Gleicher's Commentary on the WBF Timeline
In his book, Gleicher makes a number of erroneous comments about the WBF 2001 timeline, which need to be addressed. This follows a pattern Gleicher has continued since, of inaccurately representing our findings, such as in a recent online discussion where he criticized us placing the launch time of #5 at 12:50-12:55 a.m., even though the present authors list the launch time of this boat around 12:45 a.m. in the article.
On page 129, discussing the launch time of #10, and whether it was the first of the aft port lifeboats to lower away, Gleicher states:
"Virtually the sole basis for the alternative ordering of Lifeboat 10 by Quinn and Wormstedt, et al., was the testimony of two ABs who entered Lifeboat 10 and were referred to in the testimony of Joughin: Edward Buley and Frank Evans. What each had to say before the American Inquiry has been incorrectly understood to mean that Lifeboat 10 was the last to be launched from the port side of the aft end."
Gleicher goes on to say the WBF interpretation of the evidence is incorrect, and then downplays Evans' and Buley's statements that "Chief Officer" Murdoch was at #10, and claims it was Wilde instead.
As shown above in the section labeled Lifeboat #10, we feel it is Gleicher himself who has the incorrect interpretation of their statements. Evans is very clear that he lowered #12 to the ocean AND THEN went to #10, where they had to get it ready to be lowered, before people could into it. We also addressed the issue of who the "Chief Officer" Evans and Buley saw at #10 was.
Gleicher must not have read the WBF article very carefully, as he claims that Evans and Buley are "Virtually the sole basis" that #10 was the last of the aft port boats to be launched. This statement is completely untrue. As discussed in the article, multiple passenger accounts from Emily Rugg, Nellie O'Dwyer, Ada Ball, Imanita Shelley, Gretchen Longley, Kornelia Andrews, and Mrs. John Hogeboom all indicate that #10 left last. Gleicher never acknowledges or discusses any of their accounts.
We also showed that Poingdestre did *not* say anything about #10, which is part of Gleicher's "proof" that #10 left first. Gleicher's failure to acknowledge the above-mentioned passenger accounts follows his admitted policy of ignoring all accounts that are not from the inquiries, or Beesley or Gracie's book. Being cautious and carefully examining evidence before accepting it is one thing, but ignoring evidence entirely is another. Without taking this sort of information into account, Gleicher's findings are inadequate and at-odds with many of the survivor statements.
On page 129 we read "But when one considers what each witness was actually 'saying', a broad misreading of the testimony becomes apparent". We agree with this statement 100%, although we feel it is Gleicher himself who is misreading the testimony.
One paragraph of Gleicher's text from page 159 must be quoted in total:
"Of course these revisions of the Mersey Commission departure schedule ("these revisions" refers to Gleicher's own revisions of their 1912 timeline) fly directly in the face of the counter-claims of Wormstedt, et al., and Quinn. The latter leaves an unaccounted gap from 1:20 to 2 AM between Wilde's arrival at the forward end and his launching of Collapsible C. There is no evidence of, or reason why, there should have been such a delay, and much evidence that, to the contrary, there was none. Moreover, the departure time of 2 to 2:05 AM for Collapsible C leaves the departure time of Lifeboat 1 in a muddle. We have established, largely based on the testimony of Boxhall, that Collapsible C was launched roughly thirty minutes after Lifeboat 1. Thus, a departure time of 2 AM for the former would imply that Lifeboat 1 was launched at 1:30. But from Lowe's own testimony, we know that he went to assist in the loading and launching of Lifeboat 14 after Lifeboat 1 was launched. This would mean then that Lifeboats 12, 14 and 16 were launched at roughly 1:45. Interestingly enough, these absurd outcomes of reasonable inference have not found their way into the departure times of Wormstedt, et al. or Quinn. Each has 1:10 as the departure time of Lifeboat 1, and the former has 1:15 and the later 1:20 for the launch of Lifeboat 14. These times, which are virtually the same as our own, are flatly contradictory to the assertion the Collapsible C departed at 2 AM. By the same token, they are generally consistent with a departure time of 1:40" (italics in original)
What is Gleicher trying to say in this long and convoluted explanation? Is he trying to say that WBF (and also author Paul Quinn) do *not* believe that Lowe went to #14 after lowering #1? Obviously we do agree with Lowe's testimony, and our published timelines say so. Or is Gleicher trying to mix up events in his timeline with the WBF timeline? At no point in his testimony does Boxhall *claim* 20 minutes between the launch of #1 and Collapsible C. Boxhall says (in text quoted by Gleicher on page 135) that "the starboard emergency boat had gone some time, and they had been working on the collapsible boats when I went". On page 136, Gleicher reemphasizes Boxhall's testimony that "Lifeboat 1 left the ship shortly before Collapsible C to be prepared" (italics ours). Later in the book, however, Gleicher turns Boxhall's "shortly" into 20 minutes. Twenty minutes is Gleicher's own estimate of this time - not Boxhall's. Boxhall's only claim is that they were getting Collapsible C ready when he was ordered to #2, and that it was still sitting on the deck at the time. And if C was only getting ready, that could easily account for the twenty minutes that elapsed between the launch of #2 and C, and would provide even more evidence of #2 launching before C was ready to lower.
A departure time of 2:00 a.m. for Collapsible C has *nothing to do* with the departure time of #1. Our own departure time of 1:05 for #1 is dependent on #1 having been launched before #9 as the evidence shows (since we accept the direct testimony of crew members that Murdoch was at both lifeboats), and before Lowe left the ship in #14, since we know he went from #1 to #14.
The comment regarding an "unaccounted for gap between 1:20 to 2:00 a.m." between Wilde's arrival at the forward end and his launching of Collapsible C" is simply wrong. Gleicher's timeline has #14 leaving at 1:20 a.m., while the WBF's time for the same event was 1:15 at the time of his book's publication. Our timeline at that point showed Wilde at #14 at 1:15, and #2 at 1:45, before he crossed over and helped at C at 2:00 a.m. A half hour gap between #14 and #2 to be sure, but it must be stated that there is not a large amount of testimony pinpointing Wilde's movements that night, which leaves large gaps where it is not known where he was. For example, there is no record of where Wilde went after helping with Collapsible D at 2:05 a.m. Since Wilde died in the sinking, we only have the testimonies of survivors who happened to see him that night. He was likely engaged elsewhere, but not seen. For example, Sixth Officer Moody was seen working at Collapsible A by Hemming, but if Hemming had not survived, we would have no record of where Moody went after helping at #13 and #15.
What is interesting is that Gleicher criticizes the WBF's conclusions based on the time where Wilde's whereabouts are not known, but he has no qualms with the fact that his own sequence leaves Murdoch's whereabouts unknown between the lowering of #13 and #15 at his time of 1:25 a.m., and the attempted launch of Collapsible A at what he lists as 2:20 a.m. Gleicher discounts Murdoch having worked at Collapsible C, which leaves a 50 minute gap in his scenario, far greater than the one he criticizes WBF for, regarding Wilde's movements. (Our revised 2009 timeline has shifted the launch time of #14 to 1:25 a.m. based on specific new eyewitness information, which reduces this "Wilde gap" to only 20 minutes - 1:25 to 1:45 a.m.)