accepting the incorrect early launch time for No. 6, Ray could not have met Rothschild before 1:00 a.m. But more important is what Ray had just reported seeing two decks below and minutes earlier as he came out of his quarters: that water had flooded Scotland Road all the way to the level of the Forward Entrance and Grand Staircase, and was even on both the port and starboard sides. This is a detail that we will come back to shortly, and which completely rules out an early sequence for this chain of events that might otherwise be twisted into supporting the Halpern timeline.

Point 2: The release of the engineers at about 1:20 a.m., and their relationship to Boat No. 9.

There are other factors which rule out Halpern’s suggested 1:15 a.m. launch time for No. 9. As *Titanic* sank and the flooding and situation below deck became more and more precarious, members of the Engineering Department were released from duty to go up on deck. Multiple survivors testified that this occurred at 1:20, or thereabouts. For example:

³¹¹ Am. 804.

³¹² *ibid.*

- **Leading Fireman Threlfall** recounted how he had been working in Boiler Room No. 4, when: “At *about 1.20* [authors’ emphasis] Mr. Hesketh, the second engineer, said ‘we’ve done all we can, men. Get out now.’”³¹³
- **Trimmer George Cavell**, who was also present in Boiler Room No. 4, told a reporter: “Until that order was given not a man ... left his post.”³¹⁴ In another account, Cavell confirmed the details of Threlfall’s account. He was paraphrased as saying: “They tried to keep fires till *twenty past one* [authors’ emphasis] but the water gained... Up to their waists in water they drew the fires. ‘Get out of this,’ said Mr. Hesketh.”³¹⁵
- **Trimmer Thomas Patrick Dillon** concurred with the timing given by Threlfall and Cavell. He was working in the Engine Room and estimated that the order to go up on deck was issued “*An hour and 40 minutes* [authors’ emphasis]” after the collision, or 1:20 a.m.³¹⁶
- Concurring with the three other men was **Greaser Frederick Scott**, who stated that the men were released from the Engine Room at “*Twenty past one* [authors’ emphasis].”³¹⁷ In fact, Scott also stated that he saw the engineers and firemen up top standing against one of the electric cranes, once he reached the deck. He stated that some of the engineers “came up the ladder just behind me.” He specifically mentioned seeing “about eight” of the engineers on deck, including Senior Second Engineer William Farquharson.³¹⁸

When one examines the accounts of surviving members of the Engineering Department who were in the 8 to 12 watch, none of the 12 survivors from this watch were rescued in the forward-port or forward-starboard boats that left early in the sinking, or prior to 1:20 a.m.³¹⁹ In fact, according to numerous reports, they arrived on deck as the aft port and starboard boats were being loaded. Their late arrival on deck may explain why just 12 of the 83 members of this watch survived. In fact, it is

³¹³ *Daily Telegraph*, April 29, 1912.

³¹⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, April 30, 1912.

³¹⁵ *Evening Express*, April 30, 1912. Reproduced in *Titanic: The Homecoming, Tales from the Lapland* by Paul Lee (Independently published, 2020.) As Lee states, this account, attributed to a “young trimmer,” is almost certainly Cavell, given that he describes being in a starboard coal bunker and being buried by an avalanche of coal and that his other experiences, short of how he describes escaping the ship, matches Cavell’s inquiry testimony (Br. 4194-4204).

³¹⁶ Br. 3810-3811.

³¹⁷ Br. 5838-5839.

³¹⁸ Br. 5685-5693; Br. 5710-5711.

³¹⁹ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Lifeboat_Project_Survivors.html

also worth noting that a larger proportion of survivors from the Engineering Department found their way into the aft-starboard boats than the aft-port boats - particularly from the 8 to 12 and 12 to 4 watches - which also seems to indicate a later departure time for those boats. Please see the charts on this and the opposite page for further details on this, referenced from the Lifeboat Occupancy article.

Fireman George Kemish, a member of the 8 to 12 watch, was actually rescued in Boat No. 9.³²⁰ He was likely released from any further responsibilities at the same 1:20 a.m. that saw everyone else being released and many of them heading topside, just like the other members of the Engineering Department recalled.³²¹ Some have speculated that a small number of crewmen must have remained below after the 1:20 a.m. release order, to help keep the power going. However, as mentioned previously, Greaser Scott saw eight of the engineers on deck after arriving there following the 1:20 release, and Trimmer Patrick Dillon recalled seeing the Chief Engineer walking along the promenade deck with a board under his arm, sometime after arriving topside.³²² It seems highly unlikely that Chief Engineer Bell would have abandoned others below deck, and most of the machinery

Unknown placement: (no accounts that give details)	
	Watch
Trimmer Walter Binstead	4-8
Trimmer Percival Blake	12-4
Fireman George Combes	4-8
Fireman Robert Couper	4-8
Fireman John Diaper	4-8
Fireman John Dilley	4-8
Fireman Frederick Doel	12-4
Trimmer A. Dore	8-12
Fireman Edward Flarty	12-4
Fireman George Godley	12-4
Fireman Thomas Graham	4-8
Fireman John Haggan	4-8
Fireman Franz Kasper	12-4
Fireman Frank Mason (a fireman named Mason was sighted on the Poop Deck by a fellow crewman just prior to the final plunge, but there were two Masons)	12-4
Fireman Thomas Mayzes	4-8
Fireman John Moore	4-8
Fireman Charles Othen	4-8
Fireman John Pearce	12-4
Trimmer Edgar Perry	12-4
Greaser George Prangnell	4-8
Fireman John Priest	12-4
Fireman Edward Self	4-8
Fireman James Sparkman	4-8
Fireman Robert Triggs	4-8
Trimmer William White	12-4

Opposite and above: These charts show that a large portion of survivors from the Engineering Department survived in the aft-starboard boats.

³²⁰ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Kemish_George.html. Fireman Kemish later wrote to Walter Lord. A copy of this letter is available on Paul Lee's site at: <https://www.paullee.com/titanic/gkemish.php>. In the letter, Kemish makes clear that he was below and working in the Boiler Rooms during the disaster, even after he had initially come off duty. He even seemed to have referred to the incident when Junior Assistant Second Engineer Jonathan Shepherd broke his leg in Boiler Room No. 5.

³²¹ Kemish, in his June 19, 1955 letter to Walter Lord, provides times for the collision of 11:25 p.m. and 12:45 a.m. for being ordered up on deck. Clearly these are mistaken, perhaps because he gave the account many years after the sinking; it stands to reason that Kemish would have been released from duty at 1:20 a.m., the same time as his colleagues below deck. He also has incorrect details in his account, such as there being a full moon and clouds during the sinking, when in fact, it was a new moon. This account is available on paullee.com.

³²² *The Daily Mail*, May 13, 1912.

Lifeboat Timing and Placement of Surviving Engineering Crew
All placements are from "Titanic: Which People Were in What Lifeboat - A New Study"
at https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Lifeboat_Project_Survivors.html

Time	Port	Engineering Crew Aboard	Watch	Starboard	Engineering Crew Aboard	Watch	
12:40				Boat No. 7:	No Engineering Crew indicated		
12:45				Boat No. 5:	Fireman Alfred Shiers	4-8	
12:50							
12:55				Boat No. 3:	There is indication from ABS Moore and Mrs. Spedden of some firemen aboard, but they have not been identified.		
1:00		Boat No. 8:	No Engineering Crew indicated				
1:05				Boat No. 1:	(all 12 aboard are identified) Fireman Samuel Collins Leading Fireman Charles Hendrickson Fireman Robert Pusey Trimmer Frederick Sheath Fireman James Taylor	12-4 4-8 4-8 4-8 12-4	
1:10		Boat No. 6:	No Engineering Crew indicated, until a fireman was transferred aboard from No. 16, once afloat.				
1:15							
1:20		Many engineering department crewmembers released from Boiler Rooms and Engine Rooms					
1:20		Boat No. 16:	One unidentified fireman, who was transferred from No. 16 to No. 6, to help row. Sometimes speculated to be Fireman James Crimmins, but he only said "last boat."	8-12			
1:25		Boat No. 14:	(Scarrott and Morris testified 2 firemen were aboard) Fireman Frederick Harris? Leading Fireman Threlfall Fireman Thomas Street (rescued from water in No. 14?)	8-12 12-4 8-12			
1:30		Boat No. 12:	No indication of Engineering Crew in the boat, prior to those who were transferred in.				
1:32				Boat No. 9:	(Haines testified "3 or 4 firemen.") Fireman George Kemish Fireman Henry Oliver	8-12 12-4	
1:35				Boat No. 11:	(Brice testified that there was 1 fireman.)		
1:37				Boat No. 13:	(Colonel Gracie says 5 firemen were aboard.) Leader Fireman Frederick Barrett Fireman George Beauchamp Trimmer Albert Fryer? Fireman William Major	8-12 8-12 8-12 12-4	
1:38				Boat No. 15:	Trimmer George Cavell Fireman William Clark Fireman Frank Dymond Trimmer Walter Fredericks Fireman Henry Noss Trimmer George Pelham Fireman William Taylor	8-12 12-4 12-4 12-4 12-4 12-4 12-4	
1:42		Boat No. 2:	(All 17 aboard are identified, no Engineering Crew)				
1:45							
1:50		Boat No. 10: Boat No. 4:	(Buley said 1 fireman aboard) Fireman Charles Rice Trimmer Patrick Dillon (from water) Fireman William Nutbean Fireman John Podesta Greaser Thomas Ranger (from water) Greaser Frederick Scott (from water) Greaser Alfred White? (from water)	8-12 8-12 4-8 4-8 4-8 8-12 4-8			
1:55							
2:00				Collapsible C:	(Rowe and Pearcey said 3 firemen) Trimmer Albert Hunt Fireman William Murdock?	4-8 12-4	
2:05		Collapsible D:	f	n/a			
2:10							
2:15		Collapsible B:	(all from water) Trimmer Ernest Allen Trimmer James Avery? Trimmer Percival Blake? Trimmer Albert Hebb Fireman Walter Hurst Fireman William Lindsay Trimmer James McGann Trimmer John O'Connor Fireman Henry Senior	12-4 12-4 12-4 4-8 12-4 4-8 12-4 n/a 4-8 12-4	Collapsible A: (all from water) Fireman Charles Judd Trimmer William McIntyre Fireman John Thompson	12-4 12-4 12-4	

would have continued to run for at least some time without direct crew intervention. All of this evidence serves as a benchmark, indicating that Boat No. 9 could not have left until sometime after 1:20 a.m., not as early as 1:15, which Halpern suggests.³²³

In general terms, the account of Fireman Henry Oliver also contradicts an early launch time for No. 9. Oliver was rescued in Boat No. 9, along with Kemish. He related the following to a reporter:

On reaching the boat-deck, he found that most of the boats had already been launched except number nine. One of the officers ordered him into the boat, and it was then lowered away, having on board a number of women and children. Recognizing that the *Titanic* was fast settling down, the crew pulled vigorously to get beyond the region of a possible vortex.³²⁴

Oliver's comment that No. 9 was one of the only boats not launched makes sense, since Nos. 11 through 15 had been lowered down to A Deck by that point, since the forward boats on the starboard side had already lowered, and since most of the aft-port boats (16, 14, and 12) had also already been lowered according to our timeline, and since Nos. 8 and 6 had lowered from forward, with No. 4 alongside A Deck and out of the sightline to someone standing on the Boat Deck. Additionally, at 1:15 a.m., *Titanic* appeared fairly stable in the water; even by 1:25 a.m., 10 minutes after Halpern would have No. 9 being launched from the deck, *Titanic* was unlikely to have been described as "fast settling down."

Here we see that two members of the engineering staff arrived on deck in time to make it into Boat No. 9. The evidence of a 1:20 a.m. release of the engineering staff from their work below, and the time it would take for these men to then get on deck, means that No. 9 could not have left as early as 1:15 a.m., minutes before they were even released from below.

Nor were these the only two members of the engineering staff who arrived on deck before No. 9 departed. Recall that May Futrelle saw crewmen from the Engine Room with black faces arrive on deck, prior to when Sixth Officer Moody took her from the port side to the starboard side, to board No. 9.³²⁵ This is a consistent evidentiary pattern forming: No. 9 *must* have begun lowering away *after* 1:20 a.m. for all of this to work.

³²³ We are indebted to Craig Stringer for pointing out the details related to the 1:20 a.m. order to come up on deck, as it relates to the Engineering Department and Boat No. 9.

³²⁴ *Western Daily Mercury*, April 29, 1912.

³²⁵ Interview with May Futrelle by Winslow Bettinson, a radio program director at WJDA in Quincy, Massachusetts, in 1962. The interview was transcribed by George Behe and is reproduced in his book, *The Titanic Disaster: Final Memories*, currently unpublished.



Above: This still from our 2021 animation shows the condition of the ship as Boat No. 9 is drawing far enough away from *Titanic* for McGough to have clearly seen where the water level was forward. Our estimated launch time for No. 9 closely matches the description given by McGough. (HFX Studios.)

Point 3: The observed sinking condition of *Titanic* when No. 9 was leaving the ship.

Additional evidence that contradicts No. 9 leaving as early as 1:15 a.m. comes from Able Bodied Seaman George McGough. McGough stated that after departing in No. 9, “She [*Titanic*] was then down to below the forecastle.”³²⁶ The Forecastle began submerging and the forward Well Deck went from awash to flooded during the lowering of Collapsibles C and D, around 2:00 and 2:05 a.m. respectively. If No. 9 began lowering around 1:32 a.m., then one would have to factor in the addition of no less than 5-6 minutes to lower and time to row far enough away from the ship to see the Forecastle, easily another five minutes; these calculations would place his observation of the ship’s condition around 1:42 a.m. at the earliest. The orientation of the ship reported by McGough is a solid reference point that shows that No. 9 could not have lowered away as early as 1:15 a.m., as Halpern states, since the degree the ship was down to at that early time certainly doesn’t match McGough’s description.

Point 4: Boat No. 9 statements on launch times.

Given all of the above evidence, which suggests a launch time for No. 9 after 1:20 a.m. – and likely later than that – are there any witnesses who specifically give a launch time for Boat No. 9? The answer is yes.

³²⁶ *Staffordshire Sentinel*, April 29, 1912.

- **Able Bodied Seaman McGough**, who left in No. 9, stated: “At 1:45 I left the ship in a boat.”³²⁷ He did not say whether or not he looked at a watch, or was estimating.
- First Class passenger **May Futrelle**, also rescued in No. 9 stated: “The *Titanic* lurched as we reached the water’s edge. It was 2:15 [authors’ emphasis] then, just 15 minutes before she sank.”³²⁸
- First Class passenger **Mary Lines** consistently estimated that No. 9 had been *afloat for 30 minutes* when *Titanic* sank.³²⁹ This would suggest an estimated launch time of around 1:45 a.m., if you work backward from 2:20 a.m. by 30 minutes, and then add a minimum of 5 minutes or so for the boat to be lowered to the water. Lines remained consistent in saying that No. 9 left later in the sinking, telling Walter Lord years later that while No. 9 was not the last boat, “it must have been near the end as we had a very short time in the water before the ship sank.”³³⁰
- Third Class passenger **Berk Pickard** also testified that No. 9 lowered away later, stating that once afloat, he watched *Titanic* going under, “until in *half an hour* [authors’ emphasis], from my point of view, the ship sank altogether.”³³¹

McGough’s time estimates, in general, do not seem particularly reliable; however, it is fair to note that his 1:45 launch time is far closer to our 1:32 than it is to Halpern’s 1:15. Futrelle’s time is clearly incorrect, since, even allowing for a minimum of 5 minutes for No. 9 to reach the water after starting to lower, a launch time of 2:10 a.m. – after Collapsibles C and D would have lowered – is clearly too late. However, both McGough and Futrelle gave times that – even though appearing to be estimates – are certainly indicative of a launch time later in the sinking than where Halpern places it. Mary Lines and Berk Pickard both estimated that their boat had only been in the water for about a half-hour before *Titanic* sank, again indicating a later launch time for No. 9 than Halpern alleges. Other descriptions from those in No. 9, or in the area when it left, of what time the boat left and how it tied into other events also suggest a later launch time than the 1 hour and 5 minutes prior-to-sinking that Halpern postulates. (Please see further on this below.)

At the other end of the spectrum, Halpern could point to Saloon Steward William Ward, who guessed that *Titanic* sank “I suppose about an hour afterwards” Boat No. 9 lowered away and rowed

³²⁷ *Staffordshire Sentinel*, April 29, 1912.

³²⁸ *Daily Boston Globe*, April 17, 1932.

³²⁹ Letter written by Mary Lines on board *Carpathia* to her friend Helen Iselin, April 16, 1912, available at: <https://catalogs.marinersmuseum.org/object/ARI135718>; *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, April 20, 1912.

³³⁰ Lines letter from The Lord-Macquitty Collection, available on www.paullee.com.

³³¹ Am. 1055.

away from the ship.³³² However, as we can clearly see, and which we will build upon momentarily, Ward's evidence on this point is outweighed by a majority of recollections from others rescued in their boat who indicate a later launch time, and a shorter amount of time in the water before the sinking.

Point 5: Evidence indicates that the starboard-aft boats all lowered away within a short time span, in close sequence one after the next.

In Halpern's version, there is a 10-minute gap between No. 9 lowering away at 1:15 a.m. and No. 11 beginning to lower away at 1:25 a.m., and nearly 20 minutes from when No. 9 began launching to when No. 15 began launching. This is in direct contradiction to the testimony of several individuals; numerous survivor statements suggest that all of the aft-starboard boats left much closer together, without any significant gap in between them. Our own sequence places a maximum of about six minutes between the launch of No. 9 and when No. 15 started down, which is much more in harmony with the accounts.

Point 6: The Close Timing of the Launch of Boats Nos. 9 and 11.

Eyewitnesses indicate a very close tie in the launch timing between Boats Nos. 9 and 11. In our timeline, we place about three minutes between the launches of these two boats, but the Halpern timeline extends this to 10 minutes, an extension which begins to have a domino effect on the relationship with the launch times of Nos. 13 and 15. Let's look first at the gap between Nos. 9 and 11.

Saloon Steward Jacob Gibbons stated: "When I got up on deck the boats were being lowered away, but many of the passengers seemed to prefer sticking to the ship. I helped some of the passengers into boat No. 11, including two little children."³³³ This quote suggests that Gibbons came out onto A Deck in the vicinity of No. 11, as the boat was then loading. If, as he reported, he saw any lifeboats lowering away from that location, it is very likely that he saw No. 9 lowering, indicating that No. 9 was departing as No. 11 was actively loading, and indicating a close proximity between the lowering times of these two boats. We know that Gibbons left in No. 11.³³⁴

First Class passenger Philipp Mock gives details which suggest that Nos. 9 and 11 left within close proximity to each other, too. Mock described seeing several boats lowered on the starboard side. A reporter summarized his account by writing: "Four times they [Mock and his sister Emma Schabert] tried to get into boats, but Mr. Mock was refused each time." His sister refused to part with her brother, so they remained together. Mock then related the following to the reporter:

³³² Am. 598.

³³³ *Daily Sketch*, May 1, 1912.

³³⁴ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Gibbons_Jacob.html

“All of the boats had been lowered from this part of the deck [forward-starboard side], and I was told to go aft where a boat [No. 9] was about to be lowered.” He and his sister went to that boat but it was soon filled, although only six or seven men and women were around when he first reached it, yet they appeared from all directions and soon it was full.

He began to realize that the chances of getting into a boat were growing rapidly less.. When the boat aft [No. 9] was lowered, he and his sister started forward again but they were stopped and sent to the deck below. There a boat [No. 11] was being loaded.³³⁵

³³⁵ *The Evening Sentinel*, April 24, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

Below: This still from our 2021 animation shows Boat No. 9 at the Boat Deck, with Nos. 11, 13, and 15 lowered down to A Deck, where each of those boats were filled. It is clear that No. 11 was already loading when No. 9 was lowered away. (HFX Studios.)



Mock's description of there initially being few passengers near No. 9 and then a large number suddenly appearing, appears consistent with the accounts of the efforts of the crew in passing passengers over from the port side, to fill that boat (see the previous section titled "The loading process at Boat No. 9 took longer than average.").

Mock subsequently assisted in loading No. 11, prior to being permitted to enter, just before it was lowered away. His account is yet another that strongly suggests that No. 11 was already loading when No. 9 lowered away. When coupled with extremely consistent and strong evidence that No. 11 began lowering at 1:35 a.m., which will be examined later in this section, this is extremely compelling evidence that No. 9 began lowering away substantially later than Halpern's postulated time of 1:15 a.m.

While not specifying a time frame between the launch of these two lifeboats, Assistant Second Steward Wheat testified that after he saw First Officer Murdoch and some of his fellow stewards passing women and children from the port side to the starboard side to fill No. 9, the First Officer ordered him down to A Deck to help load No. 11 there. Wheat, along with the crew who were assigned to No. 11, proceeded to A Deck where they filled the boat; Murdoch subsequently ordered Wheat into No. 11. There is no suggestion in Wheat's testimony of a significant gap between the lowering of No. 9, which was *still loading* when he went down to A Deck, and the departure of No. 11.³³⁶

Edith Rosenbaum's account, referred to earlier, also suggests that Nos. 9 and 11 left close together. Just before Ismay spotted her and took her down to A Deck, where she was tossed into No. 11, she described the scene: "Women were being placed in the lifeboats as I stood perplexed on the boat deck."³³⁷ At that point, the only boat that she could have seen being loaded on the Boat Deck would have been No. 9. Emma Schabert, whom Ismay chastised for not leaving *Titanic* in No. 9, made her way to Boat No. 11, as well:

Then someone said there was a boat [No. 11] on the lower [A] deck and we went down to find it nearly crowded.³³⁸

Schabert is here recalling that when she reached No. 11, shortly after No. 9 started down, No. 11 was already "crowded", indicating that the loading process had been going on rather concurrently or delayed slightly behind efforts to load No. 9.

³³⁶ Br, 13187-13208.

³³⁷ *New York Times*, April 23, 1912.

³³⁸ Letter from Emma Schabert, April 18, 1912. From Kyrill Schabert, shared with George Behe by Don Lynch, and contained in *The Triumvirate: Captain Edward J. Smith, Bruce Ismay, Thomas Andrews and the Sinking of Titanic*, by George Behe, 2024.

Saloon Steward William Ward's testimony provides insight into how far apart the launch times of Boats Nos. 9 and 11 were. When asked whether he saw any boats "lowered after [he] left" in No. 9, Ward replied: "Yes, sir. No. 11 was lowered down to deck A, and they were putting women and children into that boat from deck A. We were already down in the water." The exchange continued:

Senator FLETCHER. Did you stay close to No. 11 after you were both in the water?
Mr. WARD. We got away from the ship's side before No. 11 was in the water, and Haynes [*sic*, Haines] gave orders to pull away, and we had some difficulty in unlash-
ing the oars on account of them being lashed up. No one had a knife, for some time. We
pulled off about, I should say, a couple of hundred yards, and Haynes gave orders to
lay on the oars, which we did.³³⁹

Here, unfortunately, there is room for interpretation in the precise wording. Halpern would no doubt argue that Ward meant that No. 9 had completely cleared the ship's side – after a delay of "some time" while the oars were unlashed with difficulty – *before No. 11 even started down from A Deck*. As mentioned earlier in this article, it took a lifeboat a minimum of 5-6 minutes to be lowered from the falls. Hence, Halpern would likely argue that the timing gap between the two boats must be closer to his 10 minutes than our 5 minutes.

However, it would be unfair to conclude from this exchange that Ward was indicating that No. 11 *had not started down* from the Promenade Deck until *after* No. 9 had cleared the ship's side. All he said was that No. 9 "got away from the ship's side before No. 11 *was in the water* [authors' emphasis]". This wording does not indicate that No. 11 had not yet started down before No. 9 had gotten clear. In fact, looking at Ward's evidence, he could just as easily have been indicating that No. 11 had, indeed, begun coming down to the water from A Deck already – and he might simply have been specifying that it hadn't reached the water yet by the point when No. 9 got clear.

Not only is this interpretation in harmony with other evidence that indicates a closer timing gap between the launching of these two boats, but it is supported by other evidence. Second Class passenger Sidney Collett, who was also rescued in Boat No. 9, recalled the following:

There were no more women to go and I asked the officers if there was any objection to my going in that boat. He said, 'No, get in' and I was the last one in. I think it was

³³⁹ Am. 598-599.

the third from the last to go from that side. It was No. 9 and we had to get away fast. *Besides other boats coming down* [author's emphasis] there was danger from the sinking boat [*Titanic*].³⁴⁰

The importance of Collett's statement cannot be minimized, since he stated that Boat No. 9 needed to clear the sinking ship's side because of dangers from "other boats coming down". The only remaining lifeboats in the vicinity of No. 9 would have been Boat Nos. 11, 13 and 15, with No. 11 being the closest. If there was a 10-minute gap between the lowering times of No. 9 and No. 11, and a 15-minute gap between No. 9 and No. 13 – the next boat lowered after No. 11 – then there would have been no danger from other boats coming down nearby like Collett stated. Our timeline places a three-minute gap between the lowering of these two boats (No. 9 and No. 11), which is much more in keeping with Collett's statements.

Additional accounts of those involved in the loading of the aft-starboard boats do not suggest a significant time gap between No. 9 and Nos. 11, 13 and 15. The launch sequence for the starboard-aft boats in both our timeline and Halpern's is: 9, 11, 13, 15. We give this sequence a gap of about 6 minutes, from 1:32 to 1:38 a.m.; Halpern's timing for this sequence runs longer, totalling 18 minutes from 1:15 to 1:33 a.m. Yet, Saloon Steward Ray's testimony implies that after seeing Boat No. 9 start down, he moved along to Boat No. 11 and then No. 13, which he left in. Ray implies that he moved from one boat to the next, with no indications of delays:

I went out there onto the open deck and along to No. 9 boat. It was just being filled with women and children. I assisted. I saw that lowered away. Then I went along to No. 11 boat, and saw that loaded with women and children and then that was lowered away. Then I went to No. 13 boat. I saw that about half filled with women and children. They said, "A few of you men get in here."³⁴¹

Saloon Steward Aragōa Harrison's account of the sinking matches Ray's, as far as providing no indication of a delay between the lowering of the aft starboard boats. Harrison stated:

... the second steward [George Dodd] came along, and sent me up to my boat, stating I belonged to boat 15.

³⁴⁰ *The Auburn* [New York] *Citizen*, April 23, 1912.

³⁴¹ Am. 804. We are grateful to Craig Stringer for sharing his thoughts on the description of the aft starboard boats, as provided by Ray.

I helped get the women into her [No. 15], and when she had been lowered I continued getting women and children into boats 13 and 11.

Mr. Murdoch, first officer, was in charge of that section of the boat deck, and just as boat 9 was ready to be lowered he told me, as there were no more women to be seen, to get into the boat.³⁴²

Harrison's account indicates that Nos. 11, 13 and 15 were actively loading when No. 9 began lowering, and that all four aft-starboard boats left fairly close together. It also provides another interesting detail. From his account, it could be surmised that Harrison was loading passengers into the aft boats from the Boat Deck, since First Officer Murdoch appears to have remained there, rather than going down to A Deck, where Sixth Officer Moody was supervising the loading process for Nos. 11, 13 and 15. Indeed, there were six crewmembers³⁴³ who seem to have boarded No. 15 at the Boat Deck level before it lowered to A Deck, where most of the loading was completed (amongst them, Steward John Hart,³⁴⁴ and Assistant Steward Walter Nichols³⁴⁵).

When Harrison says that No. 15 "had been lowered", it is likely that he meant the point when the craft was lowered from the Boat Deck to A Deck. Harrison next went forward to Boats Nos. 13 and 11, assisting to load those boats in some capacity. This is an interesting detail, because Nos. 13 and 11 are known to have been filled from A Deck, not the Boat Deck. Had he perhaps gone in No. 15 from the Boat Deck to A Deck, then stepped back onto the Promenade to help there? Or had he merely helped to see 15, 13, and 11 down from the Boat Deck to A Deck? Either way, Harrison had time to get into No. 9, which was loaded from the Boat Deck, after working in at least some capacity at Nos. 11, 13, and 15.

Harrison's account is reinforced by the recollections of Able Bodied Seaman George McGough. McGough recalled that prior to leaving in No. 9, "I last saw Mr. Murdoch when he was lowering No. 15 boat and keeping back some Italians."³⁴⁶ Presumably, this was when No. 15 was being lowered to A Deck, where it took on most of its occupants. Based on other evidence, including the testimony of Bathroom Steward Samuel Rule, there was a rush on the boat at this time, which forced Murdoch to yell: "Stand Back! Women first!"³⁴⁷ Like Harrison's account, McGough's recollection indicates that No. 9 began lowering around the same time that No. 15 was lowered and loaded at A Deck.

³⁴² *Daily Mirror*, April 30, 1912.

³⁴³ Br. 6493; Am. 551.

³⁴⁴ Br. 9996-10006.

³⁴⁵ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, April 19, 1912.

³⁴⁶ *Staffordshire Sentinel*, April 29, 1912.

³⁴⁷ Br. 6537; Br. 6587-6592; Br. 6648-6658.

Third Class passenger Agnes Sandström, along with her children Marguerite and Beatrice, appear to have been rescued in Boat No. 13.³⁴⁸ Upon reaching deck, Agnes described the following:

...and the first one [lifeboat], it was full, and the second [lifeboat] was also full, so I couldn't get into them, and in the third [No. 13] sat the steward who had been in our cabin, and he said that I should get in there, and he helped us in, and made sure that the girls got in first and then he helped me in.³⁴⁹

This strongly suggests that the first boat they attempted to board was No. 9, and that the second was No. 11, with the third, which they boarded, being No. 13. There is no suggestion of a significant gap of any kind in between those three boats.

Third Class passenger Johan Asplund, who appears to have been rescued in Boat No. 13,³⁵⁰ provides some additional evidence:

The first boat was lowered, and Einar [Karlsson] and I agreed that we would go in the second. I entered, but when Einar was ready to enter he was boxed on the ear, and when I saw that I jumped back on deck... When the next to last boat had been lowered a bit, I decided to jump. Einar agreed.³⁵¹

If Asplund was in No. 13, then the “first boat” was No. 9, the “second”, which he initially boarded, would have been No. 11, and the “next to last boat,” which, in that quadrant of lifeboats, No. 13 was, would have been the boat they were saved in. This also suggests that those three boats left close together, not with a time gap in between No. 9 and No. 11.

First Class passenger Emma Schabert gave an account which also suggests that No. 9 and No. 11 left close together. She initially refused to board No. 9, before being persuaded to board No. 11. We already looked at her account as part of our evidence that Ismay had been at No. 16 – where he convinced Evelyn Marsden to board – *before* he was seen at No. 9, because Ismay clearly went from No. 9 to No. 11, insisting that Edith Rosenbaum get into No. 11 before it lowered from A Deck. However, let's now extract another tidbit from Emma's account regarding how full No. 11 was when No. 9 had started down.

³⁴⁸ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Nysten_Sandstr%C3%B6m.html

³⁴⁹ Interview with Sandström in 1962: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VvTyua15dM>

³⁵⁰ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Asplund_Karlsson.html

³⁵¹ Letter from Johan Asplund to his mother, dated May 24, 1912. Courtesy of George Behe.

So one boat after the other left with women who were leaving their husbands behind. The great Mr. Ismay tried to make me enter the last boat on the upper deck [No. 9]; when I refused and it had gone, he said “You made a great mistake not to get into that boat.” I answered “It does not matter. I prefer to stay with my brother.” Meanwhile the boat was sinking lower. Then someone said there was a boat on the lower deck and we went down to find it [No. 11] nearly crowded.

There were just a few women left on deck so I risked it and went in, and after the women were put in there was room for one man and Boy [apparently her nickname for Phillip Mock] was allowed to enter.³⁵²

Schabert’s description of refusing to board No. 9, then going down to A Deck, where she found No. 11 mostly loaded, is not indicative of a large time gap between the launching of those boats. Indeed, it seems to dovetail nicely with the evidence presented by Ward and Collett, that No. 11 was starting down to the water from the Promenade Deck as No. 9 was getting clear of the ship’s side.

Saloon Steward Edenser Edward Wheelton’s testimony does not give the impression of a large gap between No. 9 and No. 11, either. He testified that he saw No. 9 departing, was then ordered down to No. 11 on A Deck, which he finished loading, and that he then left in that boat:

... and then No. 9. Mr. Murdoch was there, and Mr. Ismay stood up by all of the boats I saw get away. I walked along when No. 9 went, and Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, turned around. He sent the assistant second steward [Joseph Wheat] down to A deck, and he said to me “You go, too.” He got hold of me by the left arm and he said, “You go, too.” We went down to A deck. Number 11 boat was hanging in the davits. We got into the boat. Mr. Murdoch shouted “Women and children first.” He was on the top deck [Boat Deck] then, standing by the taffrail. We loaded the boat with women and children, and took in a few of the crew. I think there were about – well, there were eight or nine men in the boat, all together. That was including our crew. I think there were one or two passengers, but I really could not say.

I shouted to Mr. Murdoch, “The boat is full, sir.” He said, “All right.” He said, “Have you got your sailors in?” I said, “no, sir.” He told two sailors to jump into the boat. We lowered away.³⁵³

³⁵² Letter from Emma Schabert to her sister, written on board the *Carpathia* and dated April 18, 1912. Reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic*, by George Behe (Lulu edition, 2011) and credited to Don Lynch.

³⁵³ Am. 544.

Able Bodied Seaman Walter Brice gave some rather confused testimony regarding the loading and lowering of Boats Nos. 9 and 11. We know from many accounts that No. 9 loaded from the Boat Deck; however, Brice testified: “No. 9 went out from A deck. I lowered the boat from the boat deck to A deck - No. 9. When it was loaded, I lowered it down to the water.”³⁵⁴ Since Brice specifies both decks, he is clearly not suffering from the “deck letter confusion” that certain others did, when they called the Boat Deck “A deck”.

Brice said that after finishing there, he went aft to help at Boat No. 11, lowering it to A Deck, where it began loading. He recalled that the officer on the Boat Deck (Murdoch) said: “Is there a sailor in the boat?” Brice then went down the fall into No. 11 to help man it, shipping the rudder for the boat. As he did so, the boat finished loading and was lowered:

Mr. BRICE. I helped to lower the boat from the boat deck to A deck.

Senator BOURNE. You helped to lower the boat from the boat deck down to A deck?

Mr. BRICE. Yes, sir.

Senator BOURNE. Then you went down the fall?

Mr. BRICE. Yes, sir.

Senator BOURNE. And you went aft and began shipping the rudder?

Mr. BRICE. I went aft and began shipping the rudder, and during the time I was shipping the rudder the boat was being filled. They lowered the boat, sir.³⁵⁵

If Brice had assisted in lowering No. 9 to A Deck to begin *filling*, and saw that boat lowered all the way to the water before he even lowered No. 11 to A Deck to begin loading, then this indicates an extraordinary length of time between the lowering of Nos. 9 and 11. However, in indicating such a gap, Brice is contradicting the recollections of many others that the two boats lowered very closely together, including Mock and Schabert, whom we discussed above.

In fact, later in his testimony, when he was asked whether other boats were pulling away “about the same time” as No. 11, Brice stated: “There was one boat ahead of us that we could see.” This was certainly No. 9.³⁵⁶ This statement indicates that No. 9 had not managed to pull away from the side of the ship long before No. 11 did. In short, between the confusion about what deck No. 9 was loaded from, and other clear contraindications, there is not much use that we can make of Brice’s testimony

³⁵⁴ Am. 652.

³⁵⁵ Am. 650-652.

³⁵⁶ Am. 652.

in determining the gap between the two boats' launching. It is included so that no one can claim that we are excluding evidence.

Similarly, First Class passenger Alice Silvey, rescued in No. 11, stated that “We drew away from the ship after we were lowered to the water...I could see other boats pulling away from the ship.”³⁵⁷ Given the timing, Boat No. 9 is certainly one of the boats which she saw, indicating that Nos. 9 and 11 left close together.

Second Class passenger Robertha Watt, whose early accounts were quoted earlier in this article, gave another account many years after the disaster. In that later account, she seemed to stick largely to her early story, but with a few variations – and some extra detail about what was happening with lifeboats other than the one that she boarded and left in, No. 9. She wrote:

... shortly a call was made "Women and children this way" so we all went over to the starboard side, one boat was on the way down, and she was hanging on its davits overboard and full of men, looked as if they were steerage passengers and we had that they had more or less charged this boat so they left them having [*sic*: hanging?] there until after [unintelligible] boat left. The Master at Arms was standing with a gun at that point. One boat went down ahead of us. Then he loaded in to the next, no order some people in first seemed to be sitting with feet up on seats while some of us stood all night... We waited a few minutes and more came so we were let down, all thought we [would] stop at another deck and pick up some more women, but no we didn't and I'll never forget the sight of these 3 or 4 men standing looking over the side. One other boat was loading as we left and the one that was hanging that was the last.³⁵⁸

As we digest this account, let's focus only on what she appears to be saying about what was happening to lifeboats other than her own at the time she was approaching, boarding, and lowering away in No. 9. The lifeboat which Watt saw “on the way down” and subsequently “hanging on its davits...full of men” must have been No. 15, which as we examined earlier in this section, was lowered to A Deck, as No. 9 was loading and began lowering. She also describes another boat loading as No. 9 “left” (i.e.: lowered), which likely was the neighboring No. 11, on A Deck. Overall, this later account seems to provide some details that harmonize with facts we've already established.

We previously saw that Boat No. 9 must have lowered after 1:20 a.m., but we also know that it lowered before Boat No. 11. So do we have any specific evidence regarding the launch time of No. 11

³⁵⁷ *Duluth Herald*, May 1, 1912. Courtesy of George Behe.

³⁵⁸ Letter from Robertha Watt to Walter Lord, April 10, 1963. Available on paullee.com.

that would help us to ‘bracket’ this gap, providing a window within which No. 9 must have begun lowering? The answer is yes.

First Class passenger Emma Schabert, in Boat No. 11, estimated that they “had been out about half an hour when the bow of the ship disappeared, then the stern rose high into the air and then the tremendous craft slid rapidly into the bottomless ocean.”³⁵⁹ Schabert’s “half an hour” seems to work backward from when the ship took her “slight but definite plunge” that swamped the area of the Bridge, which occurred at about 2:15 a.m. She seems to describe the whole of the subsequent final plunge, which included the stern rising high into the air and the ship sinking at 2:20 a.m., as a single event. Working backward from 2:15 a.m. by a half-hour one reaches 1:45 a.m. Schabert also said that they “had been out” for about a half-hour before that plunge; this likely indicates that she was counting from the time her boat reached the water after lowering. To obtain the starting point for No. 11’s lowering, then, one would have to work backward by about 5-6 minutes to estimate when the lowering process had begun: this works back to about 1:40 or slightly earlier – in rough terms. Halpern has No. 11 starting down at 1:25 a.m., but we have placed the launch time for No. 11 at about 1:35 a.m. – 10 minutes closer to matching Schabert’s recollections and time estimates.

Second Class passenger Jane Quick, rescued in No. 11, provided evidence that concurs with Schabert’s timing. She stated: “By the time we *had been off half an hour* [authors’ emphasis], terrific shrieks came from the deck.” When someone asked what the screams meant, a seaman in the boat tried comforting them by saying: “They are cheering because they’ve found out they will be saved.” In fact, this appears to have been the cries that emanated from the Boat Deck as water reached it and people began running aft, since Quick then describes how “the ship’s lights went out, one by one. Then there was a big explosion.”³⁶⁰ Again, notice that Jane used a similar turn of phrase to that used by Emma Schabert: that their boat had “been off” for a half-hour from that moment. Working backward from 2:15 a.m. for the beginning of that plunge, and using the same math, one works back to 1:40 a.m. – or just before – for a launch time of No. 11. This is, again, five minutes or less from our estimated launch time for No. 11, namely 1:35 a.m., and nearly a quarter of an hour off from Halpern’s proposed launch time for this boat.

Second Class passenger Jessie Leitch, rescued from Boat No. 11, stated: “The lifeboat was swung away from the side of the liner and was lowered into the water at 1:30am.”³⁶¹

Stewardess Annie Robinson was also rescued in No. 11. She testified:

³⁵⁹ Letter from Emma Schabert to her sister, written on board the *Carpathia* and dated April 18, 1912. Reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic*, by George Behe (Lulu edition, 2011) and credited to Don Lynch.

³⁶⁰ *Tales of a Forgotten Village*, by W.P. Sugars, Ch. VII (University Lithographics Printers, 1953). Courtesy of George Behe. It must be noted that Quick gives a launch time of 12:30 a.m. for No.11, which is clearly mistaken. However, his estimates of the time that had elapsed after they lowered away until the screaming and lights going out, is helpful.

³⁶¹ As per Leitch’s obituary, a transcript of which was in Walter Lord’s papers.

13302. Can you remember at all what time it was when your boat left?

- Well, I looked at my watch when the ship went down and it was twenty minutes to two. That was by altered time when we were in the boat, and I do not think we were in the boat more than three-quarters of an hour.

13303. You left about three-quarters of an hour before the ship went down?

- Yes.³⁶²

This clearly indicates a launch time of around 1:35 a.m., the exact time we have concluded that No. 11 started down. If it had started down at Halpern's 1:25, then Robinson would have been more accurate in stating that their boat had left nearly an hour before the ship sank at 2:20. Additionally, Stewardesses Katherine Gold and Annie Coghlan, both rescued in No. 11, gave interviews following the sinking. The press paraphrased some of what they said, including the following:

After helping the ladies they returned to their berth to finish dressing. By that time it was about half-past one o'clock. They returned to the deck and were put in No. 11 boat, which was the last but two to leave.³⁶³

If one gives Gold enough time to get back on deck and into No. 11 before it began lowering, then this indicates it started down shortly after 1:30 a.m. This puts her time estimate right in line with Robinson's, around 1:35 a.m., and again in harmony with ours. However, Halpern's launch time for No. 11 would have it leaving before these two stewardesses even left their cabins to return to the deck.

These remarkably consistent estimates take on added interest when one reads the account of First Class passenger Edith Rosenbaum. Rescued in No. 11, she stated that her boat *began rowing away from the side of the ship* at around 1:45 a.m. She also stated: "I was keeping an accurate account of time, as I had a bracelet watch on my wrist."³⁶⁴ From this 1:45 a.m. time for No. 11 to have begun rowing away from *Titanic*, one must subtract 5-6 minutes for lowering and another minute or two to free No. 11 once afloat, since it was nearly swamped by the condenser discharge and the crew had difficulty freeing the aft block due to the falls being taut.³⁶⁵ Again, this puts the launch time of No. 11 right around 1:35, consistent with what Robinson estimated.

³⁶² Br. 13302-13303.

³⁶³ *Western Morning News*, April 30, 1912. Coghlan signed-on to *Titanic* using her maiden name of Martin and this is how she is named in the press accounts.

³⁶⁴ *Cassell's*, June 1913. Thank you to Randy Bigham for sharing this account and for the observation regarding time.

³⁶⁵ Am. 544; Am. 651.

One could easily take *one* of these estimates and try to make light of it, but here we have no less than *six* survivors who were in No. 11, and who together indicate that their lifeboat had a) started rowing away from *Titanic* at about 1:45 a.m. – which then must indicate that No. 11 had started down no less than 5 minutes earlier, and likely more, considering the trouble that they had freeing the boat from the falls after it was washed aft by the condenser discharge – or that b) it had started lowering after 1:30 a.m. While some of these people seemed to be making rough estimates, others were actually looking at their watches and timing events.

As a composite picture, then, the occupants of No. 11 painted a remarkably clear picture that No. 11 started to lower at about 1:35 a.m., exactly where we originally placed its launch time to the nearest five-minute mark. From this, working backward, this would tend to give a launch window for No. 9 of around 1:32 a.m., considering the evidence that No. 11 was coming down when No. 9 was still alongside the ship.

Section Summary: In the course of this section, we considered evidence along six separate distinctly separate lines of evidence that show that Boat No. 9 must have launched after 1:20 a.m., and was launched much closer to the launch times of Nos. 11-15 than the Halpern timeline allows.

The Launch Timing Relationship Between Boats Nos. 13, 15 and 10.

After Boat No. 9 lowered at 1:32 a.m., and No. 11 lowered at 1:35 a.m., amongst the aft-starboard quartet of lifeboats, just Nos. 13 and 15 remained. As described above, the sum total of the evidence indicates a very small gap in time between the launching of these boats. A useful estimate of when all of the aft starboard boats left was given by First Class passenger Dr. Washington Dodge, who departed in Boat No. 13 after seeing his wife and child safely into Boat No. 5 earlier in the night. He stated the following:

During the ensuing half or three-quarters of an hour [after No. 3 lowered away], I watched the boats on the starboard side as they were successively filled and lowered away.³⁶⁶

Boat No. 3 began lowering away at 12:55 a.m., a time that both Halpern and we agree on. Dodge's estimate that the remaining starboard boats lowered within 30-45 minutes after Boat No. 3 suggests that the aft-starboard boats had lowered away by sometime between 1:25 a.m. and 1:40 a.m. Our original lifeboat timeline has Boat No. 13 starting to lower at 1:40 a.m. and No. 15 at 1:41 a.m. For reasons

³⁶⁶ Dodge, Washington, *The Loss of the Titanic*, Reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic*, by George Behe (Lulu edition, 2011).

that will subsequently be discussed, we now believe that Boat No. 13 began lowering at 1:37 a.m., and No. 15 at 1:38 a.m. This is right around the upper end of Dodge's estimate.

First Class passenger Phillip Mock, rescued in No. 11, stated that he was near every boat lowered on the starboard side "up to the time No. 11 was lowered," and clarified: "One of these was No. 13 going down, before we [No. 11] touched the water."³⁶⁷ This is another account demonstrating how close together the aft starboard boats left. Saloon Steward Charles Mackay concurred, testifying that "No. 13 was being lowered when we [No. 11] were on the water's edge."³⁶⁸

Third Class passenger Elizabeth Davison, who appears to have been rescued in No. 15, noted: "I was terribly excited and didn't notice how many boats were left, but as we were being lowered I saw other boats pulling off under us..."³⁶⁹ Of note, she says there were "boats [plural, authors' emphasis] pulling off," not just one. This suggests that the aft-starboard boats lowered in quick succession and some were still being alongside as No. 15 came down.

Other accounts, looked at independently of one another, may at first seem useless, but when taken together can still shed light on timing. Third Class passenger Anna Nysten, rescued in No. 13, stated: "We sat in the lifeboat from 1:30 until 6:30 in the morning..."³⁷⁰ Her estimate aligns with Halpern's conclusion that No. 13 launched at 1:30 a.m.; however, the time given seems to be about 10 minutes too early for a launch time for No. 13, given how many lines of evidence support No. 11 leaving at 1:35 a.m., with No. 13 beginning to lower away shortly afterwards – our conclusion is that No. 15 started down at about 1:38 a.m.

At the other end of the spectrum, Second Class passenger Albert Caldwell estimated that his wife, son and he had "left the *Titanic* on lifeboat No. 13 about one half an hour before the *Titanic* sank."³⁷¹ By his estimate, this indicates that No. 13 lowered away around 1:50 a.m. This estimate seems about 13 minutes too late for the launch time for No. 13, given what can be established about the launch time of No. 11, how closely together Nos. 11 and 13 lowered, as well as the launch time of later boats such as No. 10. Caldwell's estimate comes in at a whopping 20 minutes after Halpern would have No. 13 lowered away.

³⁶⁷ Gracie, Archibald, *The Truth About the "Titanic,"* Chapter 7, 1913.

³⁶⁸ Br. 10842.

³⁶⁹ *Marion Weekly Star*, April 27, 1912. Davison describing men pushing into the boat before it lowered, the boat leaking and there being a small number of sailors rowing, all match No. 15. She also described a man laughing and sobbing in the morning and said "They talked of throwing him out." This matches Fireman Frank Dymond's description in his May 14, 1912 *Daily Mirror* account of a 'dago' who kept crying out "We are lost! We shall be drowned!" Dymond stated that if he could have reached him, "I would have brained him with the tiller for he was scaring the women. The rest of the men were quiet."

³⁷⁰ Letter from Nysten to her parents, after arriving in New York. Reproduced in *Not My Time to Die*, by Lilly Setterdahl, pp. 167-168 (2012). Courtesy of George Behe.

³⁷¹ Private letter from Caldwell to Andrew Cannata, dated April 8, 1969. Courtesy of George Behe.

However, taking the two accounts together, we see a balance of 10 minutes on either end of our own estimate of when No. 13 launched. Nysten and Caldwell's accounts neatly bracket the launch time for this boat to having taken place between 1:30 a.m. and 1:50 a.m. The evidence that Boat No. 11 lowered away at 1:35 a.m., coupled with the knowledge that No. 13 started down after No. 11, allows us to narrow the time of this boat's launch to between 1:35 a.m. and 1:50 a.m. Further, the accounts we have examined thus-far, indicate that No. 13 launched close in time to No. 11.

Importantly, Boats Nos. 13 and 15 appear to have been loaded with passengers simultaneously. Fireman George Beauchamp testified that an unnamed officer was present on the Boat Deck during the loading of No. 13, but he added: "I could not say who he was."³⁷² Although he was unsure of this officer's identity, other evidence leads us to conclude that it was almost certainly First Officer Murdoch, given his presence on the Boat Deck during the loading of both Boat Nos. 9 and 11, minutes prior. Steward John Hart testified that he was ordered into No. 15 by Murdoch before that boat was lowered down to A Deck.³⁷³ Bathroom Steward Samuel Rule testified that Murdoch allowed about six crewmen into No. 15 from the Boat Deck, before he said: "That will do; no more; lower away to A deck and receive any women and children there are."³⁷⁴ Earlier, we also considered the evidence from McGough, who recalled that prior to leaving in No. 9, "I last saw Mr. Murdoch when he was lowering No. 15 boat and keeping back some Italians."³⁷⁵

Even though a number of crewmen placed Murdoch on the Boat Deck as Nos. 13 and 15 loaded from the Promenade Deck, one deck below, it appears that Murdoch did not stay in the vicinity for the entire loading and lowering process. Second Class passenger Lawrence Beesley recalled an event that transpired before he jumped down from the Boat Deck into No. 13, which was loading at A Deck:

An officer—I think First Officer Murdock [*sic*, Murdoch]—came striding along the deck, clad in a long coat, from his manner and face evidently in great agitation, but determined and resolute; he looked over the side and shouted to the boats being lowered: "Lower away, and when afloat, row around to the gangway and wait for orders." "Aye, aye, sir," was the reply; and the officer passed by and went across the ship to the port side.³⁷⁶

Importantly, Beesley states that after Murdoch gave the order to lower away and crossed to port, there was time for the crew to call for "Any more ladies" several times, for Beesley to jump down from

³⁷² Br. 700-703.

³⁷³ Br. 10024-10026.

³⁷⁴ Br. 6491-6494.

³⁷⁵ *Staffordshire Sentinel*, April 29, 1912.

³⁷⁶ *The Loss of the S.S. Titanic*, by Lawrence Beesley, Chapter 3 (1912).

the Boat Deck into No. 13, and time to load two additional women into the boat from A Deck, as well as a husband, wife, and their baby (likely the Caldwells), prior to it beginning to lower away. Beesley's description suggests that No. 13 began lowering just minutes after Murdoch departed for the port side. Since we have established that Boat No. 11 began lowering at 1:35 a.m. and that eyewitness accounts suggest No. 13 began lowering very shortly after No. 11, it therefore seems likely that Murdoch departed for the port side right around 1:35 a.m., precisely when the evidence shows No. 11 started down.

Murdoch's departure from the Boat Deck in the vicinity above Nos. 11, 13, and 15, shortly before they started to lower away, suggests that no officer was present on the Boat Deck to supervise the crew manning the davits. Time was clearly of the essence, and the incredibly efficient First Officer appears to have moved on to the port side of the deck at that point.

However, Murdoch's departure may also be part of the reason why the lowering of Nos. 13 and 15 nearly ended in disaster; No. 13 drifted aft underneath the lowering Boat No. 15, due to the outflow of the condenser out of the side of the ship – and no one listened to the panicked cries of those in the two lifeboats to halt the lowering of No. 15 until they could sort the issue out. We will shortly come back to the importance of Murdoch's departure from the scene of Nos. 13 and 15, as it will factor back into where he popped up next, and this will tie Nos. 13 and 15 back to work on No. 10.

Getting back to officers who may have been present at Nos. 13 and 15, multiple witnesses described an unidentified officer supervising the loading of Nos. 13 and 15 from A Deck. Bathroom Steward Rule testified that an unidentified officer on A Deck ordered them to "get all the women and children into the boat that we could find." Saloon Steward Alexander Littlejohn also described an officer being present on A Deck, and ordering another crewman and himself into No. 13 to help row. This was almost certainly Sixth Officer Moody, who had arrived back on the starboard side after escorting May Futrelle from the port side to No. 9 before it lowered away at 1:32 a.m.

This officer, apparently Moody, also seems to have been on hand for the loading of No. 11 – also on A Deck – minutes earlier, although Rule and Littlejohn's description doesn't specify this for certain. It would seem that, having brought May Futrelle to No. 9, Moody then moved – like a number of other crewmen, including Wheelton and Wheat – from the Boat Deck to A Deck, and began assisting in loading Nos. 11, 13, and 15 on A Deck. Lookout Reginald Lee, for example, testified that the officer present on A Deck during the loading of No. 13 was "a tall officer, about 6 feet in height, [with a] fresh complexion". He added that he was "the Sixth Officer, or the Fifth Officer," that he was "tall and spare," and that "I think he was drowned." This description fits Moody precisely.

Third Class passenger Bernt Johannesen also attested to the ongoing presence of an officer, likely Moody, on A Deck, during the actual lowering of No. 13. As No. 13 got "closer and closer to the water's edge," Johannesen noticed that there were no women and children present nearby, and asked an

officer if he had any objections to him getting in the boat. The officer “said that he was at liberty to get into the boat if he could.” Johannesen then climbed down the falls into the lowering boat.³⁷⁷ Clearly Moody had remained on the aft starboard side. Yet Halpern’s timeline would nonsensically have Moody helping May Futrelle into No. 9, without enough time to be as involved in the launching of No. 16 on the port side as we know he was, and then crossing back over to the starboard side of A Deck to assist as the boats loading from there.

Fireman Frank Dymond variously claimed that it “was then about half-past one” when No. 15 was lowered away, and that about “forty-five minutes from the time we entered the water, she plunged.” Running backward from the “slight but definite plunge” at 2:15, this places his time estimate for No. 15 lowering away around 1:30 a.m. or so, factoring in the five minutes for lowering away. Working from both ends, looking at both of his accounts, his estimates do harmonize – but they come in even earlier than Halpern’s estimated 1:33 a.m. for No. 15 to begin lower away, and before our estimated launch time of about 1:38 a.m.³⁷⁸

By contrast, information given by Trimmer George Pelham in his deposition – filed as part of the British Inquiry – indicated a launch time of “between 1:30 and 2 a.m.” for No. 15.³⁷⁹ Although technically the earliest point of this very broad window would allow for Dymond’s 1:30 a.m. launch time, it also suggests that it might have launched at any point in that window. Given that we have already established that No. 11 must have begun lowering away around 1:35 a.m., Nos. 13 and 15 left later than that time; our suggested launch times for Nos. 13 and 15 – 1:37 and 1:38 a.m. – actually falls closer to the mid range of Pelham’s estimated time window.

Leading Fireman Frederick Barrett’s accounts and testimony may also suggest that No. 13 may have begun lowering away later than 1:30 a.m. Barrett testified that there was a sudden rush of water in Boiler Room No. 5, in the pass between boilers, at 1:10 a.m.³⁸⁰ At that point, Junior Assistant Second Engineer Herbert Harvey ordered him up the ladder.³⁸¹ Barrett testified that he emerged onto Scotland Road and then went up to the Promenade Deck; very likely, he had used the same working staircase from E Deck up to the Promenade Deck that many other crewmen used, the one located on the aft end of the No. 3 funnel uptake. He said that he “took a walk along the deck” heading aft “because it was no use going forward.”³⁸²

³⁷⁷ *The Boston Daily Globe*, April 27, 1912. Courtesy of George Behe.

³⁷⁸ *Daily Mirror*, May 17, 1912.

³⁷⁹ Pelham was not called to testify in the British Inquiry, but did file a deposition in Southampton with Board of Trade examiner C.T. Clee, which was later found and auctioned off for £4,000. Information courtesy of Craig Sopin.

³⁸⁰ Br. 2348-2349.

³⁸¹ Br. 2061.

³⁸² Br. 2143.

Barrett arrived on the aft-starboard side in time to see Boats Nos. 13 and 15 filling. What was the state of progress filling these boats when he arrived? Barrett testified that No. 13 “was pretty well filled when I got there,” and that “Women were coming up” to get aboard Nos. 13 and 15.³⁸³ In fact, he arrived so late in the loading of No. 13 that he specifically said that he didn’t load anyone into the boat.³⁸⁴ He also recalled:

2187. You have told us you saw some third class passengers coming up to where these boats were, as far as you know. Had you got some of those third class passengers in your boat?
- All the women were getting up in the boat at the last of it, and the women were there till there was no more. The men stood all in one line when I was getting up there. I saw them standing in one line, as if at attention waiting for an order to get into the boat, against the back of the house.

What time was it that he arrived at No. 13 and made these observations? He was asked this very question:

2148. (The Solicitor-General.) Are you able to tell us the time when you got to No. 13?
- No. As a Rule a stoker never carries a watch when he is at work.
2149. I got an impression that you could for some reason?
- No.

This testimony is interesting in light of his testimony on when Boiler Room No. 5 flooded and he had made his escape to Scotland Road:

2348. When this rush of water came from the pass, you went up and got in the alleyway?
- Yes.
2349. You have told us that was about ten minutes past one, I think?
- That is as near as I can recollect.

This is a frustrating dichotomy in recollections. For what it’s worth, Barrett did apparently tell a reporter that he “was sent on deck at 1.30 and was ordered to take charge of No. 13 boat.”³⁸⁵ Barrett also

³⁸³ Br. 2118-2130.

³⁸⁴ Br. 2325.

³⁸⁵ *Daily Mail*, April 30, 1912.

clearly testified that when he came up to Scotland Road from Boiler Room No. 5, he found that water was coming down the corridor from forward. However, here we come upon a conundrum: Barrett spotted water further forward on Scotland Road than what Ray came through; we know that Barrett must have come through first, because Ray's report that the water had nearly reached the First Class Entrance when he came up from his quarters means that if Barrett had then been trying to come up through the door from Boiler Room No. 5 to Scotland Road, his exit would already have been blocked by water. Yet Ray managed to get back to Boat No. 9 before it left; and by all accounts launched *before* Boat No. 13, the boat that Barrett and Ray both left in.

Thus, we can't assume that Barrett's second-hand quote about being "sent on deck at 1.30" – which contradicts his testimony that he came up at about 1:10 – is a trustworthy indication of what time he left Boiler Room No. 5. In fact, it's entirely possible that Barrett meant that he was sent to take charge of No. 13 at 1:30 a.m., not that he was sent up from the boiler rooms. Barrett was clearly held up in reaching the deck after he left Boiler Room No. 5 – held up longer than Ray was. In none of his accounts did Barrett ever clearly explain what he was doing before he emerged on the Promenade Deck as Nos. 13 and 15 were filling. Did he stay below until the orders came through releasing the engineers at about 1:20, and only then head up? The wording of his press account, though paraphrased, indicates that this might be a possibility, and that he may even have received that order later than 1:20; yet we simply can't say for sure.

If Barrett, for whatever reason, had stayed below until 1:20 or 1:30, and then had come up onto the Promenade Deck, or even if he came up earlier, and having been soaked in freezing water below decks, had gone into the Smoking Room to warm up after arriving on A Deck,³⁸⁶ what he described

³⁸⁶ In a press interview in the *Manchester Guardian* on April 29, 1912, Barrett stated that after he came up top from belowdecks, "men were leaning up against the saloon walls smoking cigarettes and no one seemed alarmed. I dare not say what I believed for fear of causing panic." He mentioned this, before stating: "When I got on the deck a lifeboat was hanging from the davits," Boat No. 13; he added that he was subsequently ordered aboard. Could this mean that Barrett, who was soaked from the events below deck, had gone inside somewhere to warm up, and saw the men smoking there? This could help explain what Barrett did in between coming up from below at about 1:10 a.m. and when he boarded No. 13. Stewardess Kate Gold reported that when she departed in No. 11, she saw men on A Deck smoking cigarettes and tapping their feet to the music of the band. (*Whitby Gazette*, May 3, 1912). Certainly, it would have been a significant breach of etiquette for Barrett, as a Fireman, to go into a First Class public room. However, it is worth considering that late in the sinking, Trimmer Patrick Dillon stated that someone said he should "go to the first cabin barroom", and that he and at least some of his fellow crewmen accepted the invitation, stating "we got our share" of the liquor being offered there. (*The Winston-Salem Journal*, July 23, 1912) If Barrett had warmed up inside somewhere, whether he was part of Dillon's group or not, it would have occupied some more time before he went to No. 13. It is also possible that Barrett, who had been on-duty and working before the collision, and who had been very occupied since then, could have done something as mundane as going to the restroom before coming on deck.

seeing when he arrived regarding the advanced loading state of No. 13 begins to make sense and may even support our conclusion that No. 13 began to lower away at about 1:37 a.m. It would give Barrett some time to come up on deck, be ordered to No. 13, notice that it was nearly full, and get into the boat before our postulated launch time.

On the other hand, Halpern can not use the apparent gap in Barrett's movements after Boiler Room No. 5 flooded at his estimated 1:10 a.m. to support an early launch time for No. 13. Why? Because Ray – who left in Boat No. 13, but had come back up and helped load No. 9 before it left – reported that water on Scotland Road was further aft than it was when Barrett had come up. One way or another, there is a gap in Barrett's movements that places him passing through Scotland Road before Ray, but leaving the ship after Ray. The water was not going to magically disappear or move back further forward in order to allow Barrett to come up after Ray.

It's interesting to note that both Rule and Beesley mentioned that No. 15 took on people after Murdoch had given the order to lower away and left the scene. This serves as additional proof that Murdoch left the starboard Boat Deck at about 1:35 a.m., as discussed previously, while No. 13 was launched at around 1:37 a.m., and that No. 15 launched just moments later, at about 1:38 a.m. The lowering of these two boats was *very* close together. Indeed, Barrett testified:

2170. Then there was one other boat on the starboard side still [after No. 13 lowered], No.15; what was happening to that at this time?

- It was getting lowered about 30 seconds after us. It was coming on top of us.³⁸⁷

Halpern extends the gap in the launch times of Nos. 13 and 15, going against the evidence that they lowered so closely together and claiming that there was a difference of three full minutes between the times these two boats started down.

At this point, let's consider what the sinking condition of the ship was when Nos. 13 and 15 left. Barrett testified:

2140. And by this time what was the position of the ship in the water?

- Her forecastle head was not under.

2141. Can you tell us a little more closely about it? Did you notice?

- I noticed when I got away in the lifeboat it was not under.

2142. Even when you got away in the lifeboat it was not under?

- Even then it was not under.

³⁸⁷ Br. 2170.

Barrett was very specific that “when I got away in the lifeboat”, he noticed that the Forecastle was not under water as his boat left *Titanic’s* side.

Others in Nos. 13 and 15 added some input on this matter. Assistant Steward Walter Henry Nichols stated: “As soon as we [No. 15] got a little distance off I could see that she was down a good deal by the head because the propeller was sticking half way out of the water”.³⁸⁸ Other observations about the ship’s orientation seem to refer to later times. Steward Arthur Lewis, also rescued in No. 15, recalled: “We were lowered down to the water and we got away, about five, ten minutes, when the ship’s bow was under the water and the propellers was up in the air.”³⁸⁹ At the very least, his short time estimate to when the bow was under water and the propellers had cleared the water seems to indicate a later launch time for No. 15 than Halpern’s.

By contrast, Fireman Dymond, also rescued in No. 15, claimed that once clear of the ship: “The current drifted us under the propellers of the *Titanic*, which were sticking up in the air. She drew 33ft. of water, and her keel at the stern was 12 ft. above our heads.”³⁹⁰ Bathroom Steward Rule, rescued in No. 15, also stated: “When we were five or six hundred yards away from her, her propellers were far above the water.”³⁹¹ However, Dymond and Rule seem to be referring to a later sinking condition than when their boat first reached the water.

Based on our updated time estimates for when Boats Nos. 13 and 15 started lowering, both boats would have reached the water around 1:43-1:44 a.m. We then compared what the eyewitnesses then floating in the water in these two boats reported about the orientation of the ship’s propellers, with the angle of the ship in our 2021 sinking animation.³⁹² This animation was created using a detailed compilation of numerous eyewitness accounts, which included observations about the positions of various features relative to the water level at specific times. We found that the starboard prop was indeed about halfway out of the water, with the Forecastle not yet submerged. This harmonized with both Barrett’s and Nichols’ recollections, and meshed perfectly with our updated launch time of about 1:37 and 1:38 for Boats Nos. 13 and 15.

Here we come upon another vital end of the lifeboat launch sequence: the relationship between the launch times of Nos. 9, 11, 13, and 15 to the launch time of Boat No. 10. So far, we have been working at the aft-starboard lifeboats’ launch times from *before* they launched. However, what happened after they launched is equally important. After artificially advancing the launch times of the

³⁸⁸ *New York Times*, April 22, 1912.

³⁸⁹ Interview with Lewis in Southampton, courtesy of George Behe.

³⁹⁰ *Daily Mirror*, May 17, 1912.

³⁹¹ *Western Daily Mercury*, April 30, 1912.

³⁹² The 2021 animation was re-released in 2025 with improved special effects, but with no major updates to the sinking itself.

four aft-starboard boats (assigning them launch times running from 1:15 through 1:33 compared to our 1:32 through 1:38), Halpern next comes back to match our conclusion that No. 10 on the port side launched at 1:50 a.m. However, in opening up the gap between Nos. 15 and 10, one would again be forced to diverge from the historical record in order to support the Halpern timeline and explain the gap.

After ordering Boat Nos. 11, 13, and 15 lowered away, as Beesley reported, First Officer Murdoch crossed over to the port side. As examined previously, this was around 1:35 a.m., just before No. 13 began lowering. It seems that when Murdoch arrived there, he found that Boat No. 10 was not yet swung out in the davits. Able Bodied Seaman Frank Evans was working there, having gone directly from helping load and lower Boat No. 12 to working at Boat No. 10.

Exactly why Boat No. 10 had not yet been swung out at this late stage is a mystery. Clearly, it had already been uncovered, so some work had been done on it. If it was not, given that it would take 15-20 minutes to unlace and uncover a lifeboat, then No. 10 could never have been lowered by around 1:50 a.m.³⁹³ However, it must be remembered that lifeboats which were adjacent to each other and which shared a common davit base, could not be swung out by the crew at the same time. In other words, the crew would have needed to crank out one of the two boats first, and then use the changeover mechanism in order to swing the davit for the other boat out.

In this case, the evidence is clear that Boat No. 12 was swung out and lowered level with the deck before No. 10 was. Given that there was chaos and that passengers rushed both Boats Nos. 14 and 12, it seems entirely plausible, and in fact, likely, that the crewmembers on the scene left any work in preparing No. 10, and instead went to calm things down at the other two boats, loading and getting them safely away first. Only once Murdoch arrived at No. 10, and as he stood by, did Evans and a steward proceed to lower No. 10 until it was level with the Boat Deck. It has been estimated through the tests referred to earlier in this article that this process would have taken about 8½ minutes. The boat was then loaded, at which point Evans was ordered into it by Murdoch.³⁹⁴ Why is this important?

Remember that Murdoch had ordered Boats Nos. 11, 13, and 15 to lower away before crossing over to the port side. In our timeline, this would have happened at about 1:35 a.m. When he arrived at No. 10, the boat had not been lowered to the deck. Only with that accomplished could No. 10 be filled, a process which, it has been estimated, could take 10-15 minutes. Given the fact that by that point, more people were realizing the need to get into lifeboats, we suspect that the pace of loading No. 10 was clearly moving more quickly than many earlier boats, and that filling it probably took only

³⁹³ Br. 13855.

³⁹⁴ Am. 675-676.

10 minutes rather than 15. Remember that at this point, both we and Halpern agree that No. 10 launched at about 1:50 a.m.

A 1:50 a.m. launch time for No. 10 aligns with Murdoch departing the aft starboard side, just prior to Nos. 11, 13, and 15 starting down, as Beesley witnessed. This also accords with the evidence suggesting that an officer was not present on the Boat Deck during the loading of Nos. 13 and 15.

Evans movements, on their own, going from No. 12 to No. 10 directly, is important. Halpern places the lowering of No. 12 at 1:25, but we place it at 1:30. In our timeline, No. 10 lowers at 1:50 a.m., a time that Halpern agreed with in his newer, and independent, timeline. In our sequence, Evans has 20 minutes between the time No. 12 starts lowering and the time that No. 10 starts lowering; in the Halpern sequence, there are 25 minutes. Evans clearly helped to lower No. 12, a task that is estimated to have taken a good 5-6 minutes;

Able Bodied Seaman Edward Buley specified that Boat No. 10 was lowered “I should say about 25 minutes to half an hour” before the ship sank, or around 1:50-1:55 a.m.³⁹⁵ When asked: “How much of the bow was under the water when you left,” Evans testified that it “was about 10 feet from the port bow light.”³⁹⁶ This *must* be a reference to the red port side running light forward, at the outboard side of the port Bridge wing, since by the time No. 10 reached the water the port side Forecastle was completely under water.

This conclusion is backed by another observation. Second Officer Lightoller, in his own testimony, specified that when he began lowering Collapsible D – which both Halpern and we agree started down at 2:05 a.m. – that he only had to lower the boat 10 feet into the water.³⁹⁷ In other words, at 2:05 a.m., the port side running light was the exact distance above the water that Evans specified that “the port bow light” was from the water. Boat No. 10 beginning to lower around 1:50 a.m., then reaching the water around 1:55-1:56 a.m., would leave around 10 minutes for them to row out far enough for Evans to see the light at that distance above the waterline, which seems reasonable.

Section Summary:

We have here established a close relationship in the timing of when Boats Nos. 13, 15, and 10 launched. No. 10 clearly left at about 1:50 a.m., meaning that Nos. 13 and 15 must not have left too long before, but long enough for Murdoch to move from that location over to No. 10, order the boat lowered to the deck, and see it filled with passengers before lowering it away at about 1:50 a.m.

³⁹⁵ Am. 606.

³⁹⁶ Am. 753.

³⁹⁷ Am. 83.

Below Deck Flooding and What It Reveals, in Relation to the Timing of Boat Nos. 8 and 6, as Well as Nos. 14 and 9:

There are several sightings of water on E Deck that must be taken into account when attempting to correlate the launch times of specific lifeboats.

Wheat. Assistant Second Steward Wheat recalled that at about 12:45-12:50 a.m., he received an order from Chief Purser McElroy to get all of the stewards to their lifeboat stations. Wheat headed down to E Deck to pass the orders along and make sure that all of the stewards in the Stewards' Quarters were up and turned out. When he arrived there, he found that these men had largely turned out already. Once he was satisfied that this was taken care of, Wheat chose to go back down to his own cabin on F Deck and also have a look in the Stewards' Quarters near the Turkish Baths. On his way back up, Wheat famously had an encounter with water flowing *down* the steps from E Deck above. He noticed that water had reached the E Deck Entrance, coming up through the First Class passenger areas on the starboard side of the ship, snaked around the corner, and had begun backflowing down the stairs to F Deck. Wheat looked out of the emergency door into Scotland Road on the port side, and said there was no water there at the time; this indicates a pretty significant list to starboard was then still in evidence.³⁹⁸ Based on his testimony and movements, we estimate that this sighting of water likely occurred at about 12:55 a.m. Wheat subsequently left in Boat No. 11, which we conclude lowered away at about 1:35 a.m.

Barrett. According to his own time estimates, Leading Fireman Frederick Barrett recalled that a sudden rush of water had come through the pass between boilers at the forward end of Boiler Room No. 5 at about 1:10 a.m. He was ordered out of the compartment by Junior Assistant Second Engineer Harvey and escaped up to Scotland Road on E Deck. When he arrived there, he found that water was just beginning to come into Scotland Road from forward.³⁹⁹ Clearly, this sighting of water was after Wheat's, since Wheat said there was no water on the port side at the time; the evidence also indicates that the bow of the ship had settled further, and possibly also that the list was beginning to ease, allowing the port side (and hence the forward end of Scotland Road) to sink deeper into the water.

Cavell. Trimmer George Cavell, in Boiler Room No. 4, was one of the engineering staff who recalled being released from duty at 1:20 a.m.⁴⁰⁰ When he was released by Second Engineer John Hesketh, he

³⁹⁸ Br.10942-10951; 10956-11031.

³⁹⁹ Br. 2053-2061; 2348-2352.

⁴⁰⁰ *Evening Express*, April 30, 1912. Cavell isn't named in this account, but given the details that match his testimony, it is clear that he is the "young trimmer" interviewed by the reporter.

made his way up to Scotland Road on E Deck. He was later *very* clear that he saw no water on Scotland Road when he was there. Initially, this would lead us to place his coming through that area prior to when Barrett did. However, this simply can't be. To begin with, as mentioned previously (see the section, The Launch Time of Boat No. 9) he was one of *many* engineering staff who recalled being released at 1:20. This included Leading Fireman Thomas Threlfall, who was also in Boiler Room No. 4 when they were released and who agreed with Cavell on the timing.⁴⁰¹ The 1:20 a.m. time is pretty well fixed, so he could not have had his time estimate too wrong; we also suspect that the engineering staff were released sequentially, beginning in the forward-most unflooded compartment (Boiler Room No. 4) and then moving aft.

Unfortunately, Cavell was not a very reliable witness. For example, he said that when he reached the Boat Deck, he, along with four others, was ordered into No. 15 by an officer there, and that they then lowered to the A Deck to take on some passengers – so far, so good. But he then added that No. 15 was lowered *again* to the Third Class deck to take more people aboard – notwithstanding the fact that there was no Third Class deck in Boat No. 15's line of descent, and no evidence that passengers were taken on at any other decks after the boat lowered from A Deck.⁴⁰²

Also odd is the fact that Cavell mentioned a foot of water in Boiler Room No. 4,⁴⁰³ but Threlfall said “there wasn't a drop of water in our section [No. 4]” when they were ordered out.⁴⁰⁴ However, Trimmer Patrick Dillon testified that water was coming into Boiler Room No. 4 when he was there, and that small quantities of water were “Coming from underneath” the floor.⁴⁰⁵ Perhaps Threlfall was further aft in the compartment, and simply did not see the water, before evacuating. Either way, Cavell and Dillon agreed that water was entering No. 4 before they left.

Cavell also mentioned a situation with wet Third Class passengers in Scotland Road, apparently moving aft from somewhere forward, at *some point* when he reached E Deck. However, his testimony was very disjointed and out of sequence, and it is difficult to say precisely when he spotted these soggy Third Class passengers moving aft. Initially, he testified to seeing the Steerage passengers after discussing coming up into the alleyway from Boiler Room No. 4, when the lights went out in that compartment shortly after the collision with the iceberg.⁴⁰⁶ However, and confusingly, later in his testimony, Cavell describes seeing these Third Class passengers when he “first went into the

⁴⁰¹ *Daily Telegraph*, April 29, 1912.

⁴⁰² Br. 4314-4356.

⁴⁰³ Br. 4257-4266.

⁴⁰⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, April 29, 1912.

⁴⁰⁵ Br. 3816-3827.

⁴⁰⁶ Br. 4222-4239.

alleyway” about “an hour and a half,” and “about two hours” after the collision, or between 1:10-1:40 a.m.⁴⁰⁷

If Cavell spotted the soaked Third Class passengers when he came up for the last time, at 1:20 a.m. or so, then the confusion of passengers moving aft could explain why he did not see any water in Scotland Road when Barrett, about ten minutes earlier, had. Cavell also exited Boiler Room No. 4 behind the emergency door leading into the First Class Entrance, not far aft of where Barrett had exited Boiler Room No. 5, but another possible factor in why he noticed no water on Scotland Road when he came up. It’s also interesting to consider the possibility that these passengers were fleeing from flooding forward; otherwise, how would they have been so wet?

Ray. In his testimony, Saloon Steward Frederick Ray said that when he left his quarters on Scotland Road, water had reached the open emergency door leading into the First Class Entrance on E Deck, much further aft than when Barrett had seen the water at about 1:10. Ray said that he was just able to get through the door (apparently without stepping into the water, and certainly without having to swim through deep water).⁴⁰⁸ This is interesting, because when Cavell left Boiler Room No. 4 at about 1:20, he reported no water on Scotland Road, and he was just a little further aft of this emergency door when he arrived on this deck. Ray must have come through after Cavell, but when did Ray spot water here? We have several clues.

1. Ray had first arrived at Boat No. 9 in an early stage of preparation; he said that Boat No. 7 was then ‘leaving the ship’ – either being lowered away, or rowing away from the side of the ship, depending on how you interpret his words. We feel that 12:45 a.m. is a fair estimate for when this moment took place. Ray subsequently left the deck to go to his quarters, possibly missing the detonation of the first rocket at 12:47 a.m., which he did not mention at all.⁴⁰⁹ In his later media interviews, Ray was very clear on the nature of his visit to his quarters, and what he did there. He was in no hurry, opening his suitcase, making sure he had a few things that he needed, including his overcoat, the handkerchiefs his wife had gotten him, a toothbrush and shaving brush.⁴¹⁰ Clearly, he was below for some time. In his testimony, it was as he left his quarters that he encountered the water by the emergency door to the Entrance.

⁴⁰⁷ Br. 4400-4404.

⁴⁰⁸ Am. 803.

⁴⁰⁹ *ibid.*

⁴¹⁰ BBC radio interview with Ray, 1958.

2. Coming up from E Deck on the Grand Staircase at a ‘leisurely’ pace, Ray made it up to C Deck, where there was a great deal of activity around the Purser’s Office. Here, Ray met First Class passenger Martin Rothschild as he was leaving his stateroom. As the two men knew each other, they spoke. Rothschild had already seen his wife off in Boat No. 6, which we conclude lowered at 1:10 a.m. Rothschild had then returned to his stateroom, and was leaving it when he and Ray crossed paths.⁴¹¹
3. The two men talked, watching the activity in the Purser’s Office. Ray testified that ‘we walked leisurely up the stairs [Grand Staircase] until I got to A deck’. Then the two men parted company, Ray later saying that he told Rothschild that he would be needed as a member of the crew.⁴¹² He also recalled hearing a violin tuning as he crossed through the Entrance.⁴¹³ Although Ray later seemed to have suffered some of the ‘deck letter confusion’ that plagued some of *Titanic*’s passengers and crew, it is clear that he went aft on the Boat Deck toward No. 9.
4. As he approached Boat No. 9, Ray found that it was filling with women and children.⁴¹⁴ It is difficult to say, looking at the precise words he used, how advanced the loading process was when he arrived, and an argument could be made that it had just begun, while another argument could be made that it was well under way. In either case, Ray had enough time to assist there before No. 9 was lowered away from the Boat Deck.

The lowering away of Boat No. 6, carrying Rothschild’s wife, the level of the water on E Deck being higher and farther aft than Wheat, Barrett, and Cavell all observed, the fact that Ray encountered Rothschild coming *out* of his cabin after seeing his wife safely away in Boat No. 6, and the fact that Ray had a very leisurely trip back to Boat No. 9, still having time to render at least a measure of assistance before it lowered away, all tends to push the launch time for Boat No. 9 much later than Halpern argues. It also locks in the relationship between Boat No. 6 and Boat No. 9, and locks the lowering of No. 9 to being *after* a specific sighting of water on E Deck, which was more advanced than was reported by Wheat, Barrett, and Cavell.

We feel that Ray’s sighting of the water came *just before* 1:25 a.m., which gives several minutes for flooding to advance beyond Cavell’s report, without having to claim that Cavell was wholly mistaken. Furthermore, Ray reported that when he saw the water on E Deck, ‘I went across to the other side of

⁴¹¹ Am. 803-804.

⁴¹² Am. 804.

⁴¹³ BBC radio interview with Ray, 1958.

⁴¹⁴ Am. 804.

the ship where the passengers' cabins were; saw nobody there. I looked to see where the water was and it was corresponding on that side of the ship to the port side'.⁴¹⁵ In other words, at or just before 1:25 a.m., Ray thought that the flooding was even on the port and starboard sides, demonstrating that the ship's list was then either very small or virtually nonexistent. Clearly, the liner's earlier list to starboard was here flattening out, and other evidence indicates that it was already in the process of shifting slightly to port. Over time, that list to port would steadily increase until the ship's 'slight but definite plunge'.

Of note, Margaret Brown claimed to have seen the following, as Boat No. 6 was lowering to the water:

While [No. 6 was] being lowered by jerks by an officer from above, I discovered that a great gush of water was spouting through the porthole from D deck, and our lifeboat was in grave danger of being submerged.⁴¹⁶

This would have been after the boat halted at C Deck and Major Peuchen climbed down the falls into it, since Brown subsequently describes them reaching the sea. Brown was certainly mistaken about flooding being to the level of D Deck when No. 6 reached the water. Indeed, later in the same account, she describes how, when they were rowing away from the ship, "E & C Decks were completely submerged," suggesting that she was confused about which decks were which.⁴¹⁷ However, as discussed previously, the evidence indicates that while No. 6 started lowering around 1:10 a.m., it took longer than the typical estimate of 5-6 minutes to lower to the ocean, having halted at C Deck to take on Peuchen. This resulted in Nos. 6 and 16 'leaving' *Titanic* at about the same time, just as Quartermaster Hichens testified – even though No. 16 started down later than No. 6.

If Mrs. Brown was recalling something that she had seen accurately (and was quoted accurately in the press), then it is likely she had actually seen water at the level of E Deck, not D Deck as she believed. This would accord precisely not only with Ray's sighting of water on E Deck, but also with the timing of when he saw it there.

Halpern flippantly dismissed Brown's observation as "nonsense" in online comments, saying that "water that gets into a ship cannot ever get above the level of the water that is outside the ship." While that is generally true, he does not even consider other possibilities such as *Titanic* transitioning from an even keel, as Ray's observation suggests it was just before 1:25 a.m., to a port list, which we know

⁴¹⁵ Am. 803.

⁴¹⁶ *Newport Herald*, May 28 & 29, 1912.

⁴¹⁷ *ibid.*

was present at most of the aft lifeboats. This shift may have caused water to momentarily slosh around near an open porthole as the center of gravity shifted and the water levels were even within and outside of the ship on that deck level. It is even possible that Brown was simply misquoted on the *direction* of the flow of water. Many of the details in her long account are verifiable via other witnesses, so her making up this particular detail would be odd.

Regardless, what is clear is that Boat No. 6 would have lowered directly past the E Deck portholes that were then drawing level with the surface of the ocean, making it less than remarkable that Brown would have commented regarding it. Her observation supports the timing of Ray's observations, which seems more than a coincidence. Although certain details of her recollections could be debated until the proverbial cows come home, based on the wording, we do not believe her account should be treated so flippantly; neither do we find it surprising that she observed water passing through a porthole in this vicinity, moving in some form, before No. 6 had left the ship's side, when water was known to be in this vicinity on E Deck at the time.

Conclusions Regarding Flooding in Relation to the Timing of Boat Nos. 8 and 6, as Well as Nos. 14 and 9:

Despite No. 6 starting to lower at 1:10 a.m., it was delayed by the falls playing out unevenly, and then halting at C Deck in order for Peuchen to climb down the falls to help man the boat. This led to No. 16, which started lowering at 1:20 a.m., reaching the water at roughly the same time as No. 6, just as Hichens testified. This would have been followed closely by No. 14 reaching the water, No. 14 having started down shortly after No. 16, just as Fifth Officer Lowe testified. ('Numbers 12, 14 and 16 went down pretty much at the same time.')

⁴¹⁸

After seeing his wife away in No. 6, Rothschild had returned to C Deck and was coming out of his quarters, where Steward Ray met him, and the two conversed before Ray eventually separated and headed back up, eventually reaching No. 9. When Ray reached No. 9, it was being filled with women and children. If No. 6 was briefly delayed in reaching the water (reaching the water at about the same time as No. 16), but No. 9 would not even start down for some time afterward, as the Ray / Rothschild exchange (along with many other factors) indicates, then a simple conclusion begins to emerge: clearly, the timing gap between No. 6 and Nos. 16 beginning to lower away – and hence also to when Boat No. 14 left, since it lowered away after No. 16 – is shorter than the gap between Nos. 6 and 9 lowering away. This, along with so much other evidence, helps to demonstrate that No. 14 left before No. 9.

The flooding evidence allows us to draw these conclusions, as well as indicates that the ship was on a roughly even keel just before 1:25 a.m., the initial starboard list having evened out. From that

⁴¹⁸ Br. 15834.

point forward, a port list would begin to develop, which, as will be discussed later, was present during the loading of the aft lifeboats – except, apparently, No. 16, the first of the aft boats to be lowered, where it does not seem to have been mentioned.

SECTION 3:

The launch order of the aft-port lifeboats

Both Halpern and we agree that the evidence supports Boat No. 16 being the first of the aft-port boats lowered, around 1:20 a.m. This is supported by, amongst others, Able Bodied Seaman Scarrott, who testified that Boat No. 16 got clear of the ship before No. 14 did,⁴¹⁹ as well as Bathroom Steward Morris, who testified that Boat No. 16 was lowered while he was standing on the deck by No. 14, which he subsequently left in.⁴²⁰

For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that there are some outliers. These include Chief Baker Charles Joughin, who testified that Boat No. 10 was the first of the aft port boats to reach the water, although he also stated that he did not see Nos. 16, 14 or 12 leave the ship.⁴²¹ However, the vast majority contradicts this evidence, clearly indicating that No. 10 was the *last* aft port boat lowered.

Stewardess Elizabeth Leather also gave some contradictory evidence. A reporter paraphrased her as stating that she “gave me a succinct narrative of her escape in Boat 16, which was the last on the port side to be filled, at about 1:30.”⁴²² We earlier considered the possibilities of interpretation with statements about “first boat”, “last boat”, and so forth. Although the majority of evidence indicates that No. 16 was the first of those four lifeboats to be lowered from that quarter of the deck, No. 16 was also quite literally “the last boat” – the lifeboat furthest aft – in that area. It is possible that the reporter mistook Leather’s statement, and that she meant No. 16 was the last boat, location-wise, aft on the Boat Deck, rather than the last to be filled and lower. The 1:30 a.m. time estimate she gave is not grossly incorrect, although it is clearly too late, since No. 16 was already being loaded by Sixth Officer Moody, when Fifth Officer Lowe arrived at that location after seeing No. 1 safely into the water at 1:15 a.m.

One of Halpern’s conclusions was that the aft lifeboat sequence was: 1) Boat No. 16 beginning to lower at 1:20 a.m., 2) No. 12 at 1:25 am (the same time that he has Boat No. 11 lowering away on the starboard side.), 3) No. 14 at 1:30 a.m. and 4) No. 10 at 1:50 a.m. Halpern, taking a cue from the earlier work of Ioannis Georgiou (which differs from his own in multiple, and significant, ways), repeated

⁴¹⁹ Br. 393-397.

⁴²⁰ Br. 5304.

⁴²¹ Br. 6006-6009.

⁴²² *Daily Mirror*, April 30, 1912.

this sequence in his own lifeboat timeline, albeit with different launch times than Ioannis' earlier work. This conclusion is largely based on the testimony of Bathroom Steward Frank Morris, who, when asked if “many other boats had been launched at this time on that side (i.e. during the loading of Boat No. 14 on the aft port side.)?” Morris responded: “I helped to lower 12 away.”⁴²³

Earlier in his testimony, Morris stated that No. 16, his assigned boat, lowered away while he was standing by No. 14.⁴²⁴ To Halpern, this suggests that both No. 16 and No. 12 lowered prior to No. 14, which Morris left in. Halpern suggests that the testimony of Able Bodied Seaman Frederick Clench also supports that No. 12 lowered prior to No. 14. In his testimony, Clench described loading Boat Nos. 12, 14 and 16 with passengers – in that order – before returning to, and leaving in, Boat No. 12. Clench stated that when No. 12 was lowering that “when we went down that we were to keep our eye on No. 14 boat, where Mr. Lowe, the fifth officer, was, and keep together as much as we could.” He was later asked about the makeup of passengers and crew in No. 14 and whether passengers had rowed in that boat. Clench stated, “I could not say about No. 14 boat, sir, we had gone ahead of them.”⁴²⁵

Halpern suggests that this testimony means No. 12 lowered prior to No. 14. However, this is not what Morris says. In fact, Morris seemed to be suggesting that No. 12 *had gone further away* from *Titanic* once in the water, since they had just discussed rowing and how far they had gone away from the ship. After years of analyzing the a) lifeboat launch sequence and timing, b) the movements of each lifeboat from the time they were launched until they were picked up by *Carpathia*, and c) who was in each boat, the current authors performed a detailed analysis of the distance estimates from survivors in each lifeboat to *Titanic*, and compared that with realistic speeds and movements for a lifeboat from the time that it had left *Titanic's* side as performed in a digital animation model study. The conclusions of this analysis were published in graphic form in *Recreating Titanic and Her Sisters: A Visual History*, by the current authors, and we had long since concluded that Boat No. 12 was indeed further away from the ship than No. 14, by the time it sank.

Halpern also cites the testimony of Able Bodied Seaman William Lucas as proof that No. 12 left before 14. Lucas testified that after helping uncover and swing out some of the forward port boats for loading, he went to the aft port boats:

1469. What boats did you go to right aft?

- The lifeboat - I mean on the boat deck.

1470. Do you know what number?

⁴²³ Br. 5398.

⁴²⁴ Br.5303-5306.

⁴²⁵ Am. 636.

- Well, No. 16, No. 14.

1471. Right aft on the other side, on the port side?

- On the boat deck there, right aft.

1472. That was before anybody got into the boats was it?

- That is right.

1473. Do I understand you to say that all the boats were outside before anybody got in?

- Before anybody was lowered.

1474. Where did you see the first people get into the boats?

- The afterpart of the ship where I first started lowering boats.

1475. What boat was that?

- That was number 16, 12.⁴²⁶

Of note, Lucas was later rescued in Collapsible D and did not depart in any of the aft port boats. Looking at this stretch of testimony, Lucas does not actually indicate a launch order. In answer 1470, he says Boats Nos. 16 and 14 together, and in 1475, he gives Nos. 16 and 12 together. This is not a sound basis for concluding a launch order, since if he was referring to a launch order, he is contradicting himself within just a few seconds' time.

Moving on from that, Lucas also specifically mentions being ordered to put women into the aft port boats by Sixth Officer Moody.⁴²⁷ As mentioned earlier in this article, Fifth Officer Lowe testified that the Sixth Officer was overseeing the loading of Boats No. 16 and No. 14 when Lowe arrived on the scene after seeing Boat No. 1 safely away. There is no evidence that Moody was involved in the loading of Boat No. 12 and in fact, appears to have left the area after No. 16 and No. 14 lowered away [See the section titled "The timing relationship between A) Lowe/No. 1, B) Lowe/Moody at Nos. 14 & 16, and C) Moody/No. 9."]. So Lucas receiving that order from Moody indicates that it did not happen at No. 12, but would instead have been at either No. 14 or No. 16.

Oddly, Lucas claimed there was good order during the loading of the boats, which was not true at the aft port end. He also stated that he helped lower "the majority of the boats on the port side." Yet strangely, when asked if he was told to help lower the boats, he said: "I was warned off by Mr. Moody, and to stand by."⁴²⁸ Again, this is an apparent contradiction: did he help lower all of these boats, or not? Later in his testimony, when being questioned about the transfer of passengers between the boats in Lowe's flotilla, Lucas was asked the following:

⁴²⁶ Br. 1469-1475.

⁴²⁷ Br. 1479-1480.

⁴²⁸ Br. 1505-1507.

1648. Did you see No. 12 boat at all, or only No. 8, or was it No. 12?

- Well, I *started* [authors' emphasis] all those boats on the port side right till I got forward.⁴²⁹

Lucas stated that he “started”, as in began loading, No. 12, but does not say that he lowered it away.

Of note, Lucas did not testify about seeing No. 14 lowered away, so it's possible that he simply wasn't involved in the loading of that particular boat or just did not see it lowered away. After leaving the area of the aft port boats, Nos. 16, 14, and 12, which he said that he assisted at, Lucas moved forward to Collapsible D, in the vicinity of the Bridge. There is no evidence that he was connected with work at Boat No. 10, which work had apparently not begun yet when he left the area. Lucas arrived at Collapsible D while it was still sitting on the deck, and he indicated that he assisted in some preparation work on Collapsible D itself, the he also “pulled her to the davits,” and that helped in swinging the falls from lowering Boat No. 2 back in, connecting D to these falls. (For reference, we have concluded that Boat No. 12 began lowering away at 1:30 a.m.⁴³⁰ Boat No. 2 had begun lowering away at about 1:42 a.m., according to our revised estimates; Collapsible D would lower away at 2:05 a.m.) Lucas also specified that he was in Collapsible D and was ordered back out of it by Second Officer Lightoller; this was apparently a very understated reference to when Lightoller ordered a group of men out of Collapsible D under threat of a pistol (Gracie said that Lightoller had told him that Lightoller actually fired warning shots at this collapsible). Lucas then moved to the starboard side, noting that the lifeboats there had gone already. He soon returned to Collapsible D; this time, he managed to get into the craft and was allowed to stay in it.⁴³¹ He subsequently left in that boat. As we can see, Lucas' testimony is not proof, pro or con, for No. 12 having left earlier than No. 14 and should not be characterized as such, as Halpern postulates.

Halpern, while loudly proclaiming the superiority of testimony as opposed to newspaper accounts and deriding us for citing some newspaper sources, also cites a newspaper account of

⁴²⁹ Br. 1648.

⁴³⁰ According to the Halpern timeline, which places No. 14 as the last of these three boats, 16, 14, and 12, to begin lowering away, Halpern places the lowering of No. 14 at 1:30 a.m. Thus, whichever *order* these three boats left in, Halpern and we both place the launching of the last of these three boats – whichever that would be – to leave at exactly the same time, giving Lucas the same amount of time to become involved in subsequent events at Collapsible D.

⁴³¹ Br. 1511-1540; Am. 991-992; Lightoller, Charles, *Titanic and Other Ships*, Chapter 33, 1935. In his later autobiography, Lightoller claimed that this event happened at Boat No. 2. However, by the 1930s, he was clearly mistaking the boat number; in 1912, he had told Gracie that this event had happened at Collapsible D, and there is supporting evidence that this happened at D, and that crewmen subsequently locked arms and formed a ring around this craft to prevent it from being rushed again.

Leading Fireman Threlfall as evidence supporting that No. 12 left prior to No. 14. Threlfall gave interviews in several newspapers; although the overall story he gave remained largely consistent, some details differed between the accounts. In one of the interviews, Threlfall is quoted as saying: “Boat No. 14, into which I got, was the last boat but one on the port side and the last one but one to go.”⁴³² This statement would be consistent with a sequence of No. 16, No. 12, No. 14 and No. 10; this would be particularly true if the “but one” he was referring to was Boat No. 10, which did not lower away until much later. However, in another interview, Threlfall is quoted as saying, “I got away when I was told in boat No. 14, which was the last boat to leave the port side.”⁴³³ Halpern also cites the account of Charlotte Collyer, who does describe No. 14 as “the third boat” in her newspaper account.⁴³⁴

In additional comments on the Encyclopedia Titanica message boards, Halpern and Ioannis Georgiou cited the testimony of Greaser Frederick Scott as also supporting the conclusion that No. 14 was one of the last aft port boats to lower away. However, this does not stand up to scrutiny. Scott testified: “There were two boats left then on the port side; lowered down to the ship’s side they were then.”⁴³⁵ Confusingly, Scott then testified a few questions later that after going to the starboard side, he crossed to port and “there were no boats then lowered to the ship’s side.”⁴³⁶

Scott’s testimony is unclear. Was he saying that there were no boats already lowered down the ship’s side to the water, or that none were lowered level with the Boat Deck in order to be filled with passengers? Scott seems to have provided the answer when he was later asked the following:

- 5664. When you did look over the starboard side there were no boats either forward or aft?
 - No, not alongside the ship.
- 5665. So that all the boats either forward or aft had gone from the starboard side?
 - Yes. The only two left were on the port side, the afterend of the ship.
- 5666. (The Commissioner.) And they were the only two lifeboats left?
 - Round the ship, yes.⁴³⁷

During this sequence of questioning, Scott was referring to boats in the water, not on the deck. To make matters worse, Scott described one of the boats as “where the Officer pulled a revolver out and

⁴³² *Daily Mirror*, April 29, 1912.

⁴³³ *Daily Telegraph*, April 29, 1912.

⁴³⁴ *Washington Post Semi-Monthly Magazine*, May 26, 1912

⁴³⁵ Br. 5647.

⁴³⁶ Br. 5652.

⁴³⁷ Br. 5664-5666.

shot it between the ship and the boat,” and the other as “the one I got into [Boat No. 4]” after climbing down the falls on one of the aft port davits, missing the lifeboat and ending up in the water.⁴³⁸

However, this makes little sense. Scott’s description of the boat where the officer fired warning shots clearly fits No. 14. In Halpern’s scenario, the second boat Scott saw is speculated to be No. 10, to favor his own claimed lowering sequence of No. 16, 12, 14 and 10. However, Scott was rescued in Boat No. 4, not No. 10. The basic fact is that Scott’s testimony about what boats remained, whether or not they were still on the ship, and even whether or not he personally saw certain events in connection with the loading of those boats (such as Lowe firing shots), is disjointed and anyone could really make a case for just about anything, going from his statements alone.

Unfortunately, Greaser Thomas Ranger, who left *Titanic* with Greaser Scott, did not verify Scott’s recollections, since the two men seem to have taken somewhat different routes after they were released from duty, and at the most, we can only confirm that they met up on the port-aft Boat Deck in time to leave via the aft falls for Boat No. 16, dropping into Boat No. 4 as it passed by.⁴³⁹

If Scott really saw two boats on the deck and remained in that location, it is difficult to see how he could have mistaken No. 4, which was alongside *Titanic*, as No. 10. Despite Halpern forwarding Scott as evidence of his new sequence of No. 16, 12, 14 and 10 on Encyclopedia Titanica’s message boards, in another message, Halpern laments: “It’s really hard to know what Scott actually witnesses, and that is one of the reasons I had not included anything from him in my two-part article.” If, as Halpern mentions, Scott’s recollections are so difficult to interpret, then why use him to support his revised sequence?

Clearly, Scott was referring to two boats in the water, not the deck. Indeed, Ranger, who was with Scott on the aft port side when they climbed down the falls into No. 4,⁴⁴⁰ did not mention seeing Boat No. 14 or Lowe fire shots. Ranger also testified that when he reached the Boat Deck, he saw “nothing,” and that after going down to B Deck, the group of men there were told that “all the boats had left the ship then.” He reinforced this elsewhere in his testimony as well.⁴⁴¹ So Scott’s recollections

⁴³⁸ Br. 5657; Br. 5668-5670.

⁴³⁹ Br. 4031-4088. Ranger had come up the dummy funnel to the “second-cabin deck, aft, the starboard side” – a clear reference to the Second Class Boat Deck, where Boats Nos. 9-15 had been located. He said that he “saw nothing” when he arrived there. From there, he descended to B Deck, in the vicinity of the Second Class Smoking Room, by an undetermined route; while there, he came across about 20 men, firemen mostly, who were standing. Rumor had it that all the boats had left the ship then. He next went back up to the Boat Deck, this time to the aft-port quarter. It may have been here that he ran into Greaser Scott. The two men saw Boat No. 4 passing along the port side of the ship below, and they climbed out onto the after falls which had lowered Boat No. 16, and then down into the boat as it passed.

⁴⁴⁰ Br. 4054.

⁴⁴¹ Br. 4035-4049; Br. 4063.

should not be used to support the notion that Boat No. 12 left before Boat No. 14; his evidence is simply too fragmented and confusing, and don't appear to even refer to boats on deck. Furthermore, there is no independent verification of some of his statements from someone such as Ranger that can help sort it out. Halpern was wise not to use it in his article, and neither he nor Georgiou should have used his evidence to support their article's findings in an online forum.

Now that we have examined Halpern's reasoning for concluding that No. 12 left before No. 14, it is necessary to review additional eyewitness statements regarding the lowering of the aft port boats. As the reader will see, the majority of evidence on whether 12 or 14 left next after No. 16 is in direct contradiction to Halpern's conclusions.

Fifth Officer Lowe testified: "Numbers 12, 14 and 16 went down pretty much at the same time."⁴⁴² The close timing between when these three boats left makes it more difficult, but not impossible, to determine in what order they left. As mentioned previously, Able Bodied Seaman Clench testified that he loaded passengers into Nos. 12, 14 and 16 before returning to No. 12, and leaving the ship in that boat.⁴⁴³ This is certainly proof that these three boats were all loading simultaneously, but tells us little about the launch order of Nos. 12 and 14 – although one could just as easily ask: if Clench had helped at 14 and 16 before returning to 12, why did he skip 14 as he walked forward? Was it perhaps because No. 14 had already lowered away – or was being lowered and there were enough personnel already on hand there – and No. 12 was the next available boat as he walked toward the bow?

This is supported by the fact that Clench testified that "Mr. Lowe was in No. 14 boat and he sings out, 'Anybody attempting to get into these boats while we are lowering them, I will shoot them,' and he shot three shots."⁴⁴⁴ Lowe fired these shots as No. 14 lowered past A through C Deck. If No. 12 departed 5 minutes prior to No. 14, as Halpern concludes, and was then already nearing or reaching the water, then Clench would not have seen these events play out, and was not likely to even have *overheard* them.

It is not difficult to establish the relationship between Nos. 14 and 16. As mentioned previously, Bathroom Steward Morris stated that No. 16 "was being lowered away while I was standing by No. 14."⁴⁴⁵ Able Bodied Seaman Joseph Scarrott concurred, specifying that Boat No. 16 got clear of the ship prior to No. 14.⁴⁴⁶

Second Class passenger Esther Hart and her daughter Eva were rescued in Boat No. 14. Esther recalled the following:

⁴⁴² Br. 15834.

⁴⁴³ Am. 635-636.

⁴⁴⁴ Am. 641.

⁴⁴⁵ Br. 5304.

⁴⁴⁶ Br. 393-397.

I know that there was a cry of “She’s sinking.” I heard hoarse shouts of “Women and children first,” and then from boat to boat we were hurried, only to be told “already full.” Four boats we tried and in the fifth [No. 14], there was room. Eva was thrown in first, and I followed her.⁴⁴⁷

The statement by Esther about No. 14 being the “fifth” makes sense, since in our timeline, Nos. 4 (lowered to A Deck), 8, 6, and No. 16 had all preceded No. 14 lowering on the port side.

Most passenger accounts do not support No. 14 being the third lifeboat lowered on the aft port side. Second Class passenger Ellen Wallcroft stated: “Boats were lowered, there was room for two more in boat 14 which I think was the last but three to leave the ship.”⁴⁴⁸ While we certainly do not believe the evidence supports No. 14 being the first of the four aft port lifeboats to leave, this does show that Wallcroft had the impression that multiple lifeboats left after No. 14. However, in Halpern’s scenario, only No. 10 left from that area of the deck after No. 14.

Second Class passenger Selena Cook, rescued in No. 14, gives further evidence that her boat was not the third lowered on the aft port side, as Halpern suggests. She stated that “When we [No. 14] got so far down, the ropes would not act so they gave orders to cut them and we dropped almost down onto another boat. One or two of us shrieked but was soon told to ‘shut up.’⁴⁴⁹ (See the section McGough’s evidence that Boat No. 14 left prior to Boat No. 9 for a detailed description of this incident.) The other boat that was nearly struck was almost certainly No. 16.

In Halpern’s sequence, No. 12 lowered second amongst the aft port boats, at 1:25 am; if it took 5-6 minutes to lower, his scenario would have placed it in the water around 1:30 or 1:31 a.m. Halpern has Boat No. 14 starting down at 1:30 a.m., which means it would have been in the water no earlier than 1:35 a.m., the falls having gotten hung up and needed to be cut free, so that it fell the last several feet into the water. It is unlikely that No. 12, which ended up further away from *Titanic* than No. 14 (see page 174, earlier in this section), when it sank, would have been underneath, or near, No. 14 when it slammed down in the water. However, in our own lifeboat sequence, No. 16 began lowering at 1:20 a.m., placing it in the water at 1:25 or 1:26 a.m., just when No. 14 was lowering down, falling into the water around 1:30 a.m.

Second Class passenger Imanita Shelley gave multiple accounts, which also do not support Halpern’s sequence. These accounts are full of contradictions, making them hard to rely on. However, she consistently referred to the boat in which she left (either Boat No. 12 or No. 10) as the “last boat.”

⁴⁴⁷ *Iford Graphic*, May 19, 1912. Reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic*, by George Behe (Lulu edition, 2011).

⁴⁴⁸ *Maidenhead Advertiser*, April 29, 1912.

⁴⁴⁹ Account from Selena Cook, reproduced in *The Titanic Commutator*, Vol. 20, No. 4. Feb - April 1997.

While her accounts are difficult to interpret when directly compared with one another, they do not support No. 14 being the second-to-last boat lowered.⁴⁵⁰

Fellow Second Class passenger Bertha Ilett, who was rescued in Boat No. 14,⁴⁵¹ stated that when she arrived on deck, there “were quite a number of people there and life boats being lowered.”⁴⁵² In a later interview, she clarified that when No. 14 lowered: “One lifeboat [No. 16] had already been lowered away into a cold ice-strewn North Atlantic”, and added that she “was on the second of the boats.”⁴⁵³

Second Class passenger Elizabeth Brown, who was rescued in No. 14, noted the following:

They began to lower the boat [No. 14] over the side. It seemed a terrible distance. I looked back for my husband. I saw him turning away. We never said good-bye. Ours was the second boat off [preceded by No. 16].⁴⁵⁴

From this, it's clear that No. 14 followed No. 16. But it is also quite clear from a majority of evidence that No. 12 was actually lowered away *after* No. 14, making the correct sequence: 16, 14, 12. Able Bodied Seaman John Poingdestre testified: “There were hundreds gathered round waiting to get into the three boats,” and specified these as “Nos. 12, 14 and 16.” Poingdestre’s testimony is very specific in that Second Officer Lightoller and he helped fill Boat No. 12 with women and children. He then went to help fill No. 14 and was away from No. 12 for a “matter of about ten minutes.” On the subject of No. 14, he testified:

2939. Were people put into that boat [No. 14]?
- The boat was filled with women and children also.
2940. About how many?
- About 40.
2941. And was that boat left, as you call it?
- No, the boat was lowered.

⁴⁵⁰ A detailed summary of Shelley’s various accounts and the contradictory details in them can be found at the following link. A group of researchers concluded she was either rescued in Boat No. 12, No. 10, or lowered in No. 10 and transferred to No. 12: https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Shelley_Parrish.html

⁴⁵¹ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Ilett_Bertha.html

⁴⁵² *Passaic Daily News*, April 19, 1912.

⁴⁵³ *The Geneva Times*, April 12, 1975.

⁴⁵⁴ *Seattle Post-Intelligence*, April 27, 1912. Reproduced in *The Titanic Commutator*, Vol. 19, No.2, 1995. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

2942. That boat was lowered into the water, and who went away in that boat?
- I could not say.

After seeing Boat No. 14 lowered away, Poingdestre returned to No. 12, in which he departed the ship.⁴⁵⁵ His testimony is so specific that it is hard to see how he could have been mistaken.

There is additional evidence from the testimony of crewmembers actively involved in the loading and lowering of the aft-port boats which makes it very clear that No. 12 left just prior to Boat No. 10, which both Halpern and we conclude was the last aft-port boat lowered away, at 1:50 a.m. Able Bodied Seaman Frank Evans helped to load his assigned boat, No. 12, with women and children. He stated: "I lowered that boat [No. 12], sir, and she went away from the ship. I then went next to No. 10..." which he subsequently was ordered into by First Officer Murdoch and departed the ship in.⁴⁵⁶

Able Bodied Seaman Edward Buley, who had been working alongside Evans, testified that Boat No. 10 was the last boat in the area to lower away. He also stated: "No. 12 was the last boat before me to be lowered, and Evans was one of the men that lowered that boat, and after he lowered that away I called him and told him Chief Officer Murdoch gave me orders to find a seaman and tell him to come in the boat with me, and he jumped in my boat [No. 10]".⁴⁵⁷

The testimony of Poingdestre, Buley and Evans should be persuasive enough to conclude that Boat No. 12 departed after No. 14 and that it was also the last aft-port boat lowered prior to No. 10. After all, these three men were professional seamen and intimately involved in the loading of the boats. However, there is substantial additional evidence beyond these three men that support No. 12 leaving after No. 14, opposing Halpern's conclusions.

Second Class passenger Emily Rugg, who was rescued in No. 12, stated the following:

The boat we were in [No. 12] was the last to leave the ship. The last three boats were lowered at one time. Our boat did not lower properly and we were the last of the three to clear the ship.⁴⁵⁸

Since she was in Boat No. 12, and other evidence indicates the close timing between the launches of Nos. 12, 14, and 16, it is clear that the three other boats she described being "lowered at one time" were Nos. 16, 14 and 12. Importantly, she stated her boat, No. 12, was the last of these three to depart.

⁴⁵⁵ Br. 2922-2955.

⁴⁵⁶ Am. 675.

⁴⁵⁷ Am. 604; 613.

⁴⁵⁸ *The Morning News*, April 20, 1912.

Rugg provided additional details in other interviews, saying that she “was placed in the boat which was next to last to leave the ship.”⁴⁵⁹ Rugg repeated this detail elsewhere, stating “her boat, which bore the figure ‘No.12’ painted on it, was the second from last launched.” In that same interview, Rugg stated: “I saw shots fired by the officers, but could not say for certain whether they killed anybody.” She described a man jumping into her boat and the boat lowering.⁴⁶⁰ It appears that she saw Lowe fire his pistol as the neighboring No. 14 lowered away, also indicating that No. 14 lowered before No. 12.

Rugg’s account of the launch order is verified by fellow Second Class passenger Lillian Bentham, who stayed with Rugg and Lillian Renouf throughout the sinking. She stated: “I was put in one of the last two boats that were launched, there being two filled at a time...” Earlier in her account, she described shots fired during the loading, being quoted as saying: “Some men, mostly foreigners, I think, tried to jump over the sides into the boats. Every time any one did that he was shot.”⁴⁶¹ Again, it is likely that she was describing Lowe firing shots as Boat No. 14 lowered, although like others, she seems to have believed that people were actually shot. In either case, her memory again suggests that No. 12 left after No. 14.

Second Class passenger Bertha Lehmann appears to have been rescued in No. 12. She apparently overlooked No. 10, as so many other survivors did; among these were Lowe, Scarrott and Poingdestre, all of whom omitted No. 10 from their accounts of the loading, presumably because it was not prepped for loading and was still sitting on the deck at the time. She stated: “I reached the lifeboat, the last one on the left [port] side.”⁴⁶² Fellow Second Class passenger Alice Phillips was rescued in No. 12,⁴⁶³ and stated that she was “placed in the third boat leaving the sinking vessel [Nos. 16, 14, 12].”⁴⁶⁴

Third Class passenger Shawneene Whabee, who appears to have been rescued in Boat No. 12, stated “Banoura (Ayyub Dahir) and I were placed in the next to the last lifeboat to be lowered from the ship.”⁴⁶⁵ Second Class passenger Lyyli Silvén, also likely rescued in No. 12, concurred, stating that she “was placed in the second to the last boat that was filled and lowered from the *Titanic*.”⁴⁶⁶ If No. 12 left before No. 14, and No. 10 was still forward of No. 12, as Halpern claims, then it seems unlikely that both Whabee and Silvén would have specifically stated that No. 12 was second-to-last, rather than the “third-from-last” or “last, but two.” Their statements are consistent with the

⁴⁵⁹ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 20, 1912.

⁴⁶⁰ *The Evening Journal*, April 20, 1912.

⁴⁶¹ *Holley Standard*, April 25, 1912.

⁴⁶² https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Lehmann_Bertha.html

⁴⁶³ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Phillips_Alice.html

⁴⁶⁴ *Beaver Falls Daily Edition*, April 26, 1912.

⁴⁶⁵ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Whabee_Shawneene.html and https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Ayyub_Dahir_Bannurah.html

⁴⁶⁶ *The Calumet News*, April 26, 1912. Courtesy of Don Lynch.

earlier evidence that we examined, from the survivors stating that No. 12 was the last of the three lifeboats [Nos. 16, 14, and 12, in that order] which were lowered around the same time, and before No. 10.

Additional evidence of the order of the aft port boats comes from comparing the accounts of witnesses who were rescued in No. 10. Second Class passenger Ada Ball stated:

I doubt if we ever would have been fortunate to get away if the boat just preceding us had not tossed a rope as we were pulling away which we attached to our bow. They had a number of men at the oars and realized our plight.⁴⁶⁷

This account takes on added interest when the testimony of Able Bodied Seaman Frank Evans. Evans clarified which boat was the one that first tied up to No. 10:

Mr. EVANS. I was in No. 10, and we tied up to No. 12. We gave the man our painter and made fast, and we stopped there.

Senator SMITH. How long did you stop there?

Mr. EVANS. We stopped there about an hour, I think it was, sir, when No. 14 boat came over with one officer [Fifth Officer Lowe].⁴⁶⁸

Both individuals mention the difficulty that No. 10 was having rowing, due to the lack of qualified crewmen aboard and the heavy load of passengers. Evans' account, coupled with Ball's, is clear evidence that No. 12 immediately preceded No. 10.

There are some outlier accounts as well. Second Class passenger Ada Clarke was said to have been "one of the persons rescued from the last boat." Clarke herself was quoted as saying "I was in one of three boats lashed together..."⁴⁶⁹ and in another interview, that "I was placed in boat 14."⁴⁷⁰ There is some uncertainty about which lifeboat Clarke was in⁴⁷¹ and neither Halpern nor we conclude that No. 14 was the last of the aft port boats lowered.

⁴⁶⁷ *Florida Times*, April 23, 1912.

⁴⁶⁸ Am. 677.

⁴⁶⁹ *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, April 20, 1912.

⁴⁷⁰ *New York Herald*, April 20, 1912.

⁴⁷¹ Clarke does not mention being transferred out of No. 14 into one of the other boats in Lowe's flotilla or alternately, remaining in the boat when Lowe rowed back, does not mention the gunfire or chaos at No. 14, etc., which causes at least some reasonable doubt about her having been in No. 14. She may have been in one of the other aft port boats, such as No. 10.

Second Class passenger Nellie Wallcroft is another outlier. She stated: “Boats were lowered, there was room for two more in boat 14 which I think was the last but three to leave the ship.”⁴⁷² Which three port side boats departed after Boat No. 14? In our timeline, six port side boats left after No. 14: 12, 2, 10, 4, D, and B. Halpern’s revised timeline says five boats left after No. 14: 2, 10, 4, D, and B. Neither number matches what Wallcroft stated precisely. Wallcroft was under the correct impression that multiple boats departed after No. 14, but certainly was not claiming that No. 14 was the second-to-last aft port boat as Halpern postulates.

Although there will always be some outlier accounts, and Halpern certainly picked some that tended to support his conclusion that No. 12 left before No. 14, the majority of evidence indicates the opposite. Namely, the major evidence indicates that Boat No. 14 lowered immediately after No. 16, and that No. 12 followed shortly thereafter. Boat No. 10 departed later.

The port list in relation to the aft boats.

One of Halpern’s contentions is that Boat No. 9 must have lowered before the 1:30 a.m. time that we arrived at in our original lifeboat article (we now conclude 1:32 a.m.), because he believes that there was no port list during the lowering of that boat. However, there were a few mentions of a port list at Boat No. 14 (albeit by relatively few of the approximately 40 occupants who were aboard when it was lowered from *Titanic*), which we concluded left around 7 minutes ahead of No. 9.

Remember that we earlier discussed Steward Ray’s sighting of water on E Deck at what we believe was shortly before 1:25 a.m. At the time, he reported that the water on the port and starboard sides of the ship was “corresponding”, or in other words, that there was no significant list then.⁴⁷³

So if Boat No. 14 did lower away at 1:25 a.m., as we have postulated, and Ray said that the water was “corresponding” on both sides of the Entrance shortly before 1:25 a.m., then why are there references to a port list being in evidence at No. 14 during the loading? For starters, any slight list would be most noticeable in water inside the ship at the extremities of the ship’s width; Ray was observing water levels nearer to the ship’s centerline. Unless he was *extraordinarily* observant, a change of a few inches of depth closer to the ship’s centerline could still allow for a very slight list to port at about this time.

How does this relate to reports of a port list during the loading of No. 14? We know that there was no port list reported as No. 16 filled, so a dynamic was certainly *just beginning to come into play* between the launch of Nos. 16 and 14. As Halpern himself stated on the Encyclopedia Titanica message board in August 2016, “A list to port would at first be more noticeable on the port side of the vessel because

⁴⁷² *Maidenhead Advertiser*, April 29, 1912.

⁴⁷³ Am. 803.

of a widening gap between the side of the boat and the ship's rail there." We agree, and believe the evidence shows that a slight port list was present during the loading of Boat Nos. 14, 12, 9, 11, 13, 15, and that this list became significantly more pronounced during the loading of Boat No. 10 at 1:50 a.m. and onwards.

Halpern also stated in his lifeboat article: "Perhaps one of the strongest indications that boat No. 9 was actually lowered before No. 14 is the list that *Titanic* herself took on that night. By the time the No. 9 was lowered, it was reported that the ship carried no list at all but was down by the head by a few degrees [William Ward]." Saloon Steward Ward did state that "she was not listing at all. She was down by the head, but not listing" when No. 9 lowered away.⁴⁷⁴

However, there are some accounts that suggest the presence of a slight port list during the loading of No. 9, even if it did not significantly impede the lowering of the boat. Third Class passenger Margaret Devaney, who the evidence supports being saved in that boat, described how the "officer" in charge of the boat "asked those nearest the *Titanic* to push the lifeboat free," as it lowered and that "it caught - the way so many others did," adding that "it was necessary for those in the boat to shove against the port [*sic*] side of the listing ship to get the boat in the water."⁴⁷⁵

First Class passenger Mary Lines, also rescued in No. 9, gave some additional evidence of a port list in her accounts. In a later interview, she was paraphrased as saying: "Boarding any of the lifeboats was difficult, at best, for as the giant *Titanic* listed to a greater and greater degree, the lifeboats hung outward at an angle from the ship." Is this evidence of a starboard list as No. 9 lowered away? Not necessarily. Although Mary and her mother Elizabeth did not have to jump into their boat, she remembered that it took "some scrambling." Lines went on to describe how the "lifeboat went down the side with a terrible jolt. I thought it was all over then, but we stayed afloat and began to row away from the ship."⁴⁷⁶ The jolt she described could have been No. 9 hanging up slightly on the hull, as described by Devaney, which would align with a slight list to port as other evidence indicates. Mary reiterated that there was a list in another account, which gives an actual quote stating "We ran upstairs and someone steered us to a lifeboat. The ship was listing then and some lifeboats had been lowered, but many people were refusing to get in them."⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁴ Am. 599.

⁴⁷⁵ *The Troy Daily Times*, August 6, 1912; *Boston Post*, August 6, 1912; *New York American*, date Unknown; Letter from Margaret Devaney to Ed Kamuda, November 10, 1966. Courtesy of Don Lynch; *New York American*, date Unknown; *Newark Daily News*, April 2, 1967. The evidence supporting Devaney being in No. 9, as opposed to Collapsible C, has recently become clearer. Please see this information in our accompanying article, "Titanic: Which People Were In What Lifeboat – A New Study" https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Devaney_Margaret.html

⁴⁷⁶ Unknown Topsfield, Mass. Newspaper, week of August 6, 1975. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁴⁷⁷ *The New York Times*, November 26, 1975.

First Class passenger May Futrelle had left her husband and went on deck with an officer, whom she identified as Sixth Officer Moody. She recalled what happened next: “I had no sooner reached the deck than she began to list to port; even though there was no panic, people simply couldn’t believe that the *Titanic* could sink.”⁴⁷⁸ Admittedly, this press account from Futrelle is a jumble of details compared to her later, more coherent accounts; in it, she jumps from her going on deck prior to her boat lowering, to the ship breaking up, to boarding her lifeboat, etc. However, it is interesting that she mentions a port list beginning just after she reached the Boat Deck, and after which she got into No. 9. In a later account, Futrelle does confirm that the ship began listing to port, *prior* to when she was taken by Sixth Officer Moody from the aft port side to the starboard side:

So then we noticed that the *Titanic* lunged [*sic*, listed] to the left, and he [Jacques Futrelle] said “I think the ship is gone.”⁴⁷⁹

May gave another account, which suggests the presence of a port list when No. 9 was lowered:

We settled on the water with hardly a splash. Then the men began calling for a knife. The oars were lashed, and they had forgotten to cut them loose before they launched. We bumped against the side. The men stood up and held us away with their hands. They must have found a knife among them, for a moment later they were shipping the oars.⁴⁸⁰

Futrelle gave further details in a later account which also suggests a port list was present during the lowering of Boat No. 9. She again described the difficulty in freeing the oars, which was mentioned by both Devaney, Ward, Widgery, and others:

So then, just as the boat struck the water, the *Titanic* lurched and we were being sucked under the sinking boat. Now, the oars were tied with ropes as big as your thumbs. Nobody had a knife, so Paddy [McGough], with his tough little fingers (he was a little bit of a man) pulled those ropes, released those ropes with those fingers, so just as he got the oar released, he started to put it over to push off from the *Titanic*, and he dropped it right on top of my head, this huge oar. I thought I was gone; I

⁴⁷⁸ *Seattle Daily Times*, April 22 & 23, 1912, reproduced in *On Board RMS Titanic*, by George Behe (Lulu edition, 2011).

⁴⁷⁹ Interview with May Futrelle by Winslow Bettinson, a radio program director at WJDA in Quincy, Massachusetts, in 1962. The interview was transcribed by George Behe and is reproduced in his book *The Titanic Disaster: Final Memories*, currently unpublished.

⁴⁸⁰ *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, April 29, 1912. Courtesy of George Behe.

thought my skull was cracked, and of course I went on thinking, and I wondered if I were dead and didn't know it. So anyhow, my head never ached; it was never even sore. So he got the oar over [the side], and then he got the other oars released and we pushed off...⁴⁸¹

Lest these accounts be categorized as flimsy evidence, the difficulty here described in getting No. 9 off *Titanic's* hull and the oars being needed to push it free, is exactly the sort of evidence that Halpern cites in his article as proof of a port list during the loading of Boat No. 13, as will be discussed later. Furthermore, we can see here that in no less than *three* accounts, May Futrelle connects the onset of a port list – perhaps even a lurch to port – at the time she was leaving her husband, after coming on deck, or subsequently leaving in Boat No. 9; indeed, the 'lurch' she refers to when the Boat reached the water could easily have been evidence of a list that began when she had been on deck growing stronger and stronger a few minutes afterward, a picture that harmonizes with other the fact that the port side list, once it commenced, gradually grew stronger until just before the ship's final plunge.

If Boat No. 9 was lowered just after No. 14, a slight port list being present makes sense, since Bathroom Steward Morris stated the following about the presence of a list while No. 14 was lowered:

5475. Was the ship listing to starboard when you were lowering that boat?

- I think there was a list to port.

5476. A list to port?

- I think so.⁴⁸²

Mess Steward Cecil Fitzpatrick simply said that at the time that he saw an officer, presumably Lowe at No. 14, threatening a "Dago" with his revolver, "the ship was listing to port". He added no further details on the list.⁴⁸³ Apparently, the list at No. 14 was not great enough to significantly interfere with the lowering, given how few mentioned its presence at that boat; nor did any mention genuine difficulty getting passengers aboard No. 14 as a result of it. Besides Morris' and Fitzpatrick's understated comments about it, most of the survivors in the boat did not describe the list, and there is little evidence of a major issue in loading this boat due to the gap in between the side of the ship and it, such as what would occur later at Boat No. 12, and to a greater extent, at Boat No. 10.

⁴⁸¹ Interview with May Futrelle by Winslow Bettinson, a radio program director at WJDA in Quincy, Massachusetts, in 1962. The interview was transcribed by George Behe and is reproduced in his book *The Titanic Disaster: Final Memories*, currently unpublished.

⁴⁸² Br. 5475-5476.

⁴⁸³ *Western Daily Mercury*, April 29, 1912.

It is worth noting that Fifth Officer Lowe did give an estimate of the gap present between the side of *Titanic* and Boat No. 14 when he said he fired warning shots in that gap, which he described as being as the lifeboat lowered past B and C Deck:

Senator SMITH. How far from the ship's side was the lifeboat you were in?

Mr. LOWE. I really do not know. I should say - oh, 3 or 4 feet.

Senator SMITH. It cleared each deck 3 or 4 feet?

Mr. LOWE. I mean to say she was about that much off the ship's side.

Senator SMITH. Exactly.

Mr. LOWE. She came down just like this [indicating], off the ship's side, 3 feet off.

Senator SMITH. There was a space there of from 3 to 4 feet?

Mr. LOWE. I will withdraw 4 feet and say 3 feet.

Senator SMITH. There was a space of 3 feet between the side of the boat and the ship's side?

Mr. LOWE. That is right.⁴⁸⁴

Ironically, Halpern points out in his article that “with the ship carrying about a 2½° list to port by the time No. 14 started down, the calculated gap between the side of the boat and A deck as the boat was being lowered would be about 2 feet, and between the side of the boat and B deck as it was being lowered would be about 4 feet.” He goes on to describe how “a list to port of about 2½° would have been enough for boat No. 13 over on the starboard side to come up against the side of the ship as it neared the level of the water, about 60 feet below the level of the boat deck at that location at that time.”

Why is this noteworthy? Because if Lowe said that there was a maximum of three feet between his lifeboat and the ship's hull as it lowered (he first guessed three or four, then retracted four and settled on three feet), then as No. 14 lowered away, *Titanic* was listing less than 2½ degrees to port – a very subtle list. This tends to help fix the time of Ray's sighting of the water on E Deck being practically even between the two sides of the ship as coming just before No. 14 lowered away at 1:25 a.m.

However, from that point, *Titanic's* roll to port was steadily increasing. Almost comically, Halpern's own measurements for how far a 2½ degree list to port would have brought a starboard side lifeboat, i.e., No. 13, up against *Titanic's* hull plates actually helps to prove that Boat No. 9 left after No. 14. How so? Because this scenario is precisely what Devaney described, with her lifeboat, No. 9, rubbing against the hull as it lowered. Futrelle also stated that *Titanic* was listed to port prior to No. 9 lowering, and that No. 9 had difficulty pushing away from the hull once afloat. This clearly shows

⁴⁸⁴ Am. 417-418.

a close timing relationship between when Nos. 9 and 13 lowered away, further indicating that No. 9 lowered shortly after No. 14 had – rather than supporting the notion that No. 9 preceded No. 14 by 15 minutes, at a point prior to when the port list had developed, as Halpern concludes in his timeline.

There is also evidence that there was a port list of some degree during the loading of Boat No. 12. While not expressly stated, several passengers gave descriptions suggesting a gap between the side of the ship and the lifeboat. Second Class passenger Emily Rugg described how she remembered “being pushed into the boat.”⁴⁸⁵ Fellow Second Class passenger Lilian Bentham recalled: “Little children and babies were being thrown right and left,” which sounds reminiscent of what occurred at Boat No. 10 later, with passengers literally being tossed across the gap into the boat, as the port list increased. Bentham’s brother, who was not on *Titanic*, described how Lilian had told him that an officer “attempted to throw my sister to the boat below.” A man in the boat “caught Lillian, but the drop hurt her back... .”⁴⁸⁶ Bentham herself described the loading of the boats as follows:

The way they filled them was by having one of the ship’s men stand in the lifeboat and another throw him the women and children, one at a time. Everyone that I saw that was thrown over in this way landed safely.⁴⁸⁷

Second Class passenger Bertha Lehman also had some difficulty as she boarded the boat, stating “as I stepped into the lifeboat, it was dark and, of course, the inside of the boat was lower than the deck, I fell. I thought for a moment that I was going to fall right into the water, but I hit the bottom of the boat.”⁴⁸⁸ The descriptions of loading No. 12, indicating difficulties with getting passengers safely aboard, suggests a larger list was present at No. 12 than at No. 14 – which Halpern argues preceded it.

There is also some evidence of a port list being present during the lowering of Boat No. 11, which, as we’ve established, began lowering away at 1:35 a.m., or 3 minutes later than we concluded that No. 9 began lowering. Surely, if a slight port list was present at the previous boat, it would also have been noted during the lowering of No. 11? Researcher Randy Bigham noted an interesting detail in the accounts of First Class passenger Edith Rosenbaum. As described earlier, Rosenbaum, who appears to have had an eye for detail, noted that Bruce Ismay ordered her down to A Deck. There, two sailors literally tossed her into the boat, which was already heavily loaded. Prior to boarding it, she noted that No. 11 appeared to be tilted to one side.

⁴⁸⁵ *The Evening Journal*, April 19, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁴⁸⁶ *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, April 21, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁴⁸⁷ *The Holley Standard*, April 25, 1912.

⁴⁸⁸ *The Titanic Commutator*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1997.

Rosenbaum described this as follows: “The boat was very and slightly tilted to one side.”⁴⁸⁹ In another account she stated: “One of the tough men replied: If you don’t want to go, then stay here! The lifeboat was full. It was tilting on one side.”⁴⁹⁰ Rosenbaum repeated this detail consistently in numerous other accounts.⁴⁹¹ Of interest is the fact that Rosenbaum described the boat tilting to one side as it hung in the davits, as opposed to tilting to the bow or stern, as happened at some of the boats as they lowered, with the falls playing out unevenly. Boat No. 11 was heavily loaded, with over 50 occupants aboard.⁴⁹² With this number of occupants, the weight would have had to have been distributed fairly evenly and gravity would dictate that the boat hung evenly, port-to-starboard in the falls. However, from Rosenbaum’s perspective, if *Titanic* was listing to port at the time, it would appear, from the perspective of those aboard, as if the lifeboat, rather than *Titanic*, was tilting to the side. (See the images on the following page.)

Saloon Steward Jacob Gibbons had loaded passengers, including two children, into Boat No. 11. He then observed: “Hardly had I got aboard the lifeboat with the two children than I saw the *Titanic* beginning to list.”⁴⁹³ As we previously discussed, a list to port would first have been most noticeable on that side of the ship, and was probably coming into play just before 1:25 a.m. We previously concluded that No. 11 lowered at 1:35 a.m., some ten minutes later; it is certainly possible that Gibbons first noticed the list to port during the loading of No. 11. Of course, No. 9, which we believe left at about 1:32 a.m., had difficulty once it was down close to the water, where the growing port list would have been even more evident.

Turkish Bath Attendant Annie Caton, who was also rescued in No. 11, may have provided some additional evidence of a port list during the lowering of the boat. In a letter to her mother, Caton described the lowering process, saying the following:

After what seemed hours of waiting we were lowered in the boat with great difficulty, as the ropes were stiff, and we nearly turned turtle.⁴⁹⁴

While she attributed issues with lowering the boat to “stiff” ropes, her description of the lifeboat nearly capsizing would be consistent with what was described at other boats that dragged and caught

⁴⁸⁹ *Irish Independent*, April 18, 1956. Courtesy of Randy Bigham.

⁴⁹⁰ *Moustique*, October 19, 1958. Courtesy of Randy Bigham.

⁴⁹¹ *Woman’s Own*, April 14, 1962. Courtesy of George Behe and Randy Bigham; *Ladies Home Companion*, May 1964, Courtesy of Randy Bigham.

⁴⁹² <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/occupancy.pdf>

⁴⁹³ *The Bournemouth Guardian*, May 4, 1912.

⁴⁹⁴ *Hastings and St. Leonards Observer*, May 4, 1912.



against the ship's hull as they lowered, due to the earlier starboard list and later port list. Second Class passenger Marshall Drew, also in No. 11, gave a similar description:

As it lowered down the side of the liner, our lifeboat proved a long and hazardous trip. I think this was the only thing that frightened me as the pulleys and the davits were sticking. Sitting in the stern, at first we were looking up at those in the bow, when suddenly, with jerks of the rope, the opposite happened. One end of the lifeboat would jerk down, followed by the other end and it was a harrowing experience, because you had a feeling that you were going to be dumped overboard.⁴⁹⁵

Both Annie Caton and Marshall Drew described the sensation that their lifeboat was going to 'turn turtle' or dump its human cargo overboard [side to side]. While this side-to-side tipping could have been the result of the falls playing out unevenly, it is also possible, in lieu of the statements examined above, that No. 11 was actually catching on *Titanic's* hull, causing the jerking and for the crew manning the davits to have to halt lowering and doing so at different times than the crew at the second set of davits, causing the lifeboat to tip on the way down.

With evidence of a port list present at both Boat Nos. 9 and 11, it is puzzling that there does not appear to be many overt descriptions of a list at No. 13. Second Class passenger Hilda Slayter, who was rescued in No. 13, may have referenced it when she stated the following:

We were listing to starboard badly...I thought all the boats would have gone, and I wanted to be alone...They had told us the *Olympic* would be here in eight hours, but would she stay afloat that long? Looking over the side I saw the heavy list and the strangely calm sea.⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁹⁵ *The Titanic Commutator*, Vol. 28, No. 166, 2004.

⁴⁹⁶ "Hilda Slayter's Diary" by Alan Hustak, Encyclopedia Titanica. Available at the following URL: <https://www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/hilda-slayters-diary.html>.

Opposite top and bottom: These perspectives gives some idea of what Edith Rosenbaum may have been describing when she said that her lifeboat was "tilting". Without being dogmatic on the point, it very well could be that the port list of *Titanic*, 'straightened' in the second image' was creating the appearance that the lifeboat was out of balance. (HFX Studios.)

It seems likely that Slayter was mistakenly calling the port list a starboard list, since there certainly was not a starboard list at the point that No. 13 was loading.

Fireman George Beauchamp, also rescued in No. 13, may have noted the port list in his testimony, too. When asked whether he would have seen how many men and women were in his boat, Beauchamp responded, “No. I was keeping the boat off the ship’s side with an oar.”⁴⁹⁷ Beauchamp later testified about the difficulty in avoiding the stream of water coming out of the ship’s condenser discharge, saying: “Everything lowered easily right till she got to the bottom, to the discharge, then we had a difficulty in keeping it away from the ship’s side, to prevent the water coming in.”⁴⁹⁸

It is unclear if this is a specific reference to a list, but the difficulty in keeping No. 13 away from the side and the stream of water would make sense if the boat had been up against the hull, until it was afloat and freed from the falls. Leading Fireman Frederick Barrett certainly described No. 13 being up against the hull prior to being afloat, testifying: “When we found the discharge was coming out we stopped lowering and all the hose was tied up in the boat. I had a knife and I cut the hose adrift and shoved two oars over the forward end to shove the lifeboat off the ship’s side. We got into the water and there was a bit of a current and it drifted us under No. 15 boat...”⁴⁹⁹ In his article, Halpern also cites this as evidence of a port list.

While there are relatively few mentions of a port list at Nos. 9 through 13, compared to the great number of occupants in those boats, we have seen that there are certainly some. Interestingly, there are more direct descriptions of a port list during the loading of Boat No. 15. This makes sense, since once the port list began to develop, it continued to increase and perhaps even accelerate over time, becoming more noticeable. Eventually, this list reached at least 10° about 13 minutes after No. 15 lowered, by the time Boat No. 10 lowered away at 1:50 a.m. By the time No. 15 began lowering at 1:37 a.m., it was apparently becoming more noticeable. Even then, just a few out of the approximately 70 occupants of the boat mentioned the port list in their accounts. Bathroom Steward Samuel Rule testified as follows:

6503. Can you give us any idea when it was you first noticed the list to port?

- No, not particularly; not until I got down into the boat. I found she was pretty well up against the ship’s side. I did not notice particularly in getting the other boats out that she had a list.

⁴⁹⁷ Br. 719.

⁴⁹⁸ Br. 731.

⁴⁹⁹ Br. 2171.

And:

6594. Was she well listed over to port?

- Yes, she had a slight list to port.

And:

9670. Was there any great hurry about the launching of this boat?

- The Officer, I think, was pretty anxious to get her ready because the ship was taking a list.⁵⁰⁰

Rule's testimony makes it sound as if the port list was less noticeable at the earlier aft boats and increasing as they loaded No. 15.

Other witnesses described the port list at No. 15. Saloon Steward Percy Keen described it thusly:

It [No. 15] was the last boat on that side of the ship to leave. The *Titanic* had then a heavy list to port, and as our boat was lowered away it scraped the side, and we had some trouble to keep it off.⁵⁰¹

Fireman William Taylor also noticed the port list as No. 15 lowered away, stating: "I could not see, because we kept the boat off the ship, to keep from rubbing down her side."⁵⁰²

Fireman Frank Dymond, another crewman rescued in No. 15, described damage caused to the boat, likely from the port list:

Our boat had been damaged by striking the ship's gunwale when we were first lowered... The men on the second deck (A Deck) had to step across, about two feet from the rail to the side of the boat.

In the same interview, Dymond described the boat leaking "on one side just about the water-level, where she had been bumped on the ship's gunwale."⁵⁰³ Dymond's wording makes it sound as if No. 15 dragged more on the side of the ship when it first started lowering, which would make sense, since the superstructure stuck out further than the hull, from the Boat Deck down to underneath A Deck.

⁵⁰⁰ Br. 6503; Br. 6594; Br. 9670.

⁵⁰¹ *Daily Telegraph*, April 30, 1912.

⁵⁰² Am. 553.

⁵⁰³ *Daily Mirror*, May 17, 1912.

Third Class passenger Elizabeth Davison mentioned this water in the bottom of No. 15, too, saying: “Water kept coming into it until there were several inches on the bottom.”⁵⁰⁴

As can be seen throughout this section, the ship had no apparent list at the time that Boat No. 16 began lowering away at 1:20 a.m., at least not one that was noted by survivors. By the time Boat No. 14 lowered shortly thereafter, the port list was notable to a few of the 40 occupants who were aboard it at the time.⁵⁰⁵ This does not appear to have interfered with the loading. By the time Boat No. 12 and Boat No. 9 lowered away around 1:30 and 1:32 a.m., respectively, the port list was around 2½° to port. This was more noticeable on the port side, as it caused No. 12 to swing away from the hull, and women and children to have to be tossed into the boat. At the same time, Boat No. 9 would have come up against the side of the ship as it neared the ocean’s surface.

There is also indication of a port list during the loading of Nos. 11 and 13 at 1:35 a.m. and 1:37 a.m. respectively, with the latter needing to be pushed away from the hull, once in the water. In the short interim that it took Boat No. 15 to begin lowering away at 1:38 a.m., the port list was growing significant enough that it was mentioned by several occupants of the boat and may have caused slight damage to the side of No. 15 from dragging on the hull. It is also possible that for some reason, more eyewitnesses in No. 15 mentioned it later.

Prior to the lowering of this boat, the port list was slight enough to go unnoticed by all but a few of the occupants of Nos. 14, 12, 9 and 13. However, from the point that No. 15 began lowering away, the port list grew more significant over time, reaching at least 10° by the time No. 10 began lowering at 1:50 a.m. Incredibly, while Halpern uses reports of list to help craft his arguments about the lifeboat launch sequence, a solid foundation has here been laid out whereby observations of the list to port during the loading and lowering of the aft lifeboats – a list that was starting from virtually nothing when No. 16 lowered away, to a relatively strong list as No. 15 lowered away – actually supports the sequence that we posited in our original lifeboat article. This evidence does not fit Halpern’s latest conclusions.

Officer Movements and What They Prove.

In the introduction to this study, we emphasized the necessity of considering all relevant factors and evidence to accurately determine the lifeboat launch timeline and scrutinize findings from every possible perspective. Unlike our approach, nearly every other study on the lifeboat sequence, including Sam Halpern’s, has overlooked or inadequately addressed the movements of *Titanic*’s officers and

⁵⁰⁴ *Marion Weekly Star*, April 27, 1912.

⁵⁰⁵ Boat No. 14 had around 40 individuals aboard at the time it was lowered from the Boat Deck: <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/occupancy.pdf>

crew during the sinking. These movements are crucial, as they serve as a litmus test, validating, or challenging, conclusions about the lifeboat sequence. Essentially, by analyzing eyewitness accounts of which officers or crew members were at specific lifeboats and when, and comparing these with the conclusions drawn about the lifeboat sequence, we can identify any contradictions or discrepancies.

The British Inquiry's lifeboat launch timeline and sequence actually created a number of significant paradoxes with personnel movements. For example:

1. According to the British Inquiry, Boat Nos. 10 and No. 9 each began lowering at 1:20 a.m. This conclusion creates a problem because we know that First Officer Murdoch was involved in the loading of *both* boats and was present at *each* as they started lowering.
2. Another issue is the British Inquiry's claim that Boat No. 16 was the last lifeboat lowered on the aft port side at 1:35 a.m. However, we have shown earlier in this article that Sixth Officer Moody was the officer primarily responsible for loading Boat No. 16, which was actually the *first* lifeboat lowered on the aft port side.
3. The British Inquiry also concluded that Boat Nos. 13 and 15, which Moody was also known to be present at, were lowered at 1:35 a.m. Although not far off from our time of launch, their sequence creates a paradox that would require Moody to be in multiple places simultaneously, since they placed the launch of No. 16, which Moody was involved with, at the same time.
4. They also had Collapsible C, lowered by Murdoch at 1:40 a.m., and then Murdoch's movements are unknown until he is at Collapsible A, on the same davits, which they placed at 2:20, a gap of forty minutes!

These discrepancies highlight just a few of the significant issues with the British Inquiry's timeline. Moody and Murdoch, for example, could not be in two places simultaneously, nor would they have literally been running back-and-forth between the port and starboard sides of the ship in order to make their conclusions possible. Such contradictions raise immediate questions about the accuracy of their conclusions regarding the lifeboat launch sequence.

Researcher Inger Sheil, who has spent years researching *Titanic's* officers, stated the following on the Encyclopedia Titanica message board, regarding our original lifeboat article and conclusions, on June 6, 2007:

I think it's important to view the evidence of these eyewitness accounts in context - follow Moody around the deck according to the conventional timeline [i.e. the British

Inquiry], and his movements are nonsensical. He zigzags from side to side. Same with Murdoch's actions as recorded by eyewitnesses - times contradict. However, view it in light of the revised Behe-Fitch-Wormstedt timeline, and these difficulties are resolved. We can see a perfectly logical progression on Moody's part - from where he is seen aft on the port side overseeing the uncovering of lifeboats, to forward on the boatdeck at Boat 2 seeing it swung out, seen on A deck by Gracie doing some crowd control, working his way back aft with Lucas, where he oversees Boat 16, then across to the aft starboard quarter where he works with Murdoch, then forward to where he is last seen at Collapsible A.

Similarly, there are some significant issues with Halpern's lifeboat sequence, once you begin examining where and when the officers, crewmembers and others were sighted and identified, and what this means for their movements when placed in the Halpern sequence. For example, Halpern has Boat Nos. 3 and 1, both of which Boatswain Alfred Nichols was involved with, lowering at 12:55 a.m. and 1:05 a.m. However, he also has Boat No. 6 lowering at 12:55 a.m. Second Officer Lightoller testified in 1912, and wrote in his 1935 book, that while he was working on Boat No. 6, he ordered Nichols and six sailors below to open the gangway doors. Clearly, Nichols could not have been in two places at once, on opposite sides of the ship (see the prior section titled "Boatswain Nichols and the Nos. 1 and 6 Launch Sequence").

This is not the only example of this type of problem in the Halpern timeline. We know from the testimony of Bedroom Steward Alfred Crawford that Captain Smith manned the forward falls, at least initially, as Boat No. 8 lowered away.⁵⁰⁶ We also know that Smith was present as Boat No. 1 was lowering away. Able Bodied Seaman Frank Evans testified: "He [Smith] came to the starboard action boat [No. 1] that I was lowering".⁵⁰⁷ Meanwhile, Able Bodied Seaman Albert Horswill stated: "As we [No. 1] were being lowered, I heard Captain Smith shout to me: 'Pull away as fast as you can!'"⁵⁰⁸

Why are these sightings of Captain Smith's presence at Boat No. 8 and No. 1 as they were lowering an issue? Because Halpern concluded that Boat No. 8 was the second port boat lowered, and that it departed at 1:05 a.m.; he also postulates that Boat No. 1 lowered away at 1:05 a.m. – the same time. Obviously, if these two boats lowered away simultaneously, it is impossible that Captain Smith was both manning a set of falls at No. 8 on the port side and also approaching No. 1 as it began lowering away. However, our original lifeboat article, which concluded that Boat No. 8 was the first port

⁵⁰⁶ Br. 17926-17927.

⁵⁰⁷ Am. 683.

⁵⁰⁸ Interview with Horswill on WGN radio program *Headlines of Other Days*, broadcast on May 10, 1934. Transcribed by George Behe in his book *The Titanic Disaster: Final Memories*, currently unpublished.

lifeboat lowered, at 1:00 a.m., and that No. 1 *began* lowering at 1:05 a.m., does not present such a contradiction. Smith seems to have come along and checked on progress on the forward starboard side as No. 1 was in the process of lowering, placing this sometime after 1:05 a.m.

As discussed in detail earlier (See the prior section “Additional evidence of the aft port boats beginning to lower before the aft starboard”), there is another serious issue in Halpern’s timeline regarding Sixth Officer Moody’s movements. In order for Halpern’s version to be accurate, it means that Moody would have had to have been at Boat No. 9 early in its loading, prior to crossing to the port side to Boat Nos. 16 and 14. However, as discussed in detail in the above referenced section, the eyewitness evidence simply does not support this conclusion, and in fact, renders it impossible.

Additionally, Halpern’s conclusion that Boat No. 9 left at 1:15 a.m., *prior* to Boat No. 14, creates a number of conflicts with eyewitness movements. As examined previously (See the section “The timing relationship between A) Lowe/No. 1, B) Lowe/Moody at Nos. 14 & 16, and C) Moody/No. 9”), Second Class passengers such as Toomey, the Beanes, etc., originally went to the aft port side of the Boat Deck and described hearing gunfire, prior to departing the ship in No. 9 on the aft starboard side. The only known incident of gunfire up to that point in the sinking was Lowe’s gunshots as No. 14 lowered away.

Similarly, Third Class passenger Jennie Hansen reported hearing gunfire prior to departing in Boat No. 11. Halpern has No. 11 departing at 1:25 a.m., prior to his time for No. 14 of 1:30 a.m., another conflict. This trend continues with Third Class passenger Margaret Mannion hearing gunshots prior to arriving at, and leaving in, No. 13. Halpern has Nos. 14 and 13 both departing at 1:30 a.m. Saloon Steward Thomas appears to have seen and/or heard Lowe firing shots at No. 14, prior to departing in No. 15, another issue, as Halpern has No. 15 leaving just three minutes after No. 14. Clearly, these Second and Third Class passengers were *witnesses* to the gunfire surrounding No. 14 *before* they left in their boats on the starboard side.

On the other hand, our sequence and timing conclusions do not conflict with eyewitness statements relating to the timing of the gunfire which is known to have place during No. 14’s lowering. Our sequence also allows for Moody, after seeing Boat No. 16 safely away at 1:20 a.m., to move forward, planning to go down to A Deck to check for more passengers, where he found Mrs. Futrelle on the stairs between A Deck and the Boat Deck. Boats Nos. 14 and 12 left within minutes of No. 16, so Moody’s comments to Futrelle about the women having left, past tense, make sense in that context. With Boats Nos. 16, 14 and 12 lowering away close together and No. 10 still sitting in its chocks, not yet ready to load, it would have been logical for him to then take Futrelle across to the starboard side, barely making it before No. 9 departed at 1:30 1:32 a.m. In fact, since Murdoch is known to have been involved in transferring women and children to the starboard side to board Boat No. 9, it’s quite possible that Moody had become aware of those efforts, and was looking to render assistance – either of

his own accord, or perhaps having received an order from Murdoch directly, requesting assistance. Moody then remained on the aft starboard side, helping at the remaining boats there. This sequence and timing does not require Moody to have been darting back-and-forth, nor does our timing and sequence contradict with Moody's role in loading Boat Nos. 16 and 14, and so forth.

Another contradiction in Halpern's timeline, as pointed out earlier (see the section titled "Additional evidence of the aft port boats beginning to lower before the aft starboard"), relates to the movements of J. Bruce Ismay during the evacuation. In Halpern's version, Bruce Ismay would have had to quickly move from where he was sighted at Boat No. 9 by several survivors, which Halpern concludes began lowering at 1:15 a.m., to Boat No. 16 by 1:20 a.m. to get Stewardess Evelyn Marsden on board before it departed.

However, Ismay's testimony suggests he did not see any of the port lifeboats lower away,⁵⁰⁹ implying he must have put Marsden on No. 16 sometime *before* it was ordered to lower. Moreover, Edith Rosenbaum was on the Boat Deck while No. 9 was being loaded, before being moved to A Deck and towards No. 11 *by Ismay*. This flow of movement indicates that Ismay couldn't have gone from Boat No. 9, to No. 16 and back to No. 11. Halpern's times for those boats simply doesn't allow for that scenario. Ismay clearly stayed on scene through the lowering of No. 9. This means that even if one were to, for some reason, find a sudden and "compelling" reason to ignore Rosenbaum's account of Ismay taking her directly from No. 9 down to A Deck and No. 11, there still isn't room for Ismay to make an intervening trip to the port side to help Evelyn Marsden into No. 16 before it lowered away. Additionally, there are multiple accounts of Ismay being present at No. 15, suggesting that he remained at the aft starboard boats to assist with the loading there.⁵¹⁰

Our current conclusion, that Boat No. 16 began lowering at 1:20 a.m. and No. 9 at 1:32, allows for Ismay to go from Boat No. 3, where he was last seen prior to this by Bathroom Steward Samuel Rule, standing by the after fall of Boat No. 3 as the order to lower Boat No. 1 was given⁵¹¹ at 1:05 a.m., to the aft port boats prior to No. 16 being ordered to lower away at 1:20 a.m. In fact, Ismay proceeding from the forward starboard boats to the aft port side, just as so many others, including Fifth Officer Lowe, Able Bodied Seamen Buley, Evans, Archer, and likely First Officer Murdoch, makes complete sense. Ismay likely would have been part of the group that began passing women and children across from the port side to starboard to fill No. 9, where he was later seen and which we conclude lowered

⁵⁰⁹ Am. 9.

⁵¹⁰ Saloon Steward Percy Keen (*Western Daily Mercury*, April 29, 1912) and Bathroom Steward Samuel Rule (*Western Daily Mercury*, April 30, 1912) both described Ismay's involvement in the loading of No. 15. These accounts were published in Paul Lee's highly recommended 2020 book, *Titanic, The Homecoming*.

⁵¹¹ Br. 9601-9606.

at 1:32 a.m. He then remained on the aft starboard side, helping at No. 9, No. 11 and No. 15. All of this makes logical sense and accords with the evidence.

In his current lifeboat article, Halpern asks “why is there such a large gap in time, 25 minutes, between the launching of boat No. 1 and boat No. 9 on the starboard side in the W-F-B sequence?” As discussed previously (see the sections “The Lowering of Boat No. 1, The errand to retrieve the revolvers, and Movements of the crew from forward to aft”), this gap is smaller in reality, because, while No. 1 *began* lowering at 1:05 a.m., it was hung up for several minutes and did not reach the water until around 1:15 a.m. Additionally, as previously examined, there was a movement of the ship’s crewmen from the forward starboard boats after No. 1, to the aft port boats, to assist with the growing crowds and unruliness happening there, followed by a need to pass passengers from the port to starboard side to fill No. 9. In other words, these minutes were *busy ones* filled with getting to, and then coping with, what was fast becoming a chaotic scene on the aft-port side. No. 9 simply was not far enough along to warrant as much attention at that point, when compared to the commotion that was building around the aft-port boats.

Meanwhile, Halpern, by reducing the gap between No. 1 and No. 9 to just 10 minutes and shifting the times of all the aft starboard boats earlier than in our conclusions, actually *creates* another gap, and an inexplicable large one at that, between the lowering of Boat No. 15 and the next boat launched on the starboard side, Collapsible C. This gap, 27 minutes, is completely unexplained and unsupported by the evidence; it creates the very sort of issue that he objects to from our timeline in his own article.

Halpern’s timings also lead to a large gap in First Officer Murdoch’s known movements. Using Halpern’s times, this would mean Murdoch departed the aft starboard quadrant (Murdoch was not present during the actual lowering of these boats, as discussed previously, in the section “The Launch Time of Boat Nos. 13, 15 and 10”) sometime prior to the 1:30 and 1:33 a.m., the times that he postulates for No. 13 and No. 15 lowering away, respectively. This means Murdoch would not have been seen on the starboard side again until shortly before the lowering of Collapsible C at 2:00 a.m. This gap in Murdoch’s flow of movements, *nearly a half-hour in length*, goes unexplained in the Halpern sequence.

In fact, for Halpern’s scenario to work, Murdoch would have had to have crossed to the aft port side much earlier than Halpern’s launch times for No. 11 and No. 13 or 1:25 and 1:30 a.m., respectively, to accord with the eyewitness evidence. Recall that AB Evans found Murdoch at No. 10, after Evans finished lowering No. 12, which Halpern states was at 1:25 a.m. Halpern also has No. 14 lowering after No. 12, which conflicts with a lot of eyewitness evidence, as previously examined (see the section “The Launch Order of the Aft-Port Boats”).

Additionally, this launch order would require Murdoch arriving and being seen by Collyer, Crowe, and Threlfall at No. 14 *after* Beesley saw him order the aft starboard boats lowered away, and cross over to the aft port side. As we discussed earlier (see the section “Movements of the crew from for-

ward to aft”), this creates a conflict with the accounts of others, including Crowe, who stated Murdoch was *already* on the aft port side when Crowe arrived from the vicinity of Boat No. 1, and Crowe stated that this was *before* Lowe arrived. Halpern’s assertion that Murdoch arrived at No. 14 after Boat Nos. 13 and 15 were lowered away is clearly incorrect.

There are numerous other examples of similar contradictions in Halpern’s timeline. For example, researcher George Behe discovered accounts suggesting that Captain Smith was at least briefly present and involved at Boat No. 14. This was a detail that we had not noted in our original lifeboat article. First Class passenger Mary Compton and her daughter Sara were standing near Boat No. 14 and recalled:

When Captain Smith handed us life preservers, he said cheerily: ‘They will keep you warm if you do not have to use them.’ Then the crew began clearing the boats and putting women into. My daughter and I were lifted in the boat commanded by the fifth officer [No. 14].⁵¹²

Similarly, Second Class passenger Edith Brown recalled Smith being near No. 14:

... and Captain Smith told my mother and I to get into lifeboat number 14. My poor father had to stay behind on deck.⁵¹³

Smith apparently remained on the scene, as at Boat No. 12, Second Class Lillian Bentham twice recalled the Captain being present. In one account, she stated the following:

Just as our boat [No. 12] was launched the captain called out, ‘Now, every man for himself, she’s going down.’⁵¹⁴

In another account, Lillian’s brother Walter quoted her as follows:

Before the lifeboat had gone very far Lillian says she distinctly heard Captain Smith say in reply to a question, as he stood on the bridge: ‘It’s neck or nothing now - every man for himself.’⁵¹⁵

⁵¹² *Racine Journal*, April 23, 1912. Courtesy of George Behe.

⁵¹³ The recollections of Edith E. Haisman on the maiden voyage of RMS *Titanic*, recalled on October 22, 1993. Courtesy of George Behe.

⁵¹⁴ *The Holley Standard*, April 25, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

⁵¹⁵ *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, April 21, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

It is likely that the statement about Smith standing on the Bridge is a mistake on the reporter's part, or on the part of Lillian's brother as he relayed the story. She would have been unable to hear anything from the Bridge at Boat No. 12, and in the direct quote from her, she states that she heard Smith as her boat was lowering away. Still, in two different tellings of her experiences that night, Lillian placed Captain Smith in the vicinity of Boat No. 12.

Captain Smith being present during the loading of Boats Nos. 14 and No. 12 reveals a number of issues with Halpern's lifeboat launch conclusions. In his timeline, he has Boat No. 12 lowering before No. 14, with the boats lowering at 1:25 a.m. and 1:30 a.m., respectively. However, Halpern also has Boat No. 11 lowering at 1:25 a.m. Why is this a problem? In another account discovered by George Behe, Able Bodied Seaman Robert Hopkins was manning one of the sets of davits at Boat No. 11, which, as noted earlier [see "The port list in relation to the aft boats"] lowered unevenly, either due to the falls getting tangled or playing out unevenly, the port list, or a combination thereof. As Hopkins bent over the falls to clear them, Captain Smith stepped up to him and slapped him heartily on the shoulder, saying: "What's the matter here, my lad?" Hopkins was subsequently able to straighten out the falls and No. 11 reached the water safely.⁵¹⁶

Halpern has Nos. 12 and 11 both starting to lower away at 1:25 a.m. However, this is clearly incorrect, since witnesses place Captain Smith at both No. 12 and No. 11 at exactly the same time - right as they were being lowered away. Another recent discovery by researcher George Behe is that when Captain Smith went to check on the progress of the crew at the aft starboard side, he not only stopped by No. 11, but apparently checked in at No. 15 as well. Stewardess Emma Bliss was standing in the vicinity of No. 15 when she was given a baby to look after. She said: "I put my lifejacket on the child. The captain told me it would be mine to look after if we didn't find the mother, but she was on the *Carpathia* when we were rescued."⁵¹⁷

This presents another problem for Halpern. In his lifeboat timeline, he concluded that Boat No. 14, which there is evidence for Captain Smith being observed at, lowered at 1:30 a.m. He has No. 15, where Smith was also seen, lowering at 1:33 a.m. However, Smith being seen at both Nos. 14 and 15 accords with our current timing conclusions much more logically. In our timeline, Boat No. 14 lowered away at 1:25 a.m., No. 12 at 1:30, No. 11 at 1:35, and No. 15 at 1:38 a.m. This would allow Smith to be present at Nos. 14 and 12 before crossing over to the aft starboard side, to check on progress there, and being seen at Nos. 11 and 15. Our timeline would not artificially force Smith to have run back-and-forth between both sides of the ship, or calling for him to magically be in two places at once.

⁵¹⁶ *The New York Times*, April 23, 1912. Reproduced in *The Triumvirate: Captain Edward J. Smith, Bruce Ismay, Thomas Andrews and the Sinking of Titanic*, by George Behe, 2024.

⁵¹⁷ *Toronto Star*, May (6?), 1959. Courtesy of George Behe.

The examples given throughout this section are not intended to be an exhaustive list of all such concerns with Halpern's launch sequence. There are more. Instead, this is but a sampling that shows some of the major flaws within Halpern's conclusions.

As we emphasized in our introduction, only by adopting a holistic approach can researchers draw accurate conclusions about the *Titanic* disaster's lifeboat sequence and timeline. This comprehensive method goes beyond survivor testimonies and the details of their narratives. It encompasses crucial elements such as the ship's reported angles of trim and list, verifiable event timings – like wireless messages and distress rockets – and a *range* of other supporting evidence. All of these puzzle pieces must be considered as part of a whole, and all must be input without attempting to jam pieces that don't fit into areas where we would like to see them go.

The movements of *Titanic's* officers, crew, and passengers stand out as a powerful and reliable line of evidence. This data serves as a litmus test for any researcher's conclusions regarding the lifeboat timeline. When we first published our analysis of the lifeboat launches in the early 2000s, we did not start with predetermined conclusions based on the movements of the crew. Instead, we formulated a launch sequence that made the most sense given the broadest range of evidence available. Upon testing this sequence against the recorded movements of key individuals, we found validation in how our timeline aligned with their known locations and actions—an alignment that provides further confidence in our findings.

In contrast, the timelines developed by the British Inquiry, Sam Halpern, and Ioannis Georgiou fail this crucial litmus test, casting serious doubt on their conclusions and highlighting the need for skepticism of their conclusions.

The timing of Boat No. 4's launch.

Another strange variance from our original timeline in the Halpern timeline regarded the launch time for Boat No. 4. In our original article, we concluded that Boat No. 4 departed at 1:50 a.m. Halpern concluded that Boat No. 4 lowered five minutes later, at 1:55 a.m. Why? Halpern wrote:

When boat No. 2 was being lowered, around 1:45am, Fourth Officer Boxhall noticed that boat No. 4 was still in the processes of taking on passengers. As he said, "There was only one boat hanging there in the davits, No. 4..I noticed as I was being lowered [in No. 2] that they were filling No. 4 boat." It is assumed here that it took somewhere around 10 minutes to complete the loading and final preparation for launching boat No. 4 from the time that Boxhall's boat No. 2 started down. We, therefore, assigned a launch time of 1:55am for boat No. 4. The loading and launching of boat No. 4 was under the supervision of Second Officer Charles Lightoller, who then moved on to

work on loading and launching collapsible boat D from the davits previously used to lower emergency cutter lifeboat No. 2.⁵¹⁸

Halpern's methodology here switches from analyzing angles of list and trim to determine lifeboat launch times, to analyzing how long it likely took to load Boat No. 4 before lowering it away; angles of list and trim had nothing to do with No. 4 since Lightoller had earlier, and quite wisely, tied it off to the coaling wire that ran underneath the A Deck promenade, in case the ship began to list before it launched.

Notice that Halpern here assumes that No. 4 was *just starting* to load when Boxhall noticed it, as No. 2 was lowering. However, that is not exactly what Boxhall stated. He said: 'I noticed as I was being lowered [in No. 2] that they were filling No. 4 boat'. However, he did not give any indication of how far along it was in the loading process at the point when he noticed it.⁵¹⁹ Halpern is making a hard conclusion on the situation based on open-ended wording.

In fact, Boxhall states in the American Inquiry: 'When I was lowered away [in No. 2] I was the last boat but one on the port side. There was one of the lifeboats [No. 4] lowered away after I left, *a few minutes after I left*, and then there were no more boats hanging in the davits on the port side.'⁵²⁰ The fact that Boxhall stated that No. 4 left only 'a few minutes' after No. 2 does not make it sound as if it was at the beginning stages of loading, when Boxhall saw it.

Importantly, artificially moving the launch of Boat No. 4 five minutes later begins to create an issue with the launch time of Collapsible D. Why? Because after No. 2 reached the water (since the water was then up very high along the hull, it would not likely have taken five full minutes to lower No. 2 to the water) and cast off, the falls had to be brought back in, the davits swung back in, and all of the gear hooked up to Collapsible D, which was then on the Boat Deck inside the bulwark rail. Only after the boat was brought up and over the rail could it then commence filling. This process would have taken more time than simply swinging an average lifeboat over the water, because we are talking about much more work.

Second Officer Lightoller specified that after getting Boat No. 4 away, he went forward, where Boat No. 2 had already been lowered away, but the falls had not yet been hooked up to Collapsible D, which still needed lifted and swung out over the edge of the Boat Deck:

In the case of the last boat I got out [No. 4], I had the utmost difficulty in finding women. It was the very last boat of all, after all the other boats were put out and we

⁵¹⁸ "Lifeboats, Launch Times, List and Trim", by Samuel Halpern.

⁵¹⁹ Br. 15432.

⁵²⁰ Am. 240.

came forward to put out the collapsible boats. In the meantime the forward emergency boat [No. 2] had been put out by one of the other officers. So we rounded up the tackles and got the collapsible boat to put that over. Then I called for women and could not get hold of any.⁵²¹

Despite this, Halpern still agrees with us that Collapsible D launched at 2:05 a.m. We feel that our original launch time, again, “to the nearest five-minute mark”, for Boat No. 4 is still the best estimate for the timing of its launch: 1:50 a.m. This gives about 15 minutes for the following events:

- A few minutes for No. 4 to lower under Lightoller’s supervision;
- For Lightoller to come up to the Boat Deck and then become involved with early efforts at Collapsible D;
- For the work to be done of getting the falls and davits back in and hooked up to Collapsible D from Boat No. 2;
- To get Collapsible D over the bulwark rail and swung back out over the edge preparatory to loading;
- Loading Collapsible D with around 20 occupants;⁵²²
- Collapsible D beginning to lower away at about 2:05 a.m.

Additionally, Halpern’s change in launch time for Boat No. 4 to 1:55 a.m. causes other issues. For example, First Class passenger William Carter helped his wife Lucile and family into Boat No. 4 from A Deck,⁵²³ prior to going to help at Collapsible C, which he subsequently boarded, just prior to it lowering away at 2:00 a.m. Carter described doing the following, after seeing his family safely into No. 4:

When Mrs. Carter and the children came up I had them placed in one of the boats, Which also contained Mrs. Astor, Mrs. Widener, Mrs. Thayer and several other women.

I believe at the time that they would return to the steamer in a short time, feeling certain that there was no danger. A few minutes later, however, I learned that water was pouring into the ship and that she was in a serious condition. I saw Harry Widener and walked to where he was standing on the port side of the *Titanic*. An order had been given before the boats were launched to put on lifebelts, and I had

⁵²¹ Am. 81.

⁵²² <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/occupancy.pdf>

⁵²³ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, April 19, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier. Mrs. Carter states that the family boarded No. 4, ‘leaving Mr. Carter on the deck.’

adjusted one around myself. I said to Widener, 'Come on, Harry, let us go to the starboard side and see if there is any chance to get in one of the boats.' He replied, 'I think I'll stock [*sic*, stick] to the big ship, Billie, and take a chance.' I left him there and went to the starboard side of A deck [*sic*, Boat Deck]. There I saw Mr. Ismay and several officers filling the boats with women. I aided them in the work, and as the last boat was being filled we looked around for more women.

The women that were in the boat were from the steerage with their children. I guess there were about 40 of them. Mr. Ismay and myself and several of the officers walked up and down the deck crying, 'Are there any more women here?' We called for several minutes and got no answer. One of the officers then declared that if we wanted to we could get into the boat if we took the place of seamen. He gave us this preference because we were among the first-class passengers.

Mr. Ismay called again and after we got no reply we got into the lifeboat. We took the oars and rowed with the two seamen.⁵²⁴

It is difficult to see how Carter could have been in both locations and done what was described (seeing his family into No. 4, conversing with Widener on the port side, putting on a lifebelt, crossing to starboard, helping to load passengers into Collapsible C, then spending 'several minutes,' with the crew, searching for additional women.), if those two boats lowered so closely together. However, there would have been plenty of time to do so, if No. 4 left around 1:50 a.m., as per our original conclusion.

There is simply no evidentiary reason, adequately presented or explained, to push the launch time of Boat No. 4 later as Halpern does. Indeed, since Halpern bases his own time on the launch time for Boat No. 2, any evidence-based change to the launch time for Boat No. 2 would affect his own estimate – something that we will touch on later.

⁵²⁴ *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 21, 1912. Courtesy of Mike Poirier.

SECTION 4:

How big was the port list at Collapsibles C and D?

Halpern’s regression analysis model and the port list at Collapsibles C and D.

In his current lifeboat articles, Sam Halpern utilizes what he defines as “a few key data points from the evidence where the list of the ship can be estimated.” He then utilizes “a best-fit regression analysis model to obtain a curve of List Vs. Time.” Such an approach, which is similar to what Hackett and Bedford did in their landmark study “The Sinking of S.S. *Titanic* - Investigated by Modern Techniques,” does have its applications and uses.⁵²⁵

However, Halpern himself observed the following in a discussion of the Hackett and Bedford study, on the Encyclopedia Titanica message boards on October 12, 2005:

There are “problems” with all theories. The biggest problem is that nobody has reliable input data. Much is based on what people said they saw and when they saw it. Much of the timing I’m afraid is very subjective, as is the extent of observed flooding in some cases.

He also noted: “So we have to accept that we have to deal with a large degree of uncertainty.” More recently, in his 2017 online article “Angles of Trim and Heel,” Halpern states the following: “It should be understood that the results of theoretical work is only as good as the assumptions that went into the analysis.”⁵²⁶

These statements have profound implications on the importance of relying on more than just reported angles of list and trim when trying to piece together a lifeboat launch timeline and sequence. In short, the outcomes predicted by such a model rely heavily on which eyewitness observations are utilized and entered as data points and indeed, the very *interpretation* of them. In the case of the Hackett and Bedford study, they relied heavily on information derived from the British Inquiry. However, they left out multiple, key, eyewitness statements and accounts from both that inquiry and the American Inquiry, private accounts and press interviews.

⁵²⁵ Hackett and Bedford, “The Sinking of S.S. *Titanic* - Investigated by Modern Techniques,” 1996 RINA Transactions.

⁵²⁶ <https://www.titanicology.com/Titanica/TrimAndHeel.pdf>

These omissions resulted in some clearly erroneous findings, such as having Boiler Room No. 5 flooded to the top of the bunkers by 12:40 a.m., completely ignoring the testimony of Leading Fireman Barrett. Hackett and Bedford also simulated the flooding of the ship by utilizing the lifeboat launch sequence formulated by the British Inquiry (and assuming it was accurate), rather than using the actual eyewitness testimony and statements to establish an accurate timeline for when the lifeboats left, and what the flooding conditions were at specific times during the sinking. This results in erroneous conclusions, such as that the forward Well Deck flooded at 2 hours after the collision, or 1:40 a.m. Hackett and Bedford assigned a launch time of 1:40 a.m. to Collapsible C (based entirely on the time for this boat offered up by the British Inquiry) and note that Rowe said the Well Deck was awash when this boat lowered. Therefore, their conclusions on the flooding study are based on the assumption that the 1:40 a.m. time is correct. Hackett and Bedford also conclude that *Titanic's* trim was 17° at 2:15 a.m., which is the exact time when water reached the Bridge, as demonstrated through multiple lines of evidence. The Bridge going under and water being just below the Crow's Nest, as Second Officer Lightoller described, corresponds to a forward trim angle closer to 9°, in reality.

As early as our 2021 animation of the disaster, we began to see the need to study the angles of list and trim more carefully than to simply rely on Halpern's older calculations, which we based some of our statements in *On a Sea of Glass* on. It seemed important to us to move the flotation pivot point for *Titanic* slightly further aft from the time that Boiler Room No. 5 flooded suddenly through the end of the sinking; this seemed fair since the flotation pivot point was no longer constant as the weight of water continued aft from the original compartments breached by the collision, and led us to think slightly differently about the forward trim angles that *Titanic* attained at certain points. Although our analysis of the ship's movements is not yet complete, the 2021 animation placed *Titanic* at a forward trim of about 9° degrees instead of Halpern's previously-estimated angle of 11°.

There are multiple other examples that could be discussed, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this example is illustrative of how the results of specific studies rely heavily on what data is being input at the front end of the process, and sometimes even upon subjective interpretations of the said data. Halpern relies heavily on cold numbers and calculations to try proving his points. He delves deeply into very complex mathematical computations which look *very* convincing to the average person, and which the average reader cannot verify the accuracy of, on their own. However, here is the problem: all of these complex calculations are based on *subjective* eyewitness statements, sometimes made in passing, in unclear terms, or under the influence of leading questions.

Let's take an example of an eyewitness statement about *Titanic's* angle at a certain point in the sinking, and consider how outlandish it is – assuming the testimony transcription is even correct, a detail which at times Halpern himself has been forced to disprove. But for the sake of argument, let's assume that this testimony is correct. Fifth Officer Lowe was a trained officer; he was young, but this was not

his first trip at sea. One would think that his expert evidence at the inquiry – not quoted in a newspaper article – could be reliable on something as simple as a perceived angle of list or trim. Yet he testified that when he first turned out on the Boat Deck, just before 12:40 a.m. – at a point when Boat No. 7 was filling – that there was *no list* (port to starboard), but that the ship was trimmed 12-15° down by the bow!

Mr. LOWE. I met somebody, and they said she had struck an iceberg, and I could feel by my feet that there was something wrong.

Senator SMITH. What - a listing?

Mr. LOWE. No. I heard that term applied yesterday, and it is wrong. It is not listing; it is tipping.

Senator SMITH. I suppose he meant tipping when he said listing; but did she tip?

Mr. LOWE. This is sideways (indicating).

Senator SMITH. Could you feel her tip sideways?

Mr. LOWE. No; there was no listing. Listing is the side motion and tipping is the end motion. She was by the bow; she was very much by the bow. She had a grade downhill; a grade like that (indicating).

Senator SMITH. The bow, you say, was down?

Mr. LOWE. Down, and the stern was up.

Senator SMITH. Could you tell at about what angle she was at that time?

Mr. LOWE. Do you want the perpendicular angle or the horizontal angle?

Senator SMITH. The horizontal angle.

Mr. LOWE. I should say she was about 12° to 15° by the head.⁵²⁷

Inarguably, *Titanic* did not assume an forward trim angle of 12-15° until she was taking her final plunge at around 2:15 a.m. Currently, we feel that this early on, when Lowe got up, *Titanic* had assumed a forward trim of roughly 3-4°. There is a tremendous difference between 3-4° and the 12-15° that Lowe was so clear about. However, if someone were to use Lowe's outlandish testimony as a hard data point, all sorts of bizarre things would happen as it was incorporated into an analysis. There is also reliable evidence that *Titanic* still had a list to starboard at that point, contrary to Lowe's denial of such a list: remember that just minutes later, Steward Wheat would see water coming into the First Class Entrance on E Deck via the starboard corridor, but when he looked out onto the port side, on Scotland Road, he said there was no water there. *Titanic* was, indeed, listing to starboard

⁵²⁷ Am. 387.

even though Lowe said she was not. Someone could say: “Lowe was an expert, he should have known the angle!” Yet he was clearly mistaken.

If such a well-trained young officer could be badly mistaken, is it not ludicrous to 1) ‘cherry-pick’ a few statements about a list being present at the loading or lowering of this boat or that boat, to then 2) run extensive computations on that finite, as it turns out incomplete, sometimes contradicted, and certainly *very open to interpretation and mistaken perception* set of data points, and to then 3) say that everyone else who has considered the subject – even using a vast array of data points from many lines of evidence – was mistaken because the math *must* be better, even going so far as to 4) claim that the other researchers are prejudiced and are bad researchers because they happened to make conclusions that differed from their own? Is it not downright farcical to then 5) make public derogatory comments about the methodology or motives of researchers and historians that differs from one’s own, narrowly-focused, set of data points, even trying to “shame” us into the pitfall of Walter Lord’s “rash man” who “sets himself up as the final arbiter” of how events played out that night? Indeed, would this very definition of the “rash man” not apply to the researcher working from such a limited field of analysis who is out there saying that so many others, *including so many eyewitnesses that night*, simply *must* be mistaken because their own calculations say otherwise?

Furthermore, we are forced to look at the very narrow set of “key data points” that Halpern used for his regression analysis model. Thankfully, we don’t have to guess what those are, as he lists all six of his points in Part 2 of his article:

1. **11:40 p.m.** — *Titanic* carried an assumed 2° port list prior to the collision, based on the port list that was observed during the maiden voyage by Second Class passenger Lawrence Beesley and others. Halpern speculates that this was due to the removal of coal from the starboard side bunkers of Stokehold Nos. 9 and 10, to extinguish the coal fire that had been smoldering there. **Our analysis:** The present authors agree that this is a reasonable assumption, based on the extant evidence. However, we also feel that the *exact* degree of port list that was carried immediately prior to the collision *could* be questioned, since the observations of the list were made earlier in the day, and there may have been some time for a slight alteration as the day progressed. Although we do not feel that there is extant evidence for revising the number at this point, we leave open the possibility that the subject could be revised in the future, based on careful analysis.
2. **11:50 p.m.** — *Titanic* carried a 5° starboard list on the inclinometer, as Quartermaster Robert Hichens testified. **Our analysis:** We are in agreement with this data point.

3. **1:05 a.m.** — Halpern concludes that Boat Nos. 8 and 1 were launched at this time, and that there was no starboard list at the time No. 8 was lowered. **Our analysis:** This is where Halpern’s model begins to show its flaws. We have already demonstrated that Boat No. 8 was the first lifeboat lowered on the forward port side at 1:00 a.m., and that there was indeed a starboard list reported by eyewitnesses just before, or as, No. 8 was being loaded and lowered. We agree with Halpern’s statement that Lookout George Symons noted a small list to starboard during the loading of Boat No. 1, which we all have concluded began lowering at 1:05 a.m.
4. **1:20 a.m.** — Halpern concludes that when Boat No. 9 reached the water, there was no list present. He bases this finding solely on the testimony of Saloon Steward William Ward. **Our analysis:** This data point is flawed in two ways: 1) As examined in this article, Halpern has Boat No. 9 lowering too early, when in fact, the evidence supports that it began lowering at 1:32 a.m. 2) There are multiple witnesses who contradict Ward about the presence of a list at No. 9, and who instead indicated that there was indeed a port list at the time. These eyewitnesses include Margaret Devaney, Elizabeth Lines and May Futrelle. Ironically, Halpern himself indicated that a list of 2° or greater was needed in order to cause a lifeboat to rub along the hull as it lowered, which is the exact scenario that occupants of Boat No. 9 described. This calculation would indicate that a port list of *at least* 2° was present during the lowering of Boat No. 9. Interestingly, Halpern concludes – based on the small number of eyewitness statements, which are not very descriptive – that a list of 2.5° was present during the lowering of No. 14. If his assertion is correct, then by his own calculations, the list to port present at No. 14 would suggest that Boats Nos. 9 and 14 left very close together in timing, in harmony with our original findings of No. 14 leaving just prior to No. 9.
5. **1:50 a.m.** — Halpern calculates that there was a 10° port list at the time Boat No. 10 was lowering, based on there being a $2\frac{1}{2}$ foot gap between *Titanic* and the lifeboat, as observed by Able Bodied Seaman Frank Evans. **Our analysis:** We are in agreement with this data point.
6. **2:05 a.m.** — Halpern concludes that there was a 15° port list at the time that Collapsible D was launched. This is different from Halpern’s previous work and conclusions over many years. **Our analysis:** This data point differs not only from Halpern’s previous conclusions, but from our own. We had previously agreed with Halpern’s suggestion that the ship’s list was around 10° to port as Collapsibles C and D lowered. It is important to note that with a port list greater than 10° , it be-

comes more difficult to see how Woolner and Björnström-Steffansson could have made the jump from the rail of A Deck into Collapsible D as they described; we have looked at the distances involved with a greater list, and the situation simply does not line up with Halpern's assertion of a 15° list to port at that time. And lest Halpern suggest that the davits for Collapsible D were not swung out all the way in an attempt to counteract a port list greater than 10° – as we have suggested *may* have been the case for certain other sets of davits for other lifeboats, and which suggestion seems to be thoroughly supported by some of the davits at the wreck site – the forward davit for Boat No. 2 and Collapsible D remains in position on the wreck, and is fully extended.

Halpern's conclusion that the port list was 15° during the loading of Collapsible D represents a significant change from his previous published works, which all concluded that the list at the time Collapsible D was lowered away was 10° – and importantly, the changes to his arguments were made with no new eyewitness data presented to back it up.


Researchers are certainly entitled to change their conclusions and, in fact, it should be expected that conclusions will change when new evidence is discovered. However, the present authors find Halpern's reasoning for changing his mind on this particular point *questionable at best*. This is particularly true, since he is not incorporating new or previously overlooked eyewitness evidence that *forced* a change in findings. Instead, he is utilizing the same set of eyewitness descriptions and observations, with his new regression analysis model, yet comes up with a different result.

In his 2017 paper, “Angles of Trim and Heel,” Halpern wrote the following:

At about 2:05 AM, when Collapsible D was launched, QM Bright noted that the forecastle was just going under water. When Collapsible C (launched just a few minutes earlier) got to the water, QM Rowe noticed that the well deck was “submerged.” This is very consistent with Bright's observation that the forecastle had just gone under about the same time. As QM Bright had noted, the forecastle was about 20 feet below the level of the bridge. All this points to a down angle of about 7 degrees by 2:05 AM.⁵²⁸

When writing specifically about the port list, he then described the following:

⁵²⁸ <https://www.titanicology.com/Titanica/TrimAndHeel.pdf>



Above: This image was created by Samuel Halpern for our earlier lifeboat launch sequence article. In great detail, it demonstrates the condition of *Titanic's* sinking when Woolner and Björnström-Steffansson leapt into Collapsible D with *Titanic* carrying a 10° list to port. Halpern has since revised his computations to argue that *Titanic* was carrying a 15° list to port at the time. (Original diagram by Samuel Halpern.)

Consider the following. The boat deck was 58' 0" above a 34' 7" load waterline amidships. Allowing for a mean draft of 2 feet less since the ship had completed about two-thirds of its voyage, we are talking about a boat deck that was about 60 feet above the waterline amidships under zero trim. With the forecastle head seen to be going under when they launched boat D, the water at the aft end of the forward well deck would have to be close to the level of B deck forward on the ship's centerline, or 18' 6" below the boat deck. As QM Bright had said, "What we call the forecastle head was just going under water. That would be about 20 feet lower than the bridge, I should say." Now a list to port of about 10 degrees, producing a 2.5 feet gap between the side rail of the Boat deck and the side of a lifeboat as seaman Frank Evans observed, would bring the port side of the boat deck down by 8 feet while raising the starboard side by 8 feet. This means the port side of the forward part of the boat deck would only be 18'

6" - 8' = 10' 6" above the water which supports Lightoller's observation of how far they had to lower Collapsible D. This then puts the port side of 'A' deck at its forward end about 1 foot above the water at that time lifeboat D was launched, which was about 2:05 AM. Within a couple of minutes the sea would be up to 'A' deck, and as Woolner said, "And as we went out through the door the sea came in onto the deck at our feet." They then hopped up onto the gunwale to make a jump for it "because if we had waited a minute longer we should have been boxed in against the ceiling."⁵²⁹

Halpern had also concluded that when First Class passengers Hugh Woolner and Mauritz Håkan Björnström-Steffansson leaped into Collapsible D as it lowered, there was a 10° list to port, and that D was more approximately 5 feet from the side of the ship to the lifeboat, but 9 feet to the midpoint of the lifeboat.⁵³⁰

In his current lifeboat articles, Halpern has altered his conclusions regarding this, *while still using the same set of eyewitness observations and data*:

For our sixth data point we chose the situation at 2:05am when boat D was launched. At that time the list of the ship had reached about 15° to port. This was determined from taking into account the trim that the ship took on by that time, and the reported distance that boat D had to be lowered to reach the water as related by Second Officer Lightoller and confirmed by Hugh Woolner. As will be seen in the section dealing with trim versus time, by 2:00-2:05am, during the final loading of collapsible boat D, *Titanic* had trimmed down by the head to over 6° causing the ship's forecastle head to get submerged. At a 6° down angle, the level of the sea would have reached about 22 feet below the level of the boat deck as seen on the ship's centerline (or about 3½ feet below the level of B deck on the centerline) where the collapsible boats were being launched. However, over on the port side of the ship, about 46 feet away from the ship's centerline, water was just coming onto A deck which was only 9½ feet below the level of the boat deck. From the geometry of the situation, the angle of list needed to create what was just described is about 15° to port..It is interesting to note, that QM Arthur Bright, who was put in charge of boat D, told Senator Smith at the American inquiry that when he left the ship, "What we call the forecastle head was just going under water. That would be about 20 feet lower than the bridge, I should say."

⁵²⁹ <https://www.titanicology.com/Titanica/TrimAndHeel.pdf>

⁵³⁰ Sam Halpern, "Titanic's Sinking - Angles of Trim and Heel," *The Titanic Commutator*, Vol. 30, No. 174, 2006.

The ship's forecastle head was at the level of B deck, just one deck higher than the level of the forward well deck.

One key difference is that, without introducing new eyewitness evidence, Halpern has changed *Titanic's* angle of forward trim at 2:05 a.m. from his previous finding, 7°, to her having only a 6° forward angle of trim in his new article; he does not explain this alteration. He then factored in the reported distance to lower Collapsible D to the water, 10 feet, and then using trigonometry, arrived at a calculated angle of list of about 15°. However, there are problems with all of this. Collapsible D's lowering was a very complex scenario.

First of all: Collapsible D's stern fall was held up during the lowering process, as it passed A Deck, for an unspecified amount of time, as Quartermaster Bright testified.⁵³¹ From the time that D had *begun* to lower away from the bulwark rail on the Boat Deck, the ship's head was steadily settling, bringing the collapsible closer to the sea even as it descended; as it paused, that gap was continuing to decrease while the boat remained stationary in its falls. For how long did it remain there? We can't say for sure. However, we have clues. First Class passenger Frederick Hoyt, whose wife Jane was already in Collapsible D, had time to converse with Captain Smith after he had bid her farewell, and apparently after his wife's boat had begun lowering away. Smith suggested he go below to A Deck and see if there was a lifeboat alongside that he could get into from there. When Hoyt arrived on A Deck, he was surprised to see that Boat D was "still hanging on the davits", not yet in the water, "there having been some delay in lowering her".⁵³² His wife described the length of the delay in general terms, but it must have seemed an eternity to her because she said that "*finally* [authors' emphasis]" the lowering process was finished.⁵³³

So how far did Collapsible D lower from the bulwark rail to the water? Lightoller said that it was only 10 feet from the bulwark rail to when Collapsible D reached the water.⁵³⁴ It seems that his estimate was correct for the final distance traveled. But when it had *begun* lowering, that vertical distance was clearly greater. At 2:05 a.m., when Boat D *started* down, our estimates place this distance at more like 20 feet of vertical distance, which would seem to accord very closely with Bright's recollections of how low the ship had sunk when they started down.⁵³⁵

Now the question becomes: where was Collapsible D when Woolner and Björnström-Steffansson jumped into it? Woolner said that Collapsible D was about 9 feet away from him when he jumped.

⁵³¹ Am. 839.

⁵³² Letter from Hoyt to Colonel Gracie, referred to in *The Truth About The Titanic*.

⁵³³ *Amsterdam Evening Recorder*, April 23, 1912. Courtesy Mike Poirier.

⁵³⁴ Br. 14019-14020.

⁵³⁵ Amer. 839.



Above: This still from our 2021 animation shows the distance between Collapsible D and the bulwark rail of A Deck, where Woolner and Björnström-Steffansson made their leap. During the animation process, we discovered that Halpern’s original 10° list to port was slightly greater than what was needed to define Woolner’s testimony of the distance. Halpern has since revised his computations to argue that *Titanic* was carrying a 15° list to port at the time, a scenario that would make the distance to the boat from the rail much higher than what is seen here with the ship carrying only an 8-9° list. (HFX Studios.)

He added that the boat was not only out *away* from the ship, but that they also had to jump “slightly downward”.⁵³⁶ In order for the boat to be even slightly *below* their eye level when they jumped, *and* for the water to be coming onto the deck as they did so, we are looking at a very complex three-dimensional space. Since the two men were aiming to land *in* the bow of the boat, and the boat tapered from its full breadth of 8 feet toward its midline near the bow, they were already looking at have to jump farther *out* to reach a point *within* the bow of the boat than if they were aiming for the *side* of the boat where it had its fullest breadth, which was further away from them.

⁵³⁶ Amer. 887-888.

Woolner suggested that they had made a 9 foot jump. This would represent a three-dimensional jump that consisted of 1) a distance *out* from the side of the ship and toward the midline of an 8-foot wide collapsible, 2) *down* slightly below their eye level, and 3) *aft* slightly into the bow of the boat, since the forward tip of the boat was just behind the edge of the rail. Halpern seems to simplify the jump by suggesting that it was 9 feet *to the most extreme breadth of the boat*, and this could easily have thrown off his list calculations. Indeed, his illustration seems to show exactly that.

Furthermore, we must ask: how many men could make a standing 9-foot jump from an elevated, narrow rail with a smooth wooden top, on a flooding deck, under intense circumstances, while also kicking off that rail using, theoretically, the somewhat slippery dress shoes of the time, and into a lifeboat? Perhaps a running jump from a deck with no rail at the edge would have allowed 9 feet of travel, but that was not the situation they described here. The younger man, Björnström-Steffansson, was 28 years old and a military man who may have been used to such exertions, but even then a standing 9-foot jump seems extreme for him to have managed. By comparison, Woolner was 45 years old; he did not make it into the boat, but instead bounced off of the gunwale, his legs dangling into the icy sea. Yet, importantly, he still reached the edge of the boat with his jump. Could Woolner have made a standing 9-foot jump to the edge of the boat? This still seems unlikely.

Worse yet, Woolner was the only man who seems to have said that the boat was then 9 feet away. Without any confirmation of that distance, we must ask: was his distance estimate accurate? And if there is room for some interpretation in his 9-foot estimate, and they were aiming for the bow of the boat, about four feet further away from the ship's side, how are we to accurately base complex trigonometry calculations of the ship's list from all of this? Halpern's own illustration of the situation seems to point to the two men leaping to the fullest breadth of Boat D, not more toward its centerline at its forward tip. Could this be why Halpern's calculations of *Titanic's* list at the time seem to indicate a list that was too great considering other evidence?

The present authors find it patently absurd that the angle of list could have been as much as 15° when Collapsibles C and D were lowered. First of all, Halpern himself calculated in his earlier work that with a 10° list, not his revised 15° list, there would have been around a five foot gap between Collapsible D, at its fullest breadth, and *Titanic's* side as it lowered away. In fact, on the Encyclopedia Titanica message boards on February 23, 2006, Halpern, when speaking about a 10° list at Collapsible D, stated: "To get into the boat near its bow they had to land near the center line of the collapsible not far from where the falls would be. *It had to have been quite a leap to land in the boat safely.* I don't know how Steffanson did it? Woolner almost missed reaching it altogether."

If this statement applied to the condition at Boat D with a 10° port list, it would definitely apply even more so if there was a 15° port list. Woolner and Björnström-Steffansson would have had to jump out *even further* horizontally than Halpern originally thought, a distance that not only seems

absurd, but also departs from eyewitness descriptions of the spatial relationships between the deck, the rail, and the boat at the time.

Perhaps more telling, however, is what begins to happen on the other side of the ship, to Collapsible C, as it lowers away, when one artificially increases the port list from 10° to 15°. When *Lusitania* was torpedoed in May 1915, it assumed a heavy list to starboard. When there was a 15° list, and indeed, even with a less severe list, it proved nearly impossible to lower any of the lifeboats on the liner's port, or high, side. In multiple cases, the lifeboats swung back inboard and proved impossible to swing back out, capsized, or broke apart from rubbing against the ship's hull and rivet heads while lowering, and so forth. While there are many differences between the sinkings, davits, etc., of *Titanic* and *Lusitania*, there is one vital key data point for comparison: only one port lifeboat was successfully lowered to the water from *Lusitania*, at a point when there was a 13.5° list; even then, it was capsized by catching on the ship's bilge keel once afloat.⁵³⁷

Frankly, it is difficult to envision *Titanic's* crew being able to get Collapsible C up and over the bulwark rail on the starboard side against a 15° port list and, even if they did, it would have been with great difficulty. Yet we are unable to find any accounts of those involved in working on that boat who mention any such struggles in getting the collapsible over the rail, swung out and lowered level with the outside of the bulwark. Certainly, there is no evidence to suggest that anyone had trouble climbing uphill against a list and then over a bulwark into the lifeboat to board it, which would have been the case with a list as steep as what Halpern postulates.

Collapsible C did reportedly rub against the hull as it lowered away at 2:00 a.m., and had to be pushed away from the ship's side to make it to the water. However, there is no evidence that Collapsible C nearly capsized as it was lowered from catching on the side of the ship, or was heavily damaged by running over the hull plates and rivet heads, as would have been the case with a list of 15°. This is particularly true because the canvas side of Collapsible C would easily have torn or become damaged in such a way that it would have been obvious to those aboard.

In our 2021 animation, the sinking condition of *Titanic* as Collapsible C lowers away is 8-9° to port, and even with the lifeboat davits fully extended, the collapsible's sides begin to rub up against A Deck during the lowering; the boat then swings slightly inboard upon clearing A Deck, and continues to have issues during the lowering, particularly the further down the hull it passed. This harmonizes beautifully with the situation described by eyewitnesses. However, increasing the list to 15° means that this situation would have made it virtually impossible to lower Collapsible C away altogether; such a scenario was likely to have ended in a more dramatic *Lusitania*-esque scenario, potentially even capsizing the boat during lowering.

⁵³⁷ *Lusitania, An Illustrated Biography (Volume II): A Greyhound's Downfall*, by J. Kent Layton, Tad Fitch, Michael Poirier, Tom Lynskey and Levi Rourke (The History Press, 2025).

Indeed, we know that when Boat No. 15 had lowered away, starting at 1:38 a.m., over 20 minutes before Collapsible C started down, and at a point when the port list was less severe, it had suffered damage from hitting the hull of the ship during its lowering. This damage was referred to by two witnesses, as referred to in the section “The Port List In Relation to the Aft Boats”, and there was reportedly even some ingress of water within the craft as a result.

Although the port list was strong enough to give those aboard Boat C difficulty as it lowered away, referred to by Quartermaster Rowe and others, there was no actual damage reportedly suffered by the craft, nor did it threaten to tip over as would have been the case with a 15° list. The conclusion that *Titanic* held a list that great at that time simply does not hold up to scrutiny.

Halpern’s latest conclusions, like previous studies based on calculations from specific data sets, highlight an important point: no matter how proficient one is in mathematics, the accuracy of the results depends entirely on the quality of the initial data input. Consider that with great confidence, Halpern used extensive calculations that – just as convincingly, based on the math alone – proved that *Titanic* carried a port list of both 10° and 15° as Woolner and Björnström-Steffansson were jumping into Collapsible D at 2:05 a.m. Yet looking at the larger data field available, it is easy to see that a list of 15° to port at that time is absurd. If the numbers are that easily manipulated, why trust them over the larger body of first-hand evidence available to us?

Speaking of which, it is clear that Halpern handicapped his analysis right from the start. The examples provided demonstrate that his data set was fundamentally flawed from the outset, rendering the results of his regression analysis unreliable and untrustworthy for predicting the ship’s state at any given time during the sinking, regardless of the sophistication of the model. The fact that Halpern relies almost solely on a selection of inquiry evidence, excluding private accounts, newspaper accounts and other sources, leaves him with a small subset of the overall knowledge of the sinking, and a myopic view on the overall picture of what happened.

A sudden lurch as Collapsible D was lowered?

At this point, we should pause to consider a recent tendency on the part of online “experts” to insist that there was some sort of dramatic lurch to port during the lowering of Collapsibles C and D, a dramatic movement from 10° of port list up to 15°, followed by another lurch at 2:10 a.m., coupled with some sort of easing of the list between those points. Claims have been made online that such a motion is supported by the recollections of several survivors, supposedly including Hugh Woolner, Jayne Hoyt, Edward Brown, and Robert Williams Daniel.

In one newspaper account, Woolner reportedly said:

When we saw that all the women had gone, we turned about and went below to deck

A. When I walked into those rooms with their glass portholes closed tight and saw the lights begin to turn red and glimmer, it gave me sort of an uncanny feeling. Then the ship began rocking a little and we could feel it list and move. We hurried out to the promenade. There was no one about.⁵³⁸

He then went on to describe how he and Björnström-Steffansson saw Collapsible D lowering past them, and they jumped into it. Most of the details in this account agree with Woolner's inquiry testimony, although the reference to portholes on A Deck is odd. For the moment, let's assume that while they were on A Deck, just before jumping into Boat D, this account is correct and the two men felt the ship "rocking a little" and that they could "feel it list and move". Neither statement is indicative of a hard lurch of up to five degrees. It is also worth noting that Woolner does not describe such movements in his inquiry testimony, nor in the majority of his press accounts, so it must not have been dramatic.

Although for the purposes of this discussion, we will treat this account by Woolner as authentic, we believe that it is worth mentioning that between 1) this variance between this account and his others, 2) the incorrect reference to "portholes" on A Deck, and 3) the generally dramatic tone of the quote, this specific account does not seem as reliable as his other statements.

We should also note that the very specific 9-foot gap that Woolner referred to elsewhere is now increased to 10 feet in this account. Interestingly, in one of his accounts, Björnström-Steffansson related that Collapsible D was then only "a few feet away" – not Woolner's 9-10 feet.⁵³⁹ In another account, Björnström-Steffansson stated that as Collapsible D was lowering and "came nearly opposite of us," that Woolner and he saw it "swinging in and out slowly, we jumped and fortunately landed in it."⁵⁴⁰ In a 1912 letter to his brother Sigge, written from the Hotel Gotham, Steffansson claimed, "I saw the canvas raft 20 feet from the *Titanic*" – which is assuredly an exaggeration! These variations reinforce the need for *great caution* in basing extraordinary mathematical calculations of list and trim based on a very limited number of survivors' widely varying *estimates* of distances.

Meanwhile, Jane Hoyt was then *in* Collapsible D, lowering past them. She recalled:

There were ... about eighteen of us all in the canvas craft which could not sink but could be easily turned turtle. Seamen started to lower us but the boat suddenly gave a heavy list and the men left us hanging suspended from the air and ran to the upper

⁵³⁸ *Omaha Evening Bee*, May 15, 1912.

⁵³⁹ *Paper Trade Journal*, April 25, 1912.

⁵⁴⁰ *New York Herald*, April 19, 1912.

side so as to save themselves. Finally one or two men came back and completed the task of lowering us to the water.⁵⁴¹

Assuming that Mrs. Hoyt is here referring to a motion of *Titanic* itself, and not of her lifeboat – recall that in this account she had *just* pointed out that she had feared that their canvas craft might “tip over” – then some sort of motion of *Titanic* would seem to align with Woolner’s newspaper account about the ship “rocking a little”. However, neither of these accounts gives the impression of a dramatic motion of the ship on the order of rolling from 10° up to 15°! Indeed, even a small “rocking” by *Titanic* would have caused a perceptible resulting motion of Collapsible D, then swinging from the falls like a pendulum, that could have made it feel greater than the rocking motion actually was. Recall that Björnström-Steffansson stated that Collapsible D was “swinging in and out slowly,” as it lowered.

Meanwhile, we can find no statements by anyone in Collapsible C – which was then fighting its way down the starboard side of the ship against a definite, but not extreme, list – of a lurch of from 10° up to 15° at this point. Such a *Lusitania*-esque maneuver would have smashed their canvas-sided craft up against the steel hull of the ship with great drama. Indeed, when *Lusitania* sank, virtually every lifeboat launched on the port side failed to reach the water safely, with a list of 15°, due to dragging along the hull, flipping over, breaking up, etc.

Neither was the time when Collapsible D was lowering away the actual *starting* point for when the list to port was being recognized. As discussed earlier in the paper, a port list was first noted during the lowering of the aft boats. Prior to Collapsible D’s being lowered from the deck, Colonel Gracie – then on the port side of the Boat Deck – had felt the list increasing. He had heard shouted orders from Second Officer Lightoller, who was repeating an order from Chief Officer Wilde, that everyone should proceed to the starboard side to help ease the list up.⁵⁴² Recalling this moment, Lightoller later told Colonel Gracie:

Half an hour, or three quarters of an hour before I left the ship, when it was taking a heavy list – *not a heavy list* [authors’ emphasis] – a list over to port, the order was called, I think by the chief officer, “Everyone on the starboard side to straighten her up,” which I repeated.⁵⁴³

⁵⁴¹ *The Evening Recorder and Daily Democrat*, April 23, 1912.

⁵⁴² There is some question as to whether these orders were issued in the hopes of actually righting the ship, or whether it was to get the crowd of men in the area away from Collapsible D while it was loading, thus preventing a rush.

⁵⁴³ Gracie, Archibald, *The Truth About the Titanic*, Chapter 4, 1913.

When Gracie and his friend Clinch Smith complied with this order, however, they found First Class passengers Caroline Brown and Edith Evans on the *starboard* side of the deck; they still had time to rush these ladies back over to the port side in time for them to board Collapsible D with Jane Hoyt. So the moment Jane Hoyt referred to during the lowering of Collapsible D was *not* the beginning of some dramatic motion. Nor was it dramatic to anyone but her: Gracie did not mention any sort of alleged ‘lurch’ at this point. Nor can we find statements of such a dramatic lurch at this point, or indeed at any other point, by Lightoller or anyone else who was then on board.

Worse yet for proponents of this “lurch” from 10° up to 15° during the lowering of Collapsible D, the timing doesn’t work. It would have taken place *before* Woolner and Björnström-Steffansson jumped into Collapsible D – and we have just seen that there was no way that the list was as much as 15° at the time that they jumped aboard, as has been claimed recently. Indeed, our current animation shows that the geometry of their jump into Boat D – even at Woolner’s greater 9-10 foot estimate, higher than Björnström-Steffansson’s “few feet” – could be matched through a list of as little as 8-9° to port. This was *after* Jane Hoyt’s “suddenly gave a heavy list” moment, which probably felt more dramatic to her than it actually was, and the nearly simultaneous little bit of “rocking” reported by Woolner in another of his accounts.

Regarding the claim that Saloon Steward Edward Brown’s testimony supports a lurch at about this point, we see no such evidence in any of his statements that supports this claim. Brown did state that after that point, after they got Collapsible A down from the roof of the Officer’s Quarters, they attempted to push it across the deck to the davits. Specifically, he testified that “we got it about halfway and then the ship got a list to port,” and that “the ship took a list to port, and we could not get it up the incline right up to the davits.”⁵⁴⁴ However, this does not support a sudden lurch when it can be established that a developing port list was already present at the aft boats, and that it steadily grew during the launch of Collapsibles C and D, lowered minutes prior. Nothing Brown says indicates a sudden lurch, and in fact, a 10° list by itself would make it very difficult to push Collapsible A uphill to the davits. When asked whether they could have launched Collapsible A despite the list, if the falls had been hooked up properly, Brown stated: “It would have been a little difficult, but I think we could have managed it.”⁵⁴⁵ It is hard to imagine that he would have responded that way, if there had been a massive 15° incline they had to surmount.

Nor can we find anywhere that the varying statements of First Class Passenger Robert Williams Daniel support the notion that *Titanic* lurched suddenly from 10° over to 15° at this point. Brandon Whited, who has extensively researched Daniel’s escape, noted that it appears he actually headed to-

⁵⁴⁴ Br. 10530.

⁵⁴⁵ Br. 10647.

wards the stern after Boat No. 4 lowered. Indeed, Daniel's accounts are rather contradictory, and contain many varying, and indeed, far-fetched statements. In fact, when he was asked by reporters "what happened to you," Daniel responded: "Oh, I can't tell you what happened. I hardly know myself."⁵⁴⁶ Daniel may have been drinking during the sinking, and thereafter, possibly suffered from hypothermia. He appears to have been seen by First Class passenger Jack Thayer, who witnessed him come on deck when the last two boats were loading, with a full bottle of Gordon Gin, which he subsequently "practically drained."⁵⁴⁷ Daniel was later seen on the stern by Trimmer Patrick Dillon, after the stern settled back, following the breakup.⁵⁴⁸ As such, he was likely not in a position to accurately describe any alleged sudden lurch to port in connection with the work at Collapsible A, as has been claimed.

Instead, the preponderance of evidence, taken from multiple eyewitnesses who were aboard *Titanic* late in the disaster, is that the port list was steadily increasing before Boat D started to fill. It was becoming pronounced, but not through a sudden lurch; Lightoller recalled that it was "not a heavy list" at that point. By the time Woolner and Björnström-Steffansson were jumping into D – *after* the "rocking" motion Woolner described, and Mrs. Hoyt's sudden "heavy list" – it seems that *Titanic's* port list was about 8-9°, and certainly no more than 10°. The list continued to increase from there through the attempted launching of Collapsibles A and B. Boat B landed on the Boat Deck in the water, while the well-documented, steadily increasing list hampered efforts to get Boat A "up" to the davits.

By the time the ship was about to take her 'slight but definite plunge' that swamped the Bridge at about 2:15 a.m., Jack Thayer recalled:

The list to port had been *growing greater all the time* [authors' emphasis]. ... About this time she straightened up on an even keel and started to go down fairly fast ...⁵⁴⁹

And:

There was an awful crowd around the last boat on the forward part of the starboard side, pushing and shoving wildly. ... *There was such a big list to port that it seemed as if she would turn over on her side as she sank ... In a few minutes she straightened up on an even*

⁵⁴⁶ *The Cleveland Leader*, April 19, 1912.

⁵⁴⁷ Thayer, Jack, *The Sinking of the S.S. Titanic*, April 14-15, 1912, 1940. Thayer doesn't identify Daniel by name, but the identification is obvious, based on the details given.

⁵⁴⁸ *Daily Mail*, May 13, 1912.

⁵⁴⁹ Thayer, Jack, 1912 statement.

keel. [authors' emphasis] We hurried back and stood by the rail about even with the second funnel.⁵⁵⁰

Thayer's recollections harmonize with those of others: the port side list was increasing steadily over time – possibly with some minor “rocking” or movements that affected the lowering of Collapsible D. However, the ship's list built *gradually* until about the moment that the Bridge was swamped and the final plunge began. All of this demonstrates the need to take into account the full context of the situation reported by eyewitnesses before trying to ‘plug in’ specific factoids that are turned up in a vacuum with no reference point in an attempt to create some new and exciting ‘vision’ of how events played out.

⁵⁵⁰ Thayer, Jack, 1912 letter to Judge Long.

SECTION 5:

The lifeboat davits in the wreck

In revisions to our existing lifeboat article online, we added a section pertaining to the position of the lifeboat davit arms on *Titanic's* wreck and in the debris field; to our surprise, the subject stirred up controversy and baseless attacks on our research quality, standards, and methodology from some people that we have worked closely with for years. Why did this subject stir things up so badly? What does it really mean? And how did all of this come about?

For starters, very few of the davit arms or bases remain in situ on the ship itself, with the majority having been ripped or torn away during the sinking. Furthermore, for many years detailed wreck data is difficult to come by, even for researchers and historians such as ourselves. For this reason, we have always listened carefully when anyone with a thorough knowledge of the wreck has spoken about their observations. Prior to our 2022 anniversary livestream, a nearly off-hand remark was made in private conversation by an expert on the wreck about not all of the davits at the wreck site being at the same angle. This was subsequently brought up and discussed during the livestream itself with that year's panel participants. The observation was that a very real question had been raised as to whether the lifeboats were all swung out *fully* when lowered during the sinking, or if it was possible that the crew was compensating somewhat for angles of list as they swung the boats out, to help keep the boats closer to the edge of the ship at certain points.

We felt that this observation could help to explain some of the odd reports of angles of list and trim, and presented it as a *possible* explanation for some of the unusual observations about how close or far the edge of a lifeboat was from the edge of the deck. As was stated in revisions to our existing lifeboat launch sequence article, made in December 2022:

Another factor may well have contributed to #6 hanging slightly against the *Titanic's* hull as it lowered, while #8 appears not to have, even if #8 lowered first. This factor is how far the lifeboat davits were cranked out at those specific boats. The Welin davits could be fully cranked out, or only partially, depending on how the crewmen lowering the boats positioned them. If *Titanic* had a 0 degree list, with the davit arms cranked fully out, the lifeboats would hang straight down, with a gap of a little over a foot between the edge of the Boat Deck and the side of the lifeboat. However, the gap would

be smaller, if the davits were not fully swung out. When you factor in a list to starboard or port, obviously the degree to which the davits arms were swung out could impact how far each individual lifeboat hung against, or away from, *Titanic's* hull.⁵⁵¹


During our review of survivor accounts following Halpern's new conclusions, we found several accounts, included in this article, which suggest that there was indeed a starboard list reported just before, and/or during the loading of both Boat Nos. 8 and 6; in short, these accounts render Halpern's conclusion that reports of the list indicated No. 6 left ahead of No. 8 moot. These discoveries do not mean that the angle of the davit arms is unimportant or couldn't have impacted the lowering of the boats; however, the angle of davit arms at the wreck is certainly not a big factor in determining when Nos. 8 and 6 departed in relation to each-other, regardless.

However, the point we raised – which originated from an expert on the wreck's condition, and has since been privately confirmed to us by others who have studied the wreck – still could have some bearing on the lifeboat launch sequence and timeline of the sinking. How? If the lifeboat davits at the wreck site do show evidence that they were swung out to different degrees, then it would show that the crew, either through inexperience with the Welin davits (the majority of the ABs had experience on these type of davits, particularly those who served aboard RMS *Cedric* or RMS *Olympic*, which had Welin davits, but as the sinking progressed, a shortage of ABs resulted in other crewmembers such as

⁵⁵¹ <https://wormstedt.com/Titanic/lifeboats/lifeboats.htm>

Right: This plan view shows how Welin Quadrant Davits worked. The question of whether *every* set of Welin davits was *fully* extended during the disaster was a question raised by a panel guest during our 2022 livestream after observing davits at the wreck site being slightly out of alignment with each other. We subsequently suggested that this observation *might* explain variations in observed gaps between boats and deck edges, and the subject has become an ugly controversy ever since. (Authors' Collection.)

QUADRANT DAVIT FOR DOUBLE-BANKED BOATS.
CONSTRUCTED BY THE WELIN QUADRANT DAVIT, LONDON.



stewards, playing a larger role in the lowering of the lifeboats), or through deliberate action, had not fully swung out every lifeboat. For example, if one lifeboat reportedly scraped along the ship's side as it lowered, while the neighboring lifeboat did not, it could be attributed to the first boat not having its davit arm fully cranked out, while the second boat did have it fully cranked out. That, by itself, would be an interesting factoid regarding the evacuation, if nothing else.

In all truth, the davit arm angles may not have any bearing whatsoever on the order in which the boats left, or indeed, the actual degree of list that *Titanic* had at the time. For example, if a lifeboat was not swung out completely because of a list, but there was a period of time between the swinging out and the filling and/or launch of that boat, the situation with the ship's list could have changed in the intervening period, thus altering our perception of any reports of gaps between the edge of the Boat Deck, a bulwark rail, the Promenade Deck, or the ship's hull and a lifeboat. Indeed, in his lifeboat article, Halpern concluded that a lifeboat launched on the port side would not contact the side of the hull if the starboard list was 2° or less at the time, and the davits were fully swung out. Presumably, if the davits were not fully swung out, then that would have a direct bearing on whether the said lifeboat rubbed against the hull, but again, a host of factors could be involved.

While evidence of a list in either direction can help place the order of lifeboats in the timeline to a certain extent, that data – which is *very subjective*, open to eyewitness perceptions and mistaken recollections, and so forth – certainly cannot be used in isolation, or flawed conclusions will be the result. If the data is skewed, it will yield inaccurate conclusions. This is particularly true at lifeboats where only a very small number of survivors mentioned a list, such as just two occupants out of the 23 aboard Boat No. 6 when it lowered, mentioning it scraping along the ship's side. Instead, it is more important to take reports of list and trim together with the eyewitness statements on related events, movement of the officers, crew members and passengers between various areas and lifeboats, and with the overall sequence of events.

While no eyewitness accounts have yet been found that specifically discuss whether the davits were swung out fully or not, Second Class passenger Imanita Shelley's affidavit, filed in the American Inquiry, includes the following statement:

...Mrs. Shelley made for the davits where the boat hung. It was *found impossible to swing the davits in* [authors' emphasis], which left a space of between 4 and 5 feet between the edge of the deck and the suspended boat.⁵⁵²

As stated previously in this article, there is debate regarding which lifeboat Shelley was rescued in,

⁵⁵² Am. 1147.

although it was certainly one of the aft-port boats (likely No. 12 or No. 10), where a list to port was present.⁵⁵³ It is uncertain whether Shelley's statement indicates an actual failed attempt to crank the davits at her boat back inward, in order to lessen the gap between it and the side of *Titanic's* Boat Deck; however, such an interpretation of these words would certainly fit consistently with the picture that we have painted of an increasing list to port as those two boats were prepared, swung out, loaded, and lowered.

Despite a lack of definitive eyewitness evidence, we can at least conclude that the listing of the ship was something the officers were concerned about, and were trying to compensate for during the sinking. One example is Second Officer Lightoller having Boat No. 4 tied off to the coaling wire that ran underneath A Deck early in the sinking, "in case the ship got a slight list or anything."⁵⁵⁴ It is also possible that some of the officers ordered the davit arms to be swung out to a certain angle, intentionally compensating for any starboard or port list that was present at the time; Shelley's account may go a step further, suggesting attempts to bring davit arms *back in* which had originally been extended fully, in order to help reduce the gap at certain locations. At this point, we simply can't say with any certainty based on eyewitness accounts.

In our lifeboat article revisions, we noted that the worm gear was unlikely to move or fail during the sinking, even with the trauma of the davits being torn off the Boat Deck, hit by debris and crashing to the sea floor. We therefore concluded that the davit arms, if still connected, would be at the degree of angle that they were sitting at when they were last used, after the crew had swung them out on the night of the sinking. To illustrate this point, we included an artistic representation of a cluster of Welin davits in the debris field, which seemed to show the davit arms all swung out to different degrees, even on the arms for neighboring lifeboats sharing a common frame using the same davit base.

In his lifeboat articles, Halpern dismissed these conclusions, based on feedback from Ioannis Georgiou, which he accepted without question, since it sides with his conclusions. However, prior to this, Halpern had stated the following in comments to Bill Wormstedt and Tad Fitch on June 13, 2022:

... I do agree that many of the davits were not completely cranked out fully. If they were, there would have been a lot of problems loading the first set of boats especially on the stbd fore side. On the aft stbd side, because they loaded 11-15 from A deck, the ship had to be listing slightly to port, otherwise a gap from A deck would have been even wider than at the boat deck.

⁵⁵³ https://wormstedt.com/Lifeboat_Project/Shelley_Parrish.html

⁵⁵⁴ Br. 13834; 13937-13938.

Evidently, Halpern’s concerns about there having been “a lot of problems” if the davits had been swung out fully at the forward starboard boats have subsequently evaporated. Georgiou subsequently released a detailed article, which included a direct swipe at our referencing information that had been shared with us by leading wreck experts, and offering it as a mere *possible explanation* for certain things that otherwise might seem inexplicable. He wrote:

Taking all the evidence together, what was stated about davits being swung out to different degrees in the W-F-B timeline article is simply NOT true. What the available evidence does indicate is that almost all of the davits that were photographed at the wreck had been fully swung out except those for boat stations No. 1 and 2, which were used to launch the collapsible boats as well as the wooden emergency cutter boats.

What evidence did Georgiou use to reach these conclusions? The evidence can be summarized as follows:

- For a lifeboat davit to be fully swung out, the screw block, connected to the hub, would have to be located at the outboard end of the worm gear, on the davit frame.
- For dislodged davits, the position of the hub on the worm gear in the upper part of the davit frame would determine the extent to which a given davit arm was originally swung out, not necessarily the angle of the davit and quadrant arm as they lay on the wreck or in the debris field currently.
- The davit arms and quadrant “can easily rotate if the frame was stripped off the deck during the sinking.”
- If the teeth on the bottom of the quadrant were knocked free from the teeth on the bottom of the davit frame, then the davit arm could swing to different angles inward or outward, regardless of where the screw block and hub were positioned.

Georgiou then utilized an analysis of a variety of wreck imagery – much of it of very low resolution and detail – from a variety of sources. These included imagery from, but not limited to, the following sources: RMS *Titanic*, Inc., NOAA, *Ghosts of the Abyss*, screen captures from an expedition released by *The Telegraph*, etc., to conclude the following:

Of the 8 single-ended and 12 double-ended davits, we know the whereabouts of 13 of them. Seven seem to be missing and might be buried under other debris. Aside from

boat Station No. 1, only one pair (in total 2 arms) in the cluster of davits appears not to be in a fully swung-out position. Both of these were from the forward starboard side. This might be a result of the trauma that they received, as close-up pictures show that they are severely damaged. Of the other double-ended davits at the stern, two have one arm showing at a different angle. These two sets were also ripped off from their original position and might have also struck other objects when hitting their final resting place.


The way that this is written is absolutely astounding. In this article, Georgiou himself notes that there are davit arms at the wreck site that are not at the same angle as other davits. Yet in spite of the fact that he does not present clear images, or evidence that the hub was at the end of the worm gear, he conveniently downplays the potential significance of the differences in angle.

For example, Georgiou notes the presence of a davit base and arms, a few decks below and forward of the collapsed Mainmast on the stern section of the wreck.⁵⁵⁵ Georgiou acknowledges that “even though it seems the davit arms are not in the same position,” but is quick to add that “the position of the Quadrant hubs on the frame in Image 9 shows they are in a fully swung-out position.” In fact, the low-resolution NOAA image that he cites only shows one of the hubs, due to the davit frame coming to rest on its side, obscuring the second hub. The quadrant that is visible on the top of the frame clearly still has its teeth aligned with the teeth at the bottom of the frame. Also, even a cursory glance at the davits yields definitive proof that they are *not* at the same angle; not, as Georgiou claims, that it only “seems” that they aren’t.

Another example pertains to the cluster of lifeboat davits mentioned earlier. Georgiou states the following about this cluster:


One picture, Image 11, which is called a cluster of davits, shows a pile of partly damaged davits. This pile is the missing set from the forward starboard side. The pile contains not only the aft end of boat station No. 1 but also the ripped-off arm of the aft end of boat station No. 7, which is still attached to the deck. Aside from davit No. 1, the others show to be swung out. Only one of them is not in the same angle as the others, which most likely is a result of the trauma from being ripped off the boat deck and landing on the seabed. The damage is quite visible on the very top one, where the Quadrant is now going over the frame.

⁵⁵⁵ We will not reproduce the images from the article here, as some of them seem to fall into the category of proprietary data / copyright material.





This spread: These four stills show the pair of davits sitting on the port side, just behind the remains of the Bridge. Seen from multiple angles, there can be no question that these davits were not cranked out to precisely the same angle. (NOAA)





This spread: These stills show two different sets of davits at the wreck site. The set seen opposite top is on the stern section, while the set seen opposite bottom and on this page is on the port side Boat Deck, just aft of the Bridge. Yellow lines have been added to help illustrate the clear differences in the angles of the davit arms. This is but a small sampling of imagery that shows why observers who have studied the wreck have pointed out to us that the davit arms are definitely in different positions. Sadly, pointing this detail out as a *possible* explanation of why observed gaps between the deck edge and lifeboats may have varied during the evacuation – beyond the list of the ship itself – has turned into a storm of controversy from those who would use reports of such gaps to calculate a differing list scenario, and to create an entirely different lifeboat launch timeline that is not supported by the larger body of eyewitness evidence. (NOAA)



In the conclusion to his article on the davits at the wreck, however, Georgiou contradicts the above statement, summing things up by saying that “only one pair (in total 2 arms) in the cluster of davits appears not to be in a fully swung-out position.”

Anyone who looks at this image can plainly see that almost none of the davits in this cluster are presently at the same angle. The question of why they are currently in that position – in other words, is it because of the position of the hub, set by the crew, or is it because of damage sustained during the sinking – is a different matter. However, clearly, using the images contained in his own article, the claim that “only one of them is not in the same angle as the others,” or “only one pair,” is inaccurate. Without clear images of where the hub is on all of the worm gear, Georgiou cannot draw such definitive conclusions.

The short of it is this: some of the davits in the “davit pile” are clearly damaged. One is definitely off its track, and some of the davit arms in the cluster were wrenched off the frame and base completely. This davit pile, then, is not entirely useful for obtaining *any* data about what angle the davits were originally swung out to. Georgiou acknowledges that another double-ended davit, located near the port side of the stern section, close to one of the dislodged cargo cranes, has two davit arms that are currently at different angles. However, he again attributes this to damage, stating that the quadrant is over the frame. If his contention is accurate, this also means that without being able to see the position of the hub on the worm gear, he cannot attribute the present angle of the davit arms to damage during the sinking, rather than to the actions of the crew manning the davits during the evacuation.

However, other pairs of davits located around the wreck site are clearly sitting at differing angles, while the davits are still in place on their worm gears and in their frames; while Georgiou and Halpern like to point out that these are damaged, and thus prove nothing, the visual records we have available to us do not make such a clear-cut conclusion justifiable. If any of these pairs of davit arms are still attached to their bases, and undamaged, it all but *proves* that during the lowering, not every davit was fully extended.

A good example of this is the pair of davits still attached to their base on the port side of the *Titanic's* Boat Deck, near the collapsed wall of the Officers' Quarters and close to the Bridge. Despite the base being dislodged and moved from its original position, the davits appear to remain in their track on their bottom edge of the base. The angle of the top davit arm and the position of its hub suggest it is fully swung out. In contrast, the lower davit arm is at a slightly different angle. Although the hub of the lower davit is not visible, it's clear that the two arms are not swung out to the same extent.

In the end, one must ask, do Georgiou's sweeping claims and statements that the davits in the wreck are not swung out to different degrees hold up to scrutiny? The answer is no. Before examin-

ing the specifics of why Georgiou is mistaken, it is necessary to examine a few of the technical details of Welin davits:

- First, given the robust nature of the davits' bases and arms, a failure or movement of the hub along the worm gear would be unlikely to occur, despite the trauma of the sinking. Therefore, where the hub is along the worm gear, as the davits came to rest on the seafloor, would give indication of the position of the corresponding davit arm when the lifeboat at that location was lowered.
- The davit arms would flex when the weight of a fully-loaded lifeboat was lowered, and were designed to do so. However, it would be possible for a davit arm to give way, if the angle of forward trim became too steep, with the weight of a fully-loaded and suspended lifeboat placed on the davits. In an instance such as this, the torsion within the davit and outrigger arm could cause a failure. Thankfully, this did not occur during the evacuation.
- Only 1-2 teeth at the bottom of the davit arms fully contacted the gear at the base of the davit at any given time. This is a natural failure point, when forces beyond design tolerances were placed on the davits during the break-up and plunge to the ocean floor. This appears to be where most of the visible failures occurred. However, there are some davits where the gear teeth at the bottom of the davit arm and the davit base are clearly still in place, despite trauma to the davit arm itself, so not all of the davits were damaged in this way.

At the end of the day, the issue of whether the lifeboat davits were swung out fully at every lifeboat is *just one detail* in the overall story of the sinking. Ironically, what has been shown on the wreck – namely that some of the davit arms are sitting at different angles – confirms what our colleague originally pointed out to us privately, and which another colleague with expertise in the matter discussed with us during our livestream. The basic statement was correct, and it was fair for us to point this detail out in our subsequent lifeboat article revisions; there was no attempt at deception or weighing the evidence one way or another, as our former colleagues have so publicly, unprofessionally, and incorrectly charged. Instead, we were merely pointing out informed observations of a detail at the wreck site that *could*, if accurate, help to explain some of the variances of survivor recollections about distances between the gunwale of the lifeboat they boarded and the edge of the deck.

Yet – and this is vital – the specifics about the davit arm angles observed at the wreck site are only one piece of the puzzle – indeed, a minor one compared to the body of evidence, as a whole, that we have presented about the lifeboat launch sequence. The details on this subject would not fundamen-

tally change our understanding of the lifeboat launch sequence or timeline, regardless of what they show.

However, the present authors feel that it is important to strive to reach objective conclusions regarding the forensic details of the wreck, and how those could potentially shed greater light on the actions of the crew, and sequence of events during the sinking. As such, what is required is a detailed and thorough forensic analysis of all of the davit arms on the wreck itself and in the debris field, using high-definition imagery and analysis, before any definitive statements about the angle of the arms at each boat is made. This is something that has not yet been completed, but the present authors feel such an undertaking would be an important one. We encourage this, regardless of what the results of such an analysis show.

FINAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND REVISIONS TO OUR PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to what Halpern has accused the present authors of, we have never set ourselves up as the final arbiters of what happened during *Titanic's* sinking, much less regarding the lifeboat timeline. In fact, as can be seen in our existing lifeboat article, originally written by Bill Wormstedt, Tad Fitch, and George Behe, still available on Bill Wormstedt's website, we have made additions and revisions to our original findings throughout the entire time that it has been available to the public – some 25 and more years. To date, these updates have not been major revisions to our conclusions, but rather adjustments based on new information. We have always remained open to revising our conclusions if *compelling* evidence arises. However, as discussed in this paper, we do not believe that Halpern's evidence and reasoning meet the required standard of proof.

Halpern's critique of our lifeboat timeline and his own conclusions have forced us to revisit the evidence regarding the lifeboat launch sequence objectively, and with fresh eyes. For this, we thank him, because, by poring over the accounts and details anew, two things happened. First, we were able to validate the bulk of our original findings; secondly, we also found areas where our original conclusions needed to be updated. Remarkably, we were able to make the following revisions:

Regarding the launch times of the starboard-aft lifeboats, Nos. 9-15: Originally, to the nearest five-minute mark, we identified the lowering times of Boats Nos. 9-15 as:

- No. 9: 1:30
- No. 11: 1:35
- No. 13: 1:40
- No. 15: 1:41 (or about 30 seconds after No. 13, as recalled by eyewitnesses)

Looking at things again, we believe that an approximate 11-minute gap between the lowering of No. 9 – the first of these boats to lower – and the lowering of No. 15 – the last of them to lower – is *slightly* too large. This is especially the case since that 11-minute gap *could* be interpreted as a larger gap, if the 'nearest five-minute mark' rounding was spread to its maximum available distance, i.e., 1:28 for No. 9, and 1:42-43 for No. 15, or up to 15 minutes.

Therefore, after further examination, we believe that Boat No. 9 must have launched slightly later than 1:30 a.m., perhaps as late as 1:32 a.m. While this still falls inside the range of our original estimate of 1:30 a.m. “to the nearest five-minute mark”, we feel that with these four boats clearly going down in such rapid succession, one after the other, the “nearest five-minute mark” no longer seems adequate here.

We believe that our original launch time for No. 11, about 1:35 a.m., still seems right, given all of the Boat No. 11 survivor statements and estimates that land right at or around that time, and this time then helps to serve as an anchor point for this quartet of boats. However, we also feel that the launch times for Nos. 13 and 15 were not as late as 1:40 and 1:41, respectively. Since No. 13 started down before No. 11 had reached the water, with No. 15 following only about 30 seconds behind, we feel that No. 13 should be moved up to about 1:37 a.m., and No. 15 to about 1:38 a.m. Again, this is only a *slight* adjustment to our earlier times, but it is clearly necessary to tighten up the timing between these four boats.

Furthermore, we feel that if First Officer Murdoch left the scene at Nos. 13 and 15 at about the time that Boat No. 11 started lowering, around 1:35 a.m., this would have given him plenty of time to cross to the port side, and to begin work at Boat No. 10. Remember that when he arrived at No. 10, the boat had not yet been swung out or lowered to the edge of the deck; Able Bodied Seaman Evans, just arriving from lowering No. 12, was very specific on this point.⁵⁵⁶ This would give approximately 15 minutes from the time of Murdoch’s arrival at No. 10 to the point when we feel that it lowered away, at 1:50 a.m. (again, to the nearest five-minute mark). This is right around the timelines suggested by the physical experiments made by James Cameron (five minutes to swing out and lower, and about 10 minutes to load, for a total of 15 minutes).

Indeed, we feel that by this point in the sinking, there is reason to believe that this process might have gone slightly more quickly for No. 10: Why? 1) The crew had swung out and loaded *many* lifeboats by this point, and it is likely that as they gained experience, they grew quicker with the work of swinging out and lowering to the deck’s edge, and 2) by this point in the sinking, people were far more willing to board the lifeboats than they had been earlier in the disaster. We feel that 15 minutes is well within the guidelines suggested by the physical experiments, considering these two factors, and does not push the lowering of No. 10 any later than 1:50 a.m.

Regarding Sixth Officer Moody’s movements: Sixth Officer Moody’s movements during the disaster have always been a rather spotty subject; however, the more we looked at accounts during this work, the more we began to be able to identify Moody’s movements. After working to lower Boat

⁵⁵⁶ Am. 675-676.

No. 16, Moody clearly became involved in the work to bring passengers to No. 9, saving May Futrelle in the process. He subsequently seems to have assisted at the aft starboard boats. But what did he do between the launch of those lifeboats and the efforts around the forward starboard collapsibles?

Even here, there was even a revelation, of sorts. Second Class passenger Nora Keane, who departed in Boat No. 10, left an account in which a heartbreaking detail came to our attention. She said:

First an officer and two men were put in it. The officer [possibly Moody] was then ordered out and two men, both green hands, were put in. Later one of these was ordered out. This left one man, a stoker, whom we believed was drunk.

‘What will we do if you leave us?’ we asked the officer when he left the boat.

‘I’ll return,’ he answered; but he never came back.⁵⁵⁷

If Keane was correct, then this officer who was put into the boat and then subsequently ordered back out of it may just have been Sixth Officer Moody. If so, this would have marked the *second* opportunity – at least – where Moody had nearly gotten into a lifeboat, but at the last second either chose to stay with the ship, or in this case may have been ordered back on the deck. This is but one example of how much more we have learned about personnel and passenger movements during the disaster because of our in-depth analysis of the subject, coming back to it with fresh eyes after many years.

New conclusions regarding the movements of certain other personnel: Based on our in-depth analysis of eyewitness accounts regarding every lifeboat which left the ship, preparatory to compiling this article, we were able to identify specific sightings of certain officers at a variety of boats. Some of these were new to us.⁵⁵⁸

- **Captain Smith:** In addition to our original lifeboat article documenting that the Captain had assisted at Boats Nos. 8, 6, and 2, it came to our attention that Captain Smith was also seen at some point during the loading/lowering of Boats Nos. 1, 14, 12, 11, 15, and 4.

⁵⁵⁷ *Harrisburg Patriot*, April 23, 1912. Courtesy Mike Poirier.

⁵⁵⁸ *The Triumvirate: Captain Edward J. Smith, Bruce Ismay, Thomas Andrews and the Sinking of Titanic*, by George Behe, (The History Press, 2024). We highly recommend Behe’s book, where he found numerous new accounts, revealing new information about Captain Smith and Bruce Ismay’s involvement in assisting at the lifeboats during the evacuation. Both were even more involved than concluded previously.

- **First Officer Murdoch:** In addition to our original conclusions that Murdoch was present at lifeboat Nos. 7, 5, 3, 1, 11, 13, 15, 10, Collapsible C, and Collapsible A, it came to our attention that First Officer Murdoch was seen at Boat No. 14 at least briefly.
- **Bruce Ismay:** It has come to our attention that Bruce Ismay was seen at the following lifeboats: 7, 5, 3 (where he stayed well after No. 3 lowered, until No. 1 was lowering), 16 (on the port side, during the loading, but not up to the point of launch), 9, 11, 15, and 2. He subsequently assisted at, and departed, the ship in Collapsible C from the starboard side.
- **Boatswain Nichols:** Nichols was identified as being present at Boat No. 13 as well as Boat No. 2, a fact that will become important shortly.

The departure time of Boat No. 2: In our original article, we concluded that Boat No. 2 lowered away at 1:45 a.m. This conclusion was based on a number of factors, including the launch time of the last distress rocket. *Carpathia's* Second Officer James Bisset also recalled a conversation that Boxhall, who had left the ship in No. 2, had with Captain Rostron on *Carpathia's* Bridge immediately after being picked up. Bisset quoted Boxhall as saying:

There were sixteen boats and four collapsibles. Women and children were ordered into the boats. She struck the berg at 11.40. The boats were launched from 12.45 onwards. My boat cleared away at 1.45, one of the last to be lowered.⁵⁵⁹

This statement would seem rather definitive. However, there is more to the story that we have considered in recent years.

In 2021, while we were modeling the movements of Boat No. 2 from the time of its launch through the time *Titanic* sank, something became very apparent to us: if No. 2 had begun lowering at 1:45 a.m., then the following sequence must have taken place between then and 2:20 a.m.:

- No. 2 starts lowering away;
- Reached the water and cast off (there was reportedly some difficulty with this);
- Rowed out from the side of the ship slightly;
- Boxhall reportedly took a head count of how many were aboard;
- Boxhall received orders to row aft to an open gangway door to take others off;

⁵⁵⁹ *Tramps and Ladies: My Early Years in Steamers*, by Sir James Bisset, (Criterion Books, 1959.)

- No. 2 rowed aft, more or less along the port side of the ship, and made its way around the stern. Boxhall said that the propellers were coming clear, and that he ‘wasn’t quite sure’ that he didn’t go underneath them;
- No. 2 then needed to emerge from the starboard side of *Titanic*’s stern and draw out and/or forward enough for them to have seen the gangway door on the starboard side (in 1912, Boxhall said it was closed, but in a later interview he said that it was open, but that he dared not get too close);
- for No. 2 to then row away at an oblique angle from the starboard stern quarter of *Titanic* in an attempt to put some distance between them and the ship as she sank.

What we discovered when we attempted to put all of these events between 1:45 and 2:20 was that, in the words of one of our team working on the animation, “No. 2 would have needed an outboard motor to row that distance in time.” After watching these events play out in real time, we agreed that something was *very* wrong with the timing. For this reason, in our animations, we were forced to place the launch of Boat No. 2 *slightly* earlier, moving it to the 1:42-1:43 time frame, 2-3 minutes earlier. Only by deploying this, and every other possible hat trick that we could think of, did No. 2 have enough time – and barely, at that – to get to where it needed to be by the time the ship began its final plunge and sank.

Looking at Boxhall’s statement, as recalled by Bisset, something has come to our attention that seems to support this conclusion. Bisset quoted Boxhall as giving some very accurate times for the collision (11:40) and the launch of the first lifeboat (No. 7, which he is quoted as saying took place at 12:45, but which we had placed at 12:40). Boxhall also said: “My boat *cleared away* [authors’ emphasis] at 1.45”. Did the wording mean that the boat *began to lower away* from the deck at 1:45? Or that it *cleared the ship*, having reached the water and cast off the falls, at 1:45? This is an intriguing possibility, and one that would help to explain the insufficient time for everything that happened from the time No. 2 began lowering until the time *Titanic* sank to have taken place, if it only started down at 1:45 a.m.

After having performed practical tests in our animation, and after evaluating all of the evidence at hand, we have been forced to conclude that No. 2 did indeed begin lowering before 1:45 a.m. How much earlier? Not much. Why? Because we know that Captain Smith was seen at Boat No. 15 *and* at the loading of Boat No. 2, at opposite corners of the deck. We also know that Boatswain Nichols was at Boat No. 13 as well as No. 2. So No. 2 must have begun lowering after No. 13 began lowering at 1:37 a.m. For this reason, we again feel that our previous standard of assigning a lifeboat launch time “to the nearest five-minute mark” is too open-ended when it comes to Boat No. 2, and we have decided that the time that it *began lowering* should be moved up to about 1:42 a.m.

Interestingly, our previous conclusion that Nos. 13 and 15 needed to be slightly advanced earlier in the launch sequence also helps to open up room for both Captain Smith and Boatswain Nichols to reach No. 2 in time to be present there, even if No. 2's assigned launch time is moved slightly forward in order to allow it to accomplish everything that needed to happen before the ship sank at 2:20. Although this was not considered when the decision was made that Nos. 13 and 15 needed to be slightly advanced forward in the timeline, this side effect helps to demonstrate the need to make these minor adjustments to our previous findings. **(See table on opposite page.)**

The conclusion of the matter.

As we have seen, many of the findings in the 2023 lifeboat launch sequence/timing article by Sam Halpern are dubious or demonstrably incorrect. As pointed out in the introduction to this paper, Halpern agreed with our original findings in the following areas:

1. The launch time of the first boat to leave *Titanic*, No. 7, at 12:40 a.m.
2. The launch time of the first rocket fired from *Titanic*, 12:47 a.m.
3. The launch times of Boats Nos. 5, 3, and 1.

What Time Did the Steam Stop Blowing Off?

The steam likely stopped venting around 12:58 a.m., based on a narrow window of evidence. Jack Phillips confirmed steam was still venting at 12:55 a.m. when he told the *Carpathia* the noise was preventing him from hearing (see page 61). However, the roar had clearly silenced by 1:00 a.m., as witnesses to the lowering of Boat No. 8 reported no trouble hearing Captain Smith's orders to row toward the ship on the horizon (see page 60). Given that Harold Bride placed the Captain in the wireless cabin just before the 12:57 a.m. S.O.S. transmission, a cessation time of approximately 12:58 a.m. aligns perfectly with these accounts.

Launch Times Re-Examined - 2026 Version							
Times listed are the times we believe the lifeboat STARTED lowering							
Port Side				Starboard Side			
Time	Boat	Officer(s) In Charge of Loading*	List	Time	Boat	Officer(s) In Charge of Loading*	List
11:47	Steam starts blowing off						
12:40			S	12:40	7	Murdoch, Lowe	S
12:43			S	12:43	5	Murdoch, Pitman, Lowe	S
12:47	Rockets first fired						
12:50				12:50			
12:55			S	12:55	3	Murdoch, Lowe	S
12:58	Steam stops blowing off (see text box previous page)						
1:00	8	Smith, Wilde, Lightoller	S	1:00			S
1:05			S	1:05	1	Smith, Murdoch, Lowe (hung up, reached water at 1:15)	S
1:10	6	Smith, Lightoller (halted at C Deck until Peuchen climbed down, reached water at 1:20)	S	1:10			S
1:15				1:15			
1:20	16	Moody	nil.	1:20			nil.
1:25	14	Smith, Wilde, Murdoch, Lowe	P	1:25			P
1:30	12	Smith, Wilde, Lightoller	P				P
1:32			P	1:32	9	Murdoch, Moody	P
1:35			P	1:35	11	Smith, Murdoch, Moody (on A Deck)?	P
1:37			P	1:37	13	Murdoch, Moody (on A Deck)	P
1:38			P	1:38	15	Smith, Murdoch, Moody (on A Deck)	P
1:42	2	Wilde, Smith	P	1:45			P
1:52	Rockets cease firing						
1:50	10 4	Murdoch, Moody? Lightoller, Smith	P P	1:50			P
1:55				1:55			P
2:00			P	2:00	C	Wilde, Murdoch	P
2:05	D	Wilde, Lightoller	P	2:05			P
2:10				2:10			
2:15	B	Lightoller (Bridge goes under)		2:15	A	Murdoch, Moody (Bridge goes under)	
2:20				2:20			

* Indicates that the officers listed worked at the lifeboat in question at some point during the loading and lowering process. It does not indicate that they remained there throughout the loading and lowering process.

4. The launch time of Boat No. 16, 1:20 a.m.
5. The originally-assigned launch time of Boats Nos. 2 & 10, 1:45 and 1:50 a.m.
6. The launch time of the last rocket fired from *Titanic*, 1:52 a.m.
7. The launch times of Collapsibles C and D, and of the times that Collapsibles A & B floated off the deck

We have studied the areas where Halpern’s article disagreed with our previous findings, in these key areas:

1. The launch times and launch sequence for Boats Nos. 6 and 8;
2. The launch times for Boats Nos. 9, 11, 13, and 15;
3. The launch times and launch sequence for Boats Nos. 12 and 14;
4. The launch sequence relationship between Boat No. 9 on the starboard side and Boat No. 14 on the port side, a vital area of consideration;
5. The launch time of Boat No. 4.

Of these five key areas, we have demonstrated that each of his assertions is incorrect:

1. Boat No. 6 did not launch before Boat No. 8;
2. His launch time for Boats Nos. 9, 11, 13, and 15 are incorrect;
3. Boat No. 12 did not lower before Boat No. 14;
4. His assertions regarding the timing of the launches of Boats Nos. 9 and 14 are incorrect, as are his general conclusions on the timing of the aft port and aft starboard lifeboats, in relation to each other;
5. His reasoning on the launch time of Boat No. 4 is illogical.

Furthermore, we have seen how, by narrowing his focus from a broad-spectrum analysis taking as many disparate lines of evidence into account and seeing how these data points align, correlate, and support each other – which is our methodology – Halpern’s very approach is too narrow. By not considering or including vital factors that weigh on the subjects in question, and over-analyzing the data points he chose to use, he arrived at significantly flawed conclusions.

Furthermore, we have seen that he has been very selective in his use of evidence in creating his new timeline. While overstating the reliability of inquiry testimony and tending to downplay first-hand survivor accounts found outside the inquiries, he also is quite willing to use evidence from outside the inquiries when it aligns with his theories. Halpern and his cohorts were then very quick to

condemn our own methodology, and the quality of our work and research, in unprofessional public statements – even accusing us of setting ourselves up as the “final arbiters” of what happened during the disaster where we have disagreed with his analysis and conclusions.

Because of these factors, a complete re-analysis of our original evidence was needed. In the course of our re-analysis, far from simply trying to defend our earlier conclusions, we found a few key areas where our previous findings needed to be revised and/or augmented in light of additional evidence and analysis:

1. Our original launch times for Boats Nos. 9, 11, 13, and 15 allowed for too much of a gap in between each boat. The evidence clearly indicates that they launched much more closely together. We have thus moved our original launch times for these boats from 1:30 (No. 9), 1:35 (No. 11), 1:40 (No. 13) and 1:41 (No. 15) to 1:32 (No. 9), 1:35 (No. 11, unchanged), 1:37 (No. 13) and 1:38 (No. 15).
2. We have found evidence that after lowering Boat No. 16, Sixth Officer Moody became involved in efforts to help get passengers into Boat No. 9, including helping Mrs. Futrelle into that lifeboat before it lowered away at about 1:32 a.m. We have also found evidence that he may have come very close to surviving the disaster, apparently being ordered into Boat No. 10 before being ordered back out of it.
3. We have been able to add and augment our findings on specific boats where Captain Smith, First Officer Murdoch, Bruce Ismay and Boatswain Nichols were seen.
4. We have been able to conclude that a 1:45 a.m. launch time for Boat No. 2 is too late to allow for everything that the boat did from the moment of launch to the time *Titanic* sank. We have thus reassigned the launch time for No. 2 to 1:42 a.m.

Each of these conclusions has been drawn after very careful analysis. Even though these really are ‘tweaks’ to our original findings, rather than wholesale revisions, we feel that they are both warranted and vital to our understanding of the disaster. They have not been undertaken lightly. Our analysis is always based on the *preponderance of all available evidence*, rather than the biased interpretation of a narrow range of data points, or a whim, or to make splashy headlines. As always, we are open to revising our findings if, and only if, weighty evidence comes up in the future that dictates such decisions.

After having worked with Samuel Halpern, Ioannis Georgiou and Randy Bigham for many years, we are disappointed by the turn of events in the past three years. While historians and experts can, and often do, professionally disagree with each other about certain details, their public attempts to undermine respect for our own work, and even to undermine confidence in our approach and methodology in considering the historical record, is unwarranted and unbecoming of researchers whose past work is respected within the community.

In a true stroke of irony, these three primary prognosticators all have their own individual version of the lifeboat launch timeline, all of which are very different, and differ from each other in substantial ways. The very existence of these three disagreeing alternate chronologies means that all of them cannot be right, but they certainly all can be wrong. In fact, their biggest commonality appears to be that they disagree with us, rather than agreeing on a strong, singular, alternative theory.

After Halpern's lifeboat articles being published, the aforementioned moderator, who demonstrably has a personal issue with the present authors for unknown reasons, insisted on publicly calling the Halpern depiction of the lifeboat launch sequence and timing the first 'thoughtful' and careful analysis of the subject yet performed, amongst other negative personal comments. His critiques have typically been accompanied by public insults such as labeling the present authors as "writers more interested in promoting their books than in making those titles reflective of actual documented evidence." In fact, our original lifeboat timeline was published in 2001, over a decade before any of the books we've been involved with were published, or we even considered writing any books.

Sadly, any future real-time animations based on Halpern's conclusions on the lifeboat chronology will be filled with inaccuracies. As a result, audiences will be led to mistaken conclusions on the timeline that are presented as fact.

Despite the personal attacks and outright false statements made about our research methods by former colleagues, our work will continue to be unbiased and thoughtful. We have never, nor will we ever, set ourselves up as the 'final arbiter' of events that evening. We will revise our timelines and such when presented with convincing evidence to the contrary. We continue to try to convey the history of *Titanic* as accurately as possible, and we are grateful to every member of our team who helps us to do this. We are also grateful to those of you in the audience who took the time to read our paper and analysis, and we hope that you will continue to follow our work on the subject in the future.

Some may question why we engage in debates over what might seem like relatively minor details or minutiae, to the general public. However, as demonstrated in this article, the specifics within the lifeboat timeline have a surprisingly profound impact on our greater understanding of *Titanic's* sinking and the actions taken by many real individuals in their final hours. We hope this article contributes to a deeper comprehension—not just of *why someone else's interpretations may be flawed*, but of the tragic event that claimed the lives of 1,496 men, women, and children, and forever altered the lives of countless others.

As authors and researchers, we have met survivors and their descendants, and have witnessed firsthand how the repercussions of that fateful night, over 113 years ago, continue to affect families connected to the ship. Our goal is to present *the most accurate and thoughtful analysis of the historical record that we possibly can*, honoring the memory of all of those impacted by the *Titanic* disaster, and ensuring that the story is told truthfully and preserved as accurately as possible for future generations.

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Additionally, we must here give a special word of thanks to our team at HFX Studios. They helped us by creating our 2021 animation, and also the revised and improved rendition of that animation that was released in 2025: they are Tom Lynskey, Levi Rourke, and Alex Moeller. Their hard work and willingness to work with us to help understand events in three dimensions, and even see how various events played off of each other, has been a tool and asset that we could not have done without.

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If we have omitted your names, please advise us so that we may include you in future editions of this work. As always, any mistakes that we have made are ours, and ours alone. If any reader feels we have overlooked credible evidence in our research, we encourage you to reach out to us privately.

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