Lifeboat 16
On pages 174 thru 176, a large portion of Seaman Scarrott's testimony is quoted. We read "I was taking women in when Mr. Lowe came up. There was another officer [Master-at-Arms Bailey] with him on the boat deck, but I do not know which one that was". Scarrott was talking about loading women into boat #14. Why does Gleicher *assume* that it was Bailey? Technically, Bailey was a member of the Deck Department, but was not an officer, and we do know Bailey left in #16. Per Lowe's testimony of coming to the aft port boats, we know Sixth Officer Moody was there too and that he is a far more likely candidate for being this officer. In fact, according to Able Bodied Seaman Ernest Archer's testimony in the American Inquiry, Bailey was ordered into #16, presumably by an officer on deck. We know from Lowe's testimony that Moody was in charge of the final stages of loading #16.
On page 146 and again on 181, Gleicher mentions Lowe and Bailey at these aft port boats. Is this an attempt to downplay Moody's presence during the loading and lowering of 14 and 16? We really don't know.
Collapsible C
Gleicher agrees with the 1912 British Inquiry that Collapsible C left the Titanic at 1:40 a.m., *before* boat #2 left at 1:45. What evidence does he use to try and prove this?
In reviewing the testimony of Quartermaster Bright on pages 148 to 152, Gleicher makes a number of questionable assumptions as to what the testimony means.
Bright first says after they finished firing the distress rockets, there were only two lifeboats left. He went and assisted getting the starboard collapsible (C) into position. He then went to the port side, where he got the port collapsible (D) out, describing this lifeboat as "identically the same as the other one". He also stated that Lightoller was at this port boat, and that it was the last to leave the ship. He estimated that Collapsible D left a half hour before the Titanic sank. Bright does say that Collapsible C was launched before the other collapsible, and he supposes that C left 20 minutes before his lifeboat, Collapsible D. However, he clearly indicates that he did not see C leave the deck40, so obviously Bright was guessing when he estimated that time gap.
Gleicher tells us that Bright could not have been referring to D, but actually was talking about boat #2, which Boxhall left in. Does the above description match #2 - at all? Boat #2 was *not* a collapsible. Lightoller had *nothing* to do with #2, per Lightoller and Boxhall's testimony. Boat #2 did leave the ship about 35 minutes before the sinking, but that is the *only* similarity.
But if "After we had finished firing the distress signals there were only two lifeboats left" as Bright said, which two were they? Obviously, one was C. But given Gleicher's logic of Bright going to prepare #2, then there were actually three - C, #2 and D. And since #2 and D used the same davits, Bright would be hard pressed to *not* see D sitting on the deck.
It is obvious that Bright *did* correctly refer to Collapsible D. Gleicher's claim that it was boat #2 disregards so many of the details in Bright's testimony, that it is simply not believable. But once Gleicher has "corrected" Bright's testimony to mean #2, he uses that as "proof" that #2 and C were loaded at the same times.
What reason does Gleicher have for discounting all of Bright's points about being at Collapsible D? There are no witnesses that disagree with Bright's statements, only Gleicher. We have to assume he is changing the evidence so that it now *appears* to say #2 and Collapsible C were loaded and launched at the same time, and that C left the ship shortly before #2.
On pages 135 and 136, Gleicher quotes Boxhall's statement regarding Collapsible C and leaving the ship in #2. Boxhall testified41:
I know the starboard emergency boat had gone some time, and that they were working on the collapsible boats when I went, because I fired the distress signals from the socket in the rail just close to the bows of the emergency boat on the starboard side. Every time I fired a signal I had to clear everybody away from the vicinity of this socket, and then I remember the last one or two distress signals I sent off the boat had gone, and they were then working on the collapsible boat which was on the deck.
Gleicher then states "This is consistent with the twenty minutes it would have taken to prepare, load and launch Collapsible C at 1:40. It implies there was a twenty or thirty minute interval between the departures of Lifeboat 1 and Collapsible C". As even a casual reader can see above, Boxhall's statement implies *nothing* about the times between these boats. What we do read is that Boxhall fired several rockets after #1 left, which could be as few as five to ten minutes, or even more than half an hour.
But focusing just on Collapsible C and #2, Boxhall says that the other crew were "working on the collapsible boats" when he left the ship. Which collapsibles was he talking about here? Obviously not Collapsibles A and B, which were still on the roof of the Officer's Quarters. Collapsible D was still on the deck, waiting to be attached to the falls, as #2 was in the falls, ready to lower when Boxhall got there. Boxhall specified that Collapsible C was also still on the deck, being "worked on" when he was called away to leave in #2. Note that Boxhall said C was still on the deck, and did *not* say it was being loaded. So Collapsible C was still early in the sequence of actions needed prior to filling the boat with people, probably only having the sides raised, and being attached to the falls.
We know #2 was lowered right after Boxhall got to it. Boxhall was very clear on that point, as he said "I was sending the rockets up right to the very last minute when I was sent away in the boat"42, and "The order was given to lower away when I was told to go in it and the boat was full; they had started the tackles when I got in"43. If C was only in the early stages of being prepared, or "worked on" as Boxhall relates, and Boxhall left in #2 a minute or two later, there is no way Collapsible C was lowered to the ocean before #2, and also no way that #2 and C were being loaded with passengers at the same time.
Further confirmation that Collapsible C left after #2 comes from First Class passenger William Carter. Carter loaded his family into #4 before leaving the ship in Collapsible C. This is confirmed both by Carter's own accounts, and the accounts of his wife immediately following the sinking44. The eyewitness testimony indicates #4 left after #2, a point on which Gleicher agrees with the present authors. However, Gleicher has Collapsible C leaving at 1:40 a.m., with # 2 leaving at 1:45, and #4 leaving at 1:50, both after C, clearly impossible if Carter loaded his family into #4, before leaving in the collapsible. Gleicher does not acknowledge or take this evidence into account in his book or subsequent discussions.
Gleicher also does not take into account the testimony of Lamptrimmer Hemming. At the American Inquiry, Hemming states45:
Mr. HEMMING. After I had finished with the lamps, sir, when I made my last journey they were turning out the port collapsible boat. I went and assisted Mr. Lightoller to get it out.
After the boat was out I went on top of the officer's house and helped to clear away the port collapsible boat on that house. After that I went over to the starboard side. The starboard collapsible boat had just been lowered.
Senator SMITH. Do you mean lowered or pushed off?
Mr. HEMMING. Lowered. She was away from the ship.
Hemming is saying he helped lower D to the water (a short drop of about 10 feet), then went up to the roof of the Officer's Quarters and worked at freeing Collapsible B from the roof. After that, we went to starboard side where he saw that Collapsible C had been launched just shortly before, though how "shortly" is not known. However, Hemming's testimony seems inconsistent with a twenty-five minute timeframe between Collapsible C and D such as Gleicher suggests in his timeline.
Gleicher tries very hard to discount any testimony of Murdoch being at Collapsible C. He states on page 146 that "Wilde was the officer in charge of loading and launching Collapsible C". Gleicher ignores the statement of Pantryman Pearcey, who was very clear that he was ordered into C by "The Chief, Murdoch"46. This is consistent with Gleicher's philosophy that any mention of the "Chief Officer" must refer to Wilde.
First Class passenger Hugh Woolner also places Murdoch at Collapsible C, and correctly identifies him as the First Officer47. On page 196 of Gleicher's book, though, we read "Woolner mistook First Officer Murdoch for Chief Officer Wilde". Gleicher does not even consider that both Wilde and Murdoch could have worked on Collapsible C at various times. Gleicher's claim that Woolner mistook *both* the rank and the name of the officer seems very unlikely. It must also be pointed out that Murdoch was the only Scottish officer on the Titanic, and as an Englishman, Woolner would have been easily able to identify a Scottish accent. Woolner states that he saw Murdoch, and recognized his voice, which would have been distinctive amongst the officers.
In an attempt to discredit Woolner as a reliable witness, Gleicher questions many other parts of his account. Regarding Woolner's claim of warning shots being fired in the air at Collapsible C, Gleicher suggests that Woolner mistook the shots for the flashes and sounds of Boxhall sending off distress rockets, and that the officer yelling "get out of this, clear out of this", was actually the Fourth Officer chasing passengers away from the vicinity prior to firing a rocket. As mentioned above, Boxhall had already left the ship by this point, so Woolner could not have been mistaking him for Murdoch, or mistaking the sounds of any rockets he sent up as gunfire at this boat. Gleicher even says "Boxhall testified to firing the last two rockets 'from the socket in the rail just close to the bows of the emergency boat on the starboard side' [Collapsible C]." The insert by Gleicher of "[Collapsible C]" is completely wrong. The "emergency boat" was #1, not Collapsible C.
Gleicher makes another unsuccessful attempt to discredit Woolner on page 199 by speculating that Woolner confused #2 for Collapsible D. This is extremely unlikely, as in both his testimony and in a private letter written on board the Carpathia, Woolner specifically says that the lifeboat Bjornstrom-Steffansson and he helped load on the port side was a collapsible boat.
On page 199, Gleicher states that Woolner's claim of C and D being loaded simultaneously is the only direct testimony of this happening. Gleicher conveniently forgets Bright's claims (see above) of crossing from one collapsible to the other, which he quoted back on page 150 but discounted by suggesting that Bright didn't really mean what he said.
Lightoller claims to have looked down from the roof of the Officer's Quarters, immediately after crossing over from freeing Collapsible B to see if any help was needed there. Lightoller claims that he saw Murdoch and other crewmembers attempting to attach Collapsible A to the falls previously occupied by Collapsible C. If Murdoch was at Collapsible A, then he very likely was at Collapsible C too, otherwise where would he have been prior to this point? Gleicher does not account for Murdoch's movements at all after he was sighted at #13 and #15 at Gleicher's suggested launch time of 1:25 a.m. for those boats. This leaves the reader wondering where he thinks Murdoch was between 1:25 a.m. and 2:20 a.m. which he lists for Collapsible A on his chart, particularly since he discounts Murdoch having worked at either #10 or Collapsible C during that time interim, or at all.
Why does Gleicher want to discount the claims of both Woolner and Pearcey that Murdoch was at Collapsible C? Because according to Gleicher's timeline, shortly before Collapsible C left the ship, his scenario has Murdoch working aft at #13 and #15, and he therefore cannot have Murdoch working in two places at the same time. This is another case of the conclusion driving the evidence. Gleicher doesn't consider the possibility that Woolner and Pearcey were both correct, and that both Wilde and Murdoch had worked at this boat at various times, which would be another proof that C didn't leave as early as 1:40 a.m.
Gleicher depends very heavily on Quartermaster Rowe's statement that "It was 1:25 when I left the bridge to get into the boat", to show that Collapsible C left the ship at 1:40 a.m.48. What Gleicher does not mention at all is a few lines farther down the same page of testimony- that Rowe said the Titanic sank 20 minutes after C left the ship. Or Ismay's estimate of 10 minutes for the same time frame, or William Carter's statements that C left less than half an hour before the ship sank.
Rowe testified that when Collapsible C left the ship, the well deck was "awash", and that it took 5 minutes for them to lower it due to the port list causing it to catch on the rivets. He stated that by the time C reached the water, the Well Deck was submerged49. The difference in wording between the Well Deck being "awash" when C began lowering, and the Well Deck being "submerged" after it reached the water is a significant one, when his account is correlated with that of Quartermaster Bright. Bright claimed that when Collapsible D began lowering, the forecastle head was just going under water50. For the Well Deck to be submerged, not just awash, the forecastle head would have to be under water. This means that by the time Collapsible C reached the water, which took a at least 5 minutes, the forecastle head must have gone under. Bright testified this was happening as Collapsible D began lowering. This indicates that Collapsible C left around 5 minutes at most ahead of Collapsible D, rather than the 20 minute period of time postulated in the British Inquiry. Gleicher has never acknowledged this evidence, or taken it into account, in his book, or elsewhere.
Another point that needs to be made is that if Collapsible C was truly launched at 1:40, as Gleicher claims, why wasn't Collapsible A subsequently launched successfully in the forty minutes that elapsed between 1:40 and 2:20, when the Titanic sank?
Gleicher relies heavily on Hackett & Bedford's 1996 study, and uses it to support his conclusions. H&B simulated the flooding of the ship by utilizing the lifeboat launch sequence formulated by the Commission Report of the British Inquiry (and assuming it was accurate), rather than using the actual eyewitness testimony and statements to establish an accurate timeline for when the lifeboats left, and what the flooding conditions were at specific times during the sinking. They freely admit this. The H&B report had the fore Well Deck flooded at 2 hours after the collision, or 1:40 a.m. They label this H&B condition C5. How did the report come to that conclusion? Simple. They assigned Collapsible C with a launch time of 1:40 (based entirely on the time for this boat offered up by the British Inquiry) and note that Rowe said the well deck was awash when this boat lowered. Therefore, their conclusions on the flooding study are based on the assumption that the 1:40 a.m. time is correct, not on an independent examination of when this boat was lowered, or when events happened. H&B condition C6 was based on Lightoller saying the sea was coming onto A deck, which they ASSUMED happened 10 minutes before the ship went down. C5 and C6 are the two pictures reproduced in Gleicher's book on p.205. This study, while interesting, really does not constitute evidence, and cannot be used to support Gleicher's conclusions.